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Ukraine war - part 16. Russia's Order of battle and deployment.

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In this post we cover:  1. Russia's order of battle.  2. Where their units are deployed.  3. What this deployment suggests for future operations. 4. The changing battlefield.  In my last post, I had discussed Ukrainian and Russian casualties. Ukraine war part 15 Since then, President Putin in his annual keynote speech and Q&A session at the Valdai economic summit, validated a key assumption I have been making – that the Ukrainian casualties reported by the Russian ministry of defence, are sanitary losses (all killed and wounded, including lightly wounded), of which half are irrecoverable losses. He also confirmed another key assumption I have been making, namely that irrecoverable losses are more than fresh recruits for Ukraine.   I have been getting feedback, that my posts seem to pro Russia and do not indicate problems with  their army. I therefore want to provide a more realistic view of the strength of the Russian army, with  a note at the en...

Ukraine war: Part 15. The reality behind a peace deal

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 In my last blog post I had ended my analysis with this: Winning an attritonal war depends on the manpower reserves of each side (Russia is six times more and suffering fewer casualties) the ability to supply armaments - Russia is able to replace hardware losses. Ukraine cannot – even with NATO but not US support), and the will to fight.  My sense is that the Ukrainian army is sufficiently attritted for Russia to start a spring offensive once the ground hardens after the spring thaw. Once they take most of the four provinces (with territory captured in other areas exchanged in an eventual peace deal), Russia will dig into defensive positions, from where they will offer a ceasefire – which they are under a lot of pressure to do, under the threat of more US sanctions. Once on the defensive, Russian casualties and consumption of armaments will be lower than while they have been attacking. Ukraine’s losses will be correspondingly higher, which will facilitate a de-facto cea...