DeansMusings

 A fellow war analyst, `Big Serge’ has just come out with a more complete summary of operations so far this year, than my previous article, where I anticipated a big Russian spring offensive. I can do no better than reproduce his article, here. His maps are more reader friendly and conclusions mirror mine, albeit presented in a more systematic way with a greater focus on the more important sectors of the front. https://substack.com/home/post/p-159755536 I wanted to write this to share data that has validated the assumptions I have made throughout this conflict and share new data which explains the shape this conflict is taking. A word about my sources. I rely on data more than opinions. The Ukrainian/Western side tends to mention similar statistics – not surprising since most Ukrainian channels were funded by the same source (USAID) and western channels quote them. Even when their data is obviously wrong e.g. a reporting higher casualty figure than the entire combat strength of...

 In part 10 – prelude to a Russian winter offensive, I had described how a Russian winter offensive might unfold. The reality has been somewhat different, which necessitated this piece. https://rpdeans.blogspot.com/2024/11/ukraine-war-part-10-prelude-to-winter.html As I have covered earlier in this series, the turnaround in casualty ratios has started from the summer of 2024. NATO estimates of Russian capabilities were based on their performance in the first two months of the war (when Russia attempted a show of force to get Ukraine to negotiate, rather than a full-fledged invasion). Russian forces were outnumbered till Mid 2023 and there was no net change in territory controlled during 2023. The casualties and territory gained since 2023, can be summarized as follows:   Est Ukrainian irrecoverable losses /month * Est Russian irrecoverable losses/ month** Territory captured by Russia sq km (net) 2023 Avg 16313 ...

 I was prompted to write this after news of the first call between President’s Trump and Putin and a declaration at the NATO conference in Munich, where, in my opinion, the US leadership for the first time took a realistic view of the Ukraine war. It was most likely a view that has prevailed in some sections of the US and NATO national security establishment, but was suppressed in favour of the mainstream view that Ukraine, given enough weapons and support from NATO can win. Until the election of president Trump, most NATO countries had committed far too much to the Ukraine project and had burnt all bridges with Russia, for any alternate view to be considered. There is now a lot of talk about what shape a settlement of this conflict might take. A lot has been covered in the media. I’d like to talk about my proposed solution, looking at points not widely covered in the mainstream media. My plan takes into account the following: The battlefield reality : The mainstream media narr...