DeansMusings

I had earlier written about how `unknown gunmen’ were killing off leading figures among Pakistan’s terrorist groups and speculated that RAW was doing things that hitherto were associated only with agencies like Mossad. My reasons for believing that India had contracted out the killing of these high value targets, rather than them falling out with their handlers in Pakistan’s ISI, or inter-group rivalry were: - Several of those killed were among India’s most wanted, protected by the ISI. The loss in morale to the  group was costlier than any gain to the ISI from dispensing with that person. - People across terrorist groups were killed, so it was not as if the ISI was trying to cut one group down   to size. Nor to the groups have a history of inter group killings. - Some of those were low level operatives, but of particular importance to India. For e.g. the abductor     of Cdr. Kulbhshan Jadhav, the person responsible for beheading an Indian soldier etc (who was a...

 I decided to write this after seeing a flood of articles, videos and social media discussion on Operation Sindhoor. A lot of it either focussed on the wrong subject – possible Indian aircraft losses, or does not put the operation in context, or speculates on why we agreed to a ceasefire – with the underlying assumption that Pakistan, or at least its air force, could have been finished off if the conflict had continued. Operation Sindhoor has to be evaluated in terms of its context, what its objectives were, the extent to which they were achieved and what our alternatives were at each stage of the conflict.   Background : In 1991, at the time India started economic reform and Pakistan chose an Islamist path, Pakistan’s GDP was 27% of India’s. At the time of the Kargil war in 1999, it was 20.7% of India. In 2025, Pakistan’s economy is projected to be just 9% of India’s. At current rates of growth, in 2031, Pakistan’s GDP will be 7% of India’s. In other words, India will sta...

 A fellow war analyst, `Big Serge’ has just come out with a more complete summary of operations so far this year, than my previous article, where I anticipated a big Russian spring offensive. I can do no better than reproduce his article, here. His maps are more reader friendly and conclusions mirror mine, albeit presented in a more systematic way with a greater focus on the more important sectors of the front. https://substack.com/home/post/p-159755536 I wanted to write this to share data that has validated the assumptions I have made throughout this conflict and share new data which explains the shape this conflict is taking. A word about my sources. I rely on data more than opinions. The Ukrainian/Western side tends to mention similar statistics – not surprising since most Ukrainian channels were funded by the same source (USAID) and western channels quote them. Even when their data is obviously wrong e.g. a reporting higher casualty figure than the entire combat strength of...

 In part 10 – prelude to a Russian winter offensive, I had described how a Russian winter offensive might unfold. The reality has been somewhat different, which necessitated this piece. https://rpdeans.blogspot.com/2024/11/ukraine-war-part-10-prelude-to-winter.html As I have covered earlier in this series, the turnaround in casualty ratios has started from the summer of 2024. NATO estimates of Russian capabilities were based on their performance in the first two months of the war (when Russia attempted a show of force to get Ukraine to negotiate, rather than a full-fledged invasion). Russian forces were outnumbered till Mid 2023 and there was no net change in territory controlled during 2023. The casualties and territory gained since 2023, can be summarized as follows:   Est Ukrainian irrecoverable losses /month * Est Russian irrecoverable losses/ month** Territory captured by Russia sq km (net) 2023 Avg 16313 ...