DeansMusings

 In my last article, I opined that Russian losses in infantry have prevented a more rapid advance. Part 18 - the case against Russia The use of drones, which have increased exponentially, particularly by Ukraine, have made advances more difficult over time. I also said this:     Russia’s domestic economy is only being kept out of recession by a windfall from oil and gas exports due to the Iran war.   Ukraine’s strikes on Russian energy and other high value targets are beginning to hurt morale and cause economic damage (going by people’s comments on Russian channels). It has necessitated mobilization of reservists (and some volunteers) in anti-drone units. This force might include some of those who would normally be in the anti-aircraft regiment of existing divisions (which no longer have to face a threat from Ukrainian aircraft) but it means reduced manpower for divisions at the front.   The war has also gone on longer than the Great Patriotic war (194...

 In this series, a criticism I often get in the feedback I receive, is that I am confident about a Russian victory and believe they are performing better than Ukraine. My view, through this series, based on data from both sides was prescient : - While Russia did not have a plan B, after their initial advance in 2022 and the failure of the Istanbul       talks, Russia was also not going to collapse /run out of equipment /implode economically, in 2022 and   2023 – that assumption was NATO’s strategic error.   - The Ukrainian counter offensive failed and the Kursk incursion was   mistake. - Russian armaments production was outpacing losses and was able to equip new formations & - Russia was at peak strength in 2025 and its position relative to Ukraine would only improve, making it   necessary for Ukraine to seek a peace deal in 2025. Russia would achieve its territorial objectives by the end of 2026. Over time, data from both sides began ...

In this post we cover:  1. Russia's order of battle.  2. Where their units are deployed.  3. What this deployment suggests for future operations. 4. The changing battlefield.  In my last post, I had discussed Ukrainian and Russian casualties. Ukraine war part 15 Since then, President Putin in his annual keynote speech and Q&A session at the Valdai economic summit, validated a key assumption I have been making – that the Ukrainian casualties reported by the Russian ministry of defence, are sanitary losses (all killed and wounded, including lightly wounded), of which half are irrecoverable losses. He also confirmed another key assumption I have been making, namely that irrecoverable losses are more than fresh recruits for Ukraine.   I have been getting feedback, that my posts seem to pro Russia and do not indicate problems with  their army. I therefore want to provide a more realistic view of the strength of the Russian army, with  a note at the en...