DeansMusings

 At the time of writing this, the Iran war has resumed for 14 days and it is a good opportunity to review my previous assumptions made about the war and on India’s oil security. 14 days of consecutive fighting (not brief fighting during a ceasefire) is enough time for the conflict to take on a shape that one can draw conclusions from. This is a continuation from the two previous articles in this series, focussing more on the economic consequences of the war an how they might shape military operations. https://rpdeans.blogspot.com/2026/05/iran-war-part-2-calm-before-storm.html India's coming oil crisis I had made the following predictions: 1.        Iranian oil wells (production) will not irrecoverably collapse from ending exports, because most oil produced is consumed domestically (thereby oil wells will produce more than their minimum viable output). This was correct. 2.        Iran would not feel the loss of oil revenue ...

My previous post on the Iran war, detailed how the closure of the Strait of  Hormuz would affect energy sales and impact the economies in the region. https://rpdeans.blogspot.com/2026/05/iran-war-part-2-calm-before-storm.html This crisis would come from the closure of the strait of Hormuz, affecting 20% of the world’s oil and from the longer term damage to oil fields, when the amount of oil pumped is lower than the minimum flow needed to keep an oil well functioning (production is cut where there is no capacity to store extracted oil). I had taken only a passing interest in India, as I was covering the military aspects of this conflict and because the Govt and media seemed upbeat about India handling the energy shortage. A more detailed look at the numbers for India gave me cause for concern.   As a major oil importer, India will be affected more than others because we have done the least, so far, to mitigate against this. While this is not a crisis of the Govt's making...

 In this series, a criticism I often get in the feedback I receive, is that I am confident about a Russian victory and believe they are performing better than Ukraine. My view, through this series, based on data from both sides was prescient : - While Russia did not have a plan B, after their initial advance in 2022 and the failure of the Istanbul       talks, Russia was also not going to collapse /run out of equipment /implode economically, in 2022 and   2023 – that assumption was NATO’s strategic error.   - The Ukrainian counter offensive failed and the Kursk incursion was   mistake. - Russian armaments production was outpacing losses and was able to equip new formations & - Russia was at peak strength in 2025 and its position relative to Ukraine would only improve, making it   necessary for Ukraine to seek a peace deal in 2025. Russia would achieve its territorial objectives by the end of 2026. Over time, data from both sides began ...