DeansMusings

 In my last article, I opined that Russian losses in infantry have prevented a more rapid advance. Part 18 - the case against Russia The use of drones, which have increased exponentially, particularly by Ukraine, have made advances more difficult over time. I also said this:     Russia’s domestic economy is only being kept out of recession by a windfall from oil and gas exports due to the Iran war.   Ukraine’s strikes on Russian energy and other high value targets are beginning to hurt morale and cause economic damage (going by people’s comments on Russian channels). It has necessitated mobilization of reservists (and some volunteers) in anti-drone units. This force might include some of those who would normally be in the anti-aircraft regiment of existing divisions (which no longer have to face a threat from Ukrainian aircraft) but it means reduced manpower for divisions at the front.   The war has also gone on longer than the Great Patriotic war (194...

 I am writing this part after a long gap, as there were more informative posts on subjects I wanted to cover, and because the overall direction of the war was in line with what I had mentioned earlier.  The war has also gone on longer than the Great Patriotic war, leading to some `blogger fatigue'. Last article (part 16) in this series: Ukraine war - part 16    My view is that 2026 will be the year that Russia achieves its territorial objectives in Ukraine and will be in a position to propose a peace deal that will not involve Ukraine giving up territory since they will not be in control of any territory Russia needs. In a previous blog piece in Feb 25, I had suggested that a peace deal could involve the war ending on the then front line, with an exchange of territory (Russian held territory outside four provinces claimed by Russia, in return for territory in the Donbass not yet occupied by it) that would lead to a final truce line. https://rpdeans.blogspot.com/...

In this post we cover:  1. Russia's order of battle.  2. Where their units are deployed.  3. What this deployment suggests for future operations. 4. The changing battlefield.  In my last post, I had discussed Ukrainian and Russian casualties. Ukraine war part 15 Since then, President Putin in his annual keynote speech and Q&A session at the Valdai economic summit, validated a key assumption I have been making – that the Ukrainian casualties reported by the Russian ministry of defence, are sanitary losses (all killed and wounded, including lightly wounded), of which half are irrecoverable losses. He also confirmed another key assumption I have been making, namely that irrecoverable losses are more than fresh recruits for Ukraine.   I have been getting feedback, that my posts seem to pro Russia and do not indicate problems with  their army. I therefore want to provide a more realistic view of the strength of the Russian army, with  a note at the en...