DeansMusings

 I am writing this part after a long gap, as there were more informative posts on subjects I wanted to cover, and because the overall direction of the war was in line with what I had mentioned earlier.  The war has also gone on longer than the Great Patriotic war, leading to some `blogger fatigue'. Last article (part 16) in this series: Ukraine war - part 16    My view is that 2026 will be the year that Russia achieves its territorial objectives in Ukraine and will be in a position to propose a peace deal that will not involve Ukraine giving up territory since they will not be in control of any territory Russia needs. In a previous blog piece in Feb 25, I had suggested that a peace deal could involve the war ending on the then front line, with an exchange of territory (Russian held territory outside four provinces claimed by Russia, in return for territory in the Donbass not yet occupied by it) that would lead to a final truce line. https://rpdeans.blogspot.com/...

 A fellow war analyst, `Big Serge’ has just come out with a more complete summary of operations so far this year, than my previous article, where I anticipated a big Russian spring offensive. I can do no better than reproduce his article, here. His maps are more reader friendly and conclusions mirror mine, albeit presented in a more systematic way with a greater focus on the more important sectors of the front. https://substack.com/home/post/p-159755536 I wanted to write this to share data that has validated the assumptions I have made throughout this conflict and share new data which explains the shape this conflict is taking. A word about my sources. I rely on data more than opinions. The Ukrainian/Western side tends to mention similar statistics – not surprising since most Ukrainian channels were funded by the same source (USAID) and western channels quote them. Even when their data is obviously wrong e.g. a reporting higher casualty figure than the entire combat strength of...

The last post in this series was back in Mar. Some of the observations made then have been  quote accurate, particularly the swing in loss ratios and Russia's plans for a summer offensive.  https://rpdeans.blogspot.com/2024/03/ukraine-war-part-7-after-2-years.html A note on casualty calculation: Both sides in this conflict have hitherto been silent on their own casualties, while inflating those of the other side, without validation. There is now more credible data which enables us to estimate casualties for both sides, using the following numbers: 1. Verifiable deaths. 2. Pro rata deaths based on (1) from regions not covered by (1). 3. Recent deaths not reported due to a time lag 4. Missing, believed killed 5. Deserted  (I have listed 50% of these under missing) 6. Prisoner To validate this, we know the starting sizes of both armies, the number recruited and the current strength, based on the number of formations present. The number of casualties can be derived...