DeansMusings

 In this series, a criticism I often get in the feedback I receive, is that I am confident about a Russian victory and believe they are performing better than Ukraine. My view, through this series, based on data from both sides was prescient : - While Russia did not have a plan B, after their initial advance in 2022 and the failure of the Istanbul       talks, Russia was also not going to collapse /run out of equipment /implode economically, in 2022 and   2023 – that assumption was NATO’s strategic error.   - The Ukrainian counter offensive failed and the Kursk incursion was   mistake. - Russian armaments production was outpacing losses and was able to equip new formations & - Russia was at peak strength in 2025 and its position relative to Ukraine would only improve, making it   necessary for Ukraine to seek a peace deal in 2025. Russia would achieve its territorial objectives by the end of 2026. Over time, data from both sides began ...

 I am writing this part after a long gap, as there were more informative posts on subjects I wanted to cover, and because the overall direction of the war was in line with what I had mentioned earlier.  The war has also gone on longer than the Great Patriotic war, leading to some `blogger fatigue'. Last article (part 16) in this series: Ukraine war - part 16    My view is that 2026 will be the year that Russia achieves its territorial objectives in Ukraine and will be in a position to propose a peace deal that will not involve Ukraine giving up territory since they will not be in control of any territory Russia needs. In a previous blog piece in Feb 25, I had suggested that a peace deal could involve the war ending on the then front line, with an exchange of territory (Russian held territory outside four provinces claimed by Russia, in return for territory in the Donbass not yet occupied by it) that would lead to a final truce line. https://rpdeans.blogspot.com/...

 In my last blog post I had ended my analysis with this: Winning an attritonal war depends on the manpower reserves of each side (Russia is six times more and suffering fewer casualties) the ability to supply armaments - Russia is able to replace hardware losses. Ukraine cannot – even with NATO but not US support), and the will to fight.  My sense is that the Ukrainian army is sufficiently attritted for Russia to start a spring offensive once the ground hardens after the spring thaw. Once they take most of the four provinces (with territory captured in other areas exchanged in an eventual peace deal), Russia will dig into defensive positions, from where they will offer a ceasefire – which they are under a lot of pressure to do, under the threat of more US sanctions. Once on the defensive, Russian casualties and consumption of armaments will be lower than while they have been attacking. Ukraine’s losses will be correspondingly higher, which will facilitate a de-facto cea...