DeansMusings

 In part 10 – prelude to a Russian winter offensive, I had described how a Russian winter offensive might unfold. The reality has been somewhat different, which necessitated this piece. https://rpdeans.blogspot.com/2024/11/ukraine-war-part-10-prelude-to-winter.html As I have covered earlier in this series, the turnaround in casualty ratios has started from the summer of 2024. NATO estimates of Russian capabilities were based on their performance in the first two months of the war (when Russia attempted a show of force to get Ukraine to negotiate, rather than a full-fledged invasion). Russian forces were outnumbered till Mid 2023 and there was no net change in territory controlled during 2023. The casualties and territory gained since 2023, can be summarized as follows:   Est Ukrainian irrecoverable losses /month * Est Russian irrecoverable losses/ month** Territory captured by Russia sq km (net) 2023 Avg 16313 ...

I'd like to start by  Reviewing assumptions on force levels & losses, to which I devoted an entire post, as it was at the heart of my assumptions on the war. https://rpdeans.blogspot.com/2024/09/ukraine-war-part-8-casualties-force.html In part 8 of this series I had estimated the manpower and loses of each side – and thereby the number of combat units they could field now and in the future. This was based on two approaches, which had several assumptions, though both converged on the same number. These were: 1. Units known to be in combat and their expected strength - with different data points giving similar numbers &  2. A theoretical calculation: Starting manpower + Recruitment – casualties = current manpower. I used the concept of irrecoverable casualties, which was dead + seriously wounded + missing + prisoner to estimate the number of people who would not be able to fight. Each of these numbers had assumptions, some less validated than others. There was subsequ...