DeansMusings

  When studying past wars, with the benefit of hindsight, there are often single political decisions that have influenced the course of the war, more than any battlefield decision. Decisions that were hailed as genius, could easily have had a different outcome, because there was no Plan B. Take for instance Hitler’s occupation of the Rhineland in 1936, which strengthened his position in Germany. If he had been stopped then – and France was easily in a position to do so, it might have been the end of Hitler’s regime. Similarly, Russia’s occupation of Crimea in 2014, was a bloodless coup, carried out by a small force, though a much larger Ukrainian force was present in Crimea. If they chose to resist, the invasion would have ended in a fiasco and in all probability, Putin might have been removed from power. It was a repeat of Crimea that I believe Putin was banking on when he started the special military operation. I think the speed extent of Western sanctions and the Ukrainian dete

  In Oct 2015, before the Coffee Day IPO, I wrote a piece in LinkedIn on why I did not think CCD was a good investment or even profitable, due to fundamental problems the industry faces in India. https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/coffee-day-ipo-worries-indian-qsrs-rahul-deans/?trackingId=3xvqbpePQkyIHi4UtWXbxw%3D%3D I faced some flak for that, from veterans in the industry who argued that India’s rising income meant coffee chains like CCD or Starbucks, who spent a decade understanding and building the market, would now become profitable. I passed up an opportunity to be CEO of one such coffee chain as my view of the industry was too pessimistic for the owners liking – It turned out I was quite right in my assessment. 8 years have passed. CCD continues to be unprofitable, as does Starbucks and everyone else. The point of this article is not to disparage any chain – having run a QSR chain myself, but to point out some problems inherent in the industry. Café coffee day (CCD) is 27 years

  Part 2 – Artillery   A link to part 1 of this series: https://rpdeans.blogspot.com/2023/07/ukraine-war-understanding-numbers-part.html Artillery, the God of war has accounted for more than half of all battle deaths since the beginning of the 20 th century. In the Ukraine war, the proportion is probably higher, given the relative absence of air power for both sides, clashes of large mechanized forces, or hand to hand combat. Half of all the Russian artillery (including rocket artillery) comprises the 152mm gun – both towed and self-propelled. This is a proxy for Russian artillery and the leading cause of Ukrainian deaths. Understanding Russian capacity for shell production and other constraints gives insights into Russia’s ability to sustain this war. Russia was believed to have started the war with between 1.3 and 1.5 million tonnes of artillery ammunition. This is also the Russian army’s normal stock levels. Approx. half this tonnage was for the 152mm shell. Assuming 700,000

  Part 1 – Manpower & casualties My interest in the Ukraine war arises from an academic interest in Military history and Geopolitics and the fact that I lived in Russia and have long been interested in that part of the world. My work enabled me to visit more of Russia (and Ukraine) than most Russians and make both Russian and Ukrainian friends – who worked together freely in our Moscow office. I would like to start with where I stand on the conflict. I believe the Russian invasion was wrong, both morally and under International law. I think Putin was provoked into this action and he got provoked, believing that this would be no different from the bloodless `police action’ that secured Crimea in 2014. Russia badly miscalculated the extent of Ukrainian resolve and preparation and the Western willingness to impose crippling sanctions. Ukraine and NATO in turn made the equally wrong assumptions that sanctions would cripple the Russian economy and coupled with losses on the battle

  This first appeared as part of my paper on Pakistan, summary in Swarajya in 2016 Pakistan will soon be one of the most water stressed nations in the world - due to high population growth and inadequate water management. Current per capita availability at 1000 Cu meters, makes Pakistan highly water stressed and at the same level as Ethiopia. Even the rumour that India might review the Indus water treaty, or the incorrect and misguided view that India is `stealing Pakistan’s water’, causes anxiety among all sections of Pakistani society. Pakistan’s water vulnerability is not being exploited by India. It does not require India to abrogate the Indus Water treaty (IWT), but needs to mostly do what is allowed under the IWT and in our national interest. What is also overlooked is exploitation of Afghan river water by Pakistan. The following steps by India can greatly exacerbate Pakistan’s water crisis and we believe that long before they do, India can use the resulting anxiety in Pakistan t

  China’s goal is to be the world’s pre-eminent power, replacing the US. To that end China’s GDP – in purchasing power parity terms, is set to overtake the US in 2021. China’s goal which was earlier implied and understated, been formally stated and more aggressively acted upon by Premier Xi. A key weapon in China’s Geo political strategy is the use of its economic power. This is done to do get concessions through economic coercion, undermine a country’s economy (making it more influenced by China’s policies), or affect defence spending of a rival though a small effort of its own. For e.g. a relatively small amount of aid & weapons to North Korea (or Pakistan) is enough for those countries to threaten their neighbours and force them into a higher military spend that might otherwise be spent elsewhere. China’s border policy towards India, is in my view, part of this strategy wherein small but regular intrusions across the LAC, remind us of the ghosts of 1962 and force us to deploy

First published for the Indian military review, before the Doklam & Galwan crisis, it has become more relevant with the current standoff in Ladakh.  Memories of 1962 still affect the ability of our Political and military establishment, to assess the military threat from China. Politically, we have been extremely circumspect when dealing with incursions of the PLA across the LAC. Articles in our defence journals and those written by defence experts, make repeated references to the excellent Chinese transport & airfield network across LAC and its ability to throw upwards of 30 divisions against our forces, tasked with defending the LAC. This is contrasted with the poor infrastructure development on our side and shortfalls in the men and material required to deal with this threat. As an armchair enthusiast and former company CEO who has dealt with competition mapping in the civilian world, I decided to examine this premise, using open source information and Google earth, to lite