DeansMusings

 At the time of writing this, the Iran war has resumed for 14 days and it is a good opportunity to review my previous assumptions made about the war and on India’s oil security. 14 days of consecutive fighting (not brief fighting during a ceasefire) is enough time for the conflict to take on a shape that one can draw conclusions from. This is a continuation from the two previous articles in this series, focussing more on the economic consequences of the war an how they might shape military operations. https://rpdeans.blogspot.com/2026/05/iran-war-part-2-calm-before-storm.html India's coming oil crisis I had made the following predictions: 1.        Iranian oil wells (production) will not irrecoverably collapse from ending exports, because most oil produced is consumed domestically (thereby oil wells will produce more than their minimum viable output). This was correct. 2.        Iran would not feel the loss of oil revenue ...

I have worked in Iran and done business with Israel. I know people in both countries and won't take sides, or discuss the politics of the conflict. I think this war should not have started if the leadership of each country worked in their country's interest. The irrationality around some of the decision making makes this conflict scary, while being of interest to a dispassionate observer like me.  A lot has been written on the ongoing war, examining subjects from military operations, oil supplies and political analysis – with analysts of all ideological biases weighing in. However, I don’t think enough has been written about the timelines and compulsions for each side - which in my view will determine how this conflict will be fought and end. This article looks at disparate factors that will influence the conflict. Weapon stocks : There are three variables, all of which point to the current war – waged by missiles and drones from long range lasting for no more than a month. ...

The ceasefire with Hezbollah : In my previous posts I have said that (unlike 2006) Hezbollah cannot simply stay at the Israel border while threatening Israel with rockets. From 1 Oct 24, after a year, the Israeli army began operations inside Lebanon, though the bulk of the Israel army was operating against Gaza, leaving only a small force on the Lebanon border, Hezbollah was still taking unsustainable losses – the loss ratio was 26:1 compared to 6:1 in 2006. At the same time Hezbollah’s rocket attacks inflicted less damage in a year than they did in one month in 2006. While many Israeli residents of border settlements had to leave with a resulting strain on the economy, the loss to Lebanon’s economy from a similar displacement was higher. Understanding that Hezbollah could not just remain dug in to positions in south Lebanon is important in understanding why a ceasefire was agreed to. The other point I made was that Israel’s objective was to push Hezbollah out of south Lebanon, t...