DeansMusings

I decided to write on the book controversary after actually reading the manuscript of the book, which is yet to be published and because I thought the row in Parliament and on social media lacked an understanding of the facts, or the background in which a sentence in a 400 page book was taken out of context. While I believe there was nothing wrong in how this particular incident was handled (and the outcome was in our favour) it was to me, as someone exposed to corporate decision making, and as an amateur enthusiast in military history, a case study on the interaction between the political and military leadership in a conflict. The controversary. A paragraph in the book suggested that when Chinese tanks approached an Indian position on 31st August 2020, Gen. Naravane repeatedly asked the political leadership for instructions, to be told a couple of hours later - `Jo uchit samjo vo karo’ (do what you think is right). General Naravane stated that he had been handed a hot potato and t...

In this post we cover:  1. Russia's order of battle.  2. Where their units are deployed.  3. What this deployment suggests for future operations. 4. The changing battlefield.  In my last post, I had discussed Ukrainian and Russian casualties. Ukraine war part 15 Since then, President Putin in his annual keynote speech and Q&A session at the Valdai economic summit, validated a key assumption I have been making – that the Ukrainian casualties reported by the Russian ministry of defence, are sanitary losses (all killed and wounded, including lightly wounded), of which half are irrecoverable losses. He also confirmed another key assumption I have been making, namely that irrecoverable losses are more than fresh recruits for Ukraine.   I have been getting feedback, that my posts seem to pro Russia and do not indicate problems with  their army. I therefore want to provide a more realistic view of the strength of the Russian army, with  a note at the en...

 In my last blog post I had ended my analysis with this: Winning an attritonal war depends on the manpower reserves of each side (Russia is six times more and suffering fewer casualties) the ability to supply armaments - Russia is able to replace hardware losses. Ukraine cannot – even with NATO but not US support), and the will to fight.  My sense is that the Ukrainian army is sufficiently attritted for Russia to start a spring offensive once the ground hardens after the spring thaw. Once they take most of the four provinces (with territory captured in other areas exchanged in an eventual peace deal), Russia will dig into defensive positions, from where they will offer a ceasefire – which they are under a lot of pressure to do, under the threat of more US sanctions. Once on the defensive, Russian casualties and consumption of armaments will be lower than while they have been attacking. Ukraine’s losses will be correspondingly higher, which will facilitate a de-facto cea...