DeansMusings

 In this series, a criticism I often get in the feedback I receive, is that I am confident about a Russian victory and believe they are performing better than Ukraine. My view, through this series, based on data from both sides was prescient : - While Russia did not have a plan B, after their initial advance in 2022 and the failure of the Istanbul       talks, Russia was also not going to collapse /run out of equipment /implode economically, in 2022 and   2023 – that assumption was NATO’s strategic error.   - The Ukrainian counter offensive failed and the Kursk incursion was   mistake. - Russian armaments production was outpacing losses and was able to equip new formations & - Russia was at peak strength in 2025 and its position relative to Ukraine would only improve, making it   necessary for Ukraine to seek a peace deal in 2025. Russia would achieve its territorial objectives by the end of 2026. Over time, data from both sides began ...

I have worked in Iran and done business with Israel. I know people in both countries and won't take sides, or discuss the politics of the conflict. I think this war should not have started if the leadership of each country worked in their country's interest. The irrationality around some of the decision making makes this conflict scary, while being of interest to a dispassionate observer like me.  A lot has been written on the ongoing war, examining subjects from military operations, oil supplies and political analysis – with analysts of all ideological biases weighing in. However, I don’t think enough has been written about the timelines and compulsions for each side - which in my view will determine how this conflict will be fought and end. This article looks at disparate factors that will influence the conflict. Weapon stocks : There are three variables, all of which point to the current war – waged by missiles and drones from long range lasting for no more than a month. ...