Operation Sindhoor 2.0. FAQ'S and lessons from Operation Rising lion
Six weeks
after operation Sindhoor, the narrative in India, is still about how many
aircraft India lost, ignoring weather or not the primary and secondary objectives
of Operation Sindhoor were met, or how many aircraft Pak may have lost.
I have
covered this in some detail in my earlier post on Operation Sindhoor.
https://rpdeans.blogspot.com/2025/05/operation-sindhoor-what-we-dont-realise.html
Suffice
to say that what matters in a battle is weather the objectives were met. A
secondary consideration, is the cost – both human and material, in achieving
that objective.
Our objective was the destruction of 9 terrorist facilities. That was done, with
a heavy loss of life among the terrorists and supporters, with no human loss on
our side. Pakistan’s objective, which was to either deter us from attacking, or,
if India did attack, either clear people from the targets and/or defend against
the aircraft and missiles sent against them. That failed.
Although, as
I explained, comparing aircraft losses is less relevant than achieving
objectives – which India did and Pakistan, correspondingly did not, India’s
possible aircraft losses, in a worse case scenario
were no higher than Pakistan’s in its best-case (4) scenario. Operation
Sindhoor seems to have acted as a catalyst to boost India’s aircraft procurement,
which it can do when India’s capex for defence is 10 times Pakistan’s. Pakistan
can only try to compete on aircraft numbers at the cost of hurting its already
weak economy.
This is a
theory floated by many analysts including in the military who are however,
unaware of how SEAD or DEAD - suppression (or destruction) of enemy air defences, actually
works.
The moment you initiate SEAD, it is considered an act of war and more importantly tells the enemy your air force is about to attack. If hypothetically Pakistan did SEAD before a formal declaration of war, it might involve jamming the communications of a passenger aircraft about to land, which might result in a crash.
There are counter measures for any SEAD we attempt. After three years of the
Ukraine war, Russia has been unable to supress Ukrainian air defences and
attacks only with glide bombs, out of the range of most Ukrainian surface to
air missiles.
Although we did conduct SEAD on the 8th and 9th of May, including the destruction of Pakistani radar, Pak air defences were not degraded enough for us to risk sending any aircraft into Pakistan. What we managed was getting our missiles and drones to hit stationary targets across multiple air bases in Pakistan. The number of drones and missiles that were intercepted might have been higher, without conducting SEAD, but that was it. A couple of Pakistani airbases had runways cratered, which would mean they are unable to conduct operations for a limited time.
Pakistan
also attempted SEAD without success, since almost all their drones and single
ballistic missile fired at us, were intercepted and none of their aircraft
crossed Indian airspace.
The Israeli air force which has used the most sophisticated SEAD means in
modern warfare, against an Iranian air defence that had no air force and only a
fraction of the surface to air missile capability of Pakistan, was also able to
claim air superiority over only a part of Iran, with air strikes being carried
out either by long range missiles, or by the F-35 stealth aircraft.
The larger point is that SEAD is not a silver bullet that results in your
aircraft being able to fly into enemy territory without a significant risk.
Could we
have used longer ranged missiles to hit targets on 7th May – firing
from a `safe’ distance. A Scalp
missile fired from a distance of 150km, travelling at Mach 0.8 will take almost
10 minutes. That is enough time for an air defence – particularly backed by
Chinese resources, to identify the likely target, empty it and engage the incoming missile. The terrorist camps and HQs that were
hit could have been emptied with two minutes warning and the result would have
been `hitting some trees’ as Pakistan had claimed after the 2019 Balakot
strike.
In the Ukraine war, Russia intercepts (either by shooting down or
jamming) upto 80% of storm shadow or Scalp missiles fired, as Ukraine launches
at extreme range, unwilling to risk their aircraft. I analysed the efficiency
of these missile strikes on Russia in a previous article:
https://rpdeans.blogspot.com/2024/11/ukraine-war-part-11-missile-war.html
A land based Brahmos missile, travelling at an average speed of over Mach 2, might have been a better option and was probably used to hit targets in Punjab on the 7th. However, a land based Brahmos launcher would have to be at least 100 km behind the Indian border, to avoid being detected and hit after it has launched. This again gives warning time to Pak. An air launched Brahmos could have been used – as it probably was on 10th May, but the single the SU-30 squadron, based in South India, equipped with the Brahmos would have been under constant surveillance by Chinese satellites. The mere take-off of these aircraft would have been detected and Pakistan would have been tipped off about our operation of 7th May. On the 10th, it was expected they would be used, as the air & missile war had escalated by then.
Launching from a reduced distance, gives the enemy less time to react and increases the chances of killing terrorists – who by virtue of what they do, are trained to clear an area at a moment’s notice. It also increases the probability of losing aircraft, since they come into range of enemy air defences, but that is the trade-off the IAF accepted in order to ensure the mission was achieved. The air force could have reduced the risk of losing anything by doing a `PR’ strike, saying it hit camps without a high probability of killing those in it. War is about making such cold-blooded calculations.
In the case of the Israeli and later US strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities, there was, at the time of writing, no certainty that Iran’s nuclear installations, particularly at the Fordow uranium enrichment plant, were destroyed. That may have been ensured by dropping paratroopers/ special forces there, but the expected losses would have ruled out this option.
Evaluating drone and missile strikes: At the time of writing (22 June), Iran had launched about 500 ballistic missiles and 300 drones at Israel. 68 missiles hit Israel and only one drone was not intercepted. Israel’s integrated air defence was perhaps the most sophisticated in modern warfare. Three Israeli systems – the Arrow 2 & 3 for Ballistic missiles, David’s sling for shorter range missiles and Iron Dome for rockets and drones, were backed up by the US THAAD system (Terminal high altitude air defence) and offshore warships, while Jordan helped intercept drones crossing its airspace. 2 of the 7 THAAD systems in use, were deployed to Israel.
Drones launched by Pakistan, were aimed at targets less than 50km away,
reducing reaction time significantly. In this context, intercepting almost all
of the around 700 drones fired in a three-day period
with a reduced reaction time and a less sophisticated air defence relying to a
large extent on decades old systems, is remarkable.
This podcast features the Lt Gen. Ivan D'Cunha, the head of Army air defence, explaining the role of India's integrated air defence in operation Sindhoor.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uVS81eljVjY
India fired 19 Brahmos (supersonic) and 19 Scalp or equivalent subsonic missiles. Most of these hit their targets and did so accurately – as photographic evidence shows. Even Pakistani sources do not mention more than a couple of interceptions. In contrast 85% of Iranian ballistic missiles were intercepted by Israel. Considering that the only way Iran can hit Israel is through ballistic missiles the high interception rate – resulting in far fewer casualties than expected from simulations, was a failure of Iranian strategy, whereas the success of Indian missiles – both in getting past Pakistani defences and high accuracy, give India a strong option in a future war, along with the actions of the army, air force and navy.
Did we hit a Pakistani nuke storage site?
There is a lot of speculation about why a target in Pakistan's Kirana hills was hit, with the buzz on social media and some of the more dubious analysts saying it was storage facility for Pakistani nuclear weapons. The difficulty of hitting an actual nuclear weapon facility, was seen in Israel and US attempts to hit Iranian uranium enrichment facilities at Natanz and Fordow.
India and Pakistan declare their nuclear facilities to each other, to avoid an attack that might trigger a nuclear war. On the Pakistan side, they are probably closely monitored by the US too. All facilities that
generate atomic energy are declared to the IAEA. Kirana hills was neither. Since it was attacked by Brahmos missiles, the most likely explanation was that it was a storage facility for advanced weapons, or a command centre.
Can we do an Israel ?
There are basic differences between India and Israel's ability to carry out clandestine warfare, or
a strong military response to any terror attack. Israel enjoys immunity at the UN due to US veto.
If India had done a fraction of what Israel did in Gaz or Lebanon, we would have been branded war criminals and sanctioned. They also have funding from the US.
Israel has never taken on a nuclear power, or a near peer (not since 1973). In operations against Iran. Israel has mostly resorted to air launched munitions delivered from a safe distance.
Much has been made (and rightly so) of Israel's ability to have agents operate inside Iran. We too have `unknown gunmen' operate inside Pak - as I've written about in a previous blog:
Unknown gunmen in Pak
There is however a basic difference in our ability to act with impunity in another country and get away with it, as Israel apparently does. Pakistan can retaliate just as easily. If we use a drone to kill someone
inside Pak (which is an act of terrorism), Pak can, for e.g. have drones launched against passenger aircraft when taking off. If army men are assassinated, Pak can have `unknown gunmen' they have recruited, to target families of army personnel in cantonments. My sense is both countries have a tacit understanding with each other, not to escalate in this manner. In this context, the CDS in his Singapore interview was right when he said both sides controlled the level of escalation and we were far from a
nuclear exchange.
The calculations
behind the ceasefire:
India’s
objective, as in its strikes after the Uri and Pulwama terror attacks, was to
hit terror infrastructure – each strike being more painful for Pakistan than
the previous one. There was no intention of starting a conventional war. In a conventional war, our superiority in numbers and firepower
over Pakistan is barely 4 : 3 (given our need to station troops along the border with China). That is
insufficient to visible defeat Pakistan or take any significant territory in
POK. A `draw’ will be spun by Pakistan as a victory over a numerically superior
force. It would also come at a heavy cost.
Nor was
there any indication that if operations had continued for a couple of days
more, Pak losses would have been significantly higher relative to ours. We did
just enough to enable our missiles to hit stationary targets in Pakistani
airbases.
Although
Israel appears to have scored a significant victory over Iran – decapitating its
military leadership and senior nuclear scientists and conducting airstrikes for
a week almost unopposed, it had estimated civilian losses over 200 people in the
first week from Iranian missile strikes. It is the equivalent of India with 140 times the population, losing 28,000 civilians, a loss we are not
psychologically prepared to bear.
In
operations against Hamas and Hezbollah since 7th Oct 2023, Israel
lost 870 members of its armed forces killed in action. This is against militia
groups, lacking artillery, aircraft, tanks etc.
Some elite units like the Golani or Nahal brigades, or its 89 (commando) brigade,
lost over 20% of their strength killed or wounded. In a conventional war,
losses would be higher.
The cost of the battle against Hamas and Hezbollah in 2023-24, before the start of operations against Iran was US$ 55 billion. Inclusive of indirect costs, it has cost Israel 10% of its GDP. It is a financial loss Israel, subsidized by the US and with a much higher per capita income, can absorb. India cannot.
A lot of the debate on social media is about how Pakistan has won the media war and their narrative has been accepted. It ignores the fact that the Pakistan (and Chinese) narrative is aimed at the Pakistani public and those in India more concerned with what the foreigners post on the internet. I believe our narrative was accepted by the people who mattered for the following reasons:
- We did not exchange dossiers after Pahalgam, to prove that Pakistan did it. We said so and it was accepted, as was our right to act against the terrorists (even by China).
- Our attacks on 7th Oct, which included Punjab and which destroyed a mosque/religious seminary
were technically a violation of Pak territory and should also have inflamed the Muslim world. Apart from Turkiye and Azerbaijan (which was expected) no one complained - barring a tepid OIC statement. Compare what with what happened with the Nupur Sharma episode.
- There was also no criticism of India's decision to suspend the IWT. The fear of such criticism probably prevented our doing it earlier.
-The all party delegations conveyed the impression that our Pakistan policy was India's policy with support across party lines and not just the policy of the Modi administration.
There was a furore in India, when the Chief of Defence staff, in a forum in Singapore, said in an interview that we lost aircraft and made tactical mistakes. The more important points he made, which were lost, were:
- Tactical mistakes were made on the opening day, but were corrected. Our aircraft successfully completed their missions on subsequent days &
In a forum of his peers incl. service chiefs of friendly countries who were aware of who lost what
and the Pakistan army chief (who was less professional in comparison), the CDS's remarks were appropriate and what was expected of a general talking to his peers.
role. There was a view that briefings should have been conducted by the DGMO. The DMGO however has a more important job to do - fighting a war.
to help Iran save face. Israel and Iran conducted air and missiles strikes on each other after Trump announced his ceasefire.
Compare to what Israel did to Iran we did jackshit to Pakistan, we could have decapitated them but instead we pulled a pirthviraj chauhan.
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