Ukraine war part 14. Reviewing winter operations. A vindication of the numbers

 A fellow war analyst, `Big Serge’ has just come out with a more complete summary of operations so far this year, than my previous article, where I anticipated a big Russian spring offensive. I can do no better than reproduce his article, here. His maps are more reader friendly and conclusions mirror mine,
albeit presented in a more systematic way with a greater focus on the more important sectors of the front.
https://substack.com/home/post/p-159755536

I wanted to write this to share data that has validated the assumptions I have made throughout this conflict and share new data which explains the shape this conflict is taking.

A word about my sources. I rely on data more than opinions. The Ukrainian/Western side tends to mention similar statistics – not surprising since most Ukrainian channels were funded by the same source (USAID) and western channels quote them. Even when their data is obviously wrong e.g. a reporting higher casualty figure than the entire combat strength of the Russian army, the trends are useful. Some reporters who had hitherto repeated the NATO narrative of the war but have changed their position more recently. There are also credible figures from Ukraine which give a good indication of irrecoverable losses – for e.g. the criminal cases filed for desertion, the numbers listed as missing, or those named as confirmed dead. 

Official Russian sources can be misinterpreted. For e.g. their reports of Ukrainian casualties are not
those dead, but `sanitary losses’, which include all wounded. If one assumes a standard dead: wounded ratio in modern warfare, the Russian and Ukrainian figures do not differ greatly.
 
There are Russian telegram channels which can be scathing in their criticism of the Russian military leadership, but have figures that make sense. I also apply logic to numbers. If for e.g. we know the starting strength of the Russian army, if both sides agree on the number recruited during the war and the current strength (which matches the number of Russian formations in Ukraine) then the balancing figure is irrecoverable losses.

Macro level figures become more credible when broken up over time and sectors of the front. Quiet sectors report lower casualties than active sectors. Casualties can be corelated with observed losses of
equipment (based on data from past wars) and if a brigade loses ground when their estimated casualties cross a tipping point, that data becomes more credible. Similarly, credible western estimates of Russian tank crew who were killed, corelates well with known Russian tank losses. 

Some Western sources like Col Douglas McGregor, Lt Col Scott Ritter or Col Jacques Baud are, in my opinion correct in their overall analysis, but mistaken about casualty numbers (overstating Ukrainian losses). Here then are some interesting numbers:

Geometric progression of drone usage:
The use of drones by Ukraine has increased from roughly 2000 in Jan 23, to 20,000 in Jan 24 to
200,000 drones in Jan 25, as estimated by both sides. Ukraine is estimated to increase drone use to
500,000 per month by Dec 25. An Estimated $ 2.3 billion was spent on Ukrainian drones in 2024 and $ 2.6 billion already announced in 2025. (Source: War Quants). Russian use of FPV (hand held) drones has gone up at a similar rate, but most likely below that of Ukraine, which is sourcing drones from all NATO countries. Russia's FPV drone production target for 2024 was 1.4 million.     

Russian use of long range (Geran/Shahid) drones has also increased tenfold between Mar 24 and
Mar 25. Ukraine recorded 4198 Geran drones used by Russia in March, against 356 in Feb 24.

Russia has also acknowledged that over 80% of all its casualties (dead + wounded) are inflicted by drones. An attacking side (Russia has been attacking since Nov 2023, barring a few days Aug 24 when
Ukraine entered Kursk) loses more men to drones, because attackers are visible and have to move in the
open, whereas defenders are dug in, in trenches, or built up areas, which reduce the chance of drone strikes.

The more widespread use of drones has enabled Ukraine to hold sections of the front it would otherwise have to give up. It has also substituted for the reduced supply of artillery shells. Of the estimated 6-7000
drones used by Ukraine daily, even if only 20-25% hit their target, it is 1200-1500 hits per day, compared to an estimated 3000 artillery shells fired by Ukraine each day. Assuming the greater accuracy of the drone compensates for the smaller amount of explosive, Ukraine’s firepower increased by a third in the past year due to drones. 

Ukraine downed 2328 of the 4198 Geran drones fired by Russia in March (but a negligible proportion of glide bombs). The smaller FPV drones have a higher rate of being downed by electronic warfare or shot down. March was also the first month in which Ukraine consistently launched over 100 long range drones a day.   

More deadly for Ukraine has been the increase in glide bombs in number and size. First introduced in mid-2023, as a modification to Russia’s `dumb’ of unguided bombs which had to be dropped over the target, glide bombs have GS coordinates and external fins to increase range and accuracy. From 500kg, bomb sizes have increased to 3000 kg. Russia dropped 4800 such bombs in March up from an average of 3000 per month of smaller sizes in 2024.
The US has supplied similar bombs to Ukraine – the JDAM-ER which is a conversion package fitted to old bombs. The problem is the bombs need aircraft to launch them and Ukraine lacks aircraft. Their aircraft losses have been mostly when trying to get into range to launch a JDAM-ER, or a Storm shadow/Scalp missile, before which they have to face both long range surface to air missiles (usually the S-400) or fighter aircraft with long range air to air missiles.

Each glide bomb has the same explosive power and accuracy as a full salvo of  HIMARS long range rockets, the use of which has reduced, as Russia has started destroying more
launchers and intercepting missiles.  

Trends in Russian tank losses: Oryx does a count of hardware losses on both sides based on observed wrecks of military vehicles. Early in this series, I had made the point, based on Oryx figures, that Russian tank losses had fallen from 8 per day in the beginning of the war (690 lost in the first 80 days), to 3 per day in 2023. In the last few months losses have dropped to 1 per day (under 30 per month). As battlefield mapping becomes more detailed, this info has become more accurate – notwithstanding Russian claims of double counting (and under reporting Ukrainian losses). A more credible source for Ukrainian losses is the site lostarmour.info.

The loss figures are validated by the losses in Russian tank crew. This is a link to the losses of tankmen vs tanks destroyed, both in WW2 and the current war. For every tank crewman killed (and assuming half of those listed as missing were dead) approx. 1.5 tanks are destroyed. Unit wise data from Russian tank regiments of the 1^st Guards tank army in 2022 shows 79 killed/missing for 115 tanks destroyed. 

Mediazona, which I have analysed in detail in earlier posts has an increasing accurate count of Russian dead, including by branch of service.
Mediazona reports 1110 men of the Armoured corps killed.
Adding 2% from the deaths of those mobilized in 2022, gives another 232 dead.
29% of all known deaths do not have a known branch of service, hence the figure of tank men killed should be increased by 29%. This gives an estimated 1731 tank crew killed.
This corresponds to 2596 Tanks destroyed.
The Oryx figure of Russian tanks identified as destroyed was 2771 tanks destroyed.  
Ukraine’s official figure for Russian tank losses is 10515, which is clearly overstated and contributes to the very wrong assumptions about the state of the Russian army.

As the Kiel institute concluded in their report on Russian armament production, tank production has not just replaced losses but, for the past year, is able to equip newly raised units. This does not consider the large tank reserves the Russian army had before the war.

Thus Russian tank losses are currently 25 a month. Fresh production is estimated at approx. 20 T-90 tanks and (new or refurbished) 10 T-80 tanks per month, plus refurbishing 20 older T-72 tanks. This excludes the repair of damaged tanks. Russia is therefore able to provide 25 tanks each month over and above losses. This has enabled Russia to equip newly raised formations – a process which should be mostly complete now. More significantly, barely 6% of tank losses are the new T-90 models (1-2 per
month) while Russia has been building at least 20 each month. Similarly over 80% of IFV losses are the
older model BMP 1 & 2, whereas all new production (which exceeds losses) is of the new BMP-3   

Similarly with aircraft – Russia’s heaviest losses are in ground attack aircraft. They lost around 75 SU-25 & SU-34 aircraft. However, the SU-25 is obsolete and would have been scrapped. This year production of SU-34s will equal the combined losses of SU-25 & 34, which means Russia will have the same number of ground attack fighters it started the war with, but with modern SU-34s replacing the SU-25 and operating against increasingly depleted Ukrainian air defences – as seen from a declining loss rate of all Russian aircraft.

In the recent US Senate armed services committee hearings, Gen Cavoli, (head of the US European command) who had been coordinating NATO actions in Ukraine from the beginning, admitted for the first time that Russia's ability to replace military equipment was unprecedented. He mentions for example total tank losses of 3000 (validating the figures I mentioned) but production of 1500 tanks this year (though it most likely includes refurbished tanks)  

There is a paper by a leading think tank RUSI (Royal United services institute) on how Russia has been able to outproduce Europe in weaponry from 2022-24. 
https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/occasional-papers/winning-industrial-war-comparing-russia-europe-and-ukraine-2022-24 

Ukrainian losses: In an earlier article in this series, I had cited ualosses.org (which uses the same methodology as Mediazona does for Russian dead), which listed 60644 Ukrainian dead as of 3^rd Sept 2024. I had argued that this was understated as it did not include the higher rate of casualties sustained by Ukraine since Apr 2024. I had also listed an official figure of 42,000 missing and 32000 deserted (upto Feb 2024).

The updated figure on UAlosses is now 138717 Ukrainian dead (and identified). This excludes foreign fighters and those from formations not officially part of the Ukrainian armed forces. There is also a time lag in reporting deaths – compensation is not payable until a death is officially reported.
A of Jan 2025, 59000 Ukrainian soldiers were reported missing (believed killed).

My figures for desertions last Sept did not include those AWOL (article 407 in Ukrainian law - absent from the unit but no intent to desert), only desertions under article 408 – no intention of returning, against whom criminal cases has been filed by the Ukrainian authorities.

There were 90,000 cases of desertion under both article 407 & 408 filed from 2022  upto Oct 24, of which an estimated 30,000 were under article 408.
Russian estimates of cases under article 408 are 23209 in 2024, vs Ukraine’s 19120.   

However, since Sept 24, there was a surge in desertion cases
In Oct 2024, there were 9487 cases of desertion, 18984 in Nov and 17593 in Dec. There was a corresponding drop in Ukrainian casualties reported by Russia. Russian estimates of Ukrainian desertions in Jan and Feb 2025 is 35738.
https://libcom.org/article/turn-2024-and-2025-ukraine-desertion-has-become-nationwide-mainstream

Data from individual unit suggest that cases under article 408 are significantly higher than 1/3^rd, because commanders do not want to report desertions, there is an amnesty for deserters and because the system to file criminal cases is overloaded. Permanent desertions may be running at 8-10,000 per month since Nov, which is as high as the estimated number killed each month.

Thus, irreplaceable losses for Ukraine are:

138717 dead + 70,0000 permanent desertion + 59000 missing believed killed + 400000 seriously wounded + 10000 prisoner.  

14% of all Ukrainian dead are over the age of 50, compared to 7.5% of Russian killed, though both countries have a similar age distribution of their population. 

Russian losses: Mediazona, about which I have commented in detail in past posts, as got increasingly accurate over time, as past casualties are identified. It lists 100001 Russian dead upto 25 Mar and for the first time includes those from the Donbass region of Ukraine and foreign fighters. There is still a time lag of about a month in reporting casualties. A full listing of casualties from the Donbass region and accounting for the time lag (which also affects Ualosses) will take the total to approx. 115000 dead.

Interestingly only 3% of Russian deaths are in the 18-20 age group with 12% in the 21-25 age group.
It indicates that Russia does not use conscripts in combat (they are typically 18-19 years) but several of those who complete conscription sign up for a longer term contract involving combat. 
By contrast, Ukraine, which does not have compulsory conscription of those upto 25, have only 5% of deaths in the 18-25 age group. Those would typically be reservists who had been conscripted earlier and liable to serve if mobilized. Therefore the percentage of those in the 18-25 age group who have volunteered to fight, is three times higher for Russia, (15 vs 5%). The average age of those killed is 
nevertheless higher for Ukraine, because of a much higher share of those above 50.    

Casualty trends before and during Ukraine’s Kursk incursion

	Russian estimated killed	Ukraine estimated killed
1 Mar - 31 July 2024	17360	36336
6 Aug – 6 Jan 2025	17530	53681
1 Jan – 31 Mar 2025	6000 (est)	23090

Ukrainian figures exclude permanent deserters and POW, which are negligible for Russia.
 
The point of the Kursk operation for Ukraine, was to alter the exchange ratio in favor of Ukraine and
prevent the loss of territory in Ukraine by diverting Russian troops away from threatened sectors of the front. Neither happened. Ukrainian losses after the Kursk incursion were higher relative to Russia’s and they lost more territory. Ukraine’s irrecoverable casualties for March inclusive of desertions and prisoner may be the worst in the war so far. Russia has sustained a similar level of losses, despite taking more territory, with more of its formations being on the offensive, compared to the previous six months.

Ukraine’s irreplaceable losses in the past 12 months of about 360,000 exceed recruitment of around 300,000 men in the same period. The shortfall has been made up by transferring 50,000 men from support functions to combat units, but this cannot be replicated, nor has there been any success in recruiting volunteers from the 18-25 age group, who are exempt from conscription.

All Ukrainian replacements are now conscripts, most with no prior military experience and increasingly shorter training times, who are replacing the diminishing poop of combat veterans and volunteers.
Russian irreplaceable losses in the past year of approx. 120,000 men are less then the approx. 300,000 volunteers who signed up. Of these, my sense is after replacing casualties, 100,000 men are renewing existing contracts and are not new volunteers, while 80,000 men have gone to new formations. The existing system of conscripts provides about 300,000 men a year to Russia, but these are not part of the Russian order of battle in Ukraine – many will sign contracts after their year of military service. Current
recruitment is therefore running at around 20,000 per month as there is no further need to man new formations (not because fewer people are willing to fight). If losses were higher that what I assumed, either Russia would be signing up more volunteers, or conscripts would be inducted into combat units after six months basic training.

Russia is fighting attrition war with the goal (as Putin stated at the outset) of demilitarizing Ukraine. Territorial goals, in my view will be limited to the four provinces of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporozhye. The latter two were not earlier of interest to Russia and while they have an ethnic Russian majority, it is not as overwhelmingly Russian as Donetsk and Luhansk. Their role is the protection of Crimea (Zaporozhye forms a land bridge from the Donbass to Crimea and Kherson, upto the Dnieper secures Crimea’s water supply and the Dnieper river forms a natural border.
Saying the war is a stalemate because Russia has only taken 20% of Ukraine's territory after three years is misleading. They have taken over 80% of the territory they wish to take and have destroyed a large part of Ukraine's manpower and the equipment that NATO can supply.   
 
Winning an attrition war depends on the manpower reserves of each side (Russia is six times more and suffering fewer casualties) the ability to supply armaments - Russia is able to replace hardware losses. Ukraine cannot – even with NATO but not US support), and the will to fight. 

My sense is that the Ukrainian army is sufficiently attritted for Russia to start a spring offensive once the ground hardens after the spring thaw. Once they take most of the four provinces (with territory captured in other areas exchanged in an eventual peace deal), Russia will dig into defensive positions, from where they will offer a ceasefire – which they are under a lot of pressure to do, under the threat of more US sanctions. Once on the defensive, Russian casualties and consumption of armaments will be lower than while they have been attacking. Ukraine’s losses will be correspondingly higher, which will facilitate a de-facto ceasefire line for an eventual peace deal, as I argued in a previous article.    

https://rpdeans.blogspot.com/2025/02/ukraine-war-part-12-how-war-might-end.html

Finally, a example of how the Western mainstream media can pick up a story based on wrong information and draw incorrect conclusions. At the time of writing this, a trending story is that Russia has called up an additional 160,000 soldiers for the war in Ukraine. This is in fact Russia's twice a year conscription, where before the war, around 125000 conscripts were called up every April and Oct for a year's military service (250,000 in all). Given that the size of Russia's armed forces has increased from 
1 to 1.32 million during the war (and 1.5 million end 2025), it was natural that one of the sources of recruitment - conscripts, is also increased. It increased from 140000 to 150000 last April.
There are over one million men turning 18 each year in Russia. However, even with the increased numbers, only a third of the conscript pool is actually serving. The percentage increase is less than the increase in the strength of the armed forces. If Russia had a manpower problem, it could easily have doubled the number of conscripts, which it hasn't.   
Only 3% of Russian combat deaths are in the 18-20 age group, so conscripts are not being used in 
combat. Casualties are typically `graduating' conscripts who sign contracts for longer service.