Reassessing the Chinese threat.
First published for the Indian military review, before the Doklam & Galwan crisis, it has become more relevant with the current standoff in Ladakh.
Memories of 1962 still affect the ability
of our Political and military establishment, to assess the military threat from
China. Politically, we have been extremely circumspect when dealing with
incursions of the PLA across the LAC. Articles in our defence journals and
those written by defence experts, make repeated references to the excellent
Chinese transport & airfield network across LAC and its ability to throw
upwards of 30 divisions against our forces, tasked with defending the LAC. This
is contrasted with the poor infrastructure development on our side and
shortfalls in the men and material required to deal with this threat.
As an armchair enthusiast and former
company CEO who has dealt with competition mapping in the civilian world, I
decided to examine this premise, using open source information and Google
earth, to literally, map the PLA’s strength and infrastructure in Tibet. While
we usually have fun using Google earth to identify places we know in India, it
is a very useful tool to assess the `enemy’.
The results of this analysis (often done studying images with 20m
resolution) were so counter-intuitive that I thought it merited this article.
The Order of battle (ORBAT) for the PLA in the Western Theatre command (which
includes Tibet) – after the PLA was downsized and reorganised into 5 integrated
Theatre Commands, is as follows:
The PLA has a total of 13 group armies. Each group army is an identical
combined arms army comprising 6 brigades and supporting elements. A group army
has the manpower equivalent of 2 Indian divisions, but the firepower equivalent
of an Indian army corps of 3 divisions – due to the
greater amount of artillery (incl. missiles and drones) available to Chinese
group army.
The Western Theatre has the 76th
and 77th Group armies. The 76th has its HQ in Xining
(Qinghai province) and the 77th in Chongqing (east of Tibet). In
addition, Xinjiang has the equivalent of 4 infantry divisions meant mainly for
internal security. They can be considered the equivalent in firepower, of an
Indian infantry division. During the Galwan crisis the PLA sent the 76th
Army into Western Ladakh and this was later rotated with the 77th
Army.
Surprisingly, the only PLA formations in
the TAR (Tibet Autonomous Region) are 3 brigades
in the Eastern Sector. One of these is at Lhasa and two are opposite Arunachal.
The rest of the Chinese troops in Tibet are from the People’s armed police,
their equivalent of the ITBP.
In the event of all out war, the units in
the Western theatre would most likely be reinforced by the Central Theatre,
which is China’s reserve. This comprises the 81st, 82nd
and 83rd group armies. Of these, the 82nd is based in and
around Beijing and it the `anti-coup’ army, meant for the protection of the
regime. It is reasonable to expect that only the 81st and 83rd
armies will be deployed.
Additionally the 75th group army
from Kunming (opposite the Vietnam border) can be deployed opposite eastern
Arunachal.
This gives the Chinese a maximum deployable
strength of 5 group armies (75th 76th, 77th,
81st, 83rd ) the Xinjiang army of say 3 divisions, plus 3
brigades in Tibet. This is half the PLA strength.
All the group armies are armour heavy, while the LAC (with a couple of
exceptions) does not support armoured warfare. If four group armies substitute
a tank brigade for an infantry brigade, that would mean 75% of the PLA’s
infantry brigades would be deployed against India but would still they lack
numerical or firepower superiority over the Indian army.
The PLA in its reorganisation, where a
million men were reduced, substituted manpower for firepower and technology.
However, light infantry is still at a premium in the mountains.
In the West, the nearest supply hub and
railhead for the supply of Chinese forces in Aksai Chin (who have been deployed
without the large stocks of ammunition and fuel necessary for war), is at Hotan,
in Xinjiang. The distance from Hotan to Daulat Beg Oldi is 200 km as the crow
flies. In reality, getting new units or supplies to the LAC, would involve a
road journey of over 700 km along the G219 highway – due to the intervening
mountains. This highway is never closer than 100 km from the LAC. To be in a
position to attack Daulat Beg Oldi at a point where the G219 highway is
closest, involves a further road journey of around 200 km. None of the tracks
leading to the DBO area look like being all weather. As the terrain on the
Chinese side is flat and featureless, any movement can be picked up by satellites
or Humint and highly vulnerable to interdiction from the air. The `last mile’
distance from the road to the LAC is as difficult to approach from the Chinese
side as it is from ours. Moreover, if the PLA does manage to take for e.g. the
advanced landing ground in DBO, it is very difficult to a mechanised force to
make the steep descent required to advance any further.
Along the entire Ladakh/ Himachal part of the LAC, Chinese roads leading off
from the LAC lead to only 3 points – DBO in the North and Chushul & Demchok
further south. There are no Chinese roads west of the Karakax river, between
DBO and Chushul. Opposite Chushul, a 6 km stretch of Chinese road has 106
hairpin bends – the Chinese have the same problems building roads in the
mountains as we do. Along the entire stretch between the G219 highway and the
LAC there appears nothing to support division bodies of troops (shelter,
storage dumps etc), nor is it certain if the few roads from the G219 to the
LAC, can handle the movement of thousands of heavy vehicles.
More importantly, any forces the PLA
inducts into Tibet will have to be acclimatised. Hotan is at an altitude of
1500m (other divisions are at lower altitudes) while Aksai Chin is an altitude
of 5000m.
A similar situation exists opposite
Arunachal. The G318 highway from Lhasa has secondary roads
approaching the LAC in Arunachal in only 3 areas – Tawang, Tuting and Walong –
all 200 km from the highway. 2 of the 3 routes were used by the Chinese in 1962,
so not much has changed since then. Our NH 13 in Arunachal (particularly after
completion of pending projects) would offer better road connectivity than what
the PLA has from their railhead at Lhasa to the border.
While it is believed that the PLA occupies positions at a higher altitude on
the Tibetan plateau compared to us, the roads leading to the border (on both
sides) are along steep river valleys.
Common sense suggests that whoever dominates the heights along those valleys
(as IA would, on our side of the LAC) dominates the road. The river valley
roads on the Chinese side (which do not appeared tarred) would be as
susceptible to landslides in bad weather as on our side. Similarly in the
`wedge’ between Sikkim and Bhutan, there is only 1 road that can support a
large PLA force – the S204 highway, that has secondary tracks along vulnerable
river valleys.
The Chinese forces that can be deployed
against us have to travel around 3500 km by train, to the railhead at Lhasa or
Hotan, after which movement towards the LAC will have the same problems as
mentioned earlier. Both armies are fairly mechanised, which would increase
loading/unloading times at the railhead, particularly when it is done by Han
Chinese labour, not used to high altitudes (the loyalty of Tibetans being
suspect). Even before any railway movement, the Chinese would have to
pre-position thousands of trucks, special grade fuel and lubricants, storage
dumps and facilities to house the men (which had taken the IA decades to
complete). Add to transport time is the time to acclimatise. The railway line has a limited capacity. If
for e.g., the 76th Army in Ladakh has to be reinforced by the 77th,
it will take a month to move that formation by rail – we can move and supply
the additional forces to counter that, in lesser time. The railway line itself
would be vulnerable to
interdiction by the IAF or by Tibetan sabotage groups – with repair being more
difficult than in India as large stretches of the line are uninhabited with no
local repair facilities.
Against China’s deployment, India has the
following China oriented formations:
- III corps (Dimapur) for Eastern Arunachal with 3 divisions.
- IV corps (Tawang) for Bhutan, Western Arunachal with 3 divisions
- XXXIII corps (Binaguri) for Sikkim and the Siliguri corridor.
These have to defend against limited access points and in terrain unsuitable
for armoured vehicles that the Chinese have and our mountain divisions do not.
In the West:
- XIV corps (Leh), 2 divisions and an armoured brigade.
- IX corps (Yol). 1 Division can be moved to Himachal , as this is a dual
tasked
- 6th division (AHQ reserve) would be tasked to defend Uttaranchal
(we also have a Dehra Dun based RAPID
division from our strike corps).
This excludes strike formations. During the Galwan crisis and its aftermath, an
additional division from either newly raised mountain strike corps or our Pakistan
oriented strike corps was stationed in
Southern Ladakh.
Thus, we can deploy 9 divisions in the East
and 5 divisions (plus armoured formations) in the West, without affecting formations
deployed against Pakistan.
This, against a maximum of 13 PLA divisions. While they may be superior in firepower
to the 14 IA divisions facing them, it is nowhere near enough to win - particularly in the mountains where it
takes more than a 3:1 superiority in firepower to dislodge a defending side.
For the same reason, I believe the new mountain strike corps to be unnecessary as
I do not see it having the firepower or logistical support required to take the
fight into Tibet. I think an extra division in South Ladakh would suffice, with
the armour of the corps being deployed in the
Demchok area and the corps artillery and support units being divided among the
infantry/ mountain divisions in the Western half of the LAC.
There are only a few places along the LAC
where brigade sized formations can clash. From East to West they are:
Kibhitoo / Walong river valley in Eastern Arunachal
Tuting in Central Arunachal
Tawang in West Arunachal
The Siliguri corridor between Gangtok and Bhutan
Barahoti plain in Garhwal
Demchok (south of Chushul)
Depsang Plain (East of DBO).
It is only in the last 2 areas – Demchok and Depsang, that tanks can be
employed.
In the Eastern part of the LAC, it would
probably make logistical sense to deploy only 2 divisions of each of the 3
corps, with the corps artillery brigade, forward, with 1 division in reserve.
There are in addition spots where the
terrain permits smaller formations of infantry to clash, such as Chushul, or gaps
in the long border where small groups can infiltrate across a lightly manned
LAC. However, in theory, it is the India side which should have an advantage
with a denser population of friendly locals
to provide adequate warning, while making the Chinese vulnerable to incursions
by the Tibetan manned SFF, helped by a hostile populace on the Chinese side. In
addition, the ITBP is a lot more familiar with the terrain than those of the
People’s police. The raising of the Sikkim and Arunachal scouts (in addition to
the Ladakh, Kumaon and Garhwal scouts) who are permanently deployed close to
the LAC, can enable a `Kargil in reverse’ - should our doctrine allow it.
If the Chinese did have a good road network
leading to the LAC, then it should be the PLA that feels vulnerable since it
would have to defend Lhasa /Southern Tibet, with 3 brigades, against the
divisions of 33rd corps in Sikkim and 4th Corps in
Western Arunachal. Similarly, their logistics base at Nigari – the hub for
Chinese operations in Aksi Chin, along with the G219 highway, is barely 30km
from Demchok and vulnerable to an
armoured thrust, particularly since our planned border road construction, which
has been revived, should be completed by 2022.
The PLAAF:
Although much has been made of the modernisation of the PLAAF in recent years –
and
the depletion of the IAF strength, the force the PLAAF can deploy against us in
Tibet suffers from significant disadvantages.
The Chengdu and Lanzhou military regions (comprising the Western theatre
command) can deploy a total of 11 fighter regiments, with a total budgeted
strength of 72 * J-11 (the Chinese SU-27), 168 * J-7/J-8 (Mig 21 derivatives)
and 24 * J-10 aircraft. In addition 2 bomber regiments comprise ageing Tu-16’s
type aircraft. Details of the PLAAF ORBAT can be found at: http://www.scramble.nl/orbats/china/airforce
(cross referenced with other sources)
More significantly, none of these 13 regiments operate from bases in the TAR.
All airbases of the Lanzhou and Chengdu military regions are at least 1000 km
away from the LAC. There are 6 dual use airfields in Tibet where some of these
aircraft can operate from, but except for Lhasa, none are configured to host
aircraft permanently – i.e. no SAM’s, hardened shelters etc. The bigger problem
the PLAAF will face however the significant payload penalty when operating from
high altitude airfields . All airfields in Tibet are at far higher altitudes
than Leh or Thoise. For this reason, the PLAAF actually appears to have fewer
helipads than the IAF, along the LAC. An example of the height disparity can be
seen close to the border, the relatively low altitude Chinese airfield at
Nyingchi is at 2900m above sea level, whereas our airfield at Tuting
(Arunachal) just 64 km away, is at 470m.
The PLAAF’s air to air refuelling capability comprises just 3 modern IL-78’s
with another 20 old H-6 (Tu-16) aircraft ahead by the Navy and air force –
these are increasingly tasked for the South China Sea, as China seeks to extend
its sphere of influence eastwards.
PLAAF reserve (Jinan military command) has another 144 aircraft, of which only 24
are modern J-11’s
All Chinese roads heading toward the LAC originate from a `Ring road’ highway
roughly parallel to the LAC (G318 & G219). If the IAF interdicts this,
their aircraft would be masked by the Himalayas
giving a defending force only a few minutes notice of their arrival. A
defending force would have to operate from bases literally a thousand km away
(or risk both payload penalties and the threat of attack, if based in Tibet).
Chinese helicopters would be ineffective in
Tibet with the altitude making it possible to take off only with negligible
payload. Even if they do, their ceiling is barely 1000 ft (above the ground which
is at 15,000 ft). IAF helicopters take off at lower altitudes and the newer generation
Dhruv, Rudra and LCH have a higher ceiling. Drones present the same problem at
high altitudes.
Thus, it is actually India which has both
superior forces in the area along the LAC (more divisions and air cover located
closer) and a superior transport network to the LAC which can enable faster
reinforcing than what the PLA can achieve. For e.g. 39th infantry
division at Yol, or 6th Mountain division at Bareilly, should, based
on the road networks, reach potential trouble spots on the LAC at Himachal or
Uttaranchal respectively, faster than PLA divisions, even if the latter has a
head start and is detected while transiting. Chinese actions on the LAC have
been a combination of bullying, bluff and bluster, which is not credible, but
works if we allow ourselves to be traumatised by memories of 1962.
While our
inability to complete infrastructure projects in border areas is a well-known
concern -though improving rapidly, I believe it misses a larger point. The
Chinese infrastructure build up in Tibet has an implication that I believe
Indian analysts have missed. In 13 years, the number of Chinese tourists
visiting Tibet has increased 20 times (from 7.2 lac to 15 million)! Tourism has
led to Tibet’s increased integration with China. Economic gains for Tibetans
would reduce their secessionist tendencies. By contrast while 11 million
tourists visit Jammu (mostly to Vaishno Devi) less than 1 million visit the
Kashmir valley. The single constraint that prevents an exponential increase in
this number – (as I’ve argued in a separate paper on our Pakistan and Kashmir
policy) is our failure to complete the Udhampur-Baramula rail link even after 3
decades. This link (with a Anatnag-Pahalgam extension) along with enabling
river transport by completing the Tulbul barrage (allowed under the IWT, but suspended,
so as not to hurt Pakistani sentiments) can be a game changer for tourism in
the valley. Another possible rail link : Bilaspur-Mandi-Leh (with an extension
to Chushul) can not only transform tourism in Himachal and Ladakh, but vastly
improve our ability to move and supply forces to this area- making it a
significant deterrent to Chinese adventurism in the area, without the need to
raise additional forces. While civil airports in Tibet are being converted to
possible military use, in Kashmir it is IAF bases that are used for civil
flights.
The more significant capability development of the Chinese is possibly in the
area of drones, cyber, electro-magnetic and space and a revamping of their
higher defence management (including moving to theatre commands). Perhaps this
represents more of a capability gap than any supposed disparity in
infrastructure and forces along the LAC.
My other blog posts on China:
https://rpdeans.blogspot.com/2023/07/the-real-chinese-invasion.html
Great analysis
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