Ukraine war. Understanding the numbers - Part 1 Casualties

 

Part 1 – Manpower & casualties

My interest in the Ukraine war arises from an academic interest in Military history and Geopolitics and
the fact that I lived in Russia and have long been interested in that part of the world. My work enabled me to visit more of Russia (and Ukraine) than most Russians and make both Russian and Ukrainian friends – who worked together freely in our Moscow office.

I would like to start with where I stand on the conflict. I believe the Russian invasion was wrong, both morally and under International law. I think Putin was provoked into this action and he got provoked, believing that this would be no different from the bloodless `police action’ that secured Crimea in 2014. Russia badly miscalculated the extent of Ukrainian resolve and preparation and the Western willingness to impose crippling sanctions. Ukraine and NATO in turn made the equally wrong assumptions that sanctions would cripple the Russian economy and coupled with losses on the battlefield (based on the Russian army’s performance in the first month) would cause the downfall of Putin, giving NATO a chance to defeat Russia – as opposed to just protecting Ukrainian interests. The result has been a war that has already lasted 500 days and where I believe wrong assumptions continue to drive strategy.

As a former manager in the corporate world, whose decisions were driven by data. I would like to use the same approach in answering some basic questions about the conflict – starting with the extent of losses. 
Both sides widely exaggerate casualties while not revealing their own.
Ukraine’s claims a total of 238300 Russians killed. The term `liquidated’ could mean killed, wounded or prisoner. However, the Ukrainian MOD helpfully states that the casualties are a multiple of Russian casualties in Afghanistan and the Chechen wars. Since there is an official number of dead in those wars, one can confirm that Ukraine refers to 238300 Russian soldiers killed. 

It in generally accepted that for every soldier killed, there are 3 wounded badly enough to play no further part in the war. Even assuming this dead: seriously wounded ratio is 1 : 2 (not 1:3) and assuming there are a negligible number of Russians taken prisoner, we get 715000 irrecoverable casualties. Ukraine's estimate of Russian losses is 900,000 (not including prisoner) which is consistent with 238000 killed. 

The total pre war strength of the Russian armed forces was 900000. In reality, the figure was probably closer to 850,000. Of these, the men in combat formations in the army was only 280000. Apart from this official number, one can derive it from the number of Russian combat formations in their order of battle (ORBAT), which is close to the 280,000 number.

Of the max of 280,000 Russian army men who can actually be deployed in a combat role, there are about 40,000 who cannot be deployed in Ukraine, because of Russian commitments in Syria, peacekeeping in Armenia and Tajikistan, men based in Kaliningrad and Trans-Dniester etc.
The max of 240,000 is supplemented by militia of the Donetsk and Luhansk people’s republic (since incorporated into the Russian army) and the Wagner Militia. This brings the total back to 280,000,
assuming that the conscripts among the 280,000 who were not legally permitted to serve abroad are all doing so – most of the area Russia operates in is now part of Russia, after a referendum.

Clearly, if the total number of Russian soldiers deployable in Ukraine was 280000 (till the end of 2022)
they could not have incurred 900,000 casualties.

Last Sept, Russia announced a mobilization of 300,000 additional soldiers. There have also been 70,000 volunteers found suitable and sent to the army. Of this 370,000 person additional force, a max of 200,000 can be sent to combat formations, since the need to be supported by support services in the rear. A normal support ratio of 1:1 has moved more towards support functions, since they now include anti drone and rocket activity, electronic warfare, and prevention of cross border infiltration, hence the number of 200,000 new troops from 370,000 is on the high side.    

My assumption based on cross referencing various sources is that Russia has lost approx. 40,000 dead (incl. lot of former convicts in the Wagner group) and therefore 80,000 badly wounded, giving 125000 irrecoverable casualties, assuming a negligible number of prisoners. The BBC (Russian) has done an analysis with Mediazona, based on compensation claims, funerals etc and has estimated 47,000 deaths on the Russian side, with irrecoverable casualties as 125,000 in Jul 23 *. Some time back the US military had estimated `upto' 100,000 Russian casualties, which would be consistent with 125,000 now.  

With 125,000 irrecoverable casualties, there are 355,000 men available for combat, of which at least 25% will be rotated outside the battle area for rest and refit. That gives 265000 men available for combat in Ukraine, assuming all Russian formations are so deployed. If just 10% are assigned to other areas in Russia (e.g. Belarus, or near the border with the Baltic states), we have 240,000 men in combat formations inside Ukraine.  

The total number of Russian army’s combat formations identified in Ukraine, or rotated out, are
16 divisions and 26 independent brigades. At full strength, they would number 238000 men, which
closely corresponds to the above assumption. There are also reportedly around 50,000 men from among the newly mobilized, who have been formed into new combat formations, as announced by Russia's Ministry of Defense. It is unlikely that there will be more than 50,000 men in new formations, because, as I will explain in part 2, they would not be adequately equipped. New formations would be short of artillery shells, Electronic warfare support and drones and there would not be enough tactical aviation to support them. 
 
If 25% of the 238000 men are being rotated or refitting (and none of the newly raised 50,000), we would have approx. 230000 Russian soldiers in combat formations on the battlefield in Ukraine.

This total would be 0, if Ukrainian figures of Russian casualties were to be believed. As explained above, 120,000 irrecoverable casualties are a lot more credible. 
This can be cross referenced (albeit crudely) in 3 ways:
- By looking at hardware losses as reported by Oryx. If a unit has lost 20% of its armored vehicles, it is reasonable to assume that 20% of the men in that unit are also casualties (dead & wounded). 
- US intelligence inadvertently let the cat out of the bag, when they referred to `upto 100,000 Russian casualties' some months ago, which referred to irrecoverable casualties.
- The Russian airborne forces announced their casualties separately. While western analysts seized on this to talk about the high percentage of Russian forces who were casualties, it actually vindicates my estimate, since light infantry (particularly the airborne forces who have been in constant action) will take a disproportionately high share of casualties (like ex convicts in the Wagner group).  

Ukraine’s own estimate is that there are 325000 Russian troops in Ukraine. This includes some portion of support functions (e.g. medics, combat engineers) who must be close to the front. This estimate would need to be on the high side, but ties in with my calculation of 230,000 men in frontline combat roles.   

Russia will conscript 300,000 men each year (an increase from 250,000) from which 100,000 will go into combat formations in the army. This will more than replace casualties (and those who do not want to continue beyond their contracted period), so Russia can maintain this force indefinitely, as long as they have enough hardware – something that I will explore in the next part.

Ukraine: Ukraine’s order of battle as of 15^th July 23, has 52 frontline brigades, 30 defense or reserve brigades and the equivalent of 3 brigades with foreign fighters.

Although many of these have been reportedly been badly degraded – though Russia’s MOD also exaggerates figures to a point where a brigade has been reported as being completely destroyed twice and is still capable of attacking, it would be prudent to assume these units are close to full strength since Ukraine is known to have mobilized at least 1 million men for the army – the figure was 700,000 in July 22, so 1 million is a conservative estimate.

At 3000 men per frontline brigade and 2500 for a reserve unit (lacking equipment and therefore waiting to build to full strength), we have 240000 men in combat formations.

If a million men were mobilized and with a lot of women in support functions, Ukraine could have had as many as 600,000 men in combat units. If they have 240,000 now, it would mean a loss of 360000 men.

The Russian MOD has estimated Ukrainian casualties at 192000 dead – by extension irrecoverable casualties of 600,000 (assuming 24000 POW and a 1:2 ratio of dead to seriously wounded). Because Russian missile and air strikes have hit rear areas and HQs, it can be assumed that 15% of casualties will be in support units, giving 510000 casualties in frontline units. This should be considered a maximum estimate.

Casualties: Other things being equal (and they are fairly equal in this case) casualties are determined by:
- The amount of firepower available to each side (artillery causes over half of all casualties) &
- Which side is attacking.   

It has been accepted that Russia has more firepower, particularly in artillery, where estimates vary from a 3:1 advantage 10:1.

Both sides have been attacking for roughly the same amount of time.

Given a min 3:1 artillery advantage and a higher than 3:1 missile and air advantage, it would be logical to assume Ukrainian losses are 120000 dead and 240000 injured to a point where cannot fight in future. Adding 24000 POW and assuming 15% of the 360000 casualties are in support roles, we have a loss of
330000 men from a max of 600,000 in combat units, giving a current figure of 270,000 which is consistent with the earlier estimate of 240,000.

There are other ways of estimating casualties which broadly match this estimate. Statements from the Ukrainian leadership during a relatively quiet period of the war referring to 100-200 deaths a day at the front (500 irrecoverable casualties) which matched off the record statements by NATO. There were several statements from formation commanders on the casualties they took (which point to for e.g.
at least 50,000 casualties in the battle for Bakhmut) and anecdotal evidence like the number of fresh graves and obituaries, or the percentage of people who know someone who died, give a similar number. The latter method was also used to derive a figure of Russian army dead which matches my estimate.

Pro Russia Western analysts like Col. Douglas McGregor and Lt. Col Scott Ritter, have estimated Ukrainian dead to be in excess of 350,000. However, I do not accept these figures for the same reason I don't accept Ukrainian estimates of Russian casualties. They are also higher than the Russian Ministry of defense estimate. 

Casualty trends: The rate of Ukrainian casualties has been increasing and Russia’s steady (excluding mostly convicts in the Wagner group who were killed in the battle of Bakhmut). The trend for Russia is also seen in claims by Ukraine’s MOD and verified losses of equipment (sites like oryx), while the higher trend in Ukrainian losses is based on for e.g. evidence from the battle of Bakhmut and equipment losses from the ongoing counter offensive in Zaporozhe.

There is a growing percentage of the Ukrainian army who have been conscripted (not volunteered) and have no prior military experience – this was zero throughout 2022. On the other hand there is an increasing percentage of Russians who have volunteered – recruitment figures suggest German tanks appearing on the battlefield has increased the number of Russians volunteering to fight. None of the Russians at the front are believed to be without previous military experience.

Inflated casualty estimates, examples: The inflation of casualty figures is consistent with other reported losses. For e.g. the Ukraine MOD reported that Russia lost 310 helicopters.

The ORYX website, which lists visually confirmed losses (though there is some double counting and wrong identification e.g. Ukrainian losses as Russian) shows 99 lost or damaged helicopters. Of these, an estimated 40 were Ka-52 `Alligator’ helicopters (40% is consistent with the numbers deployed in Ukraine). For every lost helicopter, there would be another damaged and unable to fly.

Russia had around 150 ka-52 helicopters pre war (or 160 assuming 10 produced in the past year).  
If they lost 40% of 310 helicopters (124) with another 124 damaged, it would be more than the total number in service. The oryx estimate would give 80 lost or damaged KA-52s or half the total strength,
which is a more credible figure. The confirmed deaths of 177 pilots would be in line with Oryx figures of Russian helicopter and aircraft losses. 

Similarly the Russian MOD reported that Ukraine lost 455 aircraft and 242 helicopters.
However, the total number of aircraft and helicopters with Ukraine at the start of the war, plus all those transferred by other countries are: 211 aircraft (incl trainers) and 160 helicopters.

Conclusions Any estimate which is accurate about enemy losses (which are impossible to know with certainty) but silent on own losses, is not credible. Estimates from the Russian and Ukrainian MOD however a reasonably accurate trend of losses and an upper limit.
While my estimates of losses – and therefore of the numbers the front, are based on several assumptions, assumption errors would broadly cancel out each other and the final number seems to be in the ballpark of other estimates.

If Russia has just over 200,000 combat troops in the line of combat and Ukraine just under 200,000, then neither side has the numbers required for a successful offensive to capture territory. Russia has more firepower per unit, but without the ability to conceal forces, will not be able to dislodge a defending force, who have to defend along shorter interior lines of communication, without taking heavy casualties. Ukraine was also not able to do so in their June counter offensive, under more favorable conditions.     

My view is that Ukraine is at its lowest point, since the conflict began, in terms of quality of manpower per brigade (fewer experienced people and volunteers) and firepower per brigade. Russia is conversely at a high point. There is a window of opportunity for Russia to launch a limited offensive in Aug-Sept to occupy more territory in areas they consider Russia and then move to the defensive, before shortages of critical weapons (152mm shells, missiles, KA52 Helicopters) and fresh supplies by NATO rule out more offensive action. 

Update Aug 25th: The study by Mediazona, reported by the BBC (Russian) looked at confirmed deaths, which were reported as 30698 on 24th Aug (the figure is regularly updated), incl Wagner prisoners. Since these are verifiable, they should represent a lower limit of casualties. Using other criteria to determine excess mortality (as was done during covid), the death count is estimated at 47,000
These also include deaths not during combat in Ukraine. Of the 30698 confirmed dead, 5783 were prisoners (Wagner group) and another 2478 members of the Wagner group, but not convicts.