Ukraine war. Understanding the numbers - Part 2. Artillery

 

Part 2 – Artillery  

A link to part 1 of this series:
https://rpdeans.blogspot.com/2023/07/ukraine-war-understanding-numbers-part.html

Artillery, the God of war has accounted for more than half of all battle deaths since the beginning of the 20^th century. In the Ukraine war, the proportion is probably higher, given the relative absence of air power for both sides, clashes of large mechanized forces, or hand to hand combat.

Half of all the Russian artillery (including rocket artillery) comprises the 152mm gun – both towed and self-propelled. This is a proxy for Russian artillery and the leading cause of Ukrainian deaths. Understanding Russian capacity for shell production and other constraints gives insights into Russia’s ability to sustain this war.

Russia was believed to have started the war with between 1.3 and 1.5 million tonnes of artillery ammunition. This is also the Russian army’s normal stock levels. Approx. half this tonnage was for the 152mm shell. Assuming 700,000 tonnes of 152mm shells, this translates to 14 million 152mm shells in stock. Given that production was well under 1 million shells a year for the last 25 years, some of this stock is over 10 years old.

Russian production of 152mm shells rose steadily from 155000 in 2014 to 733260 in 2021. Additionally, refurbishment of old shells is approx. half the production of new shells. If no old shells are refurbished, Russian production will increase in theory to 1 million 152mm shells with the same capacity utilization of production facilities. British intelligence estimate is for production to have increased to 1 million in 2022, while Ukrainian estimates are 1.2 million (2.4 million units of all types)

Increasing production is not simply a matter of running extra shifts. Russian armaments plants were facing a manpower shortage in 2021 to meet existing orders. This has been exacerbated with mobilization. There is also a shortage of machine tools due to sanctions.

Estimates of Russian consumption of 152mm artillery have varied widely, with some estimates of 50,000 shells a day reported in the mainstream media. However, this almost certainly pertains to all types of shells and rockets and possibly 125mm tank rounds and mortar shells. A more credible estimate of 152mm shell consumption would be 20,000 / day. Thus, the first year of war would have consumed 7 million 152mm shells. Add 1 million shells lost from counter battery strikes. To the remaining stock of 6 million shells must be added production of 1.2 million 152mm shells. Hence, Russia started the 2^nd year of war with 7.2 million shells. Russia would therefore have to reduce consumption in 2023, in order to have a reasonable stock of shells at the end of year 2.

By most accounts the usage of 152mm shells has fallen by half in 2023. The proportion of non 152mm rounds has also increased, both of which confirm the effort to conserve 152mm rounds. The news of old T-64 and even T-55 tanks being used by Russia was greeted with some derision by the mainstream media. However, these tanks are used as artillery in a direct fire mode, with their 115mm and 100 mm guns being quite effective in certain roles. There is also more use of 120mm mortars.  At a consumption of 3.5 million 152mm shells in year 2, with production of 1.5 million, Russia will end year 2 with a stock of 5.0 million shells (assuming 200,000 lost from counter battery fire).   

The use of more drones and better fire control systems by Russia in 2023, have led to improved artillery effectiveness – almost the same result is achieved from half the number of shells and shells of a lower caliber. 

Apart from shell production capacity, a constraint for artillery is barrel life of the gun. A 152mm gun barrel, if maintained properly, will have to be replaced every 3000 rounds, else shells will be increasingly less accurate and in extreme cases, barrels can burst – there have been several cases of that during the war. NATO guns have barrels replaced more frequently.

It is estimated that upto 1200 152mm guns (mostly self-propelled) have been used by the Russian army in Ukraine. This is approx. 9000 shells per gun, requiring 2 barrel changes to date.

Pre-war Russia had in active service, 1746 152mm SP guns and 390 field (towed) 152mm guns.
There is a reserve of 2675 * 152mm field guns and 1650 * 152mm SP guns.
 
160 field guns and 315 * 152mm SP guns were destroyed or seriously damaged as per the Oryx website.
It leaves 1660 guns in active service which is more than the 1200 required in the current Russian order of battle. Another 1200-1500 guns have been taken from the reserve to provide barrel replacements.
Barrel replacement capacity (constrained by lack of machine tools is estimated at around 1200 152mm barrels a year, so the cannibalization of 1200 barrels from reserve stocks has provided the required number of barrels so far. 

Current losses have halved to 150 guns per year, which equals the rate of production.
At the current consumption of 3.5 million shells a year from 1200 guns (more including losses), barrel replacement requirements will equal capacity. The possible supply of upto 1 million 152mm shells by North Korea will provide a buffer to the above calculation.

There are similar figures for 122mm artillery (fewer guns and correspondingly fewer shells). A supply of 300,000 shells by Iran has provided a buffer to ensure that the current rate of consumption can be sustained, as it equals production and barrel replacement capacity.
 
For Ukraine, the same constraints are more serious. Their pre war artillery was similar to Russia’s but their local production facilities for ammunition are mostly destroyed and most sources of 152mm ammo have already supplied their stocks to Ukraine (stock is limited as the largest stocks are with China and North Korea). NATO has supplied 105mm and 155mm guns. Ammunition for them is hand to mouth – their current consumption of 5-6000 shells a day across all calibers, has been for their counteroffensive, where stocks were built up.  This may drop to as low as 1-2000 shells per day. The more serious problem however is that a third of the imported guns have been verifiably destroyed and the rest are at the point of barrel replacement, or require spares – both of which will have to be supplied from outside Ukraine.

For e.g. 152 M-777 towed howitzers and 69 M109 SP guns (both using 155 mm shells), were supplied to Ukraine by NATO. Of these, 63 M-777 and 30 M-109 were known to have been destroyed by June (Oryx has apparently not been recording figures after that). A similar number may either have been destroyed and not recorded by Oryx, or damaged and unable to be used without leaving the country. The few remaining guns need to get shells from sites dispersed across a large front and, if they do, would require barrel replacements.

As argued in my previous article, it gives Russia a window of opportunity to conduct a limited offensive to move to a more defensible line, with Ukraine’s firepower per unit being at its lowest point since the war began and Russia able to indefinitely sustain a rate of 9000 152mm shells – with the use of drones and better fire control systems making that as effective as the far higher consumption rate of last year.