What an Israeli invasion of Gaza might look like

 

I will write about the military aspects of the Gaza conflict rather than analyse who is right – there are already innumerable articles on the political aspect of this conflict by people of every persuasion and I have nothing new to contribute.  

I do not think the factors that determine the success of military operations have been adequately covered in the mainstream media (incl. Israeli sources). The numbers presented are often misleading and numbers I consider more relevant have not been considered. I believe the following analysis is more helpful in understanding what might happen.

Previous conflicts in Gaza:  Previous ground incursions into Gaza, or Lebanon were preceded by days of air and artillery strikes and a limited ground incursion, with infantry used sparingly. Air strikes have always killed more civilians than militants (as per neutrals like UN agencies). Typically 3 civilians for every militant killed (though the definition of militant might include every man of military age). The disproportionate response strategy Israel has followed over the years has not helped curb the insurgency and is now being used to sway world opinion against Israel – the high level of civilians before the attack on the hospital, make allegations that Israel was responsible more credible. Israel cannot abandon that strategy now because it will mean higher casualties, now can they, in a fight to the end, continue to inflict a high level of civilian casualties.

Previous conflicts in Gaza (and the 2006 Hezbollah war) have had clear objectives and it did not take more than a month to understand if those were achieved. Before the conflicts ended, both sides had serious negotiations and accepted an imperfect truce, because neither wanted a fight to the finish.   

Implications of 7^th Oct: I believe there are two, which have not been fully appreciated.
It was done on the 50^th anniversary of the Yom Kippur war. Given the symbolism the Arab world attaches to that day, it was the one day Israeli intelligence and its armed forces should have been on maximum alert. Though Yom Kippur fell in Sept this year, the attack took place on a holiday – after the 7 day Sukkot period. Not being alert during this time, was not just a failure of intelligence, but negligence - unlike the 1973 intel failure, when the Israeli leadership did correctly interpret and then act on intelligence reports. The use of drones by Hamas should not have come as a shock to Israel, since the Gaza strip has more surveillance than any other area on earth. Israeli intelligence would therefore have a much lower level of confidence in assessing Hamas’s future intent.

The casualties Hamas inflicted in attacks on IDF bases surprised me. India has fought insurgencies for decades and have had bases attacked - Indian bases have nowhere near the level of security and ability to survey the external environment as the IDF does, but to have senior officers killed or taken prisoner would be unheard of. The events of 7th Oct might cure India of its fantasizing over Israeli methods and the Mossad.  

Most Israeli casualties – and all Hamas’s success to date, came in the first few hours of this conflict.
Considering that past conflicts have always had Hamas state their demands early in the conflict, they could have done so this time, if they wanted a negotiated settlement while enjoying the perception that they had won. They could have for e.g. stated that their objectives were to demonstrate that they could strike at Israel if pushed and to secure the release of political prisoners in exchange for hostages. If Israel refused to negotiate (unlike in the past) Hamas would have had the high moral ground. Not offering a ceasefire and negotiations was either a strategic mistake (which might distance the other Palestinian groups form Hamas) or part of a plan to goad Israel into attacking.

Israel on its part also retaliated immediately with air strikes – which it has always done in the past. The call up of 300,000 reservists – which is all of Israel’s active reserve pool, without looking at negotiating, is an indication that Israel also wanted a fight to the finish. If all reservists are mobilized, they have to be used quickly, as the civilian economy will otherwise be crippled. Not using them will be a huge loss of face from which the Israeli govt, already unpopular and under a lot of pressure would not be able to recover from.   

The only factor which might influence Israeli actions is the position of the US. The US has apparently given a blank cheque to Israel to act as it sees fit. The current situation seems similar to 1914 when Europe sleepwalked into WW1, which started when a great power (Germany) gave a client state (Austria-Hungary) a free pass to act as it saw fit against a small insurgent state (Serbia).

Israel’s Order of battle.
It is a myth that the IDF (Israeli defence forces) continues to be a `people’s army’. In theory, there’s compulsory conscription for all men and women. In reality, exemptions mean less than half of those turning 18 enlist as conscripts. 

The size of the regular Israeli army (not the larger IDF) is 129000.
Of these, 107000 are conscripts. About 20% of these conscripts at a minimum, would be undergoing basic training, giving the army an effective strength of 108,000 plus reserves. The `tip of the spear’
however, comprises just 22,000 men in the army, of which less than half serve in the infantry, which
is the most important arm for urban combat.

 In 2015, reforms in the IDF under the Gideon multi-year plan (GMYP), shortened the length of service of male conscripts (from 36 months to 32), cut 5000 officer and senior non-commissioned officer posts (a 10% reduction) and more significantly, reduced the size of the active reserve by 100,000 to around 350,000. I think it is significant that all Israel’s reserves have been mobilized (estimates vary from 300,000 to 360,000) for this conflict for the first time since the 1973 Yom Kippur war.  

Reservists who had traditionally been called up for refresher training for a month each year, have had this training time reduced to just 20 days in 3 years. Earlier this year it was doubled to 2 periods of 20-day mobilization every 3 years. However, most reservists have been called up with only a 20-day training period in the last 3 years. This assumes all those called up attend training. The number of those not doing so, for various reasons, has been increasing over the years (as acknowledged by Israel’s Institute for national security studies) and estimated at as much as 40%
This was exacerbated by the recent public protests in Israel over govt legislation around judicial reform, where many reservists said they will not serve (though they invariably would, if Israel faces an existential crisis).  

Israel’s standing army comprises 4 infantry, 1 parachute and 1 special forces brigade and 3 armored brigades. Armored brigades will be of limited use in urban combat, leaving 6 non armored brigades. 1 of these has to be based on the Lebanon border (facing Hezbollah) while another, the Kfir brigade is almost permanently based in the West bank as a counter insurgency force. This the bulk of the fighting in Gaza will fall to 4 brigades, with a combat strength of about 14,000 men, of
which about 10,000 are infantry.  The last major operation in Gaza, in 2014, where no reserves were called up, had 4 infantry and 3 armored brigades of the IDF deployed in Gaza.

The IDF reserves are formed into 13 Infantry and parachute brigades and 9 armored brigades.
These have a combat strength of approx. 75,000 men. A third of these, at the least will have to be
deployed on the Lebanon/Syria border and the West bank.
Hezbollah forces on the Lebanon and Syria border have at least 30,000 men. With a much larger border than Gaza to cover,  the IDF would have to deploy 4 infantry and 2 armored brigades here,
as was the case in the 2008 war with Hezbollah and appears to be deployment now.

This leaves just 2 infantry/Para and 1 armored brigade to cover the entire West bank and for a
strategic reserve.  What remains is 14 reserve brigades (8 infantry /para and 6 armored) for Gaza, of which the 6 armored brigades will be of limited use in the kind of urban warfare that Gaza will require.  The remaining 8 brigades have an infantry strength of about 20,000 men.
Hence, the probable order of battle of the IDF for an invasion in Gaza would be:

Standing army: 2 infantry, 1 parachute and 1 Special forces brigade and 2 Armored brigades.
Reserve: 8 infantry/Para and 6 armored brigades.

Thus, the fighting in Gaza will mostly be done by about 30,000 Israeli infantry, backed up by about 20,000 men in the armored corps (tanks) and artillery. In theory, they can field about 900 tanks and 500 artillery guns, though the constraints of operating in a heavily up area, would mean a smaller number are required. A shortage of shells in prolonged combat would also be a constraint, since the IDF is structured to fight short wars.     

The IDF in Gaza would face an estimated 40,000 fighters of Hamas (30,000) and Islamic Jihad (10,000) Almost all are trained as light infantry, with varying degrees of proficiency. The only scenario they have trained for, constantly and over several years, is an Israeli invasion of Gaza.
Of the estimated 30,000 Hamas fighters, the `core' is probably closer to 15,000 men divided into
6 brigades. 

In recent instances of Urban combat – Grozny, Fallujah, Mosul and Raqqa the attacking force significantly outnumbered the defenders. This allowed for assaulting forces to be rotated, since urban combat is more stressful than the conventional warfare in open terrain that the IDF has historically fought.  Efficiency of men in urban combat drops significantly after a few days of sustained combat – more so for reserve soldiers with no combat experience, or even coordinating with units around them.

IDFs experience in Urban combat

Battle of Jenin 2002  A 5000 strong IDF force (6 infantry battalions) fought several hundred Palestinians (Fatah, Hamas and Islamic Jihad). IDF casualties were 23 dead and 52 wounded,
and Palestinian casualties between 27 – 48 killed. It was an indication of what might happen in a largely infantry vs infantry fight, with inexperienced reserve soldiers.

Lebanon (Hezbollah war) 2006  This was not an urban war, but had some of its characteristics.
In a 34 day war, a strong 10,000 IDF  force (later supplemented by 20,000 reservists) fought an estimated 3000 Hezbollah fighters (with another 7000 in support or reserve). The IDF lost 121
men killed and 1244 wounded. Hezbollah is believed to have lost between 250 – 600 men. 
A further 800 civilians were killed in Israeli air and artillery strikes (International organisations list 1191 dead, incl. 250 Hezbollah fighters), though Lebanese citizens were technically not party to the conflict. Including the wounded, the IDF had 15% casualties among those involved in actual combat,
in 5 weeks. This was not a sustainable loss rate, which is why Israel decided not to continue the war, despite mobilizing its reserves and leaving the task of neutralizing Hezbollah rockets unfinished. Israel then withdrew from South Lebanon. Hezbollah units took far higher casualties, but those units were rebuilt with fresh recruits – as has happened with Hamas in Gaza.

Gaza 2009 & 2014.
Both conflicts were fairly similar. In 2008-9, the IDF lost 13 KIA and 336 wounded with Palestinian dead being between 500-700 in a 21 day war. 
In 2014, the conflict lasted over a month, the ground operations lasted 15 days. 7 IDF brigades of the regular army (16,000 in combat) faced around 10,000 Hamas and Islamic Jihad and Fatah fighters.
An additional 57,000 reservists were mobilized, but reserve units did not see combat in Gaza.

The first week of both conflicts had the same air and artillery strikes that characterized all similar operations in Gaza. In 2014, the IDF lost 67 killed and 469 wounded. The Palestinian forces were estimated to have lost between 693 and 936 men. The ratio of dead to wounded is likely to be far lower for Palestinian fighters, due to the difficulty of being evacuated from the battlefield and poorer quality of medical care compared to IDF wounded.  

In both these Gaza operations, the army had limited objectives (destruction of known tunnels and stopping rocket attacks). Most Palestinian casualties were from air strikes and artillery and not
close quarter combat. Where IDF units were in combat inside Gaza, casualty ratios (Dead & wounded) were probably closer to 1 IDF soldier for 2 Palestinians – as was the case with Jenin
or against Hezbollah in 2006. It’s a casualty ratio Hamas can absorb, not the IDF.

In all cases, the IDF claimed that Hamas and Hezbollah were greatly degraded and its objectives achieved. In reality, both groups have emerged stronger. In a ruthless Darwinian process, surviving Palestinian fighters from each conflict are promoted and share their battle experience with new recruits (of which there is no shortage - given the high number of civilian deaths). In the IDF in contrast, few of the conscripts who saw combat continued in the active reserve. Reservists have
not been deployed in earlier fighting, so units have a collective lack of experience in urban warfare.
It also contrasts with the IDF in the 1948-1973 period when every conscript continued in the reserve which meant even the smallest army unit, a 8 man section, had a combat veteran – as Hamas or Hezbollah do today. 
 
Combat so far: The civilian death toll, even by Israeli estimates, has crossed that of any of the previous Arab Israeli conflicts. On a per day basis, the civilian death toll in Gaza is a multiple of the2009 & 2014 operation. To put it in perspective, more children died in 6 days in Gaza than in 600 days of the Ukraine war. Morality aside, if Israel has adopted a `brute force' approach, instead of relying on tech (precision guided weapons are available in more quantity than earlier) and intel, it is playing into Hamas's hands, since they have probably gamed this response (if not the intensity). It also risks losing the goodwill Israel had after 7th Oct, from its supporters and losing the support of moderate Arabs opposed to Hamas.   

The mobilization of 300,000 (or 350,000) reservists has had some glitches in terms of providing basic kit. When Russia had the same problem providing for its 300,000 newly mobilized men (an exercise done for the first time in decades) there was derision in the West. The same thing happened with a country whose national security depends on swift and efficient mobilization. The delay has however enabled reserve units to get a better understanding of their role in the mission inside Gaza. It will also give Hamas more time to plant IEDs and booby traps, since a lot of the population of North Gaza has moved.   

In the North, Hezbollah seems to be shaping the battlefield, in case they get involved. IDF signals and observation posts are being targeted. as are tanks. 

IDF casualties as of 20th Oct (before the start of any ground operation) are 306 killed (KIA). It would suggest another 1500 wounded. 38 of those killed are women soldiers.   

What we can expect. Only a ground invasion of Gaza can satisfy the Israeli govt’s stated objectives and public opinion. The only thing that might change it, is a climbdown by Hamas, in case the Palestinian groups fall out and it is proven that the attack on the hospital was a Hamas false flag.

Beyond a point, air strikes and artillery will bring diminishing returns (that point has probably been reached). The only result will be `shifting the rubble’ (which actually makes defense easier) inflaming of world opinion against Israel and depletion of ammunition stocks. Israel has already asked for the return of 155mm ammunition, which had been stored in Israel, but the US had pledged to Ukraine. High civilian casualties will also increase the chances of Hezbollah involvement.

If Hezbollah only confines itself to rocket attacks and attacks on border infrastructure (it is doing the latter) it will be below the threshold that would justify an Israeli or US attack on Iran. Israeli actions in response to Hezbollah’s firing (air and artillery strikes) will only deplete Israeli stock faster and force the long term deployment of reservists to the Lebanon /Syria border, while resulting in a casualty ratio (if 2006 is an indication) that Hezbollah can absorb and Israel can’t (when combined with losses the IDF would take in a Gaza invasion. Hezbollah’s current actions, like the destruction of hitherto invulnerable Merkava 4 tanks, with older Russian anti-tank missiles are a PR victory. If Israel has to get out of this kind of attritional warfare, it has to escalate, which it cannot do in 2 places at the same time, unless it attacks Iran (or gets the US to do it), or inflict high civilian casualties in Lebanon. The former has the risk of unpredictable escalation and the latter further inflaming opinion in the Arab and Muslim world (and strengthen Hezbollah, as it happened in 2006).

Unlike urban battles like Grozny, Mosul or Bakhmut, where the civilian population had largely left the city, Gaza had over 2 million people. Half a million are men of military age. Under 10% of these (40,000) are officially Hamas or Islamic Jihad fighters. Misidentifying a male civilian as a fighter (he may well be aiding the regular militia, or supporting the cause) will inflate enemy casualty figures and give a false sense of how close Hamas is to being destroyed – Hitler persisted in fighting in Stalingrad for the same reason. In close quarter, hand to hand fighting that urban combat involves,
experience and motivation matter. The IDF’s regular units are expected to be more capable than Hamas, but not reservists. If it is a battle between men who want to live vs. those to expect to die (as ironically, the Warsaw ghetto uprising was) , it will be difficult for the morale of reservists to hold up.

In the 1973 Yom Kippur war, the IDF, which was roughly the same size as the force mobilized today,
lost around 2800 soldiers (10,000 killed and wounded). The casualties were considered so high, it was weeks before they were officially released. They were only acceptable because Israel fought Egypt and Syria (and large forces from Iraq and Jordan) whose combined armed forces were 3 times the size of Israel. If Israel suffers the same level of casualties against a smaller insurgent force, it would be considered a defeat, even if most Hamas fighters are killed at the end of it. 

Since Israel has asked Gaza residents to move to the southern part of Gaza, it would be reasonable to assume that Israel's plan would involve a thrust from East to West (till the sea), cutting the strip in two and reducing the area of operations. Gaza city can then be attacked from 3 sides. Based on similar operations (Mosul, Aleppo, Bakhmut), I would expect that a battle to completely control Gaza would take a couple of months, with the IDF casualty rate being about 900 KIA and 6-7000 wounded. Hamas casualties would be at least double, with a far high proportion of dead. 
There would also be about 50,000 civilian casualties (dead or seriously wounded). In addition the IDF would have casualties from fighting the north (against Hezbollah). The casualty rate would therefore approach 1973 levels - 306 are already KIA before the start of an invasion of Gaza.  

If operations cannot finish in 2 months, the IDFs reserve brigades would start feeling the stress of urban combat and casualty rates would increase. Given the high civilian death toll there would be pressure from both the International community and withing Israel, for a political settlement.
If the IDF can comprehensively defeat Hamas in a month or less, they can claim victory.