Kashmir - 5 years after Article 370

I wrote an article 5 years ago, in Swarajya, when article 370 was revoked.
https://rpdeans.blogspot.com/2023/07/kashmir-way-forward-after-370.html

In that I suggested that developing tourism had the potential to transform the state, by generating hundreds of thousands of jobs. This is what happened in Tibet when mass tourism from Mainland China followed the development of high speed rail, which increased tourism 80 times, to over 40 million a year (compared with 2.7 million visiting the Kashmir valley).   
 
The barriers to this were the completion of long delayed infrastructure projects (such as the
rail project linking Srinagar to Jammu and northern India) and the level of militancy. 5 years after the revocation of article 370 is enough time to see how things progressed.

Militancy:  

	Avg. 2014 - 18	Avg.  Aug ‘19 - Jul 24	Jun-Jul 24
Civilians Killed / year	132	29	9
Security forces killed/ year	71	36	13
Of which J&K police:	18	11	0
Militants killed/ year	177	106	22
Militants arrested/ year	133	258	20
Violent incidents/year	36	26	7

·       Source; satp.org

The drop in the number of civilians killed (from 132 to 29 each year), has been the biggest gain in the last five years, allowing daily life to move closer to normal. Moreover, between 2016 & Aug 2019, 124 of the civilians killed had died during firing by security forces. No such death has occurred in the five years since.

The ratio of militants neutralized (killed or arrested) to Indian security forces killed has moved from 4.36 (from 2014 to 2018) to 10.1 in the last five years. This is not a sustainable ratio for an insurgency.

 More significant has been the reduction in stone pelting incidents – from 1767 in 2018, with 52 instances of bandhs (closures of establishments called by militants), to zero incidents of stone pelting and bandhs from 2022 onwards (after normal life resumed post covid).  

 In June and July 2024 there was an increase in militancy in the Jammu region. 12 Indian army soldiers were killed in July. Last year, my blog post mentioned that India had been very vulnerable in the latter part of 2020, when India was hit by Covid and there was a significant intrusion by the Chinese army into Ladakh, resulting in a clash with deaths on both sides and corps sized formations `eyeball to eyeball’ with every chance of a full scale war. When India reinforced its troops on the LAC facing China, it had to do so by thinning out forces engaged in counter insurgency, particularly in the Jammu region, which was considered close to normal. At the time, instead of taking advantage of the situation, Pakistan proposed a

ceasefire along the LOC, which also led to a drop in militancy. My blog post speculated that this was due to a change of heart by Pakistan, but severe economic difficulties and later a fall in popularity after the army was believed to have engineered the fall of the Imran Khan led government.

The counter insurgency force in J&K, the Rashtriya rifles, comprises 5 sub units:

K force – Kupwara, Baramula and Srinagar
V force – Anantnag, Pulwama, Shopian, Kulgam & Badgam

K & V force operate under KV corps in Srinagar, broadly responsible for the Kashmir valley.

R force - Rajouri and Poonch
D force - Doda and Kishtwar
U force – Udampur and Banihal.

R,D & U forces, were responsible for Jammu, under XVI corps in Nagrota

In 2020, U force was moved to Ladakh, to counter the Chinese army build up. That created a gap in the counter insurgency grid.

Following the `managed’ elections of Feb 2024, which gave Pakistan a government of the Army’s choosing, the army was able to assert its position within Pakistan once again. In April the IMF released $ 1.1 billion for an urgently required bailout (part of a larger package of upto $ 6 billion). My sense is that is when the Pak army decided to revive the Kashmir insurgency, which was showing signs of dying down completely. The thinned out forces in the Jammu region gave opportunity for them to do so.

My blogpost on that:
https://rpdeans.blogspot.com/2023/08/pakistans-economic-implosion.html

Secondary factors in Pakistan’s decision to revive the insurgency, were:
-The election of a former militant, Sheik Abdul Rashid to the Baramula lok Sabha seat in June,
  may  have given Pakistan the impression that militants still have widespread support.

-India was under pressure from both Canada and the US over allegations of killing and plotting
 to  assassinate terrorist supporters in these countries. Since these were first discussed with the  
 Indian government, there was a slowdown in the killing of terrorists and their facilitators by `unknown gunmen’ in Pakistan.
While there were 12 attempts to infiltrate across the LOC in 2022, resulting in the death of
18 militants, there were 40 militants killed in 2023, when trying to infiltrate across the LOC.

In the words of a former army officer, who recently served two stints with the Rashtriya rifles in the Jammu area (identity withheld): Expansion of terms in red is mine
 
With an increased focus on the Valley over the past decade and a half, the CI (Counter insurgency) Ops grid in the region has shifted, creating a force vacuum and taking a toll on the int networks, relationships with the locals and police in the region, and overall general preparedness. With the entire Uniform Force moved out of the region following Op Snow Leopard (deployment against the PLA in Ladakh), our forces are spread very thin.

During the first few times, one would be foolish to not admit that there was a genuine lack in preparation. QRT vehicles weren't fully hardened, drills weren't fully set in motion, and really, there was little expectation that one could be brutally ambushed, especially as seen in Macchedi, Kathua.

The way forward: The entire CI/CT grid has been reactivated, and active measures are being taken at all levels. There is still an immense lack of political and bureaucratic will to carry out a large scale operation on the lines of Op Sarp Vinash and Op All Out due to calendar proximity to the Assembly Polls. All we can do it wait and watch. The army is preparing itself regardless of whether we get the go ahead or not to avoid further loss of life.

 Our relationship with the locals needs to significantly improve. I think it's only uphill from here now, as the int networks are rebuilt and the CI Ops grid slowly comes back into shape. Yes, OGWs (Over Ground civilian Workers, supporting terrorists) are active and locals have been forced into helping militants, but otherwise the locals have shown a lot of support, which one can see from how actively involved the VDG's (Village defence groups) have been. With forces spread thin, the VDC's have not only played their role well, they have exceeded expectations and gone beyond their capabilities to aid operations.

 Maximum infiltration is taking place from the IB (International border, south of the LOC) sectors, but that doesn't mean the BSF is sitting idle. No use playing a blame game when interoperability and force synergy is needed the most. No BSF units are under army operational control by the way. They're doing good work, just more needs to be done, for which existing army assets in the area can be utilised better.

Vehicles are already being modified to counter ambushes. See, if QRTs and escorts are hardened enough to survive the first contact, and lay down suppressing fire, ambushes can easily be overcome. The best way to survive a bullet is to not be shot at. Armored cabs, armored skirts and anti-grenade net mods are more than sufficient.

Similar points were made by Maj Gen GD Bakshi (who commanded R `Romeo’ force of the RR).
https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=330098083493047

Tourism: Tourism numbers are deceptive because they include visitors to both Jammu and Kashmir. Most tourists visit Jammu (mostly the Vaishno Devi temple) and the reason they do not visit Kashmir is the lack of non-stop rail connectivity and limited airline capacity.
Though the railway project is still pending (with the latest of several missed deadlines being Dec 24) tourism numbers in Kashmir are at an all time high:

(Source: Govt of J&K)

2016 – 1.26 million (compared to 12.3 visiting Jammu)
2017 -  1.22 million
2018 – 0.83 million (while Jammu numbers increased to 16 million).
2019 – 0.56 million
2022 -  2.67 million  (2020 & 21 had low tourism due to covid curbs)
2023 – 2.71 million  (Jammu remained 16 million)
2024 Jan-June 1.56 million (20% over 2023).

While overall tourist numbers into Kashmir have increased 2.5 times (from 1.26 to a likely 3 million
in 2024), foreign tourist numbers have remained static and negligible – 56,000 in 2018 and 37,000 in 2023. An indicator of normalcy will be the presence of a large number of foreign tourists in Kashmir.

Interestingly branded hotel chains in 2022-23 reported a 58% average occupancy- with average room rates increasing from Rs 2701 in 2018-19 to Rs 9860 in 2022-23.

The number of branded hotel rooms in the pipeline, in the Kashmir valley equals current rooms. The hotel industry therefore has the ability to handle more tourists. The problem however is lack of development of other critical infrastructure. I’d like to highlight areas that were actionable by
the government and results could have been achieved by now, particularly when the govt needs to highlight that the State is better off without article 370.

The IWT (Indus Water Treaty): In what is perhaps the most unequal water sharing agreement in the world, India is entitled to 20% of the water from the Indus and its tributaries, while Pakistan gets 80%. When these rivers flow from India to Pakistan, India’s share of water should have been more equitable, to state it mildly.

The various terrorist attacks on India, including in recent years, when J&K was administered from the Centre, should have been cause enough to renegotiate the treaty, or abrogate it.
What is worse is that India has not got utilized the power or water it is entitled to under the treaty. Nor have we completed projects which Pakistan has objected to under the treaty.

My old blogpost on the IWT (first written in 2016 as part of a paper on Pak). 
https://rpdeans.blogspot.com/2023/07/water-wars-revisiting-indus-water-treaty.html

Power: J&K (the old undivided state) has the highest untapped potential for generating hydel power, which is estimated at over 20000 MW. Yet only 3200 MW has been exploited and J&K has an installed capacity of just 3700 MW from all sources. In comparison Himachal Pradesh has an installed capacity of 11300 MW and with half the population of J&K and similar weather, has a domestic power consumption which is almost the same as J&K.

3700 MW is also estimated to be peak demand (which is highest in winter) in J&K. In theory, there should be no shortage. However, of the 3700 MW of installed capacity, 2300 comes from Central hydel plants operated by NHPC. Only 12.5% of the power they generate is consumed by J&K, The rest supplies the grid in North India. J&K is required to buy any further power it needs (and generates) from NHPC for which it does not have funds. What is worse is that power generation (due to lower levels of river water in winter) is least in winter, when demand is most. Peak power shortage is at least 600 MW (19% of demand) which is the worst in India. A solution is wind or solar energy, but this has made little progress in the last 7 years of central rule (only 21 MW is from non hydel renewable energy).
Average power generation has remained unchanged since 2017-8. Although 7000 MW of new projects have been announced, 4 projects of 2026 MW are actually under construction, of which one project generating 123 MW, should be complete by the end of 2024. 123 MW will be less than the incremental power demand this year. 
 
J&K also has the highest transmission and distribution losses (44% against a national average of 20%) partly due to old equipment. Thus, J&K, which exports power to other states and has large untapped potential is the state with the most power shortages as a percent of demand.
  
Source: Central Electricity authority & Jammu & Kashmir Power development dept.

Interestingly, Pakistan administered Kashmir assesses its hydro power potential (which is less than 
on the Indian side) at 18,000 MW and they have an installed capacity of just 2500 MW. 

Water: J&K, through which major rivers supplying water to several states (and most of Pakistan) flows perversely has severe water shortages, for both drinking and irrigation, not just because of an unequal treaty but because India has not developed the water resources allowed to it. Back in 1960, J&K irrigated 274000 hectares of land. Today it is just 319000 hectares. A barely 16% increase, when 25% of the land used for paddy cultivation could not be sown this year, due to lack of water. Srinagar has a shortage of 5 million gallons of water a day – when it has lakes and a river running through it. 

The Tulbul project, which would enable navigation of parts of the Jhelum river, as well as flood control and increased power generation in winter, was suspended in 1987, as Pakistan protested. When work was attempted to be resumed in 2012, there were attacks by militants. Surely with a change of govt since 2014 and relative normalcy in the State, the project can be completed. 

Apples: Apple farming employs more people than tourism and contributes 8% to the state GDP.
While agriculture depends to a large extent on the weather, there is an area where Govt intervention could have helped. Kashmir sells around 2 million tons of apples outside the state. This year, (after first facing losses due to covid lockdowns) a warm winter damaged the crop.
However, along with reduced yields, the price of apples also fell, as India imported a record quantity of apples for the year ending June 24. Imports increased by 70% to 510,000 tons. The reduced yields and price are a double whammy for Kashmiri farmers. The situation is exacerbated, as apples from Iran are mis-labeled as being of Afghan origin, attracting no import duty. It was only in 2023 that a MSP for apples in Kashmir was started.   

Transport:
There was a significant improvement in road and highway development, in line with investments made across the country. In particular reducing the road transit time between Jammu and Srinagar, by the completion of pending tunnel projects. However, there continue to be delays in other areas.   

Status of the Udhampur-Srinagar Line: This is the most delayed and, in my view, most important railway project in India with the delay currently at 261 months. After 2019, work was expected to be expedited, but revised deadlines have still been missed. The cost has increased from 2500 cr. to 41000 cr (of which 39863 has been spent). The project was 98.5% complete as of May 24 with the commissioning date now Dec 24.

Airports: While the government has highlighted the construction of 72 new airports in India at a cost of an estimated 100,000 crore, there are none in J&K, where there are existing facilities that can be converted for civil traffic.
Srinagar airport (also used by the IAF) now operates for longer hours, but has no flights between 9 pm and 7.30 am. International flights which started in 2009, where stopped.

Kargil was originally opened as a civil airport, but is now used only by the IAF. Not having civil flights because they are unviable, becomes a chicken and egg situation with no supporting infrastructure around Kargil because there is no civil airport. If a reverse auction is conducted for starting civil flights (lower capacity ATR’s) and some basic tourist infrastructure in place, there is
scope for military and adventure tourism and it can be an extension of a Srinagar centric Kashmir holiday. This is also possible with Thoise (IAF airfield) which has a long runway that can accommodate a A320 or Boeing 737 and where civil charter flights already operate for the transport of army personnel. The govt has the intention of developing both airports, but nothing has so far happened.

Nepal, which has similar terrain, smaller in size and poorer than J&K has developed tourism, with 3 International and 29 domestic airports (albeit for small capacity flights).

Key economic data: Source - Economic survey of J&k

The state GDP grew at higher than the national average, both before and after the abrogation 
of article 370 (from 2014-2023). As a result, the state moved from having 72% of India's average
per capita income to 78% 
GST collections in J&K are less than Himachal Pradesh and is too small to assess if there is a big 
change in the economy in the last few years.

There is no other verifiable data to compare development before and after the abrogation of article 370.
The economic survey has reams of data, but no before and after comparison and a lot of it is `statements of intent'.  For e.g. the Govt has said that the state has received investment proposals of over 85,000 cr since 2019. By Dec 2023, the actual investment was just 5319 crore, though there have been covid related delays, with 4182 crore of this investment coming in the last 2 years. Similarly, there was a promise to fill 50,000 vacancies in govt jobs. Two years later, 18,000 posts were advertised, but no data on how many additional people were hired. 

The J&K govt has a single window portal for investors (singlewindow.jk.gov.in) which has been integrated with other government departments. Grievances of the public pertaining to all govt departments are part of this portal. Of the 4335 grievances registered, only 1034 were resolved on time, 365 resolved with a delay and the rest pending, which does not suggest governance has improved.

 Barring China, the reaction of the International community to the abrogation of Article 370 has either been muted, or one of quiet acquiescence. One noteworthy position has been that of the Taliban Govt in Afghanistan, which has mentioned Kashmir (the Pakistan controlled part) as being separate from Pakistan. Their position is that the Wakhan corridor borders China and Kashmir (not Pakistan).   

Rather than politics, I have covered the above areas, as they those which will have the most impact on people’s lives. I have considered parameters where a visible difference can be made in five years. 

Note; When referring to J&K, I mean the Union territory of Jammu and Kashmir excluding Ladakh, though I have sometimes just said `Kashmir'. 
All figures refer to Jammu and Kashmir. Where the figures are skewed because of Jammu (e.g. tourist arrivals) I have said so.