Agnipath - Analysis and the way forward
Agnipath has been touted as the biggest reform in military recruitment in India.
In brief, it is a scheme which seeks to recruit all those below officer rank
for an assured period of
4 years only, after which only 25% will be retained for a further 15
years.
The
details of the scheme, as elucidated by the govt are here:
https://loksabhadocs.nic.in/Refinput/New_Reference_Notes/English/15072022_141146_102120411.pdf
When details of the scheme were first announced in June 22 (rather suddenly for such a major reform), the reaction from the veteran community was largely negative. The media reported the emotional sound-bites more than the underlying facts. The govt, on the other hand seemed to suggest that the services were resistant to change and that the scheme was well though through.
The best fact based criticism of the scheme I have seen came from Lt Gen. P.R
Shankar in his
blog https://gunnersshot.com/ where, in a number of posts and video clips,
he has highlighted basic
operational problems which make the scheme unworkable and suggested that even a
basic analysis of the numbers was not done. In Dec 23, that the former Army
Chief, Gen. Naravane was reported to have said that the scheme was like `a bolt
from the blue’, which vindicated this assumption.
Among the criticisms of the scheme are the obvious - to anyone doing manpower
planning, that if the average length of services is a third of what it was
earlier, the number of people being recruited and trained each year has to
increase 3 times. Assuming we have 3 times the number of qualified people in
our manpower pool (we don’t know) there is no physical infrastructure or people
available to train them.
Similarly, there is no mechanism to rank the best 25% of recruits after 4
years. Even if there is, I have a conceptual argument against it. One cannot do
a forced ranking of people when all their work is team oriented.
While proponents of the scheme have expressed satisfaction that by X years,
half the service will be short term Agniveers, when one gets down to the level
of a squad or individual gun, the ratio gets skewed to a point where efficiency
will significantly decline.
I am not qualified to comment on the operational challenges and for the sake of
argument, lets assume some of these challenges can be overcome. For e.g. the
Russian army more than doubled its army intake (from 200,000 conscripts to
550,000 per year) within a year, during its ongoing war.
At a geopolitical level, this will be the reason relations with Nepal (a time
tested friend) will be ruined. I had the opportunity to travel to the
Pokhara-Annapurna region of Nepal earlier this year and it was obvious that the
most desired occupation for the Gurung, Tamang, Magar and Chhetri people that comprise the Gurkhas, was in the British and the Indian armies.
Agnipath has ruined their job prospects – in a country where unemployed youth
led a communist insurgency and are leaning towards China.
I'm not suggesting that recruits from Nepal be treated preferentially, but that disregarding Nepal's concerns seems to be in line with the way the scheme was announced. Recruits from the Himalayan states of Himachal, Uttaranchal and Sikkim will have similar concerns as the Nepali Gurkhas.
As the
operational shortcomings are covered in detail, I’d like to look at Agnipath,
from the point of view of someone who has worked in large organisations in the
private sector. I’d like to examine if the reasons for implementing Agnipath
were valid (if it’s not broken why fix it), by looking at open source data and
how one might improve the current system with elements of the Agnipath scheme.
I started my corporate career, as a management trainee in Hindustan Lever Ltd
(now HUL). In our 15 months of training, it was clear that the company was
spending a large amount on our training (apart from our high salary – by the
standards of the time). We were expected to learn more than contribute. Yet,
after the training period, we were free to leave and some did, as a HUL manager
or trainee, was highly coveted by industry.
This taught me two things:
- Organizations strive to attract and retain the best talent &
- If your employees are good, they will be in demand elsewhere.
My concern about Agnipath (even without going into operational details) is that
the government is
trying to remove its talent rather than retain it. There is concern that
employees who are made to leave, will not be in demand elsewhere (i.e. not good
enough). Both these should be cause for serious introspection.
The Agnipath scheme has the following stated and unstated objectives:
- To reduce the average age of the armed forces from 32-33 to around 26
- To reduce the pension bill.
- To increase the education levels of the armed forces at entry level.
- To broad base recruitment by attracting those who may want to serve on a
short term basis only.
For the
purpose of this analysis, I will mention figures pertaining to the army, since
data for the
other 2 services is sketchy, both in India and for other countries.
Challenging
assumptions:
1. Reducing
average age.
A stated objective of Agnipath is to have a `more youthful’ profile for the
armed forces by reducing the average age from 32-33 to 26. The current age of
the army is closer to 33, since no recruitment has taken place during covid.
However, an average age of 32.5 can be assumed if the recruitment system pre
Agnipath. A desired average age of 26 was considered more than other major
armies that have been listed when the govt made the case for Agnipath (as
stated to the high court in a
petition challenging Agnipath). 26
years is far from true.
In the UK, whose army became the model for the Indian army, the average age of
the army is
31. It was 29 in 1973, an increase of 2 years over time.
The average age of the US army is now 28.9 years. It was 22 in the Vietnam
war.
Interestingly, the average age of the US deployed in combat (Iraq and
Afghanistan) was 33.5
because it relied heavily on the older national guard and army reserves.
Source: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK206861/
Germany, which moved away from conscription to an all-volunteer army has the
same average
age as the Indian army – 32.8 years.
The Russian army was cited as being a conscript army. In reality only 15% are
conscripts (260,000 conscripts, of which 130,000 have completed training and
assigned to a unit, from a total strength of 900,000 in the armed forces (pre
2022). There are details of 56858 deaths in the Russian army in the ongoing war
in Ukraine. Of these, the ages of 47300 KIA are known, which is a large sample
size.
The average age of the dead is 35.3
years.
A large proportion of the dead are in infantry units, which should have a lower
average age than the army as a whole, yet the average age of the dead is over 35 years. The Russian army is getting
more volunteers than it needs and can equip, so it can choose the age profile
it needs and is consciously choosing men who are 30+ (the opposite of what
Agnipath is trying to achieve). Source:
https://en.zona.media/article/2022/05/20/casualties_eng
The
average age of the Ukraine army is 43, but that is misleading, as a lot of men
in younger age groups are casualties. Significantly however, even pro-Russian
channels have not reported any instance where a unit of mostly older men
(national guard units have older men) have broken and fled, or surrendered, under heavy artillery fire, including fuel air munitions.
The average age of the Chinese army has increased by 2 years since their
military reforms, due to
an increase in joining age, in order to take in more university educated men.
For the same reason the Russian army has relaxed the upper age of conscription
to 30 from 27. We are moving towards
younger soldiers while major armies are moving in the opposite direction.
In support of the Govt’s view, the US marines, which are considered a light
infantry force, has an
average age of 25.3 (because they recruit a higher proportion of 17 & 18
y.o’s than the army and
(like Agnipath) have a lower rate of re-enlistment with a `up or out’ policy
for promotion, but even that is being reviewed.
The
debate about age in my view misses the point. The assumption being made is that
a 22 year old is fitter than a 32 year old and the increase in fitness (which
is unproven and debatable), is worth
the trade-off in the (real) inexperience of the younger person. The average
Olympic marathon runner is 31. The average ages of Olympic Triathletes and long
distance walkers are also 30+
I believe the age question should be looked at differently:
Is there an age above which a significant proportion of personnel cannot
meet the demanding physical standards the army requires ?
The US army’s physical tests allow for a drop in standards above the age of 37.
Assume for the sake of argument that fitness drops after age 38 (since data for
people above 38
is available). Less than 10% of Indian army Persons below officer rank (PBOR’s)
are over 38. It is the same 10% in the US, British and even Israeli army and
higher in the Russian army. Therefore the Indian army in its pre-Agnipath form
is no more likely to have problems with the fitness of older men, than any
other major army that had apparently been studied before finalizing Agnipath.
A larger problem across the world, is that lifestyle problems make it difficult
for 18 year olds to meet basic fitness standards required to join the army. It
is more difficult to get fit 18 year olds to join than it is to ensure that a serving
40 year old soldier continues to meet physical standards.
That said, it’s possible to reduce the average age of the army by 2 years (to
30) without any of the
disadvantages of the current Agnipath scheme, as will be discussed.
Forced
vs. voluntary termination of service: A point repeatedly mentioned by supporters
of Agnipath is that the major armies of the world have short mandatory service
periods. Armies with conscription like Israel, South Korea, Turkey and Russia
have service for between 12 and 30 months.
In the US or UK armies, which do not have conscription, minimum service is 4
years including the training period. The point made is that if a soldier can
grasp complex weapon systems and do what is
required of him, while having less than 4 years of experience, one cannot
complain that Agniveers will lack experience and the army will lose its
institutional memory.
What this argument misses is that the majority of those who join on a voluntary
basis for a 4 year
period in the US or UK, reenlist. 4 years is the minimum period of service, but
the army cannot force
one to leave after that. It is the soldier who decides how long he wants to
serve.
Fully 55% of those who complete their 4 years minimum service term in the UK,
will complete the
full contract of 22 years.
In the US army, the re-enlistment rate (for service of another 2-6 years) is
55%
In other NATO countries reenlistment is above 60%
Thus, less than half of those who complete their minimum 4 year service, leave
(compared to an
intended 75% under Agnipath).
What recent wars have shown: In the Israeli army, regular units (mostly
conscripts with a small
core of long service personnel) have taken more casualties than reserve units
with older reservists recalled to duty. However reserve units have been
deployed for shorter periods than regular units.
On a `casualty per week of combat’ basis, there is no difference in casualties
between regular and
reserve units. I have a blog series on the Gaza war where I analyse casualties
in more detail.
A point
has been made by veterans that it takes years to train a competent tank
crewman. However, the Israeli army has 19 & 20 year olds operating
sophisticated Merkava tanks, which seems to disprove the assumption about the
time taken to develop a competent tankman.
I think a point being missed is that the Israeli army has not faced tank
on tank combat since 1982. Against Hamas, armed with nothing more than RPGs,
tank crew can make mistakes and live.
The Russian army, which is getting more volunteers than it can equip, chooses
older men to man tanks (I understand enough Russian to follow their experiences
on TV). When facing threats from mines, other tanks, sophisticated ATGMs and
drones operated by NATO trained soldiers, they need men who can hold their nerve under fire and also carry out
repairs on the field, with `jugaad solutions’, which experience has taught
them.
I don’t see strong evidence that a younger age group does better than an older
one.
2.
A more tech savvy army An argument for the Agnipath scheme is that
it will lead to a more tech savvy army. While that is a good objective and
every major army is cognizant of it, we cannot have a better qualified army is
the basic level of education required remains the same as pre Agnipath.
Under Agnipath, the minimum level of education is 10th pass and
passing a written test (as before).
In Western armies almost all new recruits have a high school (12 pass) minimum
qualification, with standards of Math and Science in schools typically far
higher than the equivalent level in rural India.
20% of recruits in the US army have some level of college education.
In the UK, those joining below the age of 18 (not finished the equivalent of
class 12) go through a
49 week Army foundation course to put them on par with an 18 y.o. They
therefore have a longer
minimum period of service.
In order to have a higher level of education, the maximum age to join the army
in western countries
has been increasing. While it is 21 for Agnipath (with suggestions to make it
23), it is 35 in the UK and US. Among
armies with conscription, the maximum age is 35 in South Korea and 30 in
Russia.
The lowest maximum age to join among major armies is 23 for Germany and Poland.
At the least, the minimum qualification for entry should be 12th
pass (or enrolled in 12th) with
50% and weightage given for knowledge of Math, computers and STEM. This is what
it is in other
countries, though we will still be behind as the standard of education in small
town/ rural India is
a lot worse than developed countries. In the only instance when India participated
in a global standardized test (PISA), we came 72nd out of 73
countries. The govt’s own assessment of learning outcomes (expected vs actual) in the National achievement survey also points to poor quality. A 10th pass person may have the education expected (by the Govt) from a 6th pass student.
I have commented on this in my blog post on Ed tech.
https://nas.gov.in/report-card/nas-2021
The low level of education of recruits compared to western armies will be
exacerbated under Agnipath, by a shorter training period. It seems to a layman
that to ensure a minimum time of active service,
while not exceeding a 4 year total period in service, the
training time has been cut.
If the overall service exceeded 5 years, gratuity would be applicable.
3.Reduction
in the pension bill: On the face of it, it is a strong argument (though not explicitly
mentioned). Conceptually, with increased life expectancy, a retiring soldier
gets a pension for more
years than he has served, which will cause a problem with the wage and pension
bill of any organisation. The concerns about the ballooning defence pension
were amplified because of increases in recent years due to the implementation
of OROP (one rank one pension). These are, In my view, not valid reasons to
launch Agnipath, where 75% of those recruited will not get a pension. The
following should be kept in mind:
As a result of Agnipath, Pension’s share of the budget will only start falling
when the first batch of
Agniveers reach the theoretical retiring age (had it been regular recruitment
they would be eligible for a pension). That will be in 2040. I have not heard
of any Govt. anywhere in the world taking a decision to hurt its employees now,
so that there can be a benefit after 20 years.
The share
of the pension bill and its growth (more than the overall budget growth) were
because of the payout for OROP. By 2040, the OROP beneficiaries will also die
out and that will reduce the share of the pension bill even without Agnipath.
In any case, a downsizing of the armed forces will probably be inevitable over
the coming years, which will reduce the share of salaries and pension.
The Govt
wouldn’t dare implement an Agnipath equivalent for class C & D central govt
employees
- where the logic for implementation is much stronger. There is a model for
this, in the operations of
Passport offices, where most employees are from TCS and cost a lot less than
Govt employees with a far higher level of service.
Outsourcing of the least complex tasks (like a peon) is standard corporate
practice. The corollary is that the most complex (like soldiering) should be
done by permanent service employees.
There are similarly proposals to outsource some functions in the army. That is
a separate discussion
from Agnipath. Suffice to say, that will also reduce the manpower bill from the
defence budget.
4.Broad
basing recruitment: A simple way to find out if Agnipath is attracting recruits who would
not want long service, is to ask them (in an application form). My sense is
it’s not done because people involved in Agnipath know what the answer will be.
There is also no data from the last 2 years recruitment of Agniveers to show if
the state wise composition of the recruit has changed – changing the skewed
pattern of recruitment where a relatively small number of districts contribute
a large proportion of soldiers (though that is true of all professional
armies). There is however a different kind of profile who may be attracted to
this concept, which I will discuss.
Thus none
of the problems that the scheme seeks to resolve are valid. In trying to solve
problems that don’t exist, the solutions are likely to adversely affect the
quality of the forces.
What should be of great concern is that that once the problems become apparent,
it will be too late to take remedial action.
Post
service opportunities:
Supporters of the scheme have a caveat that the success is subject to Agniveers being placed after
their 4 year service.
After the announcement of the Agnipath scheme there were a lot of
announcements on employment of Agniveers in various govt undertakings, CAPFs,
DPSUs etc.
Critics of Agniveer pointed to the large number of civilians in defence related
establishments who have a large share of the salary and pension bill.
The number of defence civilians are not high, relative to the number employed
in countries like the
US or UK, for which data is available. They are all below sanctioned strength
and part of NPS unlike the armed forces, so criticism in that area may be
misplaced.
However, if one considers the number or retiring servicemen that can be placed:
The largest establishments employing defence civilians AND where specialist
qualifications (graduate and above) are not required are:
Defence Public sector undertakings:
80,000 employees
Border Roads organisation:
34,000
Military engineer services: 62,000
EME
14,000
Misc (HQ, CSD etc) 10,000
Of these 200,000 posts, Agniveers would be eligible to apply for half (where eligibility is non
graduates)
Assuming the average employee works 30 years, there would be only (100,000/30)
= 3333
posts per year that can theoretically be filled by Agniveers. This reduces
further to around 2300
after considering reservations. Thus even if it mandated that ALL civilian
posts that Agniveers are
eligible for be allocated to them, barely 2000 Agniveers will be absorbed. In
reality the DPSU
employees association has opposed even 10% reservation for Agniveers and of the
10% of posts
reserved for ex-servicemen, barely 1% are filled.
There are 970,000 personnel in the CAPF forces. If 10% of these posts are
reserved for Agniveers (announced but not legislated) and assuming 30 years’
service, another 3200 Agniveers can be
accommodated each year.
Under Agnipath, the army will have to recruit over 2 lac soldiers each year.
From this, they intend for 75% or 150000 to leave each year. Not more than 5200
of these can be absorbed in central govt organisations. That is a placement
rate of under 4% (though the govt seems to think it has addressed the concern,
by announcing the intent to place Agniveers).
I have personally recruited both ex officers and those below officer rank in
the organisations I have worked in and have a bias towards recruiting from the
services. While I have not had a problem recruiting ex officers for suitable
positions, there is a problem with those below officer rank.
Someone who has
served 17 years, would barely qualify to be a supervisor in a service industry,
a
job usually done by someone with 5 years’ experience. Someone who has only
served 4 years (who is 10-12th pass) would only be suitable for a
minimum wage job, which is a lot lower in pay and status than the army. While
moving to factory jobs is possible and industry groups have been positive,
manufacturing is largely absent in areas most of the army comes from and its
share in the economy has not grown in the last 10 years.
If, on the other hand, we continue with the current recruitment (pre Agnipath)
of recruiting 65,000 per year and only 25% opt to retire after 4 years, there
will be 16250 people needing jobs, from which 5200 can be absorbed (if the govt
mandates that all eligible people are absorbed in the defence civilian cadre
and there is a mandated 10% quota for Agniveers in CAPFs) and the rest will
have a fighting chance of being absorbed in manufacturing, or starting their
own business.
Possible way forward: (This is applicable to the
army):
Continue recruitment the way it was earlier, with long service contracts.
However:
-The minimum education standard should be 12th pass, or enrolment in
class 12. With 50% in 10th
and 12th (or last year
passed).
- Weightage for studying science, math or computers after class 10.
-As in the case of Agnipath, start with
an All India written test, followed by the physical test and
medical.
- The maximum age to be increased to 23.
- Have the same period of training as was the case pre Agnipath.
- After 4 years, offer all recruits the chance to opt out.
4 years becomes the minimum period
of service, not (for 75%) the maximum.
Those leaving after 4 years get the
same severance package as the current Agnipath scheme
AND first right of refusal for all defence
civilian and DPSU jobs for which they are qualified.
Ideally, 25% of recruits should opt to
leave. If the actual number is not much higher, it will belie the
govt’s claim that 75% of recruits under
the current scheme will not have a problem after they leave.
After 4 years, pension scheme reverts to the New pension scheme (NPS) which is
what the rest of the Central govt has. For those not leaving after 4 years, the
corpus they would have got if they left in 4 years, is added to the NPS amount.
The right to leave continues from the 4th onwards, with retirement
benefits being equal to the NPS corpus. This is no different from any other
organisation.
Early retirements (25% in year 4 and another 8-10% by year 10) will reduce the
average age to 30
and reduce the number of retirees at the end of the service period by a third.
For those reaching pensionable age (completing their contracted length of service), in addition to the corpus under NPS, the govt should pay an amount linked to last salary till the beneficiary reaches the age of 60. Effectively the NPS continues till 60.
If the serviceman joins another central
govt undertaking, before, or at the time of retirement,
he does not get the additional (compensatory) amount till the age of 60. The
accumulated NPS
contribution moves to the new employer. This gives an incentive to the services
to place retirees
(it reduces their pension bill) and increases the overall income of the
ex-serviceman.
The mechanics of the pension calculation is a separate subject. Suffice to say,
my intention is a
proposal that will harmonize pensions for all govt employees, compensate
service personnel for
not being able to work till the same retirement age as other govt employees and
lower the pension
bill as a percentage of the overall defence budget.
A new type of Agnipath: The US army has a cadre of personnel called
warrant officers. They are
ranked higher than all enlisted men and lower than officers. These warrant
officers are recruited for
specialist technical functions once would normally expect form an officer,
though they are usually
not required to command others. This role also existed in the USSR (because
officers were doing a lot of work that conscripted enlisted men could now) was
scrapped and is being re-introduced.
This is different from a warrant officer in the UK (the equivalent of a Subedar
and Subedar Major in India) or a rank in the Air force.
India can look at this cadre to take up specialist technical tasks without the
need for it to be done by officers. These recruits could be hired as `JCOs
(technical)’. In principle, the army has already approved the direct
recruitment of JCO for some functions, so this is an extension.
There are a large number of candidates who clear the CDS (short service
commission) or IMA entrance test, but fall short at the interview stage as they
do not have the required `officer like qualities’. They could be eligible for
JCO technical recruitment, at a level below officer.
It can attract people with STEM degrees, who don’t want to serve for over 10
years, but a shorter period (particularly women). Military service will give
their subsequent civilian career a boost, because they have the basic
qualifications desired by the corporate world.
Those who want to serve as officers can use this scheme to give them an edge if
they appear
again for the IMA or CDS entrance . Hence, candidates can either serve for 6
years, or leave to join
as an officer.
15% of recruits to the US Army academy at West point were former enlisted men.
This scheme will address the shortage of officers and reduce the average age of
JCOs (and therefore the service).
Background links to this idea:
A separate matter which gets mixed with Agnipath, is the trend across the world of reducing the
strength of the armed forces (particularly those in combat roles). That happens because automation
and tech, reduce the need for manpower, or outsource some functions.
This can be done in India too - the Lt Gen. Shekatkar committee had plenty of recommendations. However, one then needs to take better care of those personnel who remain, or reduce their cost.
In summary, the scheme
is, in my view, unnecessary and unworkable in its current form. Tweaking the
older system will bring most of the desired benefits without the
disadvantages.
- I acknowledge the article / videos from Maj Gen. (Dr) Mor and Maj Gen. (Dr) Chandel which have given me
inputs for the post. I have also linked the blog of Lt Gen Shankar.
What a balanced, well reasoned piece!!
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