Ukraine war part 9. Sector wise analysis.

In my last post (part 8), I had suggested that there are credible sources to calculate casualties from
both sides. These estimates match known numbers of the strengths of each army pre-war, recruitment
figures & current strengths, in which the balancing figure is `irreplaceable casualties’, which are
247000 for Russia and 377000 for Ukraine, upto 10 Sept 24.
https://rpdeans.blogspot.com/2024/09/ukraine-war-part-8-casualties-force.html

Based on the known strength of each side in 2024, this post attempts to explain operations in each part of the front, based on Russian strategy, the size of forces on both sides, in each sector and Ukrainian losses this year in each sector.
The following two tables should be referred to.

The first is open source data on the Order of battle (ORBAT) of each side in each sector.
The Second is the Russian Ministry of defense estimate of sanitary losses (all dead and wounded) for
each day this year on every part of the front. As we have seen in the part 8, this estimate closely
matches estimates from Ukrainian sources, of dead & deserted, from which the number of sanitary losses can be derived. The absolute number is moot. What is more important is the trend of losses – increasing at an increasing rate and the break up in each sector this year. 

Opposing forces: Sept 24.  (source theti mapping, confirmed by unit reports)

Sector	Regular army brigades Ukraine	Category 2 brigades Ukraine	Regular army brigades Russia	Category 2 brigades Russia	Sector reserve (forming & not committed to battle) brigades Russia
Kursk	4	3	6	2	2
Kharkov	5	10	6	2	2
Kupiansk	14	6	10	3	3
North Donbass	15	7	18	4	3
South Donbass	13	9	18	5	2
Zaporizhzhia	8.3	9	19	4	1
Kherson	2.6	7	9	3	3

·       Artillery, special forces and foreign fighter brigades are excluded on both sides.

·       Russia has an uncommitted reserve of another 9 brigades

Loss trend by sector 2024 (source Russian MoD, sanitary losses)

Sector	Losses in 2024 (Ukraine) upto 10 Sep	Losses* Aug-15 Sept Ukraine	Loss per brigade/ per month 2024. Ukraine
Kursk	37565	15720	302
Kharkov
Kupiansk	67765	21505	407
North Donbass	90270	21215	493
South Donbass	116815	27625	637
Zaporizhzhia	35459	5100	246
Kherson	15480	3185	194

·       Sanitary losses are all those who were out of combat for at least a day and got medical help.

·       Russia combines losses for Kursk and Kharkov

·       Fighting in the North started only in April (Kharkov) and August (Kursk)

Trends in Ukraine’s sanitary losses:
- 2022  13557 per month
- 2023  21330  per month
- Jan-Apr 2024, 27763 per month
- May-Jul was 52560 per month
- Aug-13 Sept averaging 69159 per month

-Figures exclude desertion, which increased in roughly the same proportion as casualties.
-These losses area assumed to be 5 wounded for every killed. 2 of those wounded will not return to combat and are
  therefore irreplaceable losses. I use the same assumption for Russia.  

A point being made repeatedly, particularly in the Western media, is that the conflict is largely frozen, since neither side has the means to take territory – the loss of territory being the criterion to decide victory.
My view, form the outset has been that Russia’s goal is demilitarization of Ukraine (and NATO to the extent
of weapons supplied), with the loss of territory as a consequence of manpower losses.
Ukraine’s goal is the liberation of territory within Ukraine’s 2014 borders, now occupied by Russia.

Before analyzing each sector, a few broad findings from the forces on each side:

The ratio of forces in Russia favor, has been more in sectors that are quiet – low level of fighting and
fewer Ukrainian casualties. It should be easier for Russia to take territory in Kherson in Zaporizhzhia
sectors, than in the Donetsk region where they have made most progress.

It is generally believed that in modern warfare one needs a 3:1 ratio of attacker to defenders, to overcome a defending force. It may be even more in the Ukraine context, since Ukraine enjoys a huge advantage in ISR (information, surveillance and reconnaissance) and the movement and position of Russian forces can be spotted miles behind the front. This ISR advantage is from NATOs satellite network, electronic surveillance and Ukrainian assets in territory controlled by Russia. This is backed up by a fortified line built since 2015, with a dense concentration of drones, mines and anti tank and anti aircraft missiles. 

If despite this, Russia has been able to make significant progress in the Donetsk sector (North and South) while having parity on forces, on paper – 44 Ukrainian brigades to 45 Russian, it suggests that Ukrainian forces have
been seriously degraded. That is validated by high casualties per brigade in North and South Donetsk, particularly since July, while also losing ground.  

Where Ukraine has an advantage in the number of brigades – Kupiansk and Kharkov, they have been
unable to advance against the Russians. In Kupiansk and Kursk Ukraine is taking high casualties trying
to hold areas of little strategic value. It is in Russia’s interest to continue to inflict casualties at the current rate, without trying to advance, unless they can do so with low casualties.  

Russia has an advantage in the Kherson and Zaporizhzhia sectors, but have not attempted to advance here, partly as it is not priority and because they do not see an opportunity to inflict disproportionately
high losses. However, Russian pressure on key parts of those sectors, forces Ukrainian units to stay in place, while Russian units, who have been in action longer than in other sectors, can be rotated.  

The limitation of logistics.
The Russian army has traditionally been transported by train, which is understandable given the size of the country.  The army has specialist rail brigades tasked with railway transport, loading and unloading.
Truck transportation is designed to operate no further than 100 km from a rail head. 
A Russian brigade has 3/4^th of the trucks of its US counterpart, though it has more artillery.
A Corps of two divisions (Army in Russian nomenclature) has a logistics brigade has 400 trucks to move supplies from a railhead, to brigade level depots. 
It was assumed that if the Russian army mobilizes beyond its 2022 strength, or if it is involved in a long war, trucks will be diverted from the civilian sector to military use (truck models are dual use in Russia).
There is a paper on how Russia’s military logistic operates.
https://www.cna.org/reports/2023/10/Russian-Military-Logistics-in-the-Ukraine-War.pdf
Until now Russia has struggled to supply its formations in the field for the following reasons:

1. The loss of railheads in Kupiansk and Izyum (during Russia’s retreat in 2022) and the long distance
    from the railhead in Taganrog to supply formations in Zaporizhzhia meant distances in excess of
   300 km to be covered from the railhead.
2.Supply depots being targeted by long range guided rockets (HIMARS and ATACAMS) meant depots
   had to be made smaller and dispersed, increasing distances to be covered and hence trucks.
3.The expansion of the Russian army in Ukraine from the equivalent of 26 divisions in 2023 to 46
    divisions today along with the loss of trucks in combat led to a shortage of trucks. There was visual
    evidence of trucks made in Belarus appearing at the front, along with civilian trucks from formerly
    Ukrainian administered parts of Donetsk and Luhansk.
4. Priority was given to the building of defensive structures in the first half of 2023. There was limited
    time to stockpile ammunition and supplies for a major offensive in all sectors.

This, in my view, meant Russia’s offensives, since Nov 23, was focused almost entirely on the Donbass
sector – where the existing road network and storage facilities facilitated logistics.

The logistics problem has been largely resolved, in several ways.
1. A railway line linking Taganrog, to Mariupol and then to Crimea has been completed, along
    with an additional line from Mariupol to Donetsk city. This extends to the existing
    Ukrainian line to reach new railheads in Tokmak and towards Kherson.

Map shows The new railway from Rostov and Taganrog to Crimea. Existing traffic was hitherto moving via
the rail-line through the vulnerable Kerch bridge, and ferries,  which supplied the civilian population of Crimea.
Additional lines (old Ukrainian system) go west from Dzhankol and North from Berdiansk to Tokmak

 

 

The thick blue line is the H-20 highway (and partly E50), which is now out of range of Ukrainian artillery and therefore the main road route for North South movement. The thin line is the newly captured road close to the
current front line. 

2.The H20 highway from Mariupol to Donetsk has been put out of Ukrainian artillery range by Russian
advances since August. (see map) A parallel line closer to the front: Zolota Nyva – Pavlivka- Vuledar-Kostyantynivka-Marinka will open up once Vuledar falls. This enables rapid switching of forces from one
sector to the other and reduces distances between depots and frontline units. 

3. Truck production has surged in 2023 and again in the first half of 2024 and the current rate is double of 2022. Even after accounting for reduced imports (due to sanctions) and an increase in domestic demand, the leading Russian manufacturer Kamaz, produced incrementally more heavy trucks in 2023 & 2024 than all the trucks estimated to have been lost in Ukraine. 

In the previous post in this series (part 8) I had suggested that by the end of 2024, Russian forces will be
at peak strength while Ukraine will be weaker than they currently are, which would enable Russia to launch an offensive across multiple sectors. I believe improved logistics will enable the stockpiling of
weapons, ammunition, fuel and supplies to support this offensive.

Analysis of operations in each sector – clockwise from Kursk.     

Kursk: This had been analyzed in my last article and further developments validated my earlier position.
As many even among Ukraine’s backers had feared,  Ukraine’s incursion into the Kursk region is resulting in a defeat for Ukraine both tactically and strategically. The stated objectives of Ukraine were:
- To divert Russian forces away from the Donbass where Ukraine was losing ground.
- To cause a collapse of morale in Russia (and an increase in Ukraine) by the seizure of Russian territory
   and shore up support for Ukraine in NATO.
- To seize Russian territory, in to be in a stronger negotiating position.

All the territory Ukraine took, was in the first two days of the incursion – though it is pertinent to point out that driving down a road and taking a PR video, before withdrawing to a defensible position is
not `taking territory’. Thereafter Russian forces prevented a further advance and steadily degraded the Ukrainian forces, until a counter attack was launched. As the map shows, the first 3 days of the counter attack retook a third of Ukrainian held territory.

Ukrainian casualties in Kursk and Kharkov upto 14^th Sept (before the Russian counter attack in Kursk)
were 15720. Since the Kharkov sector was quiet since the start of the Kursk operation, the majority
of casualties (around 12,000) were inflicted in the Kursk region. This comes to average of over 1100
`sanitary losses’ per month per brigade, well over the average of 200-600 per brigade per month.
About half of these losses would be irreplaceable.  Given a Ukrainian brigade strength of around 2500, irrecoverable losses of a third of a brigade’s strength in six weeks, would mean a brigade is no longer
in fighting condition. That was what probably prompted Russia to start their counter attack with just
two of their six brigades and still achieve success.

The losses in manpower were exacerbated by high losses in artillery and Anti-aircraft missile systems,
which had to be moved closer to the Russia border to support the incursion into Kursk and became
more vulnerable to Russian attacks.

Doubling down on a bad bet, Ukraine attempted two further small scale incursions on the flank of
the Kursk salient and tried to reinforce its depleted brigades, in both cases using men  with limited training (as per prisoner accounts). They were stopped at the border, because the Russian counter attack into the Kursk salient did not involve all their forces.   

The only brigade Russia moved from another sector to Kursk was the 810 Naval infantry brigade
from the neighboring Kharkov sector, where, as we will see, it was not needed. They have, as of
15^th Sept, not deployed all their local reserves. Thus, the newly formed 72^nd Motorized rifle division
has only deployed its veteran 72^nd brigade. It’s new 128^th brigade has not been actively deployed and the third brigade (probably still being formed) has not appeared in the region.

Apart from the tactical failure - Ukraine will lose the territory they have taken, along with some of their
best brigades and casualties disproportionately higher than Russia. Strategically, Kursk has been a failure
because it caused Russia to gain more territory in its ongoing offensive in the Donbass and possibly cause differences between Ukraine and NATO on basic strategy.

                

Kursk front, after 3 days of the Russian counter attack to recover territory. 
The orange line is the Russia Ukraine border, grey areas are reoccupied by the Russians.

What’s next: In the previous post in this series I had suggested that Russia could launch an offensive
across multiple sectors, this winter. In the Kursk, this will involve reducing the Kursk pocket, then
with Russian forces at full strength (the 72^nd motorized fully deployed) Russia would to a limited
incursion towards the city of Sumy, as they did in Kharkov earlier.   

Kharkov: Russia did in Kharkov in April, what Ukraine might have tried to achieve in Kursk. A modest force of three brigades (now 8) advanced with limited objectives and has managed to tie down 15
Ukrainian brigades, who have unsuccessfully been trying to dislodge them. Because Ukraine’s attacks made no progress, Russia was able to transfer the 810 Marine infantry brigade to the Kursk sector. It is slowly inducting the 69th Rifle division while giving fresh volunteer formations the experience of combat
confident they will not lose ground to a fresh Ukrainian attack. 

The problem, when assuming the war is about territory and cities and not an attritional war, is that Ukraine assumed Russia’s objective was the capture of Kharkov – which was impossible with three
Russian brigades. Ukraine hurriedly withdrew forces from the Donetsk region to contain Russia, which started the Ukrainian collapse in the Donetsk. Having realized that the accumulated Ukrainian force was
not able to take back their territory, Ukraine could have moved to the defensive and freed a couple of
brigades – just as Russia realized its 810 Marine brigade was not required and moved it to Kharkov.

I do not see this sector changing in the coming months. If there is Ukrainian withdrawal from Kupiansk,
Russian forces may move east, to link up with their Kupiansk force and move into a position to threaten
Kharkov with artillery.

Kupiansk:  As shown on the map below, Ukraine, in its autumn 2022 offensive, crossed the Severo Donetsk river and seized the logistic hubs of Izyum and Kupiansk. I believe that was Ukraine’s biggest
success in the war. Ukraine then crossed the Oskol river to liberate more territory but were stopped and
this part of the front was almost static from Oct 2022 to early 2024.
In 2023, though Ukrainian forces outnumbered Russia’s they were unable to make further headway, but remained east of the Oskil river, which is a more difficult area to defend. In 2024, Ukraine has had to move brigades from this sector, north to Kharkov and to the Donetsk, while Russia added the equivalent of four brigades, manned with of new volunteers who have been getting battle experience, before probably being formed into at least one new division. Throughout 2024, Ukrainian forces and their supply lines across the Oskol river have been attacked resulting in high losses per brigade an relative to Russian forces. Since August, Russia has made gains in three areas, as the front moves closer to the Oskol river, though it is Ukraine that has 20 brigades to Russia’s 14.
In theory there is no reason for Ukraine to lose ground, especially when it has been preparing defenses for the
past year.

This vindicates the point I have been making earlier in this series – Ukrainian brigades are depleted, while Russia’s are at full strength (validating my calculation on casualties on both sides). 
The bottom of the map shows a bulge around Sversk, which Ukraine has been holding for the past two years, albeit with high losses. Shortening the line may have freed one of the three defending brigades.

If Ukraine could not take ground, it made sense to withdraw to the river lines (blue line on the map).
What Ukraine is doing is similar to Hitler's actions in the latter part of 1943 on the Eastern front.
By refusing to withdraw from exposed salients, or shortening their line, the Germans were weakened everywhere. Conceptually I think Ukraine’s situation today is similar to the German situation on the Eastern
front just before the Red army’s 1944 summer offensive (operation Bagraton), except that Ukraine has a lifeline in the form of NATO’s armaments, the supply of which is being ramped up.  

What’s next: The 1^st Guards Tank army, which is arguably Russia’s most powerful formation in Ukraine, is part of this sector. However, its unit are not fully deployed. Of its two tank and one rifle division and two independent brigades, the 47^th Tank division is still rebuilding in the rear and part of the 4^th Tank division is deployed in the Kharkov sector. When all formations of this army come together, it will signal the start of a major Russian offensive.       

I believe Russia will first try to reach the Oskil and Zherebets rivers – which it is close to doing so in three areas. A winter offensive would target the successful crossing of these rivers to recapture the towns of Kupiansk and Izyum – which will secure Russian logistics and then push towards the Severo Donetsk river, which will threaten both Kharkov and the towns of Slavyansk-Kramatorsk. It will force Ukraine to
redeploy forces away from Kharkov and the Sversk salient, resulting in loss of territory in both places.  

Kupiansk sector.

Orange – Ukrainain line before the 2022 Autumn offensive.
Blue – Ideal defensive line along the Oskol and Zerebets rivers.
Red lines – Maximum Ukrainian advance and current front line.
Red arrows – Likely Russian attacks in winter.

Donetsk (North and South): As the map shows, this is the area where Russia has made the most gains this year.  On paper both sides have 44-45 brigades. Ukraine has been on the defensive in the Donetsk for a year, while Russia has been attacking since Nov 23 – when the battle of Avdiivka began. In theory, Ukraine, operating behind a defensive line built since 2015 and backed by the strongest surveillance and drone network in the history of warfare, should have been able to hold the line while the Russians should have been too weak to continue attacks. The fact that Ukraine has given ground and is losing men and land at an increasing rate, points to a steady reduction in the quality of leadership, ability of the men and the numbers available in each Ukrainian brigade, relative to Russia, this year.   

As Ukraine withdraws past their prepared defenses, they have brigades that are understrength – both in absolute numbers and the availability of experienced volunteer soldiers (the army of 2022). This is exacerbated by a shortage of officers and a larger proportion of men who are either exhausted from
fighting (The Ukraine army’s average age is over 40) or drafted against their will, the effective strength of each unit crosses a tipping point, where it is first incapable of any offensive action (which is the case with brigades in the Donetsk) and then of an orderly withdrawal.

Media reports keep referring to Russia’s advance in the Donetsk as the battle for Pokrovsk. While Pokrovsk is an important objective, the larger objective is attrition of the Ukrainian army and there are several ways to achieve that which do not involve an assault on Pokrovsk.  Pokrovsk’s importance has a transport hub is lost when the roads out of the city are cut – as is expected to happen. The advance towards Pokrovsk has also created pockets on either flank which can be encircled. This is about to happen, south of Pokrovsk, as the map shows.

Situation in South Donetsk, 14 Sept

Orange line – 2014 border. Blue line – Ukrainian fortified line.
Brown area in territory held by Russia. 
Red lines are Russian advances. Ukrainian forces in Blue.

Situation in North Donetsk. 14 Sept

Red line –Front Jan 2024 (Ukraine’s 2^nd defensive line west of Bakhmut)
Orange – Ukrainian fortified towns
Blue – Front Sept 24.  Blue arrows – Current Russian thrusts,

Russia has the option of either assaulting Pokrovsk, or cutting off the road heading East, which is
the main supply route for Ukraine. They can also advance either north or south of Chasiv Yar, to either
form a large pocket in conjunction with a Russian advance north of Pokrovsk, or threaten Kramatorsk.

This is an article from a pro Ukraine source on why Ukraine is losing ground in Donetsk.
https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/articles/2024/09/17/7475408/

 Zaporizhzhia:  This is a sector which for most of 2023 was the most important sector for both sides,
as it was here that Ukraine planned the counter offensive that might win the war.
It was therefore in this sector that the first of Russia’s newly mobilized forces were sent from early 2023.
A lot of supplies into this sector were allotted for building defensive works. After the defeat of tthe June
2023 counter offensive (which became apparent only by end of Sept) some Ukrainian brigades were moved
out, while Russia strengthened its forces, thus reversing the ratio of forces.

 In the last 6 months, low intensity attacks have reversed all the gains Ukraine made in the 2023 counter offensive. Ukraine’s defensive line is also stretched, most notably in the East, where the town of Vuledar is tactically encircled (the only way out, is under Russian fire).  In the western end of this sector, the
blowing up of the Khakovka dam last year has drained the reservoir (on map) which has drained the Dnieper reservoir and widened the front, just south of the city of Zaporizhzhia, which stretches the
Ukrainian defense. With the start of the railway services from Taganrog to Crimea, logistics in this
sector have been greatly eased, enabling a Russian offensive by the end of 2024.

What’s next: I believe a Russian winter offensive across several sectors, will aim to crack the Ukrainian
line in one place (see likely Russian thrusts on the map) and also secure the road (marked in blue on the  
map.

Red circle is the dried up area of the Dnieper reservoir. It makes the area south of Zaporizhzhia city more difficult to
defend. The red line is the current front and the area between the Orange and Red is what has been recaptured by
Russia in 2024. Blue arrows are possible Russian thrusts in a winter offensive.  

Kherson: The Kherson sector is one where on paper, Russia enjoys considerable superiority. Nine regular and three 2^nd category brigades (with three more regular brigades in reserve) against a Ukrainian force
which is currently under three regular brigades and seven 2^nd category. The reason Russia has not used this advantage to launch an offensive (this is the quietest sector of the front) has to do with the history of the Kherson sector.

Background: For most of 2022. The 7^th Guards air assault division, along with two brigades – the 127 recon, 205 rifle and the 61^st Naval infantry brigades, fought outnumbered, on the West bank of the Dnieper river. After they retreated across the Dnieper in late 2022 - Conducting a fighting retreat, in an orderly way, using just two bridges across the Dnieper, required considerable skill and staff work, but in my view was misread by Ukraine, which felt the Russian forces were in flight and would be defeated in the planned summer 2023 counter offensive.

Russia started building up its forces in Kherson in anticipation of this 2023 counter offensive. In the later part of the year Ukrainian forces crossed the Dnieper and occupied a strip of land around the village of Krimki. This was a foretaste of the recent battle for Kursk, what Ukraine viewed as an operational and PR victory (crossing the Dnieper), was for Russia just a matter of sealing off the bridgehead, building up their forces – the 80^th Arctic brigade in early 2023, followed by the newly raised 70^th Motorized rifle division got battle experience against the Krimki bridgehead. Two elite Ukrainian brigades were almost completely wiped out and had to be withdrawn and rebuilt.
More recently, Russia’s newly raised 104 Airborne division is being induced into the Kherson sector

Current and projected operations:  Kherson district, which is Russia’s war objective (since its people voted to join Russia) is divided by the Dnieper. The West bank of the Dnieper river is higher than the Eastern bank, which Russia controls.
Controlling the West bank enables the occupier to dominate the hinterland of western Kherson. The most important part of the district is the city of Kherson on the West bank.
In order to control either the East or West bank, one has to occupy key islands between the river banks.
(see map)

Russia has, since August, been occupying islands near Kherson city. I believe that as part of a winter
offensive, when the flow of the river is at its lowest, Russia will cross the Dnieper and either occupy
parts of the West bank, (Krimki in reverse) or occupy Kherson itself. The Ukrainian forces currently in
place, cannot, in my opinion, defend against both threats. Occupying either Kherson or the West bank, will
meet Russia’s immediate objectives and force Ukraine into, what I think will be costly attacks to recapture
lost ground. A secondary objective for Russia could be occupying territory at the end of the Dnieper gulf
(arrow on the left of the map), which protects the Kilburn spit, forces Ukraine to send forces to a new area and increases the distance Ukrainian drones have to cover to attack Crimea.  

Circles in Red are islands on the Dnieper recently recaptured by Russia. From these, they can either attack Kherson,
or the roads leading to the town, or occupy the West bank of the river. The Kilburn split on the left can be used to
land forces on the other side of the Dnieper gulf.

 The leadership crisis. At the outbreak of war, Russia was moving from an army comprised
of independent  brigades, to the previous conventional structure of  brigades being part of 
a division and a division being part of a corps or army. 

Ukraine, with a much smaller army, continued with the independent brigade structure. 
At the outbreak of war, Ukraine had the equivalent of 100 battalions and 24 brigades. 
(with a similar number in the national guard or territorial army). This meant 100 battalion
commanders with the rank of Lt Col and 24 Brigade commanders (Col) on active duty. 

Ukraine has so far known losses of 192 Colonels and 330 Lt Colonels. 
Russia has known losses of 132 Colonels and 316 Lt Colonels. 

Never having had a divisional structure, the failure of Ukraine to coordinate multiple brigades during the 2023 counter offensive, was probably a serious flaw and one that is exacerbated now. 

Ukraine has lost most of those who had ever commanded a brigade and a good part of the pool of 
past, current and potential battalion commanders. There are currently inexperienced leaders who 
have to command a battalion or brigade with a large proportion of inexperienced, newly conscripted men, under constant artillery and air attack and very little idea of how to coordinate with the units next 
to them - as the linked article from the Ukrainian media suggests. 

A Ukrainian brigade has a component of armored vehicles, motorized infantry, engineers and 
artillery. A young officer who has commanded nothing more than a company of 100 men a year earlier
with experience of one branch of the army, is now in a situation where he has to command a 4000 
man brigade, which, (when reduced to 2000 men) often has some components dis-functional due to losses. Russia has similar problems, but they have a much larger pool of officers and staff work and 
combined arms coordination is done at divisional level, by more senior officers.   

For earlier parts of this series, see the list of articles at the begining of this blog.

___________________________________________________________________________________

A note on sources and my background.

I am from India. The only country I support in this conflict is mine. 
I believe both countries and the rest of the world will be worse off the longer this continues, so I'd ideally like it to end sooner rather than later, with the risk of unpredictable escalation. 

I have done business with both Russia and Ukraine since 1996. I've lived in Russia at the start of the Putin era. I speak Russian and follow the media there, which gives me access to the media from 
both sides. Contrary to the view that Russian media has no freedom, their channels offer a broad 
spectrum of opinions, with more embedded reporters at the front than the western media and are sometimes quite critical of how operations are handled. 

I don't cover the politics of the conflict, or any topic that someone else is doing a better job of. That implies that I look at angles not covered by the mainstream media, like logistics or artillery barrel reconditioning, or deaths of commanding officers. I have linked blogs on certain subjects where their coverage is better and more helpful to the reader than mine. I follow on a daily basis, casualties on both sides, with movements of units and the front line. There will be errors, which even established sites make. For e.g. maps show Russia's 76th Air assault division at two places in opposite ends of Ukraine.
I therefore look at press reports to know where exactly they have been fighting. 

My data is open source including telegram channels from both sides, which I cross check. All numbers are at the end of the day, a guess, so where possible I present data in a logical way and explain why I believe an assumption of mine to be credible. 

I don't mention all sources as there are too many and are used to cross reference each other. 
For e.g. if a Russian and Ukrainian site both mention that the a particular brigade is fighting in a certain area, then I assume it to be true, but also track its movements. If there is geo located footage of a 
village being captured, I assume it to be true. While I rely on Russian MOD figures for casualties, 
there are reality checks based on the reports of individual units. If for e.g. there are 20 casualties for 
every armored vehicle destroyed and a certain sector reports 100 casualties with video evidence of 
5 vehicles destroyed, I believe that data to be credible, particularly when it matches other data.