Ukraine war - part 10. Prelude to the winter offensive

I'd like to start by Reviewing assumptions on force levels & losses, to which I devoted an entire post, as it was at the heart of my assumptions on the war.
https://rpdeans.blogspot.com/2024/09/ukraine-war-part-8-casualties-force.html

In part 8 of this series I had estimated the manpower and loses of each side – and thereby the number of combat units they could field now and in the future. This was based on two approaches, which had several assumptions, though both converged on the same number. These were:

1. Units known to be in combat and their expected strength - with different data points giving similar numbers & 2. A theoretical calculation: Starting manpower + Recruitment – casualties = current manpower.

I used the concept of irrecoverable casualties, which was dead + seriously wounded + missing + prisoner
to estimate the number of people who would not be able to fight. Each of these numbers had assumptions, some less validated than others. There was subsequently further data on manpower which validates my assumptions and give me more confidence in my estimate of casualties an current manpower levels. These are:

Deserters: I had stated that the number of deserters on the Ukrainian side had risen from 6000 in 2022 to 16,000 in 2023 and 4700 in the first 2 months of 2024. I had got a lot of adverse comments for that, even suggesting I was a Kremlin agent.
These is fresh data, confirmed by Ukrainian MPs and reported in the West that the number of deserters have reached 100,000. Taking a more conservative estimate of 80,000 – of which half are in the first 8 months of 2024, there are 5000 desertions a month. These are the number of cases where the prosecutor general has filed cases for desertion, so it excludes people missing from their posts on a temporary basis.  While there is an amnesty scheme to get deserters back to their units, there may be
an equal number of cases where deserters are not reported. The larger point is that even a conservative
2500 desertions a month and the fact that desertions are increasing validate my earlier assumption.

https://english.elpais.com/international/2024-10-14/alarm-in-ukraine-over-increasing-number-of-army-deserters.html

https://theeuropetoday.com/2024/10/30/over-100000-ukrainian-soldiers-have-deserted-says-mp-anna-skorokhod-amid-calls-for-additional-conscription/?no_cache=1730260572

Ukraine had mobilized 300,000 men in early 2024, by reducing the compulsory conscription age from
27 to 25 and reducing exemptions. That number has been exhausted. As against 60,000 of the newly conscripted that should be getting trained (30,000 men * 2 months training), there are now just 20,000 and Ukraine has said they need to conscript another 160,000 men from the beginning of 2025.
An article from the Economist - which has been consistently pro Ukraine, suggests that Ukraine is replacing barely 2/3rd of its losses, despite intensified conscription - which is in line with Russian estimates of its casualties that I discussed earlier.
https://www.economist.com/europe/2024/11/07/why-volodymyr-zelensky-may-welcome-donald-trumps-victory

Ukraine had earlier allowed those under 18 to leave the country. This group would have started turning 21 now. Thus a large proportion of those between 18 and 21 are abroad and not available for conscription – Poland was not able to raise a single brigade of 2000 men from among the million Ukrainian refugees in Poland.

I had suggested that Ukraine’s irrecoverable losses were increasing at an increasing rate. These losses were covered accurately, in my view, by Russia’s Ministry of defense, as sanitary losses (all dead, wounded and prisoner) of which about half are irrecoverable losses (1 dead and 2 of the 5 wounded)  

Ukraine’s sanitary losses were:

- 2022  13557 per month
- 2023  21330  per month
- Jan-Apr 2024, 27763 per month
- May-Jul was 52560 per month
- Aug-13 Sept averaging 69159 per month
- Oct. 68690.

Sanitary losses in 2024 (Jan-6 Nov) were: 488200. (244100 irrecoverable).
Add to that 30000 deserters (3000 per month for 10 months in 2024) would be 275000
irrecoverable losses. Thus the manpower conscripted during 2024, is a casualty and the
combat strength of Ukraine’s brigades today is no different from Jan 24 (which was inadequate).
Hence the need for additional immediate conscription.

If the conscription age is reduced from 25 to 18 (the age group that has the lowest number of people – about 90,000 males born in each year between 1999 and 2006) about half in the age group 18-21 are abroad. There are another 25% who are either already serving in the army, or in exempted positions (e.g. medical students). There would be approx. 90,000 men in the 18-21 age group and 180,000 in the 21-24 age group who can be conscripted. These 270000 men will be the last reserve of manpower Ukraine can conscript.  This would however, simply retain the status quo – a loss ratio which has since the past year moved lopsidedly in Russia’s favor, which means Ukraine has been losing scarce manpower and territory and at an increasing rate.   That explains the NYT estimate that Ukraine has
the manpower to last another 6 to 12 months.

https://www.nytimes.com/2024/11/01/us/politics/russia-ukraine-war.htm

Russian manpower and casualties
One of my key assumptions when assessing Russian casualties, is that the projected increase of the Russian armed forces – to 1.32 million, was reached at the end of June 2024. Given recruitment numbers in Russia, a current strength of 1.32 million would give us Russia’s irreplaceable casualties. 
President Putin had confirmed in Sept, that this number was indeed reached and had cleared the next increase to 1.5 million. This increase in number would start from the end of 2024, since, as I had explained, Russia would not have the hardware to equip more than a 1.32 million strong armed forces
till early 2025. Any recruitment from July to Dec, would retain current numbers, partly because it would allow some of those mobilized in 2022 to return home and some of the numbers would be a roll over of
expiring contracts.   

https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2024/09/16/russian-president-vladimir-putin-issues-decree-boosting-russian-army-troops-to-15-million

Mediazona, which is the most credible source of Russian deaths, has suggested that actual numbers were much higher than what they were reporting (close to 120000 and not the verified 66471).
This had been debunked in my earlier post.  Suffice to say, this was based on a theoretical model
not supported by other calculations. I had assessed the actual dead to be  79471.
Mediazona’s updated figure (with a lot of backlog of deaths now reported), are 75382 with another
9000 from the Donbass region (not covered by Mediazona) i.e. 84382 dead.
This implies a further 5000 killed in in two months since my last report, which is consistent with the
earlier report and current casualties and indicates there isn’t a large number of undiscovered dead.

https://en.zona.media/article/2022/05/20/casualties_eng

Update: I had analyzed Russian casualties in detail in my earlier posts citing Mediazona, a western initiative to list all those killed, based on various information sources in Russia, including burials, mentions on social media and in memorials, compensation payouts etc. There is also a Ukrainian source which uses similar methodology (the Information resistance group) and has similar numbers. On 11 Nov, they had a list of 80691 killed, as against 77143 in Mediazona (on 8 Nov). Mediazona figures exclude those from the Donbass region of Ukraine serving in the Russian army.

The other assumption I have consistently made and which is different from what most Western analysts made earlier in the war, is that Russia was running out of weapons. The Kiel institute – a premier European think tank has now shown that this is not so. In the weapon systems listed in the table below,

one sees that Russia’s armament production (despite crippling sanctions) has expanded and is not just able to replace losses but equip new formations (for the expanded armed forces of 1.32 million) such that these new formations might now be fully equipped – my earlier estimate was Dec 24.

The Kiel report
https://www.ifw-kiel.de/publications/kiel-report/

Armaments production trends in Russia

Prodn Per month	Pre war	Q4 2022	Q2 2024	Excess production per month to equip new units (from Mid 23)
Tanks	20	41	130	30
APC/ IFV	100	195	470	80
Artillery guns	15	15	37	10
SAM systems	10	15	39	5
Loitering drones	0	31	178

Taking Tanks as an example. Production comprises both completely new tanks (T-90) and the refurbishment and modernization of told T-72 & T-80 tanks to T-90 standards.
The calculation of excess production (over losses) is based on historical losses, which have been reducing. Russia had 11000 operational T-72 & T-80 tanks before the war (most in storage). As per
Oryx, Russia has lost 2750 T-72 & T-80 tanks. Another approx. 3600 tanks are part of Russian formations as of Jan 24. Equipping new formations will require 1700 additional tanks, of which 540 will be new T-90’s and another 1200 from old stocks of T-80s and T-72s.  That leaves approx. 3500 tanks available from old stocks – though projected losses will not exceed production. It would also mean the gradual
replacement of older T-72s with T-90’s, or refurbished T-72T/80s.  

From other sources, I have estimated production trends of aircraft and artillery shells and compared them to total losses:
What I have not listed, but is mentioned in the Kiel report is artillery barrel refurbishing capacity, which, as early as part 2 of my series, I had listed as a major constraint in artillery capacity and had suggested, along with other analysts, that Russia will have to cannibalize some gun barrels to replace others. The Kiel institute says that Russia’s machining capacity (without Western machines) is sufficient to replace barrels without cannibalization. It is actually Ukraine that has an artillery barrel problem since Europe had never planned for a long war – as per the Kiel report, at Russia’s rate of consumption, German artillery stocks would last 2 days.

Annual production	2022	2023	2024 est	Total losses (2022-24)*
Fighter aircraft SU-30, 34, 35 & 57	28	26	32	57
Helicopters KA-52 & Mi-28	30	75	90	78
Artillery shells	1.1 million	2.5 million	3.5 million
North Korean shells	0	0	1.1 million
Shell stock start of year **	14 million	7 million	4 million	8 mil (Jan 25)

*Losses of older aircraft – Mig 29 & 31, Su-24, 25 & 27  have been replaced by reserve aircraft.
** North Korea is believed to have transferred 4 million shells (excl production of 1.1 mil)

As I explain at the end of this post, with the example of 155mm artillery, it is NATO (particularly Europe) which is unable to replenish stock sent to Ukraine. 

Aircraft production and losses: From the table, The Russian air force has replaced losses and from the beginning of 2024 has built up a surplus of aircraft. Thus the Russian air force is stronger today than at the start of the war. Given a shortage of experienced pilots, I would expect that their squadrons replace older SU-27s (with low availability) with new SU-35s and the SU-24 with the SU-34.

By 2025, the SU-57 and Mig 35 are expected to go into serial production. Each model which has 6 operational aircraft to date, should have a full squadron available by end 2025.
The production of SU-30s which are intended for export and delayed because of western sanctions, is expected to resume with more deliveries to the Russian air force, to replace losses of that aircraft.

An example of why Russia is not about to run out of aircraft, is the case of the Mig 31. Russia has 480
airframes, of which only 140 entered service. Aircraft in stock are now being refurbished to the Mig-31k (Kinzal missile capable) or Mig31-I standard.  The first batch of upgrades was delivered to the Russian air force in Jul 24. The radar of the upgraded aircraft fills gaps in Russia’s radar coverage of Ukraine, given the shortage of AWA&C aircraft.  While Russia has lost of its AWACs (A-50) during the war, they are being replaced with the first two of the more modern A-100.

Russian losses are reducing with the destruction of Ukraine’s air defense network and the near absence of its air force. Russia lost just 8 modern aircraft (of 57 listed in the table) in 2024. Six of these were from
done attacks on air bases (extent of damage was uncertain) and one in a flying accident.

The Kiel report has analyzed the interception rates of Ukraine’s air defences. It averages 30% for missiles and 60% for drones. This number is reducing as Ukraine’s air defenses are more depleted and more missiles and drones saturate air defences. In addition the increased use of glide bombs (now 2000 per month) mean that aircraft release bombs outside the range of most Ukrainian air defense systems, resulting in far lower losses – only 1 aircraft lost over Ukraine in the past year. 

Russian operations before a winter offensive.
In my last post, I had listed possible Russian operations in each sector of the front and assumed there would be a break in Oct and Nov (when the mud season makes the movement of vehicles cross country very difficult) and because Russia needed to stock supplies and ammunition and induct new units before an offensive. In reality Russia has continued its summer offensive without a break in four of the seven areas of the front. 

Kursk sector: As the map shows, the Russians have made slight progress (lighter blue is the area
of the Kursk salient liberated by Russia in the past 2 months). Russia’s aim however, is to destroy the fighting capability of Ukraine’s best units sent to this area, rather than try to retake territory.

The map shows 14 Ukrainian brigades in this sector. These were part of larger brigades, which, despite subsequent reinforcements have been greatly degraded and probably number between 1000-1500 men per brigade. The 14 regiments and two brigades surrounding them (in theory a regiment is smaller than a brigade) are probably  all at full strength, with an average of 2000-2500 men each. With complete air superiority, this force is more than enough to squeeze the Ukrainians and forced them to accept losses at a higher exchange rate, if they want to remain in place. Verified losses show that this is the sector where Ukraine has lost the most armored vehicles – the muddy ground prevents Ukrainian vehicles from moving off road and are being lost to Russian air and drone strikes.

Among the Russian units at the perimeter of the Kursk salient are (on map) the 51^st, 83^rd and 234^th Airborne regiment. These have been formed into a newly formed airborne division as part of the Russian army’s planned expansion during 2024. In my last post I had suggested that this division will be fully operational by Dec.

There is a fourth airborne regiment, whose parent division is the 76^th  Airborne, which is at the opposite end of Ukraine ( the Zaparozhye sector). This may therefore be cover for the North Korean force reported to be in the area. Under the terms of the Russia- North Korea defense agreement, each country can send troops to defend the other’s territory, so it would be considered less escalatory if North Korea sends troops to defend what is internationally recognized as Russian territory (Kursk)

The right ride of the map shows Russian reserves. The 361 and 362 regiments are part of the newly raised 67^th Motorized Rifle division, listed in my previous post.
The 47th Tank division (extreme right) was withdrawn from the front to refit and replace losses.
It appears to be ready for action now. There is no evidence from other sources that it is in the Kursk sector, but it would probably be used in a Russian winter offensive.

My sense is once Ukrainian units are further depleted, there will be a Russian counter offensive that will push towards Sumy and force Ukraine to allot scarce reserves to defend the city. This Russian counter offensive might involve the new 67^th MRD and possibly the 47^th Tank division.

Eliminating the Kursk salient will enable the return of one brigade `borrowed’ from the Kharkov sector. This would enable a part of the 4^th Tank division (sent to Kharkov from the Kupiansk sector) to rejoin its parent division. Similarly the newly raised 69^th Motorised rifle division (1 brigade of which was reported to be in the Kursk sector) is now reported to be in the Kupiyansk sector and may be replaced by one brigade now in Kursk once fighting there dies down.
Both the 4^th Tank and 69^th Rifle division may be activated when the Kupiansk front breaks open, which will happen once Russian forces cross the Oskol river. The frost hardened ground will also be more conducive to armored operations.   

Kupiyansk front. In my last blogpost I had said that Russia was threatening to reach the Oskol and Zherebets river lines, cutting off the Ukrainians into hard to defend cauldrons. They have since managed to reach the river line in three areas, cutting off the Ukrainian forces East of the river into three pockets unable to support each other and without a large force West of the river to prevent a Russian crossing. Since this summer, Ukraine has been losing ground here, despite outnumbering the Russian forces (in the number of brigades). With fresh Russian forces entering this sector and none available for Ukraine, Russia will start gaining ground at a faster rate. As the map shows, the front line can be significantly shortened, if Ukraine withdraws behind the rivers.      
 

 The Russian advance threatens to cross the Oskil river in 3 places, cutting off the 
 Ukrainian forces to its East.    

Donetsk front: As can be seen in the map. the advance towards Pokrovsk has been stopped – because the Russian army sees more opportunity on the southern flank, rather than a frontal assault towards Pokrovsk. However, with the fall of Vuhledar (south of the map) there is the possibility of a huge pocket forming around the logistics hub of Kurakhove.

Western analysts who say that Ukraine is preventing the Russians from taking Pokrovsk miss the point. The Russian objective is to attrit the Ukrainian army – which continues to incur a worsening exchange rate, while making Pokrovsk’s role as a supply hub useless by cutting off the roads out of it, through physical occupation, or fire control. 

Area in brown are Russian gains since summer 2024. While the advance towards Pokrovsk has stopped, the fall of Vuledar opened up the possibility of encircling Ukrainian forces south of Pokrovsk, or attacking Velika Novosilka (where a large Russian force can be seen to the south of  the town) from the East, unhinging the whole east-west defensive line.  

                       Russian ongoing offensives south of Pokrovsk, after the fall of Vuhledar.  

A good video of the fighting in the South Donetsk region in the last six weeks. 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=14vBSaCuSdA

Zaparozhye front: 
From the map (below) Russia, after capturing the town of Vuledar moved both North and 
West, currently forming the southern end of a pincer around the town of Kurakovo and threatening the 
logistics hub of Velika Novosilka from the East. Russia has also recovered all the territory lost during
Ukraine's 2023 summer offensive. 

                                             Gains in the Zaparozhye front (Sept-Nov)

(maps source - Big Serge).

As I had speculated in my previous post, the western end of this front had an area where water had receded (after the destruction of the dam last year) leaving an undefended area west of the town of Kamyanske, which Russia has attacked, entering the town and stretching the Ukranie's 141 brigade which is being attacked by four Russian regiments.

There were also attacks towards the three defensive hubs of Orikhiv (where there is a heavy concentration of Russian forces), Gulyapole and Velika Novosilka. Just east of the map, Russia has 
two new divisions in the Kherson area. Once these are ready - in my last post I speculated that they
would be fully formed and equipped by December they can either be used to exploit and breakthrough, or (against weak Ukrainian forces west of the Dnieper) be used to cross the Dnieper - which is at a

a higher elevation than the east bank and would enable Russia to both threaten Kherson and secure its
hold on territory east of the Dnieper (by occupying the opposite river bank which has a higher elevation and preventing Ukrainian crossing attempts.  

What next ? Ukraine will have to mobilize more men from Jan 25, in order to avoid a shortage of men in combat units, that will probably cross a tipping point that make them unable to fight in any meaningful way. Even when new soldiers are inducted, casualties will steadily reduce the number of experienced men and the replacements will be increasingly reluctant to fight. There is a further problem of equipping existing formations. Even without a change in Ukraine policy following the election of President Trump, NATO has a problem arming Ukraine. 

Funds allocated to Ukraine for military purposes and not disbursed are under $ 10 billion and most of it is not immediately available.    

With the most critical item - 155mm ammunition (where Russia and North Korea produce 4.5 million shells a year, Europe had claimed it would have a capacity of 1.7 million shells in 2024. In reality its 
capacity is 580000 shells. The Czech led initiative to supply 1.5 million shells from non NATO sources, was scaled down to 800,000 and then 500,000 shells of which just 170000 were supplied. 
The US had exhausted its stocks by supplying 3 million shells and while it currently has the capacity  

to produce 80,000 per month, it is unlikely they will all continue to be be supplied  to Ukraine.
 

The other problem Ukraine has is that its 155mm artillery pieces are unlikely to exceed 500, since total transfers of 155mm guns, less verified losses are 500. This assumes guns are not damaged, or being cannibalized for spares (which is unrealistic). For e.g. 152 M777 155mm guns were supplied by 
NATO. 90 were verified to have been destroyed (Russian figure is 90 - the figure from Oryx is 98).
However, the last such gun destroyed was on 29th June.
Its therefore possible that few of the remaining 62 guns are in operation.  

1.5 million shells a year supplied to 500 guns is  6000 shells fired per gun on average, for 2023 & 24. Barrels have to be replaced after 3-4000 shells and neither NATO or Ukraine have the capacity for that. Using multiple types of shells (12 types of 155mm shells) and guns, all of which are not compatible with each other, leads to some guns having excess shells (and barrel wear) and others having none. Europe's total inventory of 155mm guns is under 500 with ammunition stocks less than the minimum required to fight a war, 

Source for NATO arms supply: 
https://www.ifw-kiel.de/topics/war-against-ukraine/ukraine-support-tracker/

Russia's long term problem Russia's current advantage does not guarantee victory. In Dec 2025, 
the war would have lasted longer than the great Patriotic war (June 1941 - May 1945). The Russian people may not be able to accept fighting for longer, particularly if by then, Russia has control of the 
Russian majority Donbass region and the land bridge to Crimea. If there is no existentialist crisis to Russia, there would be more concerns over inflation and Russia's current GDP growth is unlikely to sustain beyond 2025. More men diverted to the armed forces will cause labor shortages, which already hosts seven million foreign workers and more stringent application of sanctions will start affecting industry. President Putin indicated that Russia already faces a labor shortage of two million men. If there is no peace deal in 2025 and NATO doubles down on armaments production, it could match or outpace Russia from 2026.    

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A note on sources and my background.

I am from India. The only country I support in this conflict is mine. 
I believe both countries and the rest of the world will be worse off the longer this continues, so I'd ideally like it to end sooner rather than later, with the risk of unpredictable escalation. 

I have done business with both Russia and Ukraine since 1996. I've lived in Russia at the start of the Putin era. I speak Russian and follow the media there, which gives me access to the media from 
both sides. Contrary to the view that Russian media has no freedom, their channels offer a broad 
spectrum of opinions, with more embedded reporters at the front than the western media and are sometimes quite critical of how operations are handled. 

I don't cover the politics of the conflict, or any topic that someone else is doing a better job of. That implies that I look at angles not covered by the mainstream media, like logistics, or artillery barrel reconditioning, or deaths of commanding officers. I have linked blogs on certain subjects where their coverage is better and more helpful to the reader than mine. I follow on a daily basis, casualties on both sides, with movements of units and the front line. There will be errors, which even established sites make. For e.g. maps show Russia's 76th Air assault division at two places in opposite ends of Ukraine.
I therefore look at press reports to know where exactly they have been fighting. 

My data is open source including telegram channels from both sides, which I cross check. All numbers are at the end of the day, a guess, so where possible I present data in a logical way and explain why I believe an assumption of mine to be credible. 

I don't mention all sources as there are too many and are used to cross reference each other. 
For e.g. if a Russian and Ukrainian site both mention that the a particular brigade is fighting in a certain area, then I assume it to be true, but also track its movements. If there is geo located footage of a 
village being captured, I assume it to be true. While I rely on Russian MOD figures for casualties, 
there are reality checks based on the reports of individual units. I've pointed out for e.g. that while 
Russian sources have evidence of 90 M777 guns being destroyed, a widely quoted western source has that figure at 98.