DeansMusings

 In my last article, I opined that Russian losses in infantry have prevented a more rapid advance. Part 18 - the case against Russia The use of drones, which have increased exponentially, particularly by Ukraine, have made advances more difficult over time. I also said this:     Russia’s domestic economy is only being kept out of recession by a windfall from oil and gas exports due to the Iran war.   Ukraine’s strikes on Russian energy and other high value targets are beginning to hurt morale and cause economic damage (going by people’s comments on Russian channels). It has necessitated mobilization of reservists (and some volunteers) in anti-drone units. This force might include some of those who would normally be in the anti-aircraft regiment of existing divisions (which no longer have to face a threat from Ukrainian aircraft) but it means reduced manpower for divisions at the front.   The war has also gone on longer than the Great Patriotic war (194...

 I am writing this part after a long gap, as there were more informative posts on subjects I wanted to cover, and because the overall direction of the war was in line with what I had mentioned earlier.  The war has also gone on longer than the Great Patriotic war, leading to some `blogger fatigue'. Last article (part 16) in this series: Ukraine war - part 16    My view is that 2026 will be the year that Russia achieves its territorial objectives in Ukraine and will be in a position to propose a peace deal that will not involve Ukraine giving up territory since they will not be in control of any territory Russia needs. In a previous blog piece in Feb 25, I had suggested that a peace deal could involve the war ending on the then front line, with an exchange of territory (Russian held territory outside four provinces claimed by Russia, in return for territory in the Donbass not yet occupied by it) that would lead to a final truce line. https://rpdeans.blogspot.com/...

 In my last blog post I had ended my analysis with this: Winning an attritonal war depends on the manpower reserves of each side (Russia is six times more and suffering fewer casualties) the ability to supply armaments - Russia is able to replace hardware losses. Ukraine cannot – even with NATO but not US support), and the will to fight.  My sense is that the Ukrainian army is sufficiently attritted for Russia to start a spring offensive once the ground hardens after the spring thaw. Once they take most of the four provinces (with territory captured in other areas exchanged in an eventual peace deal), Russia will dig into defensive positions, from where they will offer a ceasefire – which they are under a lot of pressure to do, under the threat of more US sanctions. Once on the defensive, Russian casualties and consumption of armaments will be lower than while they have been attacking. Ukraine’s losses will be correspondingly higher, which will facilitate a de-facto cea...