Ukraine war part 4 - Ukraine's counter offensive.

 

Understanding Ukraine’s counteroffensive

As I am not a military man, I would hesitate to comment on an actual battle, not just due to lack of subject matter expertise, but because there would be many who can do a better job of explaining military operational art. My posts on the Ukraine war have been either on grand strategy, or commenting on certain parameters, based on open-source data, where I think they are important indicators of how the conflict will pan out and there is no single article I have read that provides a good explanation.
In this context, the Ukraine counter offensive (CO) which started on 4^th June has also not had analysis which looks at numbers and overall strategy to explain what is happening on the ground. Most Western reporting echoes press releases from the Ukraine Ministry of defense and reflects what the writers would ideally like to see happen, while Russian posts talk of heavy Ukrainian losses to a point where they are not credible. After going through telegram channels and media from both sides, incl. Russian, here is my attempt to explain the counter offensive, with the relevant numbers:

Background: Ukraine carried out successful offensives in Sept 22, that saw the Ukrainian army retake about 6000 Sq km of territory in Kharkov region and the Russian withdrawal across the Dnieper in the Kherson region. NATO wanted to build on this success. At the same time, it was recognized that NATO support for Ukraine, in the form of arms and money, could not continue indefinitely. A long drawn-out attritional campaign might hurt Ukraine (with its smaller population) more and exacerbate recessionary trends in European economies. 

A single offensive which resulted in an unmistakable military victory as well as shatter Russian morale was therefore the preferred option.

Crimea, Russian forces and the proposed offensive

The objective: As seen on the map, a thrust towards the cost (blue arrow) to capture Berdiansk or Mariupol) would cut the land bridge from the Russian mainland to Crimea. This would isolate 3 groups of Russian forces (in black) who would have to depend on supply from the Crimea rail/road bridge as well as ferries. However, Ukrainian long-range missiles would be able to destroy the bridge and any ferries across the Kerch straits. The narrow causeways connecting Crimea with the 2 Russian army groups - 8^th Army on the Eastern bank of the Dnieper) and 58^th army to its East, could also be destroyed. This would cut off the 3 Russian army groupings from each other and from Russia. 
This would lead to not only the loss of the 3 army groupings, but the recapture of Crimea. It would not just be a catastrophic military defeat, but probably cause Putin to be toppled – precluding the use of nuclear weapons to protect Crimea.

Timing: The offensive could only start once NATO equipped and trained 9 new brigades. This was in addition to units trained and equipped earlier in the conflict. These 9 brigades were only ready in May, albeit partly. Artillery ammunition, which I had touched upon earlier (part 2 of my Ukraine posts) had to be surged and stockpiled. Ukraine had to separately raise and equip the equivalent of 8 `storm’ brigades to replace losses in the battle of Bakhmut that ended in May. After the spring thaw, the ground would also be hard enough to allow for mechanized operations, only from May.  

The Russians, who had mobilized 300,000 men from Sept 22, had finished training them and started inducting them into frontline units. They also spent the time between Sept 22 and May 23, building defenses along what is now called the Surovikin line.

When an anticipated Russian winter offensive did not materialize, it was believed that the Russian army had low morale and were incapable of offensive action (and would not fiercely defend a difficult position). The Russian capture of Bakhmut also played into this assumption as it was believed that this was done by the Wagner group, not the Russian army and the Wagner group, which took high casualties, was not going to be transferred to the Zaporozhe front – perhaps Western intelligence had an inkling of the Wagner group rebellion against Moscow, on 23^rd June. I think it too much of a coincidence that by 23rd June the Ukraine offensive was expected to either reach the sea, or make a significant break in the Russian lines for a clear path to victory to be visible and panic to set in among the Russian army leadership.

The Russian view: Russia chose to consolidate in winter and build strong defensive positions along the Zaporozhe front. Newly mobilized former veterans were retrained, rather than pushed into battle, which is reflected in the low casualty figures (about 3800 dead among 300,000 mobilized, as per Mediazone’s detailed analysis). The battle of Bakhmut involved the exchange of Russian convicts for a larger number of the Ukrainian army killed (much like Stalingrad destroyed the best German formations before the battle of Kursk).

This situation was similar to the Battle of Kursk in 1943. The Kursk bulge was too inviting a target for the Germans not to attack. The Red army spent the spring of 1943 preparing for the attack.  Hitler could not attack before July, as he needed to wait for enough quantities of the new generation Panther and tiger tanks and freshly inducted troops, much like Ukraine had to wait for NATO weapons, which they thought would overcome deficiencies in aircraft, artillery and manpower. In both cases, it was believed that a sudden attack by superior armed and trained mechanized force, with better morale, would overcome a prepared defense, as earlier experience suggested.

In 2022-23, The Russian army's war college prepared a paper on conducting a flexible defense which Russia is now demonstrating. The Lt. Gen who wrote that was then asked to command the Southern front, to implement his strategy. 

The order of Battle (ORBAT).
Russia: The forces on the southern part of the front, were part of Russia’s Southern Military command and comprised the 8^th and 58^th Army. 

The 8^th Army was deployed along the Eastern bank of the Dnieper, having withdrawn across the river in Sept 22. It comprised:
20^th Guards Motor Rifle Division (MRD) and
7^th Guards Air Assault Division (with 4 regiments of 2000 men each).
The 8^th army was supported by 2 artillery and two tank regiments.  

The 58^th Army. On the Zaporozhe front facing the expected Ukrainian offensive. It comprised:
- 42 Guards Motorized Rifle division & 19 MRD.
- BARS-10 & 11. Each was a 5000 man brigade of volunteers.
- 1 Naval infantry and 1 tank brigade.
- 2 tube Artillery brigades and 1 rocket brigade.
There were also 2 battalion sized Spetsnaz or special forces units.

Holding units (part of Southern Military district): 2 Rifle brigades and 2 Donbass Militia Brigades.

Ukraine ORBAT
West of the Dnieper: 2 Tank and 4 rifle brigades, incl 1 of the territorial army, in reserve.  
1 Artillery brigade

Zaporozhe front:
9^th Corps: 60th, 65^th & 128 Assault Brigades
                   23, 59, 67 Brigades.
                   47, 31, 32 Mech brigades
                   43 Arty brigade            
Of these 11 brigades, the 47^th, 31^st & 32^nd brigades were NATO trained and equipped.  

Marine Corps: 33, 35, 37, 38 Marine Brigade supported by the 45^th Artillery brigade
The 33^rd brigade was NATO trained and equipped.  
Each marine brigade comprised 2000 men, so this was a 8000 man formation. 
                
10^th Corps: 116, 117, 118 Brigade.
                     82^nd, 46^th   71^st Air assault brigades
                     4 Battalions independent infantry (Foreign fighters)
                     44^th artillery brigade in support.  
The 117th, 118^th and 82^nd Brigades were NATO trained and equipped.

There were also `holding formations’ meant to hold ground in areas of the Zaporozhe front (half the 150km front) where Ukraine would not be advancing. They were:
3^rd Tank brigade (later redeployed to Kharkiv)
53 & 30^th brigades 
100, 102 & 108^th territorial army brigades of low quality.  
          
Reserve brigades : 61^st 115^th & 21st brigades & 3^rd national guard brigade
The 21st brigade was NATO trained and equipped.

Map showing the units of Russia’s 8^th and 58^th Army and Ukraine’s 9^th and 10^th Corps and Marine Corps. The arrows were the planned axis of attack for the counter offensive

Of the 9 NATO trained brigades, 1 was redeployed to the Bakhmut area before the counter offensive. Another, the 21^st Brigade, was moved to the Bakhmut area after the counter offensive began. Thus while Ukraine used all its 9 new NATO equipped brigades, 2 of them were not part of the counter offensive.

The counter offensive would effectively be fought between Russia’s 58h Army and Ukraine’s 9^th, 10^th and Marine corps. Excluding artillery, there would be 10 brigades on the Russian side and 20 on the Ukraine side, with 4 more Ukrainian brigades in reserve. Ukraine had 6 `holding’ brigades vs. 3 for Russia. Russia would transfer 2 regiments of the 7^th Guards Air assault division to 58^th Army, making the ratio of Ukrainian brigades to Russian as roughly 20 : 12   

Along the Dnieper, both sizes were at roughly the same strength. 6 Russian brigades (after the transfer of 2 regiments to 58^th Army) vs. 6 Ukrainian. The Dnieper river was a formidable obstacle to cross, but if the Kakhovka dam was blown (which happened), it would be possible to cross the Dnieper easily in some places, as Ukraine did (shown by the red arrow across the Dnieper).  

A glance at the map shows that it is easy for the Russians to transfer units from 8^th to 58^th Army, since the distance to be covered is low. On the other hand Ukrainian units trying to move from West of the Dnieper to reinforce the counter-offensive would have to cross the river and travel a longer distance, increasing the chances of interdiction from air strikes. 

Russian pressure all along the Eastern part of the front, would make the transfer of Ukrainian units from the East to the Zaporozhe front difficult. This was exacerbated by Ukraine’s decision to start a new counter offensive North and South of Bakhmut, that meant the transfer of reserves away from Zaporozhe. Ukraine also transferred 2 reserve brigades to the Kharkov front, to stop a Russian offensive there. In all, 5 brigades earmarked for the Zaporozhe CO, would be transferred away. 1 of these before the counter offensive and 4 during.  

The Ukrainian plan.  The counter offensive would start on the night of 4-5 June. 2 (each) Brigade sized formations would make 4 thrusts across Russian lines. These would be made by 9^th Corps and the Marine Corps. The Russian defense of Zaporozhe, comprised 3 defensive lines. It was expected that at least 2 of the 5 thrusts would succeed in breaking the first 2 Russian lines, after which 10^th Corps would exploit the breakthroughs, in the sectors they occurred in, beat back any Russian counter attack and reach the coast. The assumption was that it would be over (in terms of a decisive breakthrough of Russian lines), by the end of June, after which dissatisfied Wagner forces would move on Moscow.   

An additional opportunity was presented by the destruction of the Kakhovka dam – my view is that repeated shelling caused a weakness in its structural integrity. This made crossing the Dnieper easier and weakened Russian defensive positions along the Dnieper bank.
If the Ukraine CO resulted in a panicky retreat of the Russian forces, it could be exploited by a Ukrainian force crossing the Dnieper.

The composition of Russian defenses was well known. As suggested by analyst Lt Col Scott Ritter, simulations of the counter attack would have been carried out by NATO, even to the level of individual sections (8-10 men).  One can predict for e.g. what damage a 155mm barrage will do to an infantry section that is dug is and at what point that unit will break and retreat, or flee. A simulation with a force ratio of 20:12 would typically need the following pre-requisites for success:

-          - Air superiority.

-          - Attacking side is better in operational art (or Combined arms warfare) than the defenders. It was
  assumed that NATO training will ensure this – as compared to conscripted Russians.

-          - Artillery (or firepower superiority) of 3 : 1.  After stockpiling shells, Ukraine had rough parity with
   Russia in both guns and the number of shells each had in stock.

-          -  Domination of electronic warfare and intelligence.

 If Ukraine lacked air superiority (or ability to prevent Russian air superiority), firepower superiority and better electronic warfare, it would have to be compensated for by lower morale of the defending side. The assumption that Russian morale, particularly among the newly mobilized, would be poor, was key to the success of the CO.

If there was any doubt about the timing and location of the CO, the Ukrainians dispelled it by announcing it on every medium of communication (apart from leaked `Pentagon papers’).

On the Russian side, use of drones was almost 10X higher than the previous year (as seen from the number of verified strikes by Lancet drones) by Ukrainian drone effectiveness was greatly impacted by superior Russian jamming. The Russian air force had increased its sortie rate, partly because its KA-52 attack helicopters were equipped with longer range anti-tank missiles (outside Manpad range) and superior electronic warfare systems and because the Ukrainian air defense network had been greatly degraded in previous months.  

Phase 1: 4 -30 June. The first phase of the CO was a disaster which NATO also admitted. In the first week 20% of NATO supplied equipment was a confirmed loss, reaching 33% after the first 15 days. This meant an over 50% loss in equipment in those formations actually fighting, since 10 Corps had not yet been committed. The loss in manpower would be proportionate to this, particularly as it was mines (not artillery) that was believed to have caused the largest share of casualties. The claim of 50% losses in equipment among the brigades used in phase 1, can be confirmed from verified losses  recorded by Oryx. For e.g. 51 of 99 Bradley IFVs were confirmed to have been lost. However, the brigades committed to the CO in phase 1, had 60 Bradleys, which is a greater than 50% loss rate. A similar loss rate was seen in the brigade equipped with Leopard tanks. I believe the presence of Germany’s Leopard tanks did more to boost volunteers to the Russian army, than any initiative of the Russian govt. 

13 Brigades with 2 artillery brigades were committed in phase 1, in 5 thrusts covering 70 km of a 150 km (as the crow files) Zaporozhe front. They failed to make any progress in 3 of the 5 thrusts and marginal progress in 2 (but falling short of the first defensive line).

 9 of the 13 brigades suffered very heavy casualties. The 31, 32, 35 & 37^th Brigades disappeared from the order of battle till date (moved to the rear, to be refilled with freshly mobilized men).
What was left of the 67^th brigade was redeployed to the Northern front. Of the remaining brigades, Russian MoD announced that the 30^th, 59^th, 60^th and 65^th brigades suffered more than 400 irrecoverable casualties each. This seems a credible estimate as 85% of casualties announced by the Russian MoD are not identified with units. If they are, it tends to be based on a higher level of probability. Interviews with fighters done by Pro Ukrainian media, also points to a very level of casualties among brigades in phase 1.

The high casualties and failure to achieve any of the phase 1 objectives, led to the following, which were an admission of the failure of phase 1.

Ukraine started a fresh counter offensive north and south of Bakhmut. They initially made some progress – largely because the Russians, who had only occupied the area in Apr-May, did not have the time to prepare defenses. However, at the time of writing, the Russians recovered most of their lost territory (particularly in the Klisheevka area). Apart from using 1 of their new NATO trained brigades in the earlier battle for Bakhmut, Ukraine also moved the 21^st brigade to the Bakhmut front.

Among the brigades in defensive (holding) roles, Ukraine transferred the 3^rd Tank to the Kharkov front to stop a Russian advance. This was done despite the 30^th and 53^rd brigades taking heavy casualties in the attritional fighting in previous months. It leaves Ukraine dangerously exposed to any Russian attack in sectors that were hitherto not threatened. 

Among the reserve brigades, Ukraine moved the 115^th Mechanized and 3^rd National guard brigade to the Bakhmut front. This was a tacit admission that the CO was not working and its brigades might achieve better results, either in taking territory in the Bakhmut area  (failed), or stopping a Russian advance towards the Oskol river (which has been a partial success as of 27 Aug). This leaves the 61^st brigade as the only theatre reserve for Ukraine. As of 28 Aug, its whereabouts were unknown. 

From the elite 10^th Corps,  the 46^th brigade was committed in June itself and took heavy casualties.

A raid across the Dnieper failed when the attacking force took very heavy casualties, without tying down a lot of the Russian defenders. It enabled the Russian army to transfer 2 of the 4 regiments of the 7^th guards Airborne division to the more threatened Orekhov sector of 58^th Army.

The commander of the 58^th Army, Gen Popov, was fired after he complained (indirectly to a former General and now a Member of Parliament) about the lack of rotation for his men and shortages in artillery and counter battery radars, leads me to assume that the Russians did not deploy reserves in phase 1 and that they did not have the advantage in artillery they had traditionally enjoyed in the war.
The ORBAT of both sides, shows a book strength in guns and rocket launchers that are similar. NATO had stockpiled ammunition that would in theory ensure that the shells allotted, per gun per day, would be similar to Russia’s.

Of the 4 axes in which Ukraine attempted to advance, there were some advances in 2 of them – in the Rabotino sector and at the Vremievsky ridge. However, in neither case did the Ukrainians reach the Russian first line of defense. The area occupied was largely `grey zone’ not fully under the control of the Russians and where there was no serious defense.  

Phase 2: 2^nd week July – 1^st week August.

In the latter part of phase 1 Ukraine changed tactics and the new tactics would be used throughout phas 2. There would be fewer armored vehicles (to reduce high losses) and instead smaller groups of men would infiltrate into Russian lines in a slow advance. While this reduced vehicle losses, it increased human losses and reduced any chance of breaking Russian lines, because any penetration would be sealed off and taken in a counter attack, or destroyed by artillery. 
 
There was an attempt to show progress in the CO before the NATO summit on 11^th July, which failed.
In phase 2, the intensity of the CO reduced - as seen from reduced casualty claims form the Russians – and  reduced daily death toll reported by independent media and no significant claims of capture of territory by the Ukrainian media. There was more focus on Ukraine’s other counter offensive, North and South of Bakhmut. By the end of July, that offensive had fizzled out, though heavy fighting continued and there remained a strong Ukrainian presence in that sector.

There was also a Russian offensive in the North, aiming to reach the Oskol river and Kupiansk. Stopping it required Ukraine to move a reserve brigade and the 67^th Brigade of 9 Corps, from the area of the CO, to the North.    

Ukraine did make further progress in both areas they had moved into in phase 1 – towards Rabotino village and towards Vremievsky ridge. The capture of the village of Staromayorskoye was the first setback the Russians had. While the village itself had no strategic value (surrounded on 3 sides by a higher ridge) it was a springboard to capture of the more important village of Urozhayne, which would have given the Ukrainian marine corps more scope to maneuver around Russian defenses.

The Russians identified Rabotino and the Vremievsky ridge as the main effort for Ukraine. As per doctrine their reserves started moving to both areas. 2 Regiments of the 7^th Guards airborne division and a brigade of BARS (volunteers) moved to Rabotnio, while a Naval infantry brigade moved to the Vreminsky ridge.

At the end of both phase 1 & 2, Ukraine had the option of calling off the CO and saving valuable NATO equipment and trained manpower from a battle of attrition they were not winning. The battle of Kursk was called off by the Germans when they were in a better position than Ukraine’s. The `sunk cost’ fallacy could have affected Ukraine’s thinking, along with the feeling that `one final effort’ could win the battle. It was similar to Germany’s thinking at the gates of Moscow in Nov 1941, when military logic dictated that the Germans should have dug in for the winter outside Moscow, but it was felt that
the `last unit' thrown into battle would bring victory, because the Red army was in worse shape. The Germans had the same view at Stalingrad a year later.     

Phase 3: 1^st week August – Current
Ukraine attempted to exploit their gains in both Rabotino and the Vremievsky ridge. They captured the village of Urozhayne, but this was either recaptured or in the grey zone (under control of neither side) with the surrounding heights being under Russian control. The Marine corps were too weak to exploit
their gains. They had brought back regiments withdrawn after phase 1 fighting, but after Russia sent in reserves, to seal the gap in their lines and recapture some lost ground, Ukraine had no numerical superiority in this area. Ukraine recalled the 35^th and 37^th Marine brigades that were withdrawn after phase 1. The Ukraine forces at Urozhayne are too small to advance further and are still short of the first Russian defence line. 

Ukraine recognized the Rabotino was the only remaining thrust that could be exploited. The whole of 10 Corps was sent to the Rabotino area. The village was captured after the fiercest fighting of the CO to date. It also changed hands, which was contrary to doctrine, which required them not to contest territory in front of a defensive line and to fall back if the cost of defending a position was too high. This tactic of fiercely contesting the `crumple' zone in front of the first line of defense was a new innovation from traditional Soviet and Russian defensive doctrine. 

Ukraine’s last uncommitted brigade the elite 82^nd airborne (named after the US division with the same name) was sent to Rabotino, along with the rest of 10 Corps and the 47^th and 65^th brigades of 9 Corps, recalled after phase 1. Ukraine also sent in the only new unit it could find, the 15^th National guard brigade and mentioned 10 brigades that were involved in the capture of Rabotino. Subsequently,
10 Corps reached the first Russian defensive line south of the village, where they were halted by
Russian counter attacks. Since this was the only Ukrainian effort – along a very narrow front, any
advance by Ukraine without strengthening the flanks, would result in a dangerously long salient, liable to being cut off, or attacked from 3 sides. All Russian reserves – 2 regiments of the 7^th Guards Airborne, 2 BARS brigades (10 and 11) and a newly arrived rifle brigade from the Far East, were sent to Rabotino.

Thus 10 Ukrainian brigades in Rabotino, will find it difficult to make any further breakthrough against 8 opposing Russian brigades. The conundrum for Ukraine is that the harder they try to breakthrough, the more losses they will take and any further advance harms their position (lengthening salient with a small base pushing against increasing larger forces). It was a similar situation to that of the SS Panzer Corps in Kursk 1943, when they made a breakthrough and seemed to have won the critical battle of Prokhorova, but retreated because of a similar situation as Ukraine’s 10 Corps (which has not defeated the Russians in any set piece battle) finds itself in now. The Ukrainians cannot remain in place, because they do not have enough ammunition for extended combat. 

It has been acknowledged by the Western media that the 10 Corps and the theatre reserve 61 Brigade, represent Ukraine’s last reserves. There are no further units available anywhere, barring undermanned and under equipped territorial army units. Russia, on the other hand has around (as per Ukraine) 100,000 men in reserve along the northern (Kharkov – Kupiansk) front, which is of less strategic importance than the Zaporozhe counter-offensive. This figure seems credible, since we know these man have been mobilized and trained (after considering replacements into existing units) but do not feature in any of the units currently fighting - as I have explained in part 1 of this Ukraine blog. If Russia needed more reserves in the South, they can tap into this source, or move the experienced 150^th Rifle division, which is part of 8^th Army and was moved to the Bakhmut front. It can ideally get back to its parent formation, while new brigades (located closer) can move into Bakhmut.       

 Implications: Ukraine has exhausted its reserves and have announced a fresh round of mobilization where 200,000 men are sought to be recruited. The recruits from this round, will have lesser experience and willingness to fight as compared to previous rounds of mobilization. They cannot be equipped untilspring of 2024 at the earliest and that assumes that NATO ramps up armament production and continues to support Ukraine at the same rate. Mere NATO support, at current levels of production is not enough, because whatever could be transferred from existing stocks has been sent.  Ramping up production would in many cases, be contingent on Ukraine demonstrating a path to victory. Trying to do so (as the CO has demonstrated) will result in higher losses relative to Russia, particularly considering the poorer quality of manpower and equipment of the Ukraine army after this CO.

If Ukraine goes on the defensive, Russia has an opportunity to conduct its own offensive, either in Sept, until the Oct rains, or in winter after the ground freezes. The Sept-Mar period will be when Russia is strongest relative to Ukraine’s manpower and armaments. After March, Russian production of key items will equal consumption (assuming Russia conducts defensive operations only).  

My other posts on the Ukraine war:

https://rpdeans.blogspot.com/2023/07/ukraine-war-understanding-numbers-part.html

https://rpdeans.blogspot.com/2023/07/ukraine-war-understanding-numbers-part_18.html

https://rpdeans.blogspot.com/2023/07/ukraine-war-part-3-missed-opportunities.html 

https://rpdeans.blogspot.com/2023/09/ukraine-war-part-5-how-russia-fights.html