Is RAW the new Mossad ?

 I decided to write this after an unprecedented number of people – all senior figures in Anti India terrorist groups, were killed by `unknown gunmen’ in Pakistan. There is speculation about the possible role of the Indian external intelligence agency RAW. While most of the publicity around these deaths has focused on the killing of Hardeep Singh Nijjar in Canada, there were a larger number of deaths in Pakistan, most of whom who were more of a `clear and present’ danger to India than Nijjar and protected by the Pakistan establishment. How likely is it that RAW was behind these?

I will focus on the unexplained shootings in the last year, of those wanted and India and based in Pakistan (though two were killed outside Pakistan. This is the list, starting with the most recent:

11 Nov Maulana Raheem Ulla Tariq. Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM). Shot in Karachi.
9 Nov   Akram Khan Ghazi. Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). Shot in Kyber Pakhtunkhwa
6 Nov  Khwaja Shahid. LeT. Kidnapped in POK and beheaded near the LOC.
21 Oct  Dawood Malik. Lashkar-Jabbar founder and tribal elder. Killed in Waziristan. 
11 Oct  Shahid Latif. JeM. Shot in a mosque in Sialkot. Mastermind of Pathankot attacks.
             2 other terrorists were shot with him.
10 Oct  Mullah Bahaur. Kidnapper of Kurbhushan Jadhav. Shot in Baluchistan.
2 Oct    Mufti Kaiser Farooq. LeT. Close to Hafeez Sayed. Shot in Karachi
29 Sep  Zia Ur Rehman: Hizbul Mujahadeen. Cleric, shot in Karachi
8 Sep    Abu Kasim Kashmiri :LeT shot in a mosque in Pak occupied Kashmir
5 Aug    Hussain Arai: Jamat-ul-Dawah. Ran the network of Anti India Madrassas. Shot in Karachi
6 May   Paramjit Singh Panjwar: Head of Khalistan Commando force. Shot in Lahore.
4 Mar   Syed Noor Salobar: Recruiter for terrorist groups. Shot in Kyber Pakhtunkhwa
26 Feb  Syed Khalid Raza. Al Badr head. Shot in Karachi
20 Feb  Bashir Ahmed Peer: Hizbul Mujahadeen commander. Shot near Army HQ Rawalpindi.
14 Feb: Aijaz Ahmed Ahangar: Kashmiri head of ISIS for Kashmir. Shot in Afghanistan
22 Sep 22. Laal Mohammed. ISI organiser of fake currency to India. Shot in Nepal
1 Mar 22   Zahoor Mistry. IC 814 hijacker. Shot in Karachi

23 June 21 Hafeez Sayeed: Survived a bomb blast, but injured along with 2 of his bodyguards.
He was no longer actively involved in militancy. Interestingly this was the only case where the
victim survived and people arrested. 

A Khalistani, Harvinder Singh Sandhu, was believed to have been poisoned in a hospital in Lahore, in Nov 22, but it may have been a drug overdose and no confirmation is available from Pak sources.

In addition, on 3 Jan  Naveed Sadiq ISI director was killed with another ISI officer Naseer Abbas. 
on 21 Mar 23, ISI Brigadier Mustafa Kamal Burki was killed. In both cases the TTP Pakistan claimed responsibility.  These were the first senior ISI officers to be killed in its history. 

I’d first like to say that its most unlikely RAW agents killed any of them. Not because they lack the ability (I don’t know, neither would people outside RAW) but because it is very difficult to get Indians into Pakistan for an extended period and because if caught, India would not have `plausible deniability’. There would be no evidence linking India to these – if there was it would have serious ramifications, as we have seen in the case of Nijjar (though there is no evidence).

 I would assume RAW would outsource the job to any of the armed militant groups in Pakistan which have gone against the Pak establishment, but would prefer to take on their proxies (Anti India militant groups) rather than the Pak army itself. 

Those killed included men from every anti India group – LeT, JeM, JuD, HM, Al-Badr, ISIS & Khalistanis all sheltered by Pak.
All were key members of their organisation. Except for Panjwar, all were active in Jihadi activity.
All were shot in public. 
In all cases where information was available, they were shot at close range by 2 gunmen.
They were shot in different cities, including tribal areas and POK where any stranger, or someone from a different ethnic group would be quickly noticed.

There is speculation that the ISI may have done it themselves, to get rid of troublemakers, or earn brownie points with the world community, to get an IMF loan, or removal from the FATF grey list. I do not agree for the following reasons:

Those killed represented all Anti India groups. It was not as if the ISI wanted to punish one group which not following their diktats and promote another. They were either senior leaders, or specialists, or those the ISI needed to protect.   

If the ISI wanted to kill them, they would have been called in for a `routine meeting’ and they would then disappear, which has been the ISI style. They would not have publicised the killings in remote places along the Afghan border or in POK. Alternately, the shooter would be caught and would confess to being hired by RAW.  

If terrorist groups got an inkling that the ISIS was after them – all it would take was one ( of the hundreds) of supporters of these groups, working in the ISI to leak info, or a shooter to confess,
the group would go after the ISI. For the first time this year, senior officers of the ISI have been killed.

The agency’s popularity (after the action against former PM Imran Khan) with the people, is at an all-time low and they have to deal with insurgencies among the Baluchi’s and the TTP. They would not want to make more enemies and are aware that they have never been more vulnerable.

Groups or leaders that were threatened, might have chosen to stop their operations and either leave the country, or surrender to India (working out a surrender deal as had been done in the past).

Pakistan needs to revive the Jihad, which has reduced in intensity after the fait accompli of the revocation of article 370 in Kashmir in Aug 2019 and (post covid) the Jan 21 ceasefire. The rapid normalization of life in Kashmir, opening up of tourism and the reduction in the number of militants and over ground workers (OGW) have greatly reduced the life expectancy of a militant crossing the LOC. It will require more effort from the ISI to keep them motivated. Killing their leaders is not the way to do that.

My previous blogpost post discusses how tourism can be a game changer in the Kashmir valley.
A turning point might be the completion of the Jammu-Srinagar rail line.

https://rpdeans.blogspot.com/2023/07/kashmir-way-forward-after-370.html

f Pakistan wanted to get credit from the world community and get loans etc, they could simply have handed over `retired’ terrorists to India, such as Panjwar or Dawood Ibrahim, who are not popular in Pakistan (unlike Hafiz Sayed) and are an International embarrassment. On the contrary, the ISI protects their assets, to ensure that terrorists who are active now, have the confidence that the ISI will ensure a comfortable retirement for them.   

The argument has been made (in the case of the killing of Nijjar in Canada for e.g.) that they may have been victims of gang wars, or rival militant groups. Unlike in Canada, these men were engaged only in Jihad against India, under the watch of the ISI. The ISI also keeps groups apart as much as possible. If it was gang war, a lot of foot soldiers of each side would have died, rather than targeted killings of their key people.

Some of those killed are those who are not leaders, but who handle operations like recruitment, operations planning or fake currency. It is only India that gains from their loss and they are difficult to replace – unlike foot soldiers.
Two of those killed were very symbolic for India – the hijacker of IC 814 and the kidnapper of Cmdr. Kulbhushan Jadhav.   

It is suggested that if RAW outsources this job to gangs in Pakistan, the ISI could well do the same, with terrorist groups in India carrying out assassinations. However, unlike Pak, India does not shelter terrorists. If Pakistan attempts to assassinate for e.g. Army officers, or politicians, it would not only be an act of war, but India will retaliate in the same way and after the events of Apr 23 the Pakistan establishment has become more vulnerable to mobs or assassins. My sense is that there would be an informal agreement between both armies, not to deliberately target each other – however, militants are disposable and fair game.

The killings (going by the chatter on Pak forums) have spooked the groups and establishment. When each person is killed in roughly the same way, despite bodyguards, in a public place, or remote parts of the country they hitherto considered safe and none of the perpetrators caught, it convinces them that they can be killed at any time and at no risk. Looking over your shoulder for the rest of your life reduces your efficiency.

My view of how and why India may have initiated this is:

In May 2020, during covid, when the Chinese intruded into India in Ladakh taking the Indian army by surprise, the Pak army felt that the loss of territory would be a huge blow to India and to the morale of the Indian army and they might capitalize on it through a `hot’ LOC and increasing the level of militancy in Kashmir valley. The Chinese withdrew from most of the disputed area and the Indian army was able to reinforce the area without weakening its forces on the LOC and engaged in counter insurgency (unlike during the Kargil war in 1999).  

On Republic day 2021, agitators protesting the Farmer bill, ran amok in Delhi, tearing down the national flag form the red fort. I believe this was a turning point. The Govt was convinced that this incident and the farmer agitation, was sponsored by anti-national elements abroad and decided to go after them.

From 25^th Feb 2021 India and Pakistan agreed to a ceasefire across the LOC. I discuss the effect of this and why it happened in my previous blog post:

https://rpdeans.blogspot.com/2023/08/pakistans-economic-implosion.html

Since the abrogation of article 370, in 2019, for every terrorist killed in Kashmir, there were 2 who were arrested. Until 2019 there were always more terrorists killed than arrested. Moreover the number of terrorists killed each year between 2020 and 2022 (207 each year) was more than the

number killed between 2011 & 2019 (150). The ratio of security forces and civilians killed / per militant neutralized also steadily decreased from 2.8 terrorists neutralized for every security force + civilian killed between 2016-18 to 8.5 terrorists neutralized for every security force + civilian killed in 2022 & 2023.  Thus, not only is terrorism yielding diminishing returns to militant groups, but there is less will to die for the cause, with a higher proportion of terrorists surrendering. 

If low morale among terrorists and reduced support from the Pak army (no firing across the LOC to aid terrorist infiltration) is coupled with the killing of their leaders and key personnel, it can deal an irrecoverable blow to the insurgency. Conversely, the last thing the ISI would do, when faced with low morale and a questioning of the basis for support to militant groups, is to kill the men to are key to the continued motivation and recruitment of militants, along with operational expertise.

I would assume that RAW’s negotiations and financing of groups responsible for these killings,
would take place in Dubai, where Afghan and Anti Pak groups are based. It is a convenient location for banking and hawala transactions. The first steps would have been taken in 2022, when Zahoor Mistry was killed in Karachi, followed by financier Laal Mohammed (possibly by Indian agents, since he was killed in Nepal).   

The killing of Aijaz Ahmed in Afghanistan was possibly a trial run for the group that might have carried out later killings in Pakistan. If the assassins were an Afghan based group, it would be a lot easier to pull off in Afghanistan. Afghan based groups, some opposed to the Pak govt, also operate in Karachi, which has a large Pashtun population.  

The pace of assassinations increased from Feb 2023, once the Pak army and ISI came under pressure from the public over its treatment of former PM Imran Khan, the renewed insurgency in Baluchistan and a failure to agree to a ceasefire with militant groups like the TTP, as well as the Taliban govt in Afghanistan, over its sheltering of Anti Pakistan groups. Its possible that any of these groups, who may consider a hit against the Pak army or ISI too risky, would be willing to embarrass the ISI by killing militants under their protection and get a large payoff for doing so.   

A Sindhi separatist group (SRA) claimed responsibility for the killing of Hussain Arai. This group is not regarded as a threat and naming them might be an attempt to muddy the waters. 

Recent killings have become more brazen and perhaps designed to send a message to terrorists that they are not safe anywhere. Khwaja Shahid was kidnapped and beheaded near the LOC. Abducting him was far more difficult that just killing him, as was beheading him in an area that is heavily patrolled by the Pak army. The manner of his killing sends a message that it was to avenge the deaths of Indian soldiers killed in a similar manner and makes it clear that it was not done by the ISI, or a rival gang.

Akram Khan and Dawood (Daud) Malik were killed in the tribal areas of KP & Waziristan. These are places where an outsider would be spotted easily. The latest victim, Raheem Ulla Tariq was shot in a large slum of Karachi, where the govt has limited authority and were none of the people around intervened. He was on the way to address an Anti-India gathering in support of the jihad in Kashmir. 

The ISI cannot blame India for the deaths, because admitting it was India would be a huge embarrassment for the agency. It would also boost the image of the Indian govt. Without proof, the allegations would be as credible as all the other allegations about India's role, whenever Pakistan faces any militant attack.