Gaza war part 6 - One war ends another begins ?

 In my last blogpost of 10 June, I made several predictions.

https://rpdeans.blogspot.com/2024/06/the-gaza-war-part-5-what-next.html

- Operations in Gaza will be largely over by the end of August.
- IDF casualties in Gaza have been falling for some time, notwithstanding an increase in May,
  and though Hamas has been trying to defend its last remaining strongholds.  
- Two IDF divisions will handle Gaza, with a model similar to the West bank. All IDF units under
   Israel’s  northern command will be moved to the North, for possible operations against Hezbollah,
   after getting battle experience in Gaza.
- It was not in Netanyahu’s interest to reach a ceasefire or hostages deal with Hamas, without fully
  neutralizing Hamas’s in Gaza. To avoid a deal, Hezbollah will be provoked in a bid to increase
  tensions and scuttle a deal.
- Ground operations against Hezbollah could begin in Sept. Until then Israel can wage attritional warfare because unlike in 2006, the exchange ratio favours Israel. Unlike 2006, Hezbollah cannot
stay on the Israel border and do nothing, nor does it have the strength to attack Israel in a meaningful way.

At the time of writing this – 25 Aug, when Israel launched a pre-emptive strike on Hezbollah, these forecasts have largely been accurate. To elaborate:

Gaza operations:
In July the IDF secured the Philadelphia corridor, cutting off Gaza from Egypt and Hamas’s source of supply. Simultaneously, the IDF pushed deeper into the last two Hamas strongholds in Rafah and
Khan Yunis. In the process the IDF lost 9 men in July and 10 in August. In comparison it lost 36 men in May and 27 in June. The lower casualties were despite the fact the Hamas should have been expected to fight harder to avoid losing control of Gaza and the Philadelphia and Netzarim corridors
(the Netzarim corridor split Gaza in two). Of the 19 men lost, seven were from IEDs or bobby traps when dismantling tunnels and one each from friendly fire and an accident. Only 10 men in two month were lost when in contact with Hamas fighters, which is an indication of Hamas’s decreased
ability to resist.

I have received feedback from readers that if the IDF has claimed it has killed 17000 Hamas fighters and in turn has only lost about 350 men in operations in Gaza, the kill ratio of 48 : 1 seems implausible and has not been achieved in the last by the IDF or in any comparable operation.
A similar analysis by Al Jazeera put this ratio at 62:1.

 I look at it differently, by considering irreplaceable losses (i.e. killed, too seriously wounded to fight
and prisoners).
The IDF lost (as on 25^th Aug) 702 personnel, including casualties from 7^th Oct.
In addition 72 police and paramilitary personnel were killed
652 were seriously wounded and 1113 moderately wounded.
This gives 2540 irreplaceable losses.

The US estimate of Hamas dead is 10,000 (while the IDF claim 17000).
In Feb 2024, a Hamas source gave a figure of dead fighters as 6000 (which would be consistent
with 10,000+ today). This statement was later denied. 
Assuming that Hamas has the same ratio of wounded to dead as Israel, the total casualties for 10,000 dead, would be 32800. However, the IDF estimate is a 1:1 killed to seriously wounded ratio – which is plausible given the poorer level of medical care inside Gaza.
Assuming 10,000 dead and a ratio of 1.5 seriously wounded to 1 killed and adding another 2000 Hamas fighters who are probably prisoner, Hamas casualties would be 27,000 which is a 10:1 ratio and in line with previous conflicts.

Hamas and other militant groups in Gaza were estimated to have a combined strength of between
30 & 40,000 fighters. The loss of 27,000 would for all practical purposes be the end of Hamas’s ability to offer organized resistance, particularly when many of the survivors are also wounded in varying degrees. It is true that Hamas has probably recruited more fighters in the last ten months. However, an amateur with a AK-47 or RPG is of little use when a lot of Hamas’s tunnel network has been destroyed and movement of fighters gets detected by drones, followed by an artillery or air strike. An indicator of the lack of weapons remaining with Hamas is that in the last two months, only one man was killed by an anti-tank missile (Hamas’s strongest weapon) while rocket attacks have stopped.   

Current forces in Gaza.
Since July, just as I had predicted in my post 0f 10 June, the IDF units in Gaza have been:
- the 162 Armored Division.
- The 252 (reserve) Armored division.
- The 143 Territorial division which has the 8^th Armored brigade from Central command,
  along with two territorial brigades that will `hold’ the Gaza perimeter.

Reserve units can function only with a fraction of their strength as reservists cannot be called up 
for more than 60 days. In the linger term probably one month in a year. Therefore the two reserve 
divisions will probably have one battalion each actively deployed, while 162 Division would probably 
have two of its three brigades deployed. This would be a total force of not more than 6-8000 men, much too small to occupy Gaza, Hence, as I suggested in my last post, Israel would look at occupying the 
Gaza perimeter and (unlike in the past), key corridors and check points inside Gaza and conduct small unit raids or drone strikes against Hamas fighters. 

The 98^th and 99^th divisions of the IDF which played a central role in the Gaza operation from the beginning and were originally part of Northern and Central command respectively were moved out from the Gaza area in July. 
The two remaining brigades of Northern command – the 2^nd (Carmeli) and 679 (Yiftach) brigades, were also de-inducted from Gaza, by the end of July.
The 98 Division (one commando and two parachute brigades) can operate in a specialist role in targeted operations, in both Gaza and in Northern Lebanon.  

Thus, the IDF’s northern command is now at full strength. All its brigades have got a minimum of
two months combat experience in Gaza and all units have spent at least two months on the Lebanon border opposite Hezbollah, this year. This is a contrast to the 2006 Hezbollah war, when some brigades were sent into battle against Hezbollah in a ad-hoc manner with little preparation.

The war against Hezbollah so far:  
In 2006, the month long war with Hezbollah cost the IDF 121 killed.
44 civilians died from rocket attacks.
The IDF claimed it killed up to 600 Hezbollah (Hezbollah admitted 250).
Assuming the IDF estimate is correct, it is a loss ratio of 1 : 5 at best.

In the current conflict, the IDF has lost 19 men in 11 months.
Hezbollah has admitted 476 of its fighters were killed, including its top commanders.
There are also an estimated 20 deaths among Iranian proxy forces in Syria.
Based on Hezbollah’s own estimate the loss ratio is 1 : 26

27 civilians in Israel have been killed in 11 months of rocket attacks.
150 Lebanese civilians were killed, excluding those in the mass air strikes of 25 August.

While Hezbollah’s stock of rockets is a multiple of what it was in 2006 and the sophistication of missiles and drones has increased, Israeli counter measures also improved as seems evident from the far lower losses (per month or per thousand rockets) in Israel. Unlike 2006, Hezbollah cannot replace its rocket stock, as supplies from Iran through Syria are being interdicted.  
The IDF on the other hand has built up stocks as the Gaza conflict is drawing down. Supply from the US has probably been assured. It is unlikely that any action perceived to be against Israel will be
taken so close to the US election.

Lebanon’s economy – Hezbollah is part of the government, contracted 34% between 2018 & 2022. Given the negative growth in previous years, it was expected to increase in 2023, but instead
decreased by another 0.5%. In 2024, Lebanon’s economy was projected to grow only 0.5% assuming the Hezbollah-Israel war ended in the 2^nd half of 2024. Growth is estimated to be negative again for
the first half of 2024.

Israel’s GDP growth in the first quarter of 2024 was 4.1% though it shrank to 0.3% in the Apr-June quarter and is forecast to grow 1.5% for the whole of 2024.

Thus Hezbollah cannot afford either the economic cost, or the manpower losses of simply staying in place on the Israel border as they did in 2006. Israel on the other hand, can continue an attritional
war, imposing heavier costs on Hezbollah over time, if both sides stay in place and fire at each other.   

Israel’s strategy: As I had suggested in my last post, Prime Minister Netanyahu’s political future can probably be ensured only if he is able to deal with the two threats Israel faces – from Hamas and Hezbollah (and by extension, Iran) and putting on the backburner any talk of a two state solution.

It was therefore not in Netanyahu’s interest to agree to a Gaza ceasefire, if it did not result in the
return of all the hostages and the end of Hamas as a threat to Israel. The only bargaining chip Hamas had was the hostages and that was becoming weaker over time. Nevertheless, towards the end of
July, there was a real possibility of a ceasefire, with the US pushing for it, the twin killings of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran and Hezbollah’s military leader Fuad Shukr in Beirut, ended ceasefire
talks, with Israel being able to blame Hamas for a impasse. Similarly, I believe the ongoing ceasefire
talks will also be stalled with Israel’s pre-emptive strikes of 25 August.
Israel has escalation dominance. It can choose to escalate and give Hamas or Iran two bad choices to choose from. Either retaliate and suffer an adverse exchange ratio (in the case of Iran, the possibility of US intervention), or do nothing and lose face. 

Israel’s objective is the de-facto implementation of UN resolution 1701 of 2006, which means the de-militarization of part of south Lebanon, south of the Litani river. It would mean Hezbollah loses
its tunnel network close to the Israel border and the threat to Israel diminishes significantly. If Hezbollah voluntarily does so, it would mean a loss of face (for them and their sponsor, Iran) – though that will also happen if they stay where they are and do nothing.

If Hezbollah respond with a stronger rocket attack, I believe it will precipitate a ground offensive by Israel which it is now ready for. The objective of this operation would be an advance upto the Litani
river – possibly handing the newly created demilitarised zone to the UN peacekeeping force UNIFIL. 

For this operation Israel now has the following formations:

- 36^th Infantry division. This took the highest casualties in the Gaza war, but has recovered and replaced casualties over the last six months. It is possibly Israel’s strongest regular division comprising two Infantry, two armored and one artillery brigade.

- 91 Reserve Division. One reserve brigade each of infantry, armor and artillery with two
 territorial brigades to hold ground.

- 146 Reserve division. Two infantry, two armored, one parachute and one Artillery brigade.
 
- 210 Reserve division. One reserve brigade each of infantry, armor and artillery with two
 territorial brigades to hold ground.

- 98 Parachute Division – With three Parachute brigades and One commando brigade, this will be  used for special operations both in Gaza and against Hezbollah, as it has done in the past. The
division lost 130 men in Gaza (300 irrecoverable casualties including wounded). It possible that
replacements will come from the 11 (Reserve) Commando brigade and 646 (Reserve) para brigade
which were withdrawn from Gaza back to their parent central command. 

Houthi attacks on shipping From March to May, the Houthis claimed to have targeted 29 ships.
In reality 19 ships were aware of an attack and only 5 were actually hit, none seriously. 5 hits
from 19 defenceless merchant ships, targeted by missiles or drones, is a poor result.

From June, the Houthis stepped up attacks on ships.  29 ships were targeted in June, 10 of them were hit, with one sinking and two damaged, though the Houthis claimed to have used multiple missiles against individual ships and once a hypersonic missile.  In July, 17 ships were targeted and seven hit, none seriously. In August, seven ships were so far targeted, six were hit, one seriously.
Attacks in August have had fewer missiles with more attacks by boats and drones. Traffic through the Suez canal reduced by over 50% in the first half of 2024 which impacted Egypt (through loss of Suez canal revenues) more than Israel.

From March to August, of the 82 ships claimed to have been targeted by the Houthis, only one sank. Far from affecting shipping as many analysts have suggested, my view is that shows Iran’s anti-ship capability in poor light, has wasted missiles and has further isolated Iran, which is the opposite of
what Iran’s new Prime Minister, Pezeshkian, who has a more conciliatory view of the west, would have wanted.

A note on sources:
All info in the blog is open source. Details on IDF casualties are from two official web sites, 

cross referenced with press reports. I have asked critics to produce evidence of any IDF casualty
not covered in official data, which has not been forthcoming.