The Gaza war - Part 5. What next ?

 Since my last post in April, there have been some significant non military developments in this
 conflict. 

Israel’s GDP grew in the 1^st Quarter of 2024 (after a fall in Q4 2023), showing it has shrugged
off the effect of war. GDP growth was close to pre war estimates.
Iran will elect a new President on 28^th June. His policy may impact Israel’s policy towards Hezbollah.

A word about the deployable strength of the IDF:

An IDF brigade is barely 2000 personnel (it is lower in an armored brigade), compared to over
3000 in an Indian army brigade.

Reserve personnel who have been mobilized and form the bulk of the IDF soldiers in combat in Gaza, cannot be mobilized for more than 60 days. Thus reserve units who have been fighting in Gaza for several months, have deployed only individual battalions of those brigades at any point of time. A particular reserve brigade may be deployed in Gaza on paper, but in reality, only a single battalion (barely 500 personnel) of that brigade are in combat at any time. Some reserve brigades have been fully demobilized after a 60 day rotation was over.

An analysis of units fighting in Gaza, shows the following length of deployment upto end May.

Regular armored brigades:
7 and 401 armored brigades: 176-180 days
188 armored brigade: 78 days for its battalions (rotated to the Lebanon border)

Regular infantry brigades:
Golani Brigade: 78 days per battalion (2 of its battalions took heavy losses and presumably replaced).
35 Para, Givati, Nahal and the Commando brigade: 140-200 days

Training formations: 460 Armored and the Bismalach brigades: 80-84 days.

Reserve brigades: Between 42 and 57 days in combat. (the 14^th Reserve armored brigade has 65 days in combat, but it’s probable that individual tank regiments have not exceeded 60 days).

The five regular infantry & parachute brigades of the IDF have lost 54 men dead per brigade on average. With a ratio of 5.8 wounded (hospital admissions) to every person killed, you have 367 casualties per brigade or over 15% of its strength. These casualties are not distributed equally across battalions in a brigade, with the result that losses in some battalions may make them temporarily incapable of offensive operations and necessitating a replacement with another battalion of the same brigade. For e.g. the 13^th battalion of the Golani brigade lost 41 killed and another 91 irrecoverable casualties, or over 25% of its strength. 

Thus, even if there are Ten brigades deployed in Gaza currently, they might comprise as little as 10,000 personnel. I have assumed higher numbers in earlier posts, not considering the
limited time that reserves can be deployed for and smaller size of units compared to an
equivalent  Indian army unit.

What this implies is that the IDF will not have the strength to occupy the whole of Gaza. The Israeli strategy for Gaza seems to be similar to what Israel has done in the West bank, which is to control key locations, preventing the free movement of militants and being able to react quickly to the presence of militants – a `Corridor and raid strategy’, as I will illustrate.  This could be called the `West Bankisation of Gaza’ and in my view will be the future of Gaza until there is a more durable peace agreement.

In the last post I had suggested that Israel’s operations in Gaza from April, will not be carried out by just  division (as was suggested when several units were demobilized or moved to the border with Lebanon), but will involve 3 divisions. These were the 162^nd div with the reserve 252 and 143 divisions. There were indeed 3 divisions in Gaza in May-June, but the 252 and 143 divisions were largely stood down (with most soldiers de-mobilized), while the regular
98^th and 99^th divisions operated in Gaza.
https://rpdeans.blogspot.com/2024/04/gaza-war-part-4-israels-quiet-turnaround.html

My sense is that the battle for Rafah in southern Gaza (the part of Gaza that had not yet been targeted by the IDF) was to involve two divisions. Possibly under US pressure to curtail the scope of the operation, this was reduced to one, but it was disingenuously done. The 162^nd division, tasked with fighting for Rafah, had six brigades, instead of its regular five (most IDF brigades have three infantry or armored brigades and one artillery).  This was more like a two division strong force. 

The objective of the battle for Rafah was to occupy the strip of land separating Gaza from Egypt, called the `Philadelphia corridor’. Along with this, the destruction of tunnels leading into Egypt would cut off Hamas from their supplies. In the process four of the estimated six remaining battalions of Hamas (of the 25 they had in Oct 23) would be degraded after which the IDF might control more of Rafah city.

The objective was reached on 7^th June (as seen on the map). The IDF also raided and withdrew from adjoining areas along the strip. It took a month for the IDF to occupy the corridor (physically occupying just under 40% of Rafah). In the process the IDF lost nine men in the Rafah operation.

In Central Gaza, the IDF occupied the `Netzarim’ corridor (or route 749) which cuts Gaza between North to South. This 6.5 km corridor is the means to bring aid to Gaza by sea and also prevent movement by Hamas from one half of Gaza to the other, incl. by underground tunnels. This operation was led by the 99^th Div (normally assigned Central command) which had under it the only two uncommitted brigades of the IDF – the reserve 679 Armored brigade and the 2^nd (Carmeli) brigade. The 99 div lost just 2 men in this operation fighting against what was believed to be 1 of the 6 remaining battalions of Hamas.  

In Northern Gaza, the IDF operated against the Jabaliya refugee camp. Expecting to fight 1 battalion, the IDF found that 2 more battalions were built from previously destroyed Hamas units. Link to report from Israeli analyst Amir Bohbot
https://news.walla.co.il/item/3666700

The IDF’s 98^th Para division normally part of Northern command and which had earlier moved out of the Gaza area, was assigned to the Jabalaya operation. Under this division was the 7^th armored brigade (normally part of 36^th armored division in the North), with the 35^th Para brigade (of 98^th div) that had been fighting in Gaza throughout and the Kfir brigade from Central command, which is a specialized urban warfare brigade. The Bismalach brigade (training formation) was also recalled for this operation.  The IDF lost 21 men in operations in the Jabalaya area from 1^st May to 8 June, when most units withdrew from the area.

There was a separate operation south of the Netzarim corridor, to push into the area of Deir Al Balah, in the center of Gaza, as shown on the map. This mini salient into Gaza will further restrict Hamas movement. This was done by the Kfir brigade which moved back to its parent 98^th div. The whole of Gaza has also been pushed inward by the creation of a de-facto buffer zone between the Israel border and inhabited areas of Gaza.

My view is that the 98^th division will now move back to Northern command, opposite Lebanon for a possible operation against Hezbollah. Over the next month, once the 162^nd Division consolidates their hold on the Rafah area, Gaza may be occupied by 2 divisions, from the regular 162^nd division the reserve 252 Division, or the territorial 80^th or 143 Division (possibly a weaker territorial division paired with the stronger 162 or 252 division.    

In the last post in this series on 2 April, I had made two assumptions based on losses on both sides.

- Civilian losses are declining each month &
- IDF losses are declining each month, while Hamas’s ability to post a threat to Israel is being
  degraded with an increasingly adverse loss ratio. The rescue of 4 hostages in a heavily        populated area with a strong Hamas presence, with no IDF casualty, is to me, an indicator
  of that degraded capability. 

In May, Hamas reported a total of 1751 people killed in Gaza. While they have earlier reported that almost 70% of deaths were of women and children (below 18), the actual number from identified bodies is 40%. Most of the remaining, given IDF estimates of Hamas losses in May, would be Hamas, particularly unidentified bodies. If 50% of the 1751 were civilians, the civilian losses were 29/day, similar to the 27 I had estimated in my last post (a drop from 150+ per day in the first 3 months).
This chart shows a broad trend of casualties in Gaza, incl. Hamas fighters. 

What I think is quite remarkable, is that with the IDF carrying out 50+ air strikes per day (down from 100-150) and upto 1500 artillery shells per day (90,000 shells in the first 60 days which
probably reduced since) in Gaza, which is densely populated, with no bomb shelters and basements and with Hamas positioned intertwined with residential areas, the civilian death toll is so low.  

The IDF, which had lost 16 men in March and 8 in April, lost 36 men killed in May. Though this went against the trend of falling casualties, it was the result of two intense battles in Jabalaya and Rafah, as well as losses from Hezbollah attacks, terrorist attacks and friendly fire.

The IDF has 10 armored, 17 Infantry, five Parachute and two Commando/Special forces brigades (both regular and reserve units). Of these, nine Armored, nine Infantry, four para and both commando brigades were deployed for the Gaza operation at different times. Thus 24 of the IDF’s 34 brigades have got battle experience – in addition to all seven artillery brigades which have been in action in both Gaza and the border with Lebanon. This would be a force far better prepared for combat than the one that started operations against Hamas last Oct.

 The ceasefire proposal

I see it as an attempt by President Biden to gain support from both sides, prior to the election. While he has given the impression that the proposal has come from Israel ( it didn’t ) and therefore Hamas must accept it, since Israel has made some concessions, I don’t see it being acceptable for either side. Hamas has only one bargaining chip left, which is the hostages. They will either accept a ceasefire which allows them to keep the hostages and retain what is left of their capability, or exchange them for a permanent settlement, on terms that will not be acceptable to Israel.
The Netanyahu government will accept a deal that returns the hostages for a ceasefire and nothing more. This sounds cynical but I believe that with the passage of time, the remaining hostages will either be dead, or rescued – as it happened on 8^th June, when four hostages were rescued. Hamas’s ability to retain the hostages and their fighting ability diminishes with each day, so it is not in Israel’s interest to agree to a ceasefire now, though it would make sense to keep talks going.

My view is that it will take another month for the IDF to clear the Rafah area, secure its corridors and buffer zones in Gaza and degrade the remaining Hamas forces in the Jabalaya and Khan Yunis areas. After that its 98^th and 99^th divisions can move North, for possible operations against Hezbollah in Lebanon.

The (possible) invasion of South Lebanon:
In my last post, I had said that Hezbollah, unlike in the 2006 war, was suffering from a poor loss ratio. They have lost, as per their figures, 331 fighters against 12 IDF killed. Inclusive of losses in Syria and among other Iran or Syria backed groups, losses are 589 killed, as claimed by Israel.
It is not a sustainable loss ratio for Hezbollah.

 There is a possibility of Iran being unwilling to unable to back Hezbollah, at least for the next few months. Unwilling, because I believe Iran’s bluff – the ability to strike at Israel, was called, when its mass drone and missile attack failed. Iran’s presidential elections will be held on 28^th June. Of the six Presidential candidates cleared to stand, there are 3 conservatives, 2 ultra conservatives and 1 moderate. A new President may not want to precipitate a conflict with Israel that may well draw in the US under a Trump administration.

Operationally, Iran’s supply routes into Syria and Lebanon are being increasingly hit by Israel. Hezbollah rockets and drones being fired into Israel cannot be easily replenished, whereas Israel is replenishing its own stocks of artillery and bombs, after the US aid package. Unlike in 2006, Israel can exchange fire with Hezbollah across the border, indefinitely, because the loss ratio is overwhelmingly in Israel’s favor.

The economy of Lebanon, which was weak to begin with, is suffering more than Israel from the Hezbollah Israel confrontation. Hezbollah, which is part of the Lebanon govt, would be under pressure to not exacerbate the economic crisis. Hezbollah is already unable to compensate Lebanese civilians for losses they have suffered in the ongoing campaign (unlike in 2006). There is therefore  pressure on Lebanon (with Hezbollah being a part of the Lebanese govt) to accept a possible US backed to withdraw behind the Litani river, creating a buffer zone with Israel, monitored by the UN, in exchange for financial aid to Lebanon. This is similar to UN resolution 1701 after the 2006 war.

If Hezbollah does not take a peace deal, but continues its current posture of cross border attacks, Israel may initiate an invasion of South Lebanon, to push Hezbollah behind the Litani river. This is a rerun of the 2006 Hezbollah war.

Time frame for a Lebanon invasion:
I believe IDF units earmarked for a possible invasion of Lebanon will not be able to leave the Gaza area till the end of July (the 98^th and 99^th Division and the 6^th infantry and 7^th armored brigade).
Thereafter a month to regroup and replenish. Until then, the IDF will be content to carry out air and artillery strikes on the Hezbollah leadership and weapon sites. Hezbollah retaliation will strengthen
the case among the Israeli people (and abroad) for a ground incursion.  

Time would be needed for Iran’s new President to determine what his policy towards Israel and by extension, helping Hezbollah, would be.
There would also have to be an opportunity for Hezbollah (and Iran) to respond to what I think will be a US peace proposal, which will involve Hezbollah withdrawing from the Israel border in line with UN resolution 1701. This proposal might be timed before the US election.

Given the difficult political position of Prime Minister Netanyahu and the resignation of Centrist minister Gantz (making the govt more oriented to the right) the Netanyahu govt might need to
intervene in South Lebanon to `finish the Hezbollah threat once and for all’, soon after declaring the Gaza operation complete – in terms of largely neutralizing the Hamas threat. Prolonged fighting in Gaza, or an continued threat from Hezbollah would probably necessitate fresh elections in Israel.  

All these factors suggest that if a Lebanon operation has to happen, it would be in Sept.

Any invasion of south Lebanon, will have to take not more than 60 days (given the restriction on mobilization of reserves) and will therefore be limited in its objectives. While a longer mobilization is possible, IDF planners would ideally like to plan for an operation of no more than 60 days.

A constraint the IDF may face is the availability of shells. In the 2006 war, the IDF consumed 5000 shells per day (mostly 155mm), similar to their consumption in the 1973 Yom Kippur war. This quantity is equal to the combined output of NATO, almost all of which has been going to Ukraine. Given the extensive use of artillery in Gaza and against Hezbollah since last year, the IDF stock of shells would be depleted - the IDF's doctrine has always been to fight quick wars. This may well affect the duration of a war with Hezbollah.  

The possible IDF force for this operation would be;

36^th Armored division – with Two Armored, two Infantry and one artillery brigade.
146^th (reserve) Armored division  - Two Armored, two Infantry and one Artillery brigade
91 or 210 Territorial div – Two Infantry, one Armored and one Artillery brigade.
98^th Parachute div – Three Parachute, one Commando and one Artillery brigade.
99 (reserve) div. One Para, One infantry, One armored and One artillery brigade

Most of these units have seen combat in Gaza. 

The 2006 Israeli operation in South Lebanon involved Four Israeli divisions, but most of this force was sent into Lebanon only three days before the war ended. 

Analysis of Houthi attacks on merchant shipping

In my previous post, I had suggested that the Houthi threat was not significant. At the time of writing it, the last merchant ship hit was on 24^th March. Since then, the Houthis have claimed attacks on 29 merchant ships (till 1 June), of which 19 ships were aware that they were attacked, but only five ships were hit, none seriously and with no loss of life. Although a merchant ship is defenseless  against a modern anti-ship missile, hitting barely 5 ships, of 29 (or 19) targeted, is a poor success rate. The tonnage of shipping transiting through the Red sea is slowly increasing, though its is still not at the level reached before attacks began. While in the early stages of Houthi attacks, there was a concern that cheap drones attacking warships had to be countered with expensive anti-aircraft missiles, it is
now expensive Iranian anti-ship missiles that are failing to hit their targets and not cause significant damage when they do. In the process, Iran will expose more of its missiles (depleting their arsenal) while facilitating countermeasures. It is not a sustainable strategy, just as Hezbollah rocket & drones attacks are not.

Notes:

Maps courtesy: Theti mapping & Gaza war unit tracker on twitter 
Casualties: https://www.gov.il/en/pages/swords-of-iron-idf-casualties
(these are cross checked with reports in the Israeli press)

A note on IDF casualties: This site started publishing details of the wounded from last Dec, both from 7 Oct,
as well as the start of the IDF entry into Gaza. The number of wounded was recently increased by around 700 and the breakup suggested that these were all wounded on 7th Oct. Rather than this being an attempt to be `economical with the facts' on casualties (as the Gaza health ministry appears to be) I see it as a transparency in openly stating the total casualty figures.    

I have used Gaza health ministry numbers for civilian casualties. Though these appear to have overstated the 
number of women and children killed and the methodology is suspect, they validate my point that most Hamas fighters have been neutralized.   

My previous posts on Gaza:

https://rpdeans.blogspot.com/2024/04/gaza-war-part-4-israels-quiet-turnaround.html

https://rpdeans.blogspot.com/2024/02/gaza-war-part-3-100-days-of-ground-war.html

https://rpdeans.blogspot.com/2023/12/the-gaza-war-by-numbers-2-months-later.html

https://rpdeans.blogspot.com/2023/10/what-israeli-invasion-of-gaza-might.html

In forums that I post in, I have been asked who I support in this conflict and about my background.
In my posts on this conflict (and all my blog posts) I avoid politics and try to analyze military and geopolitical
strategy based on data. The only country I’d support in a conflict is mine (India). The political aspect has been covered by innumerable people of all persuasions and I have nothing new to add.

My experience has been in the corporate world and I am an enthusiastic amateur in the area of military history and geopolitics, where I use data and information from different sources to make sense of what is happening – much as I might so when running a business.

I worked in Iran and Turkiye and have done business with Israel and across the Arab world. 
My experience gave me a more nuanced understanding of the region than `One side good, the other bad’.