Ukraine war - part 11. The missile war
This post has been because the use of Long range missiles by
both sides, has escalated the war andtaken analysis around the war into the realm of a possible nuclear war or World
war 3.
I wanted to look at open source data to examine what each side hopes to
achieve from this.
Before that an update on the fighting:
November is the first month, since June when Ukrainian casualties (all dead
& wounded) have not increased. Sanitary losses (which is how Russia defines
all dead and wounded) in Nov was 60000, compared to a high of 70450 in Sept –
to which must be added desertions and prisoner which is
probably 3-4000 per month. Half of these sanitary losses will be irrecoverable.
Only inside the Kursk salient (where Ukraine lost half the territory it captured in August) will Nov casualties be higher than in Oct. The fighting in Kursk had been analysed in detail in my previous posts.
In part 8 of this series, I discussed in details the concept of sanitary and
irrecoverable losses.
https://rpdeans.blogspot.com/2024/09/ukraine-war-part-8-casualties-force.html
Losses in Sept and Oct were higher than November, although Ukraine lost more
territory.
Losses in armored vehicles, which had been increasing each month between Nov 23
and Aug 24, started declining in Sept and this trend continued in November,
though monthly losses were higher
than 2023 levels.
What this may indicate is that Ukraine is simply running out of tanks and has
increasing shortages of infantry. The Ukrainian tanks that have appeared are
the few remaining Western tanks – Abrams, Leopard 2 and Challengers. Only a
handful remain of each type and were kept in reserve. Ukraine has also burned
through most of the 300,000 men mobilized during 2024.
I had analyzed Russian casualties in detail in my earlier posts citing Mediazona, a western initiative to list all those killed, based on various information sources in Russia, including burials, mentions on social media and in memorials, compensation payouts etc. There is also a Ukrainian source which
uses similar methodology (the Information resistance group) and has similar numbers. On 11 Nov, they had a list of 80691 killed, as against 77143 in Mediazona (on 8 Nov). Mediazona figures exclude those
from the Donbass region of Ukraine serving in the Russian army. The larger point is that total Russian deaths are in this ballpark and not the 500,000+ cited by Ukraine. What is more important that absolute numbers are casualty ratios. As discussed in the past, Ukraine's losses are increasing at a faster rate and Russia's are reducing.
From the Russian side, there is an interesting documentary (English subtitles) featuring
a brigade or division HQ. have found
that Russian news channels have more news from the frontline – with embedded
reporters than do Western channels.
https://x.com/simpatico771/status/1858690512728768603
The organization of the Russia HQ – with a network of tunnels, visibility over
the battlefield and the
planning of attacks upto a squad (8 man) level is very different from the
Western stereotype of Russian meat assaults and lack of concern for casualties.
I haven't covered western video clips in my blog, partly because the Western mainstream media is freely available to readers and also because there is limited battlefield reporting. One reporter I follow is
Julian Ropcke of Bild (Germany). While he is admittedly pro Ukrainian, his reporting is detailed and honest. This is his latest video which is in English.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vDXuAcJVPeU
He makes points I have referred to in my previous posts.
- Although the paper strength of the Ukrainian forces is high (particularly in the Velika Novosilka region which had seen little previous fighting) there are trenches which are lightly manned and hence captured easily.
- Russia captured an area in 5 days which was equal to what Ukraine captured in its entire summer
2023 counter offensive in the same area.
- There are no Russian `meat assaults' but movement by a small number of heavily protected vehicles.
- Ukraine seems to be relying on drones more than artillery, or tanks.
The logic of strikes into Russia and implications.
Ukraine’s has long had the view that they are at a disadvantage because
Russia’s logistics: Supply depots, Airfields & Air defense sites,
Headquarters and support areas cannot be attacked because they are inside
Russia and attacking Russia – with the risk of Russian retaliation against NATO
would be a red line NATO was not willing to cross.
Russian hardliners similarly have the view that NATO’s has an advantage in ISR
– Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance, because NATO AWA&C and
Electronic warfare aircraft either operate from NATO airspace or over
International waters (Black sea) and attacking them would be tantamount to an act of war against NATO. Similarly NATO has many more reconnaissance
satellites than Russia and they operate over Russian air space. In an actual
war with NATO, Russia would quickly target AWACs and Satellites. Similarly,
Ukraine’s rear area military infrastructure is also largely untouched as it is
in NATO territory – e.g. Repair workshops, ammunition depots (from where
smaller quantities move to Ukraine) and training facilities. NATO staffed units
that monitor operations are also on NATO territory.
A second reason for considering long range strikes to be an act of war by NATO against Russia, is that missiles requiring targeting info from NATO satellites and the weapons cannot be operated by Ukrainians – it is a specialized task which has to be done by NATO personnel on the ground. That is why Germany has not so far agreed to use Taurus long missiles against Russia. If NATO `presses the trigger’ on a NATO weapon, fired into Russia, Russia considers it a NATO attack against Russia.
Russian red lines that were crossed earlier were the
targeting of Russian rear area locations inside disputed borders (in Crimea and
the Donbass) which have mostly been done with HIMARS rockets.
These caused a lot of damage in the first few months, till Russia improved the
interception of incoming missiles and dispersed locations that were being
targeted.
A second red line was the use of long range Ukrainian drones to attack targets
upto 1000 km inside Russia, which also required NATO satellites.
Impact of long range missile strikes:
A point which has not been fully appreciated in the West, where there a clamor
for providing long range missiles, is that inexpensive Ukrainian long range
drones have caused more damage than the missiles, even though 90% are shot down
or jammed.
He impact of the first two missile strikes – after
permission was given to strike inside Russia, has been analyzed in detail in
his blog. In summary:
https://simplicius76.substack.com/p/zelenskys-atacms-gambit-nuclear-red
1. First strike with 6 ATACMS missiles. Russia claimed 5 were intercepted (NATO
claimed 2) and the remaining missile caused minor damage. Weather 1 or 4
missiles hit the target is moot because no fires were reported at the site (by
the FIRES satellite system), or reports of casualties. The target was a Soviet
era ammunition dump not containing munitions in active use in Ukraine. Given
that most HIMARS missiles (with the same technology) get intercepted at an
increasing rate, the claim that 5 of 6
missiles were intercepted has merit. This target was some distance from the
Kursk region. It was speculated that permission to strike inside Russia was
confined to the Kursk region.
2. The second strike was with upto 12 Storm shadow missiles
– a very large number considering the quantity available. The target was a HQ barely 30 km from the
front, which was a waste considering the 300+ km range of the missile. The reason this was the target was because the
missiles were launched from west of the Dnieper, keeping the launch aircraft
out of the range of Russian anti-aircraft missiles and within the Ukrainian air
defense network, which reduces the chance of interception by Russian aircraft.
Since the target was so close to the front, it was ahead of the main line of
Russian intercepting missiles, which meant a larger proportion of missiles got
through. The number is unclear. Both sides acknowledged there were casualties.
However, the initial claim that many senior generals and officers were killed
was reduced to one North Korean General injured. Given the distance of the HQ
from the front, it was possibly a brigade HQ and not a place where one would
find generals. The target could have been hit by HIMARS missiles (which were present in the Kursk region),
rather than waste scarce storm shadow missiles on it.
There were two ATACMS strikes after Russia fired its Oreshnik
(Hazel tree) IRBM hypersonic missile
as a deterrent against future strikes.
3. The third strike was with ATACMS on 23th Nov.
It happened two days after the Russian use of a hypersonic Intermediate range
Ballistic missile at the Yuzmash plant (the biggest armaments plant in Ukraine).
The target was a S-400 battery 35 km from Kursk (120 km from the border).
5 ATACMS were used. 3 were shot down. The radar and parts for the S-400 was known to have
been destroyed with some loss of life. Damage to individual missile launchers was not known. Russian media reported that the S-400 was under maintenance and the casualties were the manufacturers representatives who were servicing it. There were pictures of shot down missiles, near the Pantsir system that had apparently shot them down.
4. On 25 Nov. 8 ATACMS struck the Khalino airfield in the Kursk region. This
attack was preceded by drones, to saturate the defense. At the time of writing it is unclear how many
missiles got through. Russia clamed 7 missiles and 6 drones were intercepted. There
is video evidence of two missiles with cluster munitions, hitting the airfield
and starting fires, so not more than 6 ATACMS were probably intercepted. The
target was 110 km from the Ukraine border – in this area Ukraine had penetrated
20 km into Russia, which was well short of the max ATACMS range of 300 km. No
aircraft were based at Khalino (they had been moved out), but it is used to
launch long range drones.
These 3 ATACMS attacks are estimated to have used over a third of Ukraine’s
ATACMS stocks.
Land based long range missiles:
The only missile available to Ukraine is the ATACMS. This is a longer range
derivative of the HIMARS system – which is simply a multiple launch rocket
system (MLRS) albeit with missiles that are more accurate. Russia’s Tornado is
a advanced than the HIMARS. The ACATMS was designed in 1986 and first used in
the 1991 Gulf war.
The HIMARS when first used had a significant impact, when it successfully hit
arms depots and Russian fields headquarters. However, once the missile’s
characteristics were known, Russian electronic warfare jammed several HIMARS (causing them to miss targets) while most others were
shot down. Russia has also been increasingly successful in destroying HIMARS
launchers. HIMARS strikes have been increasingly less frequent in the past
year. As ACATMS uses the same principles, one has to consider its effectiveness
in the light of what happened with HIMARS.
After permission was given to strike inside Russia, Ukraine was believed to
have a stock of 50 ACATMS with no further deliveries scheduled. 12 to 14 have
so far been used in two strikes into Russia. Though production was to have been
phased out, a fresh contract was placed to enhance US stocks and for supply to
Ukraine and Taiwan. It is estimated by end 2024, considering enhanced
production in the past year, the US has 2500 missiles in stock of which about
1200 may have expired and have to have warheads replaced. If Ukraine gets
further deliveries, it will most likely be the older block 1 (160 km range missiles).
Taiwan has also increased its requirement for ATACMS and a US administration is
more likely to give Taiwan priority over Ukraine.
The ATACMS are being replaced by the PrSM (precision strike missile) with the
US military just starting to get delivery.
The land based missile with a longer range than ATACMS is
the Tomahawk. While Tomahawk production since 2018 has been barely 90 a year
(the minimum amount required to keep the production line viable) a single
week’s operations against the Houthis in Yemen consumed 70 missiles.
Air launched cruise missiles:
The long range missiles in NATOs inventory comprise the SSM
(US), Storm shadow / Scalp (UK/France) and Taurus (Germany). Only Storm shadow
/ Scalp missiles have been supplied.
An estimate I find credible is that 50 missiles were supplied from 2023. Of
these, going by reports of missiles fired and missiles destroyed on the ground,
I believe stock would have been exhausted in the end of 2023. Since then, France
has supplied 10 missiles (of 40 announced) and the UK possibly 40
(making this a 2nd batch of 50 supplied to Ukraine). Each missile
costs US$ 2 million, excluding the cost of integration on Soviet era aircraft
(SU-24) and larger quantities will show up in the value of arms transfers.
It is unlikely that more missiles can be supplied by either France (apart from
30 missiles committed but not supplied) or the UK which is short of the minimum
stock needed for its own use.
The only other Air launched missile option is the US JASSM
(Joint Air to surface standoff missile) now used by the US armed forces. While
the range of the basic missile is 370 km, the extended range version (should
the US decide to escalate further, is 1000 km). There has been no decision to
supply this missile so far, so any decision will have to be taken by the
incoming administration. After that the missile will have to be integrated with
the aircraft used by Ukraine, which at this stage is only the F-16.
The possible problems supplying this missile are:
The official reason was that Ukraine lack the aircraft
(including electronic warfare and escorts) to use this missile. It is normally
to be used in conditions of air superiority. Storm Shadow and Scalp missiles
have been fired well behind the front line, negating their range advantage over
ATACMS and HIMARS. If aircraft are available, the airfields housing them will
be increasingly vulnerable.
The US is currently short of JASSM missiles and in view of an enhanced threat
from China is likely to
increase its procurement from 2025 onwards.
Simulations have shown that a three week war with China will require the use of
4700 missiles from the JASSM family. The total inventory across all locations
and branches of the US military will be 7000 by
2025 and is planned to reach 10,000 in view of the Chinese threat. Current
production is 500 missiles (all variants) per year which can increase to 1000.
Given the need to fill pending orders of 3000 units, plus pending export orders
(800 for Poland alone) and plans to supply Taiwan, it is unlikely that Ukraine
can be supplied in 2025, without affecting US preparedness.
If the JASSM is used against Russia, its characteristics
will be studied and counter measures developed – as has happened for the HIMARS
and storm shadow. The effectiveness of the weapon in a more important possible
conflict with China will be affected.
To put the impact of long range missiles in perspective –
Russia has so far fired 6-7000 such missiles into Ukraine. No more than half
have been intercepted. A stock of no more than 100 ATACMS + Storm shadow/Scalp
missiles will not have an impact on Russia’s larger military infrastructure,
with targets more widely dispersed than in Ukraine.
In this context, NATO’s objections to using long range
missiles to strike inside Russia were:
1. - NATO does not have enough missiles to make a
difference.
- The missiles are being intercepted at an
increasing rate.
- Understanding the missile’s characteristics
(missiles have been recovered with key parts intact) will help adversaries like
China and further improve countermeasures.
- Russia can retaliate against NATO leading to
escalation, which can result in a war that could turn nuclear.
For e.g. a Storm shadow or long
range ATACMS (both of which can have a nuclear warhead) is fired towards Moscow
and is detected only two minutes before impact, there is every chance that
Russia may react with firing a nuclear missile against a NATO target before verifying
if the incoming missile is actually nuclear. This danger is exacerbated by the
breakdown in communication and consulting mechanisms between NATO and Russia
during this war.
Russia’s new Oreshnik missile: The
Oreshnik (Hazel Tree) was developed probably from an old
design for an Intermediate range ballistic missile designed to carry nuclear warheads.
This missile is hypersonic (Mach 10 or 3500 m/ sec at the time of impact) with
6 independently targeted warheads.
After the US unilaterally withdrew from the INF treaty (in 2019) which scrapped
all IRBM missiles and announced plans to deploy these missiles in Europe – a red
line for Russia, it has the excuse to deploy the Oreshnik.
The difference
between this and conventional IRBMs with multiple warheads is that the Oreshnik is hypersonic and would be very difficult to intercept - In
theory the latest US THAAD missile battery, (of which only a small number are
available with the US), firing all its missiles might do it. The warheads are
probably not as accurate as the ATACMS/ Storm shadow, as they were intended to
carry nuclear missiles and are too expensive to be used in a conventional role.
What the Oreshnik might do is increase the threat of a nuclear war, or make Western
Europe less certain about protecting key infrastructure in a war with Russia
(the UK has five minutes more warning time). It does not make much different to
the fighting in Ukraine, where any target can be hit by Russia’s existing missiles – an exception was the Yuzmash plant, which made
nuclear missiles in the Soviet days, has several levels of underground
workshops and was designed to be immune to even a nuclear blast. The kinetic
energy produced by the Oreshnik (3500m /sec) would be sufficient to penetrate
well below the ground and kill with the shockwave generated.
P.S - Oreshnik is also slang for the stick used to beat peasants with, in
Tsarist days.
Russia’s options:
Russia’s bluff using the Oreshnik seems to have been called, with the fresh ATACMS
strikes of
24 & 25 Nov. If Putin backs down from retaliation
against NATO, he will be seen as weak even in Russia and more red lines will probably be crossed possibly with JASSM’s supplied to Ukraine, which
have a 1000 km range (able to hit Moscow).
His reasons to back down might be the hope of getting President Trump to de-escalate and propose a peace deal acceptable to Russia and the fact that Ukraine has used over a third of their ATACMS with negligible results.
Russia’s constraint in attacking NATO – apart from the risk of triggering a
full scale war with NATO which would go nuclear, is a shortage of long range
missiles which can hit Europe - they were expected to run out in 2022, but have
been able to ramp up production, despite western sanctions in components.
The
quantities that Russia has, are being used in Ukraine – possibly with some
stockpiling in the event of war with NATO.
Apart from the hypersonic Kinzal missile, most missiles – with a longer flight
time into Europe, will also be intercepted. Missiles on ships will be
vulnerable in the waters of the Baltic or Black seas, surrounded by NATO
countries, as will ships moving into the North Atlantic.
Short of a conventional war with
NATO – a possible scenario is a Oreshnik strike in a NATO country, followed by
NATO retaliation and more escalation, Russia might have the following options.
1. Sabotage of NATO infrastructure – e.g. blowing
up undersea gas pipelines, or cables.
I believe the recent cutting of cables in the Baltic sea, was a warning shot. Blowing
up a
gas pipeline between Norway and Germany (as Nord stream was done) with an
underwater
drone, will increase the price of gas to a point where the German economy is
crippled.
Talk of supplying the Oreshnik to allies. A
single Oreshnik with Iran or North Korea, fitted with six nuclear warheads (which North Korea has and Iran will develop quickly with
Russian help) could reach Israel or South Korea in five minutes and for all practical
purposes, wipe out country, (six warheads, which won’t be intercepted, will
kill a large portion of the population).
If a Russian winter offensive (which I have spoken of in my previous posts), is successful across multiple sectors of the front, it may precipitate a Ukrainian collapse and with no further stock of ATACMS or Storm shadow available, Russia may be willing to absorb the impact.
Interception of Russian missiles & drones.
To put the rate of Russian interception of Ukrainian missiles in context, it is useful to look at
Ukraine's data of their interception of Russian missiles and drones since the start of the war.
Drones: Launched 13315. Intercepted: 8836 (63%)
Missiles launched: 9590. Intercepted: 2429 (25%)
Russia’s economy: Though Russia has been the fastest growing economy in Europe (or compared to any NATO country) in 2023 & 2024, its growth in Q3 2024, was 3.1% compared to 4.1 % and 5.1 % in the preceding two quarters. Growth is expected to fall further in the next two quarters. More significantly, almost all positive growth has come from the increase in armaments production. Further sanctions, such as the recent sanctions on Gazprom bank, will start to seriously impact the Russian economy after 2025.
Update on long range missile strikes: There were no missile strikes between 25 Nov and 10th
Dec. During this time Russia claimed to have destroyed a train carrying new stocks of storm shadow missiles. On 11th Dec Ukraine attacked an aircraft factory and repair plant and adjoining airfield in the city of Taganrog, with six HIMARS missiles. Taganrog produces Russia's AWAC aircraft (the A-50 & A-100 Beriev). Russia claimed two missiles were shot down and four diverted by electronic warfare systems. The latter claim is interesting, because the effectiveness of HIMARS was greatly reduced by EW counter measures. At least one missile even if diverted, caused an explosion that was filmed and casualties were reported in the vicinity of the airfield.
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