Israel war part 8 - The ceasefire and beyond.
The ceasefire with Hezbollah:
In my previous posts I have said that (unlike 2006) Hezbollah cannot simply
stay at the Israel border
while threatening Israel with rockets. From 1 Oct 24, after a year, the Israeli army
began operations inside Lebanon, though the bulk of the Israel army was operating
against Gaza, leaving only a small force on the Lebanon border, Hezbollah was still
taking unsustainable losses – the loss ratio was 26:1
compared to 6:1 in 2006. At the same time Hezbollah’s rocket attacks inflicted less
damage in a year than they did in one month in 2006. While many Israeli
residents of border settlements had to leave
with a resulting strain on the economy, the loss to Lebanon’s economy from a
similar displacement was higher. Understanding that Hezbollah could not just
remain dug in to positions in south Lebanon is important in understanding why a
ceasefire was agreed to.
The other point I made
was that Israel’s objective was to push Hezbollah out of south Lebanon, to
the area north of the Litani river, which was what was agreed under UN
resolution 1701 but never implemented. Israel would have achieved this either
by an agreement without war, or by a battle of
attrition which is what was done between Oct 23 and Sept 24, or an full scale
invasion. Israel’s objective was not the destruction of Hezbollah (unlike in
Gaza) but securing a buffer zone for northern Israel, which had international approval
– a consequence of this would be the return of Israelis who had to leave border
settlements (the official war aim).
The ground fighting. In my previous post I had covered operations in the
first month of Israel’s
incursion into Lebanon. The IDF which lost 42 men in the first month of
fighting in Lebanon (compared to 121 in a shorter period in 2006) lost only 13
more November. Adding 18 more who died in the fighting before the ground
invasion started on 1st Oct, the total IDF dead in the war against
Hezbollah are 72 (till 3 Dec). Interestingly Hezbollah’s own estimate of IDF
dead is 95.
While the IDF lost only 13 more men in a month, in Lebanon, they made
negligible progress
advancing towards the Litani river – which was widely believed to be their
objective. As the map shows, the furthest penetration into Lebanon was barely 5
km and almost all of that was gained in
the first month of fighting. In November, the IDF seems to have concentrated on
destroying Hezbollah’s tunnel network near the border and weapons caches.
Hezbollah which claimed to have destroyed 34 Israeli tanks in the first month of fighting, has a total claim of 54 at the end of the second month. The reduced number of tank claims, is consistent with the reduced number (13) of IDF fatalities in month 2.
A point I have been making in earlier posts however is that the claims of Hamas & Hezbollah are not supported by evidence. Even video evidence of a tank being hit by an anti tank missile does not mean it is destroyed. It is more likely to be damaged.
A good measure in my view is that one tank crewman killed equals one tank completely destroyed. This ratio has held in previous wars and in the Russia-Ukraine war. While Israeli tanks are more heavily protected than Russian tanks, they have four crew compared to three in Russia, so the ratio still holds.
Six Israeli tank crew have been killed in Lebanon since 1st Oct.
The slow progress in
month 2 – particularly when there was an expectation of Israel trying to reach
the Litani river, vindicates the point I made in my previous post. As I posted
after the first month of fighting: The IDF has
advanced at the same rate as the Russian army in Ukraine has in 2024. The
Russian rate of advance is much derided despite the fact that unlike Israel,
the Russians do not have complete air superiority – Ukraine has a formidable
NATO supplied air defense. Unlike Hezbollah, Ukraine has unmatched ISR
capability (from a network of satellites) giving Russian forces of any
significant size no chance of concealment and Ukraine has its own mechanized
forces and artillery.
The IDF’s objective was therefore similar
to that of Russia in Ukraine, a battle of attrition, where destruction of the
enemy was more important than gaining territory and an advance is made only
when the casualty ratio is overwhelmingly in your favor, or the enemy is
absent.
While the IDF has
claimed 3500 members of Hezbollah killed, Hezbollah has stopped publishing
casualty figures once the ground fighting started. Prior to 1st Oct,
they had admitted a loss of around
520 men. The govt of Lebanon has claimed losses of 4000 people overall without
distinguishing between Hezbollah and civilians. This is not likely to include
Hezbollah fighters who are not from Lebanon, or those whose bodies have not
been recovered. Just over 1000 of the identified dead are
women and children. It is reasonable to assume that civilian males would not
exceed the combined
total of women and children, which would leave an estimated 2000 Hezbollah
dead, as a lower estimate. That would mean a 25:1 ratio of Hezbollah to IDF
killed, which has been the case in the year of fighting prior to Oct 24. As
against a potential of 1500 rockets per day that it was believed Hezbollah
would fire into Israel during a ground war, the average for two months has been
under 100, with diminished efficiency, which vindicates the claim that 80%
Hezbollah’s rocket arsenal was destroyed.
The ceasefire
agreement.
The agreement of 27 Nov seeks as
the desired result, UN resolution 1701 but has important differences, as the
chart shows.
The problem with 1701 was that it was never implemented with regard to preventing Hezbollah from reoccupying South Lebanon. In the current agreement, Israel has the right to intervene either in self-defense (as does the Lebanese army, not Hezbollah), or to prevent arms entering Lebanon.
Israel also has rights to overfly Lebanon.
The US and France are a party to the agreement and are supposed to advise a UN
peacekeeping force on violations of the ceasefire terms. What the current
fighting showed was that Hezbollah positions and tunnels were located very
close to UN posts, indicating that the UN forces were
aware of violations of resolution 1701 but did nothing to stop them.
This article is the best I could find, on the reasoning behind the ceasefire.
Why the ceasefire
The side that appears keener to accept a ceasefire is generally regarded as
having done worse. In 2006, it was Israel, this time it was Hezbollah. Apart
from the elimination of most of Hezbollah’s leadership and destruction of a
large part of their weapon stocks and an unsustainable casualty ratio, their
supplies from Iran were being interdicted and Iran seemed less keen to continue
supplies, particularly faced with the possibility of a Trump administration
taking tougher action against Iran.
Hezbollah had earlier
said that would continue to fight as long as there was no ceasefire in Gaza,
which has not happened.
For Israel, though
surveys show most Israelis do not think they won in Lebanon (only 20% think
Israel did, with the same number saying Hezbollah won), the problem is fatigue
for the soldiers. Israel’s regular army formations – the 36th
Division with its 1st (Golani) brigade, 7th Armored and
188th Armored brigades have been fighting continuously for over a
year, as was the 35 Para brigade.
The elite Golani brigade has lost 98 men since 7th Oct 23, with
twice that number being seriously
wounded. 65 men of the hard to replace Commando and special forces were killed.
This is more
than 10% of the frontline strength of both units.
Reserve formations had already been called up twice – for 60 days each and
their current deployment of 60 days has ended. Only 75-85% of reservists who
had been called up for duty reported – compared to over 100% after Oct 7, 2023.
These figures would have fallen as operations in Lebanon continued.
https://www.timesofisrael.com/20-of-coalition-voters-back-lebanon-truce-vs-50-of-opposition-voters-poll-finds/
The unintended
consequence: The Syrian civil war flared three days after
the ceasefire (30 Nov). Turkish backed rebels broke a ceasefire and made a
rapid advance against the Syrian Arab army (the army of the Assad regime)
backed by Iran and Russia. The SAA fled from the strategic city of Aleppo and
nearby areas. The only force friendly to the Assad regime who could quickly be
deployed were Hezbollah fighters who could, after the
ceasefire, move quickly into Syria, gaining time before other Shite militia from Iraq and Iran also moved into Syria. Hezbollah may be the only force preventing the disintegration of the Assad regime and their movement into Syria was made possible by the ceasefire.
Israel may prefer
a weak Assad govt struggling to run the part of Syria under their control, than an Islamist govt, with ISIS and
Al-Qaeda ties.
Hamas: A point I have made in previous posts in this
series, is that objective of the war against Hamas was not about rescuing
hostages – that might be an outcome, but destroying Hamas as an organized
fighting force. Back in March 2024, I had pointed out that far from being
bogged down, Israel had been able to turn around the situation in Gaza. Both
civilian casualties and IDF casualties were reducing and Hamas was steadily
losing control of Gaza. By August, I had anticipated that the IDF was ready to
start pulling out most of their forces to the Lebanon border with those
remaining
being able to control Gaza and handle any residual Hamas forces.
The IDF lost 35 men in
Gaza in October and Nov. All those killed were from regular formations, the
largest number were from the 900 (Kfir) brigade, which is a specialized urban combat
brigade, that conducted raids deep into Gaza.
The IDF has five divisions deployed in Lebanon and the equivalent of two divisions
in Gaza.
Of the four divisions in Israel’s southern command, three are reserve or
territorial divisions and in
the last 3 months, just one of these has been deployed along quieter parts of
the Gaza perimeter (rotating with the other two divisions). Active combat is
being conducted by the 162 Armored division (2 of its 4 brigades are rotated
with the other two) along with the 900 (Kfir) brigade taken
from the 99 Division of Central command. Central commands other
regular formation – the 98 Para division is fighting in Lebanon.
Hamas has shown increasing readiness to enter into a ceasefire agreement. Since
Hezbollah had agreed to a ceasefire (though they had always said would fight
until there was a ceasefire in Gaza)
and with the IDF in control of most of Gaza, there is little incentive to
continue fighting.
Something I have
wondered about ever since the Gaza conflict started, was how Hamas could
construct miles of well-designed tunnels, despite Israeli surveillance and an
apparent lack of resources. An article for the US military academy (West Point)
by John Spencer provides an interesting study of how the IDF dealt with the
Gaza tunnel network.
https://mwi.westpoint.edu/israels-new-approach-to-tunnels-a-paradigm-shift-in-underground-warfare/
There is an article by an Israeli correspondent who served twice in Gaza (typically a tour of duty is
60 days for a reservist). The points he makes are in my view a good summary of
how Israel sees the war and include criticism of the army .
There are two things he says which I have been reiterating in my posts
- Hamas is largely finished as an organized fighting force &
- There is fatigue among reservists and regular formations.
The article in
Jerusalem Post (posting in full as it is paywalled):
By MICHAEL STARR DECEMBER
1, 2024 21:24Updated: DECEMBER 2, 2024 01:41
I returned to The
Jerusalem Post after being drafted for my second tour of duty in Gaza since the
October 7 massacre. Here's my experience.
On Sunday, I returned
to The Jerusalem Post after being drafted as an IDF reservist
for almost 80 days for my second tour of duty in Gaza since the October 7 massacre. My
anecdotal experience as an infantryman and perspective as a journalist in
civilian life have given me a unique perspective on war issues, familiar and
unexplored alike. These ten takeaways from someone who has been in the mud of
the battlefield should be considered by policymakers and citizens for whom much
of the information about the war is second-hand or hearsay.
1. The IDF is
winning, and needs to be allowed to win
Compared to their
operations during my first tour at the end of 2023, there is a sense that Hamas is collapsing.
The terrorist organization once fielded ambush cells that conducted frequent
hit-and-run anti-tank missile attacks and ambushes from a wide network of
bunkers and tunnels for a guerilla defense-in-depth strategy.
Almost a year later,
Hamas seems unable to operate on a strategic level, even from areas in which
its battalions have remained structurally intact or reconstituted from degraded
units. This is exemplified by Hamas’s inability to launch targeted reprisals
for the death of military leaders or even attempt traditional attacks on Jewish
holidays, or the anniversaries of Oct 7.
By and large, they do
not operate at night or the light of day, clinging even closer to the low
visibility of dawn and dusk, whereas their operatives would once openly operate
in daylight hours due to being able to escape underground after an attack. It appears
that their tunnel networks have been greatly compromised, as they have had to
travel along roads and weave between buildings.
Their legitimate
operations focus on improvised explosive devices and lone sniper attacks rather
than using heavier munitions, but a greater focus has been filming any
engagement so that they can edit the footage and claim to foreign supporters
and Israeli citizens that they have destroyed Israeli vehicles. Stealing
humanitarian aid was apparently not enough for some Hamas battalions, as in one
case, they resorted to sending plainclothes operatives to loot food and
supplies from abandoned IDF positions.
Their mortar bombs
fall far less accurately than they once did, and we did not encounter any enemy
drone activity. The Netzarim security corridor seems relatively safe, with
paved roads and outposts enjoying electricity provided by power lines.
While many soldiers
left Gaza positive about the IDF’s advancements, the path to victory is long,
and the journey should not be confused with its destination. Many soldiers have
mixed their sense of Hamas’s significant degradation with the feeling that the
military is being held back from decisive action, entering and leaving areas to
allow Hamas to retain territorial control.
2. Gaza has
suffered heavy damage
The extent of the damage to infrastructure hasn’t been completely
appreciated by the general public, and Israeli and international leaders will
need to develop extensive plans to rebuild the territory. Whole neighborhoods
have been leveled during direct combat, the search and destruction of tunnels
and booby traps, and the establishment of defensible positions.
If buildings have not
been damaged by their proximity to explosives or pocked by suppressive fire,
they have had their outer walls shaved away to reveal the possible presence of
terrorists. Concrete rubble and trash are strewn along wide fields in the Strip
and will need to be collected and moved before some areas are traversable, let
alone livable. The IDF will need to prepare to explain the extensive damage to
civilian infrastructure.
3. Gaza was far
from an 'open-air prison'
One of the great
shames about the extensive damage to Gazan infrastructure is that it was not
the desolate “open-air prison” that it had been advertised as being in
anti-Israel propaganda. While there certainly were residents living in
desperate conditions, the houses, apartments, and villas that we cleared and
took position in had a decent and even opulent quality of life. All the homes
we saw had televisions, computers, refrigerators, decorations, and stores of
food similar an Israeli suburb.
Our impression was not
one of squalor but normal conditions. In rural areas, villas and mansions
oversaw sweeping vineyards on one side and a view of the ocean on the other,
and in urban areas, large schools, restaurants, and other facilities. The lost
potential and degraded conditions in Gaza make Hamas’s decision to attack
Israel and weaponize its territory - rather than develop what they held - even
more of a shame.
4. Hamas weaponized
Gaza
Much has been said
about Hamas’s use of civilian shields to deter IDF operations – a detained
civilian told our troops that he was unable to travel from the north to the
south along humanitarian corridors because he had to bribe Hamas operatives who
were bent on keeping civilians around them as cover. Yet the civilians are just
one aspect of Hamas turning Gaza into a weapon to try to destroy Israel.
Tunnel networks are
not just placed around or under civilian objects; terrorist infrastructure is
integrated into civilian infrastructure in a way that makes the two
indistinguishable. Civilian homes are turned into lookout and reconnaissance
outposts, with members of families hired by terrorist organizations to provide
intelligence, as was exemplified by the capture of spotters by a neighboring
battalion.
Armories are hidden
within houses to be accessed by plainclothes terrorists when they have the need
to shed the veneer of being civilians. Tunnel entrances can be found on the
first floor of apartment buildings, not just in their backyards. Other homes are
booby-trapped, leading to widespread suspicion of each home being laced with
explosives. With Gaza being weaponized in such a fashion, it has led military
units to take precautions and actions that damage buildings and homes so that
they can stay alive.
5. The IDF is not
conducting a genocide
The purpose of our
operations was not geared toward the elimination of Gazan civilians. There were
never orders to kill civilians wantonly, and there were debates on whether we
had enough information to use deadly force and when it was legitimate to open
fire. Civilians were allowed to pass by our positions along humanitarian
corridors unmolested.
These elements would
not be found among a force that is devoted to mass murder or genocide. Civilian
casualties are tragic, and unfortunately, they always occur in war, which is
why such conflict should be avoided in the first place.
6. The IDF needs to
restore discipline
While IDF soldiers are
not engaged in mass war crimes or genocide, there is inappropriate and even
criminal behavior. Other soldiers have shared with me stories of looting, and I
had to stop someone who had been temporarily attached to our battalion from
taking a necklace from a house.
While my battalion did not bring our cellphones into Gaza until our last week,
when we were moved back to a rearguard outpost, we have seen the widespread use
of phones by other neighboring units. This is all the more shocking not just
because posting on social media can be used by enemies to geo-locate positions
and gather intelligence but also because the violent machismo and inappropriate
fooling around in videos and photographs discredits the moral legitimacy of the
military and create an overly relaxed and familiar environment that can get
people killed.
While journalists have
to answer to the IDF censor, it felt to many of us that the military has done
little to crack down on soldiers who are acting as poor spokespeople, even
documenting what appear to be crimes. Even small issues such as unsanctioned edgy
uniform patches lead to a breakdown in discipline, which may lead to even
greater behavior unbecoming of the IDF’s ethics.
The military
leadership seems unwilling to deal with the overly involved families and loss
of manpower that comes with disciplining inappropriate behavior.
7. Trust has been
eroded in military leadership
The failures of the
October 7 massacre have led to a distrust of the military brass among many
soldiers and reservists I have spoken to. It has become a common refrain among
the ranks to not trust anyone above the rank of a battalion commander.
High-ranking officers
are viewed critically as out-of-touch “October 6” officers who care more about
the advancement of their careers through checking task boxes on their
clipboards than actually changing the reality on the ground.
Reservists and
mandatory soldiers alike are results-oriented, and if they feel that officers
are more focused on satisfying their superiors than the realities on the
ground, their orders will have less validity. The military brass, like the
political leadership, needs to prove to their soldiers that their sacrifices
for victory will not be in vain.
8. Reservists are
frustrated with domestic squabbles
As the news broke that
defense minister Yoav Gallant had been fired by Prime Minister Benjamin
Netanyahu, fierce debate broke out in the company about the legitimacy of the
move. While Netanyahu’s camp claimed that there were professional differences
over strategy that could not be overcome and that the prosecution of the war
required Gallant’s firing, too much suspicion and bad blood had been developed
about political plays within the current government.
Many believe that the
move was made to save the coalition because the haredi (ultra-Orthodox) parties
threatened to leave because of Gallant’s work towards drafting haredi youth.
Such suspicions have been informed by some politicians continuing to pursue
their prior political interests, such as major judicial reform proponents
calling to renew the process.
While soldiers are
fighting and dying, they don’t feel that the politicians are with them and take
the war seriously. This distrust extends to the opposition as well. With many
of the same actors that were involved in the anti-reform camp pushing for hostage
deals at varying costs, many soldiers have expressed to me that they can’t help
but wonder if they are motivated by the good of the nation or their own
political agendas.
9. The IDF needs
more soldiers
As the war and debate
about who has been drafted continued, reservists have become increasingly
frustrated that some demographic groups are benefiting from the blood and toil
of reservists while not contributing to the endeavor themselves. My battalion deputy
commander and company commander have become involved in movements calling for a
more equal draft.
The need for an
increased draft comes as current reservists face multiple tours and are pushed
off retirement. Our battalion saw a drop off in reenlistment as some reservists
had to deal with crumbling families, businesses, and health. Many reservists came
despite these challenges – the sacrifices that they have made are beyond just
the risk of death and injury.
10. Soldiers
deserve victory
The sacrifices that
were made by reservists and mandatory soldiers were made under the implicit
promise that they would be in exchange for victory. The state has to consider
in its policies and strategic decisions not just the feelings of hostage
families and residents who have to return home but also those who have
willingly given everything for them and the state.
Reservists want a
resolution to the problems that led to October 7; they don’t want this war to
become yet another round in an ongoing conflict. While we will continue to
fight for Israel, we don’t want to have to come back to Gaza and Lebanon in a
few years’ time – not just for our sake but also for that of all Israelis and
Palestinians.
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