Israel war part 8 - The ceasefire and beyond.

The ceasefire with Hezbollah:

In my previous posts I have said that (unlike 2006) Hezbollah cannot simply stay at the Israel border
while threatening Israel with rockets. From 1 Oct 24, after a year, the Israeli army began operations inside Lebanon, though the bulk of the Israel army was operating against Gaza, leaving only a small force on the Lebanon border, Hezbollah was still taking unsustainable losses – the loss ratio was 26:1
compared to 6:1 in 2006. At the same time Hezbollah’s rocket attacks inflicted less damage in a year than they did in one month in 2006. While many Israeli residents of border settlements had to leave
with a resulting strain on the economy, the loss to Lebanon’s economy from a similar displacement was higher. Understanding that Hezbollah could not just remain dug in to positions in south Lebanon is important in understanding why a ceasefire was agreed to.

The other point I made was that Israel’s objective was to push Hezbollah out of south Lebanon, to
the area north of the Litani river, which was what was agreed under UN resolution 1701 but never implemented. Israel would have achieved this either by an agreement without war, or by a battle of
attrition which is what was done between Oct 23 and Sept 24, or an full scale invasion. Israel’s objective was not the destruction of Hezbollah (unlike in Gaza) but securing a buffer zone for northern Israel, which had international approval – a consequence of this would be the return of Israelis who had to leave border settlements (the official war aim). 

The ground fighting. In my previous post I had covered operations in the first month of Israel’s
incursion into Lebanon. The IDF which lost 42 men in the first month of fighting in Lebanon (compared to 121 in a shorter period in 2006) lost only 13 more November. Adding 18 more who died in the fighting before the ground invasion started on 1st Oct, the total IDF dead in the war against Hezbollah are 72 (till 3 Dec). Interestingly Hezbollah’s own estimate of IDF dead is 95.
While the IDF lost only 13 more men in a month, in Lebanon, they made negligible progress
advancing towards the Litani river – which was widely believed to be their objective. As the map shows, the furthest penetration into Lebanon was barely 5 km and almost all of that was gained in
the first month of fighting. In November, the IDF seems to have concentrated on destroying Hezbollah’s tunnel network near the border and weapons caches.



Hezbollah which claimed to have destroyed 34 Israeli tanks in the first month of fighting, has a total claim of 54 at the end of the second month. The reduced number of tank claims, is consistent with the reduced number (13) of IDF fatalities in month 2.  

A point I have been making in earlier posts however is that the claims of Hamas & Hezbollah are not supported by evidence. Even video evidence of a tank being hit by an anti tank missile does not mean it is destroyed. It is more likely to be damaged. 
A good measure in my view is that one tank crewman killed equals one tank completely destroyed. This ratio has held in previous wars and in the Russia-Ukraine war. While Israeli tanks are more heavily protected than Russian tanks, they have four crew compared to three in Russia, so the ratio still holds. 
Six Israeli tank crew have been killed in Lebanon since 1st Oct. 

The slow progress in month 2 – particularly when there was an expectation of Israel trying to reach the Litani river, vindicates the point I made in my previous post. As I posted after the first month of fighting: The IDF has advanced at the same rate as the Russian army in Ukraine has in 2024. The Russian rate of advance is much derided despite the fact that unlike Israel, the Russians do not have complete air superiority – Ukraine has a formidable NATO supplied air defense. Unlike Hezbollah, Ukraine has unmatched ISR capability (from a network of satellites) giving Russian forces of any significant size no chance of concealment and Ukraine has its own mechanized forces and artillery.

The IDF’s objective was therefore similar to that of Russia in Ukraine, a battle of attrition, where destruction of the enemy was more important than gaining territory and an advance is made only when the casualty ratio is overwhelmingly in your favor, or the enemy is absent.

While the IDF has claimed 3500 members of Hezbollah killed, Hezbollah has stopped publishing casualty figures once the ground fighting started. Prior to 1st Oct, they had admitted a loss of around
520 men. The govt of Lebanon has claimed losses of 4000 people overall without distinguishing between Hezbollah and civilians. This is not likely to include Hezbollah fighters who are not from Lebanon, or those whose bodies have not been recovered. Just over 1000 of the identified dead are
women and children. It is reasonable to assume that civilian males would not exceed the combined
total of women and children, which would leave an estimated 2000 Hezbollah dead, as a lower estimate. That would mean a 25:1 ratio of Hezbollah to IDF killed, which has been the case in the year of fighting prior to Oct 24. As against a potential of 1500 rockets per day that it was believed Hezbollah would fire into Israel during a ground war, the average for two months has been under 100, with diminished efficiency, which vindicates the claim that 80% Hezbollah’s rocket arsenal was destroyed.

The ceasefire agreement.
The agreement of 27 Nov seeks as the desired result, UN resolution 1701 but has important differences, as the chart shows.


The problem with 1701 was that it was never implemented with regard to preventing Hezbollah from reoccupying South Lebanon. In the current agreement, Israel has the right to intervene either in self-defense (as does the Lebanese army, not Hezbollah), or to prevent arms entering Lebanon.

Israel also has rights to overfly Lebanon.
The US and France are a party to the agreement and are supposed to advise a UN peacekeeping force on violations of the ceasefire terms. What the current fighting showed was that Hezbollah positions and tunnels were located very close to UN posts, indicating that the UN forces were
aware of violations of resolution 1701 but did nothing to stop them.  

This article is the best I could find, on the reasoning behind the ceasefire.
Why the ceasefire

The side that appears keener to accept a ceasefire is generally regarded as having done worse. In 2006, it was Israel, this time it was Hezbollah. Apart from the elimination of most of Hezbollah’s leadership and destruction of a large part of their weapon stocks and an unsustainable casualty ratio, their supplies from Iran were being interdicted and Iran seemed less keen to continue supplies, particularly faced with the possibility of a Trump administration taking tougher action against Iran.  
 
Hezbollah had earlier said that would continue to fight as long as there was no ceasefire in Gaza, which has not happened.

For Israel, though surveys show most Israelis do not think they won in Lebanon (only 20% think Israel did, with the same number saying Hezbollah won), the problem is fatigue for the soldiers. Israel’s regular army formations – the 36th Division with its 1st (Golani) brigade, 7th Armored and 188th Armored brigades have been fighting continuously for over a year, as was the 35 Para brigade.
The elite Golani brigade has lost 98 men since 7th Oct 23, with twice that number being seriously
wounded. 65 men of the hard to replace Commando and special forces were killed. This is more
than 10% of the frontline strength of both units.  

Reserve formations had already been called up twice – for 60 days each and their current deployment of 60 days has ended. Only 75-85% of reservists who had been called up for duty reported – compared to over 100% after Oct 7, 2023. These figures would have fallen as operations in Lebanon continued.

https://www.timesofisrael.com/20-of-coalition-voters-back-lebanon-truce-vs-50-of-opposition-voters-poll-finds/

https://www.timesofisrael.com/sharp-drop-seen-in-reservist-response-rate-due-to-burnout-amid-long-war/

The unintended consequence:  The Syrian civil war flared three days after the ceasefire (30 Nov). Turkish backed rebels broke a ceasefire and made a rapid advance against the Syrian Arab army (the army of the Assad regime) backed by Iran and Russia. The SAA fled from the strategic city of Aleppo and nearby areas. The only force friendly to the Assad regime who could quickly be deployed were Hezbollah fighters who could, after the ceasefire, move quickly into Syria, gaining time before other Shite militia from Iraq and Iran also moved into Syria. Hezbollah may be the only force preventing the disintegration of the Assad regime and their movement into Syria was made possible by the ceasefire. 
 
Israel may prefer a weak Assad govt struggling to run the part of Syria under their control, than an Islamist govt, with ISIS and Al-Qaeda ties. 

Hamas: A point I have made in previous posts in this series, is that objective of the war against Hamas was not about rescuing hostages – that might be an outcome, but destroying Hamas as an organized fighting force. Back in March 2024, I had pointed out that far from being bogged down, Israel had been able to turn around the situation in Gaza. Both civilian casualties and IDF casualties were reducing and Hamas was steadily losing control of Gaza. By August, I had anticipated that the IDF was ready to start pulling out most of their forces to the Lebanon border with those remaining
being able to control Gaza and handle any residual Hamas forces.

The IDF lost 35 men in Gaza in October and Nov. All those killed were from regular formations, the largest number were from the 900 (Kfir) brigade, which is a specialized urban combat brigade, that conducted raids deep into Gaza.

The IDF has five divisions deployed in Lebanon and the equivalent of two divisions in Gaza.
Of the four divisions in Israel’s southern command, three are reserve or territorial divisions and in
the last 3 months, just one of these has been deployed along quieter parts of the Gaza perimeter (rotating with the other two divisions). Active combat is being conducted by the 162 Armored division (2 of its 4 brigades are rotated with the other two) along with the 900 (Kfir) brigade taken
from the 99 Division of Central command. Central commands other regular formation – the 98 Para division is fighting in Lebanon.

Hamas has shown increasing readiness to enter into a ceasefire agreement. Since Hezbollah had agreed to a ceasefire (though they had always said would fight until there was a ceasefire in Gaza)
and with the IDF in control of most of Gaza, there is little incentive to continue fighting.

Something I have wondered about ever since the Gaza conflict started, was how Hamas could
construct miles of well-designed tunnels, despite Israeli surveillance and an apparent lack of resources. An article for the US military academy (West Point) by John Spencer provides an interesting study of how the IDF dealt with the Gaza tunnel network.

https://mwi.westpoint.edu/israels-new-approach-to-tunnels-a-paradigm-shift-in-underground-warfare/

There is an article by an Israeli correspondent who served twice in Gaza (typically a tour of duty is

60 days for a reservist). The points he makes are in my view a good summary of how Israel sees the war and include criticism of the army .
There are two things he says which I have been reiterating in my posts
- Hamas is largely finished as an organized fighting force &
- There is fatigue among reservists and regular formations.

The article in Jerusalem Post (posting in full as it is paywalled):

By MICHAEL STARR DECEMBER 1, 2024 21:24Updated: DECEMBER 2, 2024 01:41

I returned to The Jerusalem Post after being drafted for my second tour of duty in Gaza since the October 7 massacre. Here's my experience.

On Sunday, I returned to The Jerusalem Post after being drafted as an IDF reservist for almost 80 days for my second tour of duty in Gaza since the October 7 massacre. My anecdotal experience as an infantryman and perspective as a journalist in civilian life have given me a unique perspective on war issues, familiar and unexplored alike. These ten takeaways from someone who has been in the mud of the battlefield should be considered by policymakers and citizens for whom much of the information about the war is second-hand or hearsay.

1. The IDF is winning, and needs to be allowed to win

Compared to their operations during my first tour at the end of 2023, there is a sense that Hamas is collapsing. The terrorist organization once fielded ambush cells that conducted frequent hit-and-run anti-tank missile attacks and ambushes from a wide network of bunkers and tunnels for a guerilla defense-in-depth strategy.

Almost a year later, Hamas seems unable to operate on a strategic level, even from areas in which its battalions have remained structurally intact or reconstituted from degraded units. This is exemplified by Hamas’s inability to launch targeted reprisals for the death of military leaders or even attempt traditional attacks on Jewish holidays, or the anniversaries of Oct 7.

By and large, they do not operate at night or the light of day, clinging even closer to the low visibility of dawn and dusk, whereas their operatives would once openly operate in daylight hours due to being able to escape underground after an attack. It appears that their tunnel networks have been greatly compromised, as they have had to travel along roads and weave between buildings.

Their legitimate operations focus on improvised explosive devices and lone sniper attacks rather than using heavier munitions, but a greater focus has been filming any engagement so that they can edit the footage and claim to foreign supporters and Israeli citizens that they have destroyed Israeli vehicles. Stealing humanitarian aid was apparently not enough for some Hamas battalions, as in one case, they resorted to sending plainclothes operatives to loot food and supplies from abandoned IDF positions.

Their mortar bombs fall far less accurately than they once did, and we did not encounter any enemy drone activity. The Netzarim security corridor seems relatively safe, with paved roads and outposts enjoying electricity provided by power lines.

While many soldiers left Gaza positive about the IDF’s advancements, the path to victory is long, and the journey should not be confused with its destination. Many soldiers have mixed their sense of Hamas’s significant degradation with the feeling that the military is being held back from decisive action, entering and leaving areas to allow Hamas to retain territorial control.

2. Gaza has suffered heavy damage

The extent of the damage to infrastructure hasn’t been completely appreciated by the general public, and Israeli and international leaders will need to develop extensive plans to rebuild the territory. Whole neighborhoods have been leveled during direct combat, the search and destruction of tunnels and booby traps, and the establishment of defensible positions.

If buildings have not been damaged by their proximity to explosives or pocked by suppressive fire, they have had their outer walls shaved away to reveal the possible presence of terrorists. Concrete rubble and trash are strewn along wide fields in the Strip and will need to be collected and moved before some areas are traversable, let alone livable. The IDF will need to prepare to explain the extensive damage to civilian infrastructure.

3. Gaza was far from an 'open-air prison'

One of the great shames about the extensive damage to Gazan infrastructure is that it was not the desolate “open-air prison” that it had been advertised as being in anti-Israel propaganda. While there certainly were residents living in desperate conditions, the houses, apartments, and villas that we cleared and took position in had a decent and even opulent quality of life. All the homes we saw had televisions, computers, refrigerators, decorations, and stores of food similar an Israeli suburb.

Our impression was not one of squalor but normal conditions. In rural areas, villas and mansions oversaw sweeping vineyards on one side and a view of the ocean on the other, and in urban areas, large schools, restaurants, and other facilities. The lost potential and degraded conditions in Gaza make Hamas’s decision to attack Israel and weaponize its territory - rather than develop what they held - even more of a shame.

4. Hamas weaponized Gaza

Much has been said about Hamas’s use of civilian shields to deter IDF operations – a detained civilian told our troops that he was unable to travel from the north to the south along humanitarian corridors because he had to bribe Hamas operatives who were bent on keeping civilians around them as cover. Yet the civilians are just one aspect of Hamas turning Gaza into a weapon to try to destroy Israel.

Tunnel networks are not just placed around or under civilian objects; terrorist infrastructure is integrated into civilian infrastructure in a way that makes the two indistinguishable. Civilian homes are turned into lookout and reconnaissance outposts, with members of families hired by terrorist organizations to provide intelligence, as was exemplified by the capture of spotters by a neighboring battalion.

Armories are hidden within houses to be accessed by plainclothes terrorists when they have the need to shed the veneer of being civilians. Tunnel entrances can be found on the first floor of apartment buildings, not just in their backyards. Other homes are booby-trapped, leading to widespread suspicion of each home being laced with explosives. With Gaza being weaponized in such a fashion, it has led military units to take precautions and actions that damage buildings and homes so that they can stay alive.

5. The IDF is not conducting a genocide

The purpose of our operations was not geared toward the elimination of Gazan civilians. There were never orders to kill civilians wantonly, and there were debates on whether we had enough information to use deadly force and when it was legitimate to open fire. Civilians were allowed to pass by our positions along humanitarian corridors unmolested.

These elements would not be found among a force that is devoted to mass murder or genocide. Civilian casualties are tragic, and unfortunately, they always occur in war, which is why such conflict should be avoided in the first place.

6. The IDF needs to restore discipline

While IDF soldiers are not engaged in mass war crimes or genocide, there is inappropriate and even criminal behavior. Other soldiers have shared with me stories of looting, and I had to stop someone who had been temporarily attached to our battalion from taking a necklace from a house.
While my battalion did not bring our cellphones into Gaza until our last week, when we were moved back to a rearguard outpost, we have seen the widespread use of phones by other neighboring units. This is all the more shocking not just because posting on social media can be used by enemies to geo-locate positions and gather intelligence but also because the violent machismo and inappropriate fooling around in videos and photographs discredits the moral legitimacy of the military and create an overly relaxed and familiar environment that can get people killed.

While journalists have to answer to the IDF censor, it felt to many of us that the military has done little to crack down on soldiers who are acting as poor spokespeople, even documenting what appear to be crimes. Even small issues such as unsanctioned edgy uniform patches lead to a breakdown in discipline, which may lead to even greater behavior unbecoming of the IDF’s ethics.

The military leadership seems unwilling to deal with the overly involved families and loss of manpower that comes with disciplining inappropriate behavior.

7. Trust has been eroded in military leadership

The failures of the October 7 massacre have led to a distrust of the military brass among many soldiers and reservists I have spoken to. It has become a common refrain among the ranks to not trust anyone above the rank of a battalion commander.

High-ranking officers are viewed critically as out-of-touch “October 6” officers who care more about the advancement of their careers through checking task boxes on their clipboards than actually changing the reality on the ground.

Reservists and mandatory soldiers alike are results-oriented, and if they feel that officers are more focused on satisfying their superiors than the realities on the ground, their orders will have less validity. The military brass, like the political leadership, needs to prove to their soldiers that their sacrifices for victory will not be in vain.

8. Reservists are frustrated with domestic squabbles

As the news broke that defense minister Yoav Gallant had been fired by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, fierce debate broke out in the company about the legitimacy of the move. While Netanyahu’s camp claimed that there were professional differences over strategy that could not be overcome and that the prosecution of the war required Gallant’s firing, too much suspicion and bad blood had been developed about political plays within the current government.

Many believe that the move was made to save the coalition because the haredi (ultra-Orthodox) parties threatened to leave because of Gallant’s work towards drafting haredi youth. Such suspicions have been informed by some politicians continuing to pursue their prior political interests, such as major judicial reform proponents calling to renew the process.

While soldiers are fighting and dying, they don’t feel that the politicians are with them and take the war seriously. This distrust extends to the opposition as well. With many of the same actors that were involved in the anti-reform camp pushing for hostage deals at varying costs, many soldiers have expressed to me that they can’t help but wonder if they are motivated by the good of the nation or their own political agendas.

9. The IDF needs more soldiers

As the war and debate about who has been drafted continued, reservists have become increasingly frustrated that some demographic groups are benefiting from the blood and toil of reservists while not contributing to the endeavor themselves. My battalion deputy commander and company commander have become involved in movements calling for a more equal draft.

The need for an increased draft comes as current reservists face multiple tours and are pushed off retirement. Our battalion saw a drop off in reenlistment as some reservists had to deal with crumbling families, businesses, and health. Many reservists came despite these challenges – the sacrifices that they have made are beyond just the risk of death and injury.

10. Soldiers deserve victory

The sacrifices that were made by reservists and mandatory soldiers were made under the implicit promise that they would be in exchange for victory. The state has to consider in its policies and strategic decisions not just the feelings of hostage families and residents who have to return home but also those who have willingly given everything for them and the state.

Reservists want a resolution to the problems that led to October 7; they don’t want this war to become yet another round in an ongoing conflict. While we will continue to fight for Israel, we don’t want to have to come back to Gaza and Lebanon in a few years’ time – not just for our sake but also for that of all Israelis and Palestinians.

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