Ukraine war - part 13. Russia's (non) winter offensive

 In part 10 – prelude to a Russian winter offensive, I had described how a Russian winter offensive might unfold. The reality has been somewhat different, which necessitated this piece.

https://rpdeans.blogspot.com/2024/11/ukraine-war-part-10-prelude-to-winter.html

As I have covered earlier in this series, the turnaround in casualty ratios has started from the summer of
2024. NATO estimates of Russian capabilities were based on their performance in the first two months of the war (when Russia attempted a show of force to get Ukraine to negotiate, rather than a full-fledged invasion). Russian forces were outnumbered till Mid 2023 and there was no net change in territory controlled during 2023. The casualties and territory gained since 2023, can be summarized as follows:

	Est Ukrainian irrecoverable losses /month *	Est Russian irrecoverable losses/ month**	Territory captured by Russia sq km (net)
2023 Avg	16313	11900	0
Jan-May 24 (avg/month)	16326	11502	140
Sept	37225	8704	1573
Oct	36345	8305	535
Nov	33277	6483	2015
Dec	29896	3625	286
Jan	31510	1573	320
Feb (est)			545

 *Based on Russian estimate of sanitary losses (dead, prisoner and all wounded). They exclude desertions. Half of all sanitary losses (dead, seriously wounded & prisoner) assumed irrecoverable. 
Ukrainian untraceable desertions since Sept avg 4000 per month (I have assumed 2000 for Ukraine 
as an increment over Russia).  

** The basis of Russian losses is Mediazona – which has verified dead. The actual numbers may be
20% higher as they exclude those living in the Donbass. For both sides I have assumed 2 seriously
wounded for 1 dead, as irreplaceable losses. 

I have spent some time in previous posts explaining the calculations for Ukrainian and Russian losses and how I have derived and verified irreplaceable losses. Suffice to say that if we know the starting strength of each force, the numbers recruited and the current strength (all of which have been quantified by different sources and confirmed by the other side), then the balancing figure is irrecoverable losses.

Until mid 2023, the fully mobilized Ukrainian army outnumbered Russia. It was only in may 2024 that Russia had a superiority of over 1.5: 1 in manpower (and about 2.5:1 in firepower), which had risen to
a 2:1 manpower advantage towards the end of 2024.   

Ukraine had for the first time confirmed that their recruitment in 2024 (25,000 per month) since
March 2024, was less than losses – something I had calculated in earlier posts and confirms the
above estimate irrecoverable losses. They also confirmed the frontline strength of each side:
600,000 Russian vs 250-300,000 Ukrainian. I had estimated that the Russian army would be at its full strength (1.5 million total manpower) by the end of Dec 2024 with freshly raised divisions being trained
and equipped by this time. Hence, I had anticipated `big arrow’ offensives in winter where I believed
Russia would take larger amounts of territory than they actually have and the Ukrainian army would start cracking.

What seems most obvious from the figures is that while Russia is not taking ground at the rate I had anticipated (what is called a `big arrow’ offensive) they continue to wage an attritional war with increasing efficiency, as can be seen from casualty ratios that are increasingly unfavorable to Ukraine. Russia has no timetable to take territory. The objective is to inflict casualties in the most efficient way.
Russia will not increase the pace of advance if it means more casualties.  

The number of Russian attacks recorded each month (by Ukraine MOD) doubled between May and Sept, but has reduced since then. Before getting into an analysis of each sector, I believe there are some underlying factors that are influencing Russian operations:

1.     Russia believes that its territorial goals can be achieved within the expected timeframe of talks with the Trump administration. Of the four districts of Ukraine that Putin had stated belong to Russia and should be part of it, only parts of Donetsk and Luhansk were autonomous territories of Ukraine prior to the war and were mostly ethnically Russian. About 90% of Luhansk and 60% of Donetsk participated in the referendum of 2022, to be part of Russia. Luhansk is now fully controlled by Russia and I believe Donetsk will be by the end of 2025 (in time for a ceasefire agreement) with any unoccupied area being traded for Russian occupation of Kharkov district.

Kherson was made part of Russia’s goals because it offers control of Crimea’s water supply and
most of the district is east of the Dnieper River, forming a natural defensive barrier for Crimea.
The capital, Kherson city (which is also mostly Russian and voted in the referendum) requires Russia to cross the Dnieper. It is a complex operation which I believe Russia will do this year.
Most of Zaporozhe district will also be under Russian control except perhaps the city of Zaporozhe, where half the population lives.

2.    The winter has been mild, resulting in the ground freezing late and thawing early. It has limited the off-road movement of vehicles. The ground will also dry early, which would mean an offensive can resume in April.

3.       Not all the newly raised formations which I expected would be ready for action, by Dec 24 have been deployed in Ukraine.  Specifically, the newly raised 25^th Combined arms army has not been seen in the Ukraine theatre. The 55^th Naval Infantry division, the 67^th Motorized rifle division and the 44^th VDV (Air assault) division are not present. 

Of the newly formed units not present when I last analyzed the Russian deployment in  November, the 47^th Tank division, refitting after high losses, is back and deployed near Kupyansk. 
A newly raised division – 18^th Motor rifle, is present at Kursk. The newly raised 69^th and 72^nd Motor Rifle divisions, which, in Nov had one of their brigades in combat In Ukraine, now appear to be fully formed. The new 70^th Motor Rifle and 104^th Air assault divisions near Kherson, which had the equivalent of one brigade in place, now have two.

4.       The manpower crisis in the Ukraine army, which I have covered in detail earlier, required that Ukraine mobilize all men between 18 & 25, so far exempt from mobilization. To defer this unpopular step, Ukraine moved 50,000 men from rear areas to combat units and offered attractive terms to volunteers in the 18-25 age group. Given a minimum of 25,000 irrecoverable losses each month, this will retain the strength of combat units (at barely 50-60% of their authorized strength) for only another three months. At that time Ukraine will also start facing shortages of weapons, particularly artillery.   

5.       Coupled with the manpower crisis is a likely drop in morale, given the Ukraine policy of the Trump administration. Once the Ukrainian army believes that there is no prospect of NATO membership, no US backed security guarantees and the future earnings from the country’s natural resources going to the US or EU, the will to fight could collapse.   

On each section of the front, I anticipate the following happening:

North: Kursk & Kharkov:  As I have said from the beginning of the Ukraine’s Kursk incursion last August, it suits Russia to pin down Ukraine’s best formations in an unimportant area, preventing them from reinforcing sectors that Russia is attacking and inflicting losses at an unsustainable rate for Ukraine. Of the 1250 sq km that Ukraine occupied at their peak (Aug 24) they now control barely 350 km. A force of roughly 25,000 men has to be supplied by on road, where Russian forces are barely 3 km on either side of it and can attack any vehicle on it. Two attempts by Ukraine to break out of the cauldron were costly failures.

Ukrainian forces in Kursk have suffered sanitary losses of over 50,000 men (half are irreplaceable). It’s a 100% (irreplaceable) casualty rate of the force that originally entered Kursk and shows that rather than leave in an orderly way, once it was clear that the Kursk incursion was achieving nothing, Ukraine doubled down on a bad bet and has suffered the highest percentage of casualties for any sector of the front, since the war began. I believe the Kursk
bulge will collapse before April. The remaining Ukrainian units have to remain the area to defend the city of Sumy, whereas some of the Russian force can be redeployed after a rest.  

At Kharkov, both Russian incursions, on either side of the Severo-Donetsk river have not changed.
A two division strong Russian force has pinned an equal number of Ukrainians. The Push towards Kharkov forces Ukraine to deploy forces to defend the city and creates a buffer for the Russian city of Belgorod, against Ukrainian drones and rockets. The position of the Ukrainians defending the city of Volchansk, is threatened by Russian forces from the north.

Blue lines are possible advances for Russian forces after crossing river lines. 
Ukrainian forces in the north near Vovchansk are supplied by a single road, the capture of which 
can collapse the entire group. The end point of the blue lines might be Russian campaign objectives.    

Kupiansk: Since Nov, the Russians have managed to cross the river lines north and south of the
town of Kupiansk, which present multiple threats to Ukraine, as the map shows. Apart from the
possible capture of Kupiansk, the Ukrainians (orange circle) to the East of the river are threatened
with encirclement. The logistics hub of Izyum (red star) is also threatened.
If the forces west of the river move further west, they can threaten the supplies of the Ukrainian forces defending Volchansk and unhinge the Ukrainians, apart from threatening Kharkov from the East.  

A third crossing of the Zherebets river to the south, threatens the logistics hub of Lyman, which
will also be a base to threaten the last remaining town in the Donbass: the Slavyansk-Kramatorsk
agglomeration. This will be threatened from Lyman in the north, an advance from Chasov Yar in
the South and form Seversk in the East, as the map shows.

 

The blue line is the front before the winter offensive. Red bulges are the bridgeheads across the
rivers, which may be springboard to capture the locations in red stars (Izyum, Liman, Kupyansk
and the Slavyansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration).  

Centre: Pokrovsk. The Nov-Jan period saw the Russians held on the approaches to Pokrovsk albeit with Ukrainians launching unsuccessful counterattacks. Most of the Russian effort was to capture the heavily defended towns of Chasov-Yar, the Niu York - Toretsk agglomeration and the town of Kurakhovo, where defenses had been built up over eight years.

 West of this line, Ukraine does not have significant defenses. As the map shows, Russia has the
 option of either creating cauldrons around the town of Konstantinova, or push into the
 Dnepropetrovsk district. Achieving either one of these, will free forces for a push to the north,
 towards Slavyansk-Kramatorsk, the (in my view) last remaining objective in Donetsk district.   

 

Red line is the current front. Pink line was the front in Nov.
Orange circles are Ukrainian towns or troop concentrations and black lines are likely Russian
advances. Russia has multiple options to take territory or encircle Ukrainian forces. 

South Donetsk: As the map shows, since Nov, the Russians have occupied the area between the red line (current front) and orange. This involved the capture of the heavily fortified towns of  Vuledar and Veliky Novosilka. From here, Russia has the option of moving west to unhinge the  Ukrainian defensive line and capture more of Zaporozhe district, or move North West, along with Russian advances in the center, to enter Dnepropetrovsk. The green lines on the map are district boundaries and probable Russian objectives for a spring offensive. 

The red line shows the current front, orange is the front before the winter offensive. 
The straight green lines are the district boundaries of Zaporizhzhia and Dnipro and possible end objectives of the Russians. Arrows are the directions of possible offensives. 

  Kherson: As I speculated in a previous post, the Russian army will have to cross the Dnieper river near Kherson city, to strengthen their claim to the district in negotiations. The Red army did it under more unfavourable circumstances in 1943, as did Ukraine when they crossed to briefly occupy the village of Krimki on the eastern bank. This is a sector where the Russian army has the most numerical superiority. Russian forces in the Kerson sector are:

         - 70 Motorized rifle division
        - 104 Guards Airborne division.
        - 144, and 105 independent Motor rifle brigades.
        - 214 Tank regiment.
        - 1233, 1253 and 1054 territorial regiments in a holding role.
        - Two artillery brigades
               
  In the northern half of Kherson, Russia has another three infantry brigades and three territorial 
  regiments, largely in a holding role.

 Opposing this, the Ukrainians in Kherson have three low quality brigades, six territorial defence
 battalions (equal to two brigades) and on artillery brigade. Russia has a 3 : 1 manpower and firepower
 advantage, which I believe to be good enough to attempt crossing the Dnieper and taking the city of
 Kherson and an area upto a depth of 10km from the western bank of the Dnieper.

In conclusion, I believe Russia has shaped the battlefield for a multi-sector offensive in April that 
could enable it to reach its territorial goals. 
    

Videos/ posts of interest:

A video with data on the desertion crisis in Ukraine with an example of a French trained brigade

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g_8_p8Kyqb0&t=1150s

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EadAXT1Zrjk

This analyst has good maps and analysis at the operational level, which compensates for my
very amateur maps. His videos are frequent. 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gJH6yeOMPvE&t=836s