Ukraine war - part 16. Russia's Order of battle and deployment.
1. Russia's order of battle.
2. Where their units are deployed.
3. What this deployment suggests for future operations.
Since then, President Putin in his annual keynote speech and Q&A session at
the Valdai economic summit, validated a key assumption I have been making – that
the Ukrainian casualties reported by the Russian ministry of defence, are
sanitary losses (all killed and wounded, including lightly wounded), of
which half are irrecoverable losses. He also confirmed another key assumption I
have been making, namely that irrecoverable losses are more than fresh recruits
for Ukraine.
I have been getting feedback, that my posts seem to pro Russia and do not indicate problems with
their army. I therefore want to provide a more realistic view of the strength of the Russian army, with
a note at the end, that goes into these problems in more detail.
Russia was to increase the size of their
armed forces from 900,000 (at the start of the war) to 1.5 million this year.
While the increases to 1.15 million and then 1.32 million were done on schedule,
there does not seem to be a further increase in numbers. Ukraine reports the
size of the Russian armed forces as remaining at 1.32 million. About 8 new
divisions, scheduled to be raised by 2025, have not. Several of Russia’s
combined arms armies are under resourced. While Russia continues to report a
recruitment of 30,000 soldiers a month, most of these are existing contract
soldiers renewing their contracts, with the rest replacing casualties. Of the
300,000 men mobilized in 2022, in the wake of Ukrainian advances, 100,000 have
returned home, while the remaining will need to, having spent three years at
the front.
Unless there is a fresh mobilization – possibly all conscripts being drafted
for active duty after their training (as opposed to some of them signing
contracts), or veterans with specialties needed at the front are recalled to
duty, the number of 1.5 million is unlikely to be reached. In this context, I
wanted to take a look at Russia’s strength at the front and their deployment.
The reality of Russia's 30,000 men a month recruitment.
Since this figure is believed to be correct and the Russian army is not growing, it is assumed that new recruits are replacing casualties. This is not correct, can the following explanation will show:
There are probably upto 10,000 irreplaceable casualties a month in the Russian army (3000 dead + 6000 seriously wounded). Another 12000 are sanitary losses - wounded but returned to active duty. This partly explains the difference between western estimates of Russian casualties and verified dead.
There are four sources of recruitment in Russia:
- Conscripts: About 260,000 a year or which 200,000 go into the army. These are not deployed in combat but some of them sign contracts to serve, after their one year conscription.
- Compulsory mobilization: This was done only once in 2022, from the pool of ex conscripts who have signed an agreement to serve as a volunteer reserve. There is a pool of 2 million such people of which 300,000 were mobilized and upwards of 100,000 released from service, or casualties by the end of 2024. This reserve is different from other ex conscripts who can be subject to compulsory mobilization (as Ukraine has done) in wartime. The rest of the 200,000 men have now completed 2-3 years at the front and have to return, so a lot of new volunteers in 2025 have been to fill this gap.
- Volunteers signing contracts with the Ministry of defence. These are typically long term contracts and represent the bulk of the army. Some of those signing are conscripts finishing their service, or from the
pool of ex conscripts in the volunteer reserve.
- Volunteers from BARS (non ministry of defence) units. These are short term contracts with relaxed recruitment standards - incl. ex convicts, migrants etc. Many of the 30,000 signups per month are those renewing their 6 monthly or annual contracts.
The Russian order of battle. Both Russia and Ukraine have similar numbers for the Russian combat strength at the front. The strength of the Russian armed forces increased from 900,000 to 1.32 million.
The combat strength of the army – including airborne forces and naval infantry is
around 750000 men. Of these, around 650,000 are deployed for the war in
Ukraine. They are divided as follows:
|
Military district |
Formation |
|
Moscow military District Air force: 9 fighter squadrons |
1st Guards Tank Army |
|
Leningrad Military
district
Air force: 12 fighter squadrons |
6th combined arms army (68th & 69th Division newly
raised) |
|
Southern military district
Air force: 16 fighter squadrons |
3rd Guards combined arms army (Old - Luhansk militia) |
|
Central military district
Air force: 6 fighter squadrons |
2nd Guards combined arms army |
|
Eastern Military district
Air force: 13 fighter squadrons |
5th Guards combined arms army |
Units in Blue have
been raised after Feb 22 (the start of the Ukraine war).
Units in Red were raised after Feb 22,
but deployed outside the Ukraine theatre. I have excluded independent brigades
and supporting units based outside Ukraine.
The Russian army is organized differently
from India’s. A combined arms army is usually the equivalent of an Indian corps
(2 or 3 divisions and supporting arms). A Russian corps is a little bigger than
an Indian army division – typically 2-3 mechanized brigades, plus regiments of
artillery, air defense and
engineers. A Russian military district is headed by an army officer and has air
force divisions and regiments subordinated to it.
What Russia’s current order of battle
(above chart) shows is the following:
The Eastern military district is under resourced. Three of the four armies attached to it – the 29th, 35th and 36th has the equivalent of just one division i.e two or three motorized brigades and a brigade of artillery, with other supporting regiments). The 5th Guards army has one division and one brigade. The 68th Corps has just one brigade.
Units of the Eastern military district took
heavy casualties since 2022 and my sense is replacements from the Siberian
region have replaced casualties rather than formed new units, which would
surely have been the Russian army’s intention, since the supporting artillery,
engineers, air defense units etc. in each army could support larger formations.
This is what has been done with the Moscow and Central military districts. Since
the start of the war the Eastern military district (called `Group of forces East’
at the front) has had five commanders. It
is also the only military district where none of its units were awarded the
Guards prefix, during the Ukraine war.
The Leningrad military district has
been newly formed. It’s formations were first sent into the fighting North of
Kharkov in 2024, to divert Ukrainian forces from more important sectors. Later,
they were used to stop the Ukrainian advance into Kursk. However, the Russian
counter attack to regain all their lost territory and advance into Sumy region,
required reinforcements from a North Korean contingent, as well as several
airborne brigades transferred from different parts of the front.
Thus both the Leningrad and the Eastern
military districts (corresponding to group of forces North and
East) are relatively weak formations, which can either hold ground, or advance
against weak opposition, or where there is a collapse of Ukrainian
positions.
Deployment: Clockwise starting from Sumy in the North to
Kherson in the South, the deployment of Russian formations is as follows:
|
Front |
Russian formations |
Subordinate to |
|
Sumy |
XLIV Corps. |
Leningrad Military district
|
|
North of Kharkov |
6th Combined arms army (CAA) |
Leningrad military district
|
|
East Kharkov - Kupyansk |
Part of XI Corps |
Leningrad mil district |
|
Lyman |
20th CAA |
Moscow mil district Central Mil district |
|
Siversk |
3rd Guards CAA |
Southern mil district |
|
North Donetsk |
III Corps |
Central mil district |
|
Central Donetsk |
LXVIII Corps |
Eastern mil district |
|
South Donetsk |
5th Guards CAA 35th CAA |
Eastern mil district |
|
Zaporozhye |
58th Guards CAA |
South mil district |
|
Kherson (along the Dnieper) |
18th CAA |
South Mil district |
The number of brigades in each sector (clockwise), is as follows:
|
Army Group |
Front |
Russian brigades or regiments |
|
North |
Sumy |
1 Rifle brigade. 3 rifle regiments. |
|
North |
North of Kharkov |
6 Rifle regiments, 2 tank regiments. |
|
West |
East Kharkov - Kupyansk |
1 Rifle brigade. 7 Rifle regiments. |
|
West |
Lyman |
1 Rifle brigade. 7 rifle regiments |
|
West |
Siversk |
6 rifle brigades, 1 artillery brigade. |
|
Centre |
North Donetsk |
1 rifle brigade, 3 rifle regiments. 1 artillery brigade. |
|
Centre |
Central Donetsk |
11 Rifle brigades. 11 Rifle regiments. |
|
East |
South Donetsk |
6 Rifle brigades. 2 rifle regiments. 2 tank brigades |
|
South |
Zaporozhye |
6 Rifle regiments. 3 artillery brigades. 1 tank brigade |
|
South |
Kherson (along the Dnieper) |
6 Rifle regiments. 2 Artillery regiments |
*The
difference between a brigade and a regiment in the Russian army, is that while
both typically consist of 3 battalions, the brigade can operate independently –
A motorized rifle brigade will have its own tanks and self-propelled artillery, with air defence assets. A rifle
regiment would usually have
more riflemen (all three battalions) but without the supporting units that
enable independent operations. A regiment is part of a division, while a
brigade can operate independently, as part of a Corps or Army.
** All sectors of the front (above) have an
air defense and engineering brigade and most have a
special forces regiment. All sectors have at least one brigade equivalent of
independent volunteer units
(BARS) units outside a parent army. I have listed the BARS unit known to
operate in Sumy which is not part of the parent XLIV corps.
The problem of command and control.
Both armies have struggled with this problem. Ukraine's army expanded fivefold at the start of the war with 20 odd brigades growing to over 100. Ukraine has now organized all of brigades under a parent Corps. Russia moved from the Battalion tactical group, back to the brigade & division structure, which were subordinated to either an independent corps or army, both of which came under a `Group of forces'
(or Army group).
Currently, the group of forces Centre (which was to comprise the forces of the Central military district), responsible for the most important sector of the front - from Pokrovsk to Chasiv yar, has units from the Eastern, Southern and Central military districts, while surrendering one of its units to Group West.
Its strongest unit - the 90th Tank division, has served at different parts of the front,
During the war, this front has had four commanders. Other fronts too have had three commanders in the
last three years.
The strongest and most battle hardened military district, the South, is handling a relatively quiet part of the front, though some of its armies - the 3rd Guards and 8th Guards army and the 5th Combined arms army have been loaned to other army groups. The longest section of the front - albeit a relatively quiet one, is handled by the newest and most inexperienced group - the North. (Northern military district).
A more positive development for Russia (like the Red army in WW2) is that the commander of every army group and army are those who have proved themselves in this war commanding smaller formations, while a lot of deadwood and officers accused of corruption have been purged (including the minister of defence). Thus both the head of ground forces and his chief of staff were commanders of
an army group who had performed well in combat (Col Gen Mordvichev and Col Gen Lapin). The war has also reduced the average age of front and army commanders - to mid and early 50s
What does Russia’s deployment indicate ?
In the North (Sumy and Kharkov) the
strength of Russian forces are not enough to launch any attack with the intent
of taking territory – nor is that territory important to Russia’s aims. Those
aims focus on four provinces (Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaparozhye and Kherson) and
exclude Kharkov and Sumy districts. Moreover, several formations of the new
Leningrad military district (Group of forces North) have been newly raised.
While they were adequate to defend against a Ukrainian advance in Kursk last year, they needed an
airborne division and the North Korean group to launch an offensive to regain
their territory.
At the same time, the size of the Russian force, prevents Ukraine from pushing
into Russia (as they did with their Kursk offensive last summer) and is of a
size that forces Ukraine to deploy a sizable force to prevent a Russian advance
towards the cities of Kharkov and Sumy – which are now within drone and
artillery range.
In the South, along the Dnieper opposite
Kherson, the 18th Combined arms army is probably not strong enough
to force a crossing of the Dnieper, to take the district capital Kherson city –
which would be the Russian objective. This sector is defended by four lower
grade Ukrainian infantry brigades and one artillery brigade – totally about
half the size of the Russian force.
It is however possible for Russia take part of the city, that lies on an island
on the Dnieper, or occupy or land opposite the Kilburn spit, which will have
the psychological impact of occupying part of a new district – Mykolayiv with a
`straight line’ distance of only 70km to Odessa. (see map)
Map shows the area of operations of Russia's 18th army (east of the Dnieper river). Kherson (star)
which is capital of the district of which 65% is occupied by Russia is the ultimate objective. The other stars - Krimki and Nova Kakhovka are areas where Ukraine tried to cross the Dnieper in 2023.
The red arrows can be, in my view, possible Russian advances - to capture a suburb of Kherson city, on
an island of the Dnieper and to occupy the whole of the Kilburn spit (left arrow) which puts Russia in a new province and controls river traffic of two rivers.
The rest of Russia’s Group South occupies a line from the Dnieper (Kamyanske), running south to Orikhiv and south of Hulaiypole. This was the location of Ukraine’s 2023 summer counter offensive that failed, but has since had both sides heavily dug in. Since the Russian forces are just 25 km from Zaparozhye city (Russia’s final objective for this district) and 5km from Orikhiv and Hulaipole, Ukraine has to defend that line running from east to west. The problem is that Russia’s group East, is advancing into Zaporozhe (and the province to its north – Dnipropetrovsk) from the East, threatens to envelop the Ukrainian defence line from the north. (see map)
Map shows the deployment of 58 Guards army (south) and Group East. Group East, advancing to the West, threatens to envelop the Orekhiv & Hulaipole positions of Ukraine (which face south), as shown by the big red arrows. 58th army continues to pin the Ukrainian defenders.
The lines in Yellow are areas of Dinpro province occupied or threatened by Russia. This province is
not a Russian objective, but area can be exchanged for territory in Zaporizhzhia.
I believe Russia’s plan is to use the strongest groups – group West and group Centre, to launch a pincer attack which will take the remaining 30% of Donetsk and potentially end the war – my sense is Russia will agree to a ceasefire once the remaining city of Donetsk is taken, or cut off – the agglomeration of Slavyansk-Kramatorsk. (refer map).
Map: The black line is the boundary of Donetsk province which is Russia's campaign objective.
The red line is Russia's current position. The orange stars are key defensive locations which are all in danger of falling in the next month. Clockwise, they are Lyman, Siversk, Konstantinovka and Pokrovsk.
There are no major defences behind these towns. My view is the fall of these places will enable Army group west to advance East (blue arrow going east to west) and army group centre to advance north
would open a railway route from Russia, cut supplies to Slavyansk and threaten Kharkov from the East.
The nature of the Ukraine war today is very
different from when it started. In 2023,
most casualties on both sides, were from artillery – as it has been throughout
the last century. In the past year, most casualties are from drones.
The `tip of the spear’ of the Russian army
is 98 infantry brigades or regiments (including 10 from
volunteer (BARS) units which are light infantry. At an average of 2000 men per
regiment and 3000
per brigade, there are no more than 250,000 men who directly participate in
assaulting Ukrainian forces.
They are rotated, so no more than 2/3rd of this force is at the
front at any time. They are opposed by around 100,000 Ukrainians who are their
frontline infantry. While Russia does not have the numerical superiority needed
to successfully attack ( 3:1 has been considered necessary to overcome a peer
adversary), Russia has hitherto made it up by superiority in firepower – more
artillery, tanks and air strikes. However, drones are now the primary means of
delivering firepower and until recently it was Ukraine who were using more
drones, though Russia seems to have caught up over the last two months.
A Russian at the front described it thus:
Small squads are fighting
a huge war. A "strongpoint" can be held by a handful — two, three, or
four people. The line of contact has been completely transformed. In 2023 our
mission was to get a company into a village with ten BMP-3s. That was already
difficult back then. Now the vehicles sit tens of kilometers from the LOC (Line of contact). If in 2023 those same BMP-3s
could play the role of little tanks, today they’re unlikely to reach a firing
position. Not because the vehicles are "obsolete" — it’s that, for
whatever reason, they can’t be systematically protected or covered from the
main threat: kamikaze drones. Here’s what “getting there” looks like for a
regular infantryman. It’s a full march now. With all your kit — roughly 30
kilos — you get dropped 10–15 kilometers from the point where you will actually
fight. Some approaches run up to 30 kilometers. Other routes, under forest
cover, let you leap to within a few kilometers of the LOC. Beyond that,
resupply and movement rely on ATVs, dirt bikes, and whatever sort of sketchy
electric scooters people are improvising. The rear area now begins some 50
kilometers from the LOC. The hardest part is getting there. Routes and lines of
communication are being mined — via drones. Improvised mines and booby traps
are shoved into medkits, casings are smeared with glue and covered with grass,
scores of small bomblets are scattered on trails, and where you can see a wheel
track there are large magnetic mines. If you don’t know how all these mines
look, you will step on one. The route is the single most dangerous segment.
Small Mavics constantly watch movement and can instantly pass coordinates to an
FPV strike team or an artillery battery. On the LOC itself — in a dugout — it
can be less dangerous than on the way to it. The common pattern now: guys sit
holed up for a month or two and pull through with no losses, then get into
trouble on the exit. There is no organized mechanized resupply. Everything
moves on foot. The best you can hope for is a gutsy motorcyclist who’ll dash in
and get out. At night the nastiness wakes up. Large drones with thermal sensors
drop mortar rounds. If you haven't found your fighting position before sunset —
you die. That leads to the core problem. You can’t amass forces or sustain
large numbers on the LOC anymore. That’s true for both sides. To fix this and start
winning systematically you need unit-authorized ATVs, large logistics drones,
small evacuation buggies, and drone interceptors. Right now all of those are
off the books — bought privately or cobbled together through aid channels.
Micro-teams must do everything. There are no dedicated combat engineers,
signalers, or medics in many units. You have to know it all yourself. First —
navigation and working with mobile maps; second — radio and signal procedures;
third — explosive ordnance recognition and basic EOD tradecraft. Without those
skills you’ll get physically lost, lose contact with those who could help, and
step on a little woolly thing in no-man’s land that will end you. The gray zone
is now about 2–3 kilometers. In that "no-man’s territory" there’s nothing
but abandoned 200s and mines. It’s crushing for fighters’ morale. The enemy
will often break and run after taking their first losses during an assault. The
quality of their troops — you can see the forced draft and degradation for
yourself. Even their special units have lost their old edge. Still, the bottom
line is we can barely reach them.
What life at the front, in a Russian trench is like
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GLyh_ZMUjcY
This video (English subtitles) featuring men from a volunteer (BARS) brigade, is about how soldiers are trained for this new type of warfare.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B1QHxbpfD44&t=180s
This is a reason why
Russia as relatively few tank or mechanized brigades at the front. It’s not
because they have lost most of their tanks – apart from a large tank reserve,
their production has been greater than losses for over a year. The reason was
that tanks and other armoured vehicles have less utility than earlier. Newly
raised units have more infantry than in the Soviet era and some of those who
would have served in tanks, or infantry fighting vehicles (BMPs) are now in
anti-drone, or electronic warfare.
The contribution of
NATO. NATO forces handle most
ISR work – collecting and interpreting satellite feed, electronic signals and
other intel. They also coordinate the management of battles across the front –
since NATO has constant surveillance of Russian forces and feedback from every
Ukrainian unit on the front. Russia’s battlefield management is not as advanced.
NATO also handles major repairs of vehicles and weapon systems, ordnance
handling, transportation
and storage upto the Ukraine border and medical treatment of the seriously
wounded. They continue to
train many new recruits. If the Ukrainian army handles these functions, they
would probably need 100,000 personnel, that they do not have.
Russia has over a
million men of military age (many ex conscripts) working in armaments plants,
while it is a quarter of that number for Ukraine, since NATO contributes most
of Ukraine’s armaments.
and mistakes made earlier, He's no longer saying Ukraine can win - as he did in the op-ed of 2023.
marat khairullin. Ukraine army
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