The Gaza war by numbers - 2 months later

 My earlier post was published a week before the Israeli ground invasion of Gaza started. I had estimated then, that it would take 2 months for the IDF to eliminate Hamas as a significant threat.

Two months have passed since the start of ground operations and it will be useful to see how things have progressed and how my assumptions have held up.

Based on the Israeli army’s order of battle (ORBAT), I had speculated that Israel will deploy the following force for a ground invasion of Gaza:
The link to that post:
https://rpdeans.blogspot.com/2023/10/what-israeli-invasion-of-gaza-might.html

3 Parachute / Commando Brigades.
9 Infantry brigades ( 2 regular and 7 reserve).
8 Armored brigades ( 2 regular and 6 reserve).

The IDF’s did deploy 20 brigades, with a slightly different composition:

4 Parachute /Commando brigades
10 Infantry brigades (4 regular and 6 reserve),
6 Armored brigades (4 regular and 2 reserve).

This is open source info from the Israeli govt website and media.

These units were also assisted by 2  specialist engineering battalions (to clear paths through rubble) and the air force’s 669 unit (to rescue people trapped behind enemy lines) and 2 more brigades
in the Gaza area (part of the Gaza division), which took heavy casualties on 7^th Oct.
These 20 brigades (plus backup) represent two third of the strength of the Israeli army (with almost all its engineering and anti terrorist units). 
 
While the IDF deployed the 20 brigades I assumed they would, they increased the number of infantry formations in Gaza and their quality (more regular units) – which is understandable, given the difficulty of operating armored formations in built up areas and the need for more infantry. Correspondingly, the IDF moved more tank formations to the Lebanon border.

However, with Hezbollah not joining the war in any meaningful way, the IDF appears to have moved the 179^TH Armored brigade from the North (facing Hezbollah) to Gaza, making it the 7^th armored formation in Gaza. The IDF also deployed the overwhelming majority of the regular army formations to Gaza. Thus the elite Golani brigade, usually based in the North, was deployed to Gaza, as was the 188 Armored brigade. The 900 (Kfir) brigade, which is based in the West bank and designed for counter terrorism and urban warfare, as is the Etzioni infantry brigade, was also moved to Gaza.

The required number of infantry formations (10 brigades, instead of the 9 earlier assumed, with 2 more in reserve) were made up by deploying the 228 and 261 brigades – normally training formations and the 421 brigade, which is a lower quality formation meant for territorial defence. 

The actual units deployed in Gaza are:
Regular brigades:
35th Parachute & 89th Commando brigades.
1st (Golani), 84th (Givati) and 933rd (Nahal) Infantry brigades.
7^th (Saar), 188^th (Barak), 401^st (Ikvot) and 460th (Bnei) Armored brigades

Reserve brigades:
55^th and 551st Parachute brigades.

5th (Sharon), 12th (Negev), 261st, 421st (Epharim), 228^th (Bismalach* ), 900 (Kfir)
6th (Etzoni) Infantry brigades. 261 Brigade (part of the 3 brigade Gaza div).
10th (Harel) and 14^th (Machatz) Armored brigades. Later 179 (Onyx) Armored Brigade.   

Note: Bismalach is an acronym for School for Infantry squad leaders.  

The nature of urban warfare requires engineering units to move rubble and blow up tunnels. The fighting in Gaza has involved all the engineering units that are part of the armored formations, in addition to 2 specialist engineering battalions and an engineering battalion normally assigned to an armoured brigade that is stationed in North Israel (facing Hezbollah).

Hamas Forces: I had assumed Hamas and Islamic Jihad had 40,000 fighters (30,000 for Hamas).
More recent estimates of the IDF and the US, are 5 brigades (or 24 battalions) with around
20,000 fighters. There is less activity than expected from other Palestinian groups like Islamic Jihad
so at best the IDF would face about 25000 men and not 40,000.
Thus the number of IDF `boots on the ground’ in Gaza of about 35,000 infantry and 20,000 in armored and artillery units, would outnumber Hamas 2:1 and, in a long war, which this one is going to be, can be rotated with units on the quieter northern front facing Hezbollah.

Progress to date: I had assumed it would the IDF 2 months to take total control of Gaza. This was based on the IDF’s dislike for long wars, apart from casualty aversion and the terrain in Gaza.
The longest conventional war for Israel has been 21 days (1973) and the longest counter terrorism or
limited war has been 34 days (2006 vs Hezbollah).

Israel’s estimate was that the war is costing them $ 270 million per day. This is not a cost that can be sustained for a long time, notwithstanding aid from the US. This does not include the hit to sectors like construction and agriculture because Palestinian workers from the West Bank and Gaza cannot work in Israel. There is also the virtual closure of Eliat port (Israel’s 2^nd largest) due to attacks on ships bound for Israel or Israeli owned, by the Houthi militia in the Red sea and closure of the tourism industry for the 2023-24 season, which has not been factored in. There is a growing erosion in support for Israel the longer the conflict continues. 

It was therefore in Israel’s interest to complete the operation quickly (2 months was my estimate).
However, the IDF’s own estimate is that they control no more than half of Gaza - the half which is less built up and easer to control  and would require another 2 months (this seems the most credible estimate) to complete operations.

Losses: My data on Israeli losses comes from its official website, which I believe to be credible. It gives names of all casualties, with details like their rank, age and unit. These names are also mentioned in the Israeli press. In a small country with a free press, where people know each other, it is difficult to hide deaths. Palestinian casualties are reported by their Health ministry and while their claims have been disputed, in the past their numbers matched UN estimates. In this case, UN sources do not question the broad casualty figures. They do not include Hamas fighters. 

I had assumed 900 Israeli soldiers KIA and between 6-7000 wounded in the 2 months it would take the IDF to defeat Hamas and control all of Gaza.
After 2 months, with under half of Gaza under Israeli control, the IDF death toll is 460 Killed (plus 64 men from the police and internal security (Shabak) units with an estimated 6200 wounded, of which 2100 are classified as permanently disabled.

My view is that while Israel is transparent about its dead, it has been economical with the facts regarding wounded soldiers. Its official wounded count was 1900. However, investigative reports by Israel’s leading daily Yedioth Ahronoth, with separate reports from English dailies Times of Israel and Haaretz put the wounded – as of 9^th Dec at 5000. Another Israeli paper listed it at 6100 on 20^th Dec, with 2005 listed by the defense ministry as permanently disabled. Yehidot’s estimate was that 58% of all injured (from hospital data) are severely injured – the IDF’s figure is 42%. One hospital alone treated more than the 1900 injured soldiers the IDF originally reported. Israeli media reporting on the war has to pass through military censors and these figures would not have been published if they were untrue.

Since 1982, the IDF has between 8.5 and 10 men wounded for every soldier killed. Wounded is defined as those admitted to hospital. The IDF has fewer men killed relative to the number wounded because they can evacuate a casualty rapidly to an advanced medical care facility (which is world class). Typically in combat, casualties first move to a first aid post, then a field hospital and then to an advanced facility. For the IDF casualties are evacuated by helicopter, which can reach the best hospitals in the country in half an hour.
From available data, we have approx. 11.8 wounded (hospital admissions) for every IDF soldier killed, of which 42% are severely to moderately wounded (35% of the 42% permanently disabled).
I have taken a more conservative figure than 58% seriously wounded.
Hence, excluding police and internal security deaths, we have IDF irrecoverable losses of
470 dead & 2280 seriously wounded on 22 Dec.

I had assumed 50,000 deaths on the Palestinian side. At the `halfway stage’, Hamas has reported
21000 deaths. There are another 7000 missing and believed dead (under rubble) and 50,000 injured, may of whom will die as medical care in Gaza is now negligible.  These are figures the UN believes to be credible as most are identified. Of those dead, 6200 are reported by Hamas to be adult men. The IDF has estimated that a third of all killed (7000) are Hamas fighters. If twice that number are irrecoverably wounded (Hamas wounded to dead ratio is a lot worse than the IDF) due to the absence of medical care), it would mean over 80% casualties (21,000 out of 25,000), or the end of Hamas as an organization capable of organized resistance. 

Since every adult male is not a Hamas fighter, 6000 is probably the upper limit of Hamas casualties
Given the tonnage of bombs and shells fired into Gaza and the admission that almost half the bombs (and all shells) are dumb or unguided with a targeting error that will invariably result in civilian casualties and given the population density of Gaza the casualty figure (extrapolating from confirmed civilian casualties of similar IDF operations in Lebanon and Gaza in the past), the Palestinian casualty figures seem credible.

In the 4 weeks following Oct 7, the Israeli air force was believed to have dropped 1000 tons of bombs on Gaza per day (now reduced to around 500). The Israeli figure is 1000 bombs per day, along with approx. 1500 artillery shells daily (100,000 shells in 60 days), which roughly equates to the claimed tonnage of 1000 Tns of explosive per day, particularly if one includes drone strikes and Naval gunfire.  That amount of explosive is about 5 times more per day than what was used against Hezbollah in 2006, though Gaza is a much smaller area. A validation of those numbers is from the emergency airlift of shells and bombs for aircraft, from the US, to replenish Israeli stocks.

Nature of IDF losses:
So far almost all IDF losses after 7^th Oct have been suffered by regular brigades. The Golani brigade has lost 75 men (though most killed were on 7^th Oct). Most Golani casualties were in its 13^th and 51^st battalions, which together lost more men than in the 1967 and ‘73 wars combined.
The Givati brigade: 31 killed, Nahal 28 killed and the elite 35 Para, 24 men killed in action.

The special forces  (3 army commando battalions and the Navy’s Sayaret Maktal) grouped into the 89^th commando brigade, lost  45 killed. The loss of so many elite commandos is probably the IDFs most serious loss so far, along with 12 men from the air force’s rescue teams.     

Excluding the losses of 7^th Oct, the Eleven reserve brigades in the Gaza operation lost a combined 40 men, 16 of them from the 551 para brigade, which is being used as a regular brigade. The casualty figures indicate that 9 of the 11 reserve brigades have so far not seen anywhere near the level of fighting of regular brigades, but that may change as regular units are rotated after 2 months of combat.

25% of those killed are officers (103 officers), excluding officers from the border protection corps and armed police) which is a very high ratio. Irrecoverable officer casualties could be over 600. The loss of so many officers in relatively few combat units, can seriously affect the unit's ability to conduct sustained combat operations. 

Professional armies which have an experienced NCO cadre have officer losses of between 4 & 10% of total deaths. Armies with a large proportion of officers and lacking experienced NCO will lose a larger proportion of officers – the Russian army in Ukraine had officer losses of 15-25% in its
frontline units (infantry and armor). It appears to be similar for the IDF. Given the ratio of 5-6 seriously wounded for every one killed, Israeli frontline infantry brigades like the Golani, Givati , Nahal, as well as their 401 and 7^th armored brigades would have officer losses that would make them incapable of sustained offensive operations.

10 officers killed were of the rank of Lt Col and Col. In the IDF, a Lt Col commands a battalion (it is a Colonel in the Indian army). A larger number might be expected to be seriously injured. These are difficult to replace because reserve officers have already been assigned to reserve units that have been mobilized and because they have come out of civilian jobs with little refresher military experience in the past few years.   

The high number of officer casualties might explain why the elite Golani brigade was reported to have been withdrawn from the fighting on 21^st Dec. Three Lieutenants from an officer training school (probably cadets training to be officers) were killed on 20^th Dec, suggesting that they were emergency replacements for officer losses.  

Once the Gaza invasion started 35% of IDF men killed were reservists, though reserve units have done a smaller proportion of the fighting.

Hamas and Hezbollah have together claimed that they destroyed over 200 Israeli tanks. I believe this to be very implausible. It is possible they hit 200 armored vehicles, half of which may be tanks. Few of those hit will actually be destroyed, given the high level of armor on the Merkava tank and the relatively low level of anti-tank missiles used against them. Most Hamas videos of tanks being hit, show that they were hit by older RPGs and not the Iranian dual warhead anti-tank missiles that Hezbollah has. In the 2006 war against Hezbollah, the IDF had 52 Merkava tanks damaged, but
only 5 were destroyed. Currently, the IDF has reported only 1 tank crewman killed in Northern Israel as a result of Hezbollah action, though Hezbollah has claimed 25+ tank kills, with video footage of missiles hitting several tanks.

The 4 regular tank brigades involved in the fighting had 42 men killed (upto 40 were tank crew). 
Its 3 reserve tank brigades in the Gaza sector, lost 4 men between them (3 crew).

In WW2, 1 tank crewman was killed for every tank completely lost. This figure was true for both western and Soviet tank crew. Soviet tanks had fewer crew than western tanks, so 1 crew killed per tank lost was a high proportion of crew killed, which reflected the difficulty the Red army faced in evacuating casualties over a longer distance.

In more recent times, with tanks offering better crew protection and better medical care the ratio is approx. 1.5 tanks destroyed for every tank crew killed. Thus the Russian army in the ongoing Ukraine war, lost around 1000 men in its tank formations, for an estimated 1500 tanks completely destroyed as I have discussed in my blogpost on casualties in the Ukraine war.

If we assume 1.5 tanks destroyed for every Israeli crew killed (the ratio is more likely to be higher) then with 44 tank crew killed, there would be 66 tanks destroyed in Gaza and probably be an equal number damaged and unusable for the duration of the war. After the 6 day ceasefire, Israel appears to have moved the reserve 179 armored brigade into Gaza, which will make sense if it lost a brigade (135 tanks) worth of tanks. Israel also stopped the planned export of older tanks, anticipating that they would be needed to replace losses. Though there are replacement tanks and reserve tank crew available to each brigade, it is not easy to integrate them into a unit in the middle of a high intensity battle. 

Of the division HQs deployed in Gaza, the 36^th division (comprising the 1^st – Golani infantry brigade and the 7^th and 188 armored brigades) lost 102 men, with an estimated 40 tanks.
The 162^nd division – comprising the Givati and Nahal infantry brigades with the 401 armored brigade, lost 66 men and 22 tanks.
The 98 div (35 and 55 Para brigade and 89 commando brigade) lost 83 men.
The other active division in Gaza, the 366^th ( 10 and 460 Armor and 551 Para brigade) lost 16 men.

After the 6 day ceasefire, units assigned to the 252 division appear to have played a more active role in Gaza (giving a rest to worn out units from the 36^th and 162 division). The 188^th armored brigade of the 36^th division, appears to have been moved north for rest and refitting – ironically it lost a man to a Hezbollah rocket attack on 21^st Dec.
The 252 division comprises the 12^th (Negev) brigade with 14^th Armored and one of the unassigned reserve brigades.

There is little evidence of Hamas using drones – apart from 7^th Oct. Nor are their anti-tank missiles as sophisticated as those in Hezbollah’s inventory. This has simplified fighting for the IDF. They need to watch for threats in 2 dimensions - underground tunnels and on the ground, but not from the air.   

Hamas was able to carry out a sophisticated double ambush, against the elite Golani brigade, in a part of Gaza supposedly under IDF control.

The loss from friendly fire of upto 20% of all IDF casualties, including the well-publicized case of the 3 hostages shot by their own troops. At the very least, it is indicative of troops suffering from the stress of battle and shooting at any perceived threat. Previous friendly fire incidents, point to some lack of clarity on rules of engagement, or gaps in training.   

Hezbollah’s no show: The Gaza war was a conundrum for Hezbollah. If they attacked Israel, they feared serious IDF retaliation against them – just when they were trying to consolidate their political hold over Lebanon, while Iran feared US action – including hitting their oil revenues. If Hezbollah stayed out, they would lose credibility among their followers and among those in the Muslim world who wanted to fight Israel. Hezbollah has tried to do just enough (possibly managing the level of escalation in consultation with Israel) to appear that it is fighting Israel, without the IDF having to fear a serious Hezbollah action.

By Hezbollah’s own admission, they lost 127 men killed through Israel strikes – this excludes people killed in Syria from IDF air strikes on pro-Iranian or Syrian forces. The IDF lost 8 men, plus 4 civilians (which matches Hezbollah’s claim of 120-130 Israelis killed and injured, given the 11:1 ratio of wounded to killed among Israelis. This is not a loss ratio for Hezbollah to claim either victory, or the creation of enough civilian martyrs (unlike the high civilian casualties in Gaza).        

What Hezbollah has achieved however, is to destroy the Israeli surveillance infrastructure along the border and cause the displacement of upto 200,000 Israelis from border areas. These have to be housed in safer locations, while being unproductive in their existing jobs. Hezbollah has also so far  tied down a third of the IDF on the northern border. This appears to have changed, with the 179 (reserve) Armored and the 646 (reserve) parachute brigade moving from the North, to Gaza, in Mid Dec, possibly with two equivalent units being rotated out from Gaza to the quieter North – most likely the 188^th armored and the 551 or 35^th Para brigade.   

A surprise in this war has been that the West bank has been fairly quiet, though many Palestinians have been killed ether by settlers, or killed and arrested in IDF raids. Israel will find it more difficult to subdue a full blown insurrection in the West bank compared to Gaza.

What can escalate this: The attacks on ships bound for Israel by Houthi rebels has resulted in the US forming a 20 country coalition  to safeguard shipping in the Red sea. The US also identified Iran as supporting the attacks with intel and missiles, or drones. If there are further attacks, it would be a big loss of credibility for the US, not to retaliate against Iran. Attacking Houthi positions, rather than Iran will be seen for what they are – a `safe’ attack against low value targets to save face. An Iranian response to an attack will be a major escalation. At the least it would mean a far greater involvement in the fighting by Hezbollah and attacking western shipping in the Persian gulf.

Israel has called on Lebanon to move Hezbollah forces 10km away from the Israel border, or face a possible ground invasion of Lebanon (similar to 2006). Lebanon had said it will comply if Israel does the same – which at the time of writing this, appears unlikely. There is also a steady escalation by both sides with the IDF resorting to more artillery shelling and air strikes and Hezbollah to rocket attacks. Israel will lose credibility, particularly among hardliners in its Govt, if Hezbollah does not withdraw and does not stop rocket attacks, while Hezbollah will be under more pressure to escalate if Hamas starts collapsing and Israel controls most of Gaza.  

What will victory look like ? The objective of both Hamas & Hezbollah – leaving aside the rhetoric, it’s the only thing on which they probably agree, is a 2 state solution for Palestine. That can only happen if the civilian casualty count is so high, that Israel is isolated and some Israeli lawmakers and the US force serious negotiations with the Palestinians on a two state solution. My view in the previous post was that it would have to be 50,000 dead. We are halfway there.
Thus Hamas will have to drag out the war as long as possible, while keeping their command structure intact, while slowly bleeding Israel, both in terms of numbers and economic cost.

Israel will win if most of the Hamas cadre are dead or surrender, with the remaining hostages freed, before the Hamas conditions of victory are achieved.  

If the Hamas leadership believes its fighters and leadership will collapse before it has inflicted enough casualties on the IDF, or lost enough of its civilians, they will look for Hezbollah or the Houthis to escalate. Based on the current trend, my view is that Israel will only face real pressure from its population on IDF casualties and the economic cost and from the world community on Palestinian casualties, after another 2 months. Israel has more time than I projected, since it has a casualty averse strategy and so far, the Arab world is not prepared to act – neither is the UN.
Based on current consumption and stocks, Israel will run out of guided bombs and 155mm artillery shells, as well as interceptor rockets for their Iron Dome anti missile system, even after US replenishment of stocks, within 2 months, which would mean they have to significantly scale down operations in Gaza, particularly if ammunition is needed for a war against Hezbollah. Bombing Gaza has already starting yielding diminishing returns.   

If Hamas believes they won’t last that long, they will look to Hezbollah or the Houthis to escalate. An indicator of collapse would be surrenders, which so far have not been at the level which suggests that Hamas fighters have lost the will to fight (200 surrenders in the past week, as per the IDF).  

Geopolitical factors: The Taiwan elections on 13th Jan, may being the Pro independence, pro US DPP party back to power, which can exacerbate tensions between China and the US.

In the Ukraine war, US and NATO assumptions about Russia were incorrect and it is the Russian army that is resurgent going into the new year. If the US is faced with a confrontation with China over Taiwan, the possibility of a NATO defeat in the Ukraine war and a festering Israel war, there will be increased pressure in the US, to get Israel to agree to a peace deal.