Gaza war (part 3). 100 days of the ground war. An update

100 days into the ground war (excluding the ceasefire after a month of fighting) is a good time to review the assumptions made in the first 2 parts of this series and provide and update on the fighting. As was the case in the first 2 parts of this series. I am not commenting on the moral or political aspects of the conflict, as that has been commented on at length in any number of fora, representing a wide spectrum of opinion. There are however military and military related geopolitical aspects of this war that are inadequately covered, which is a gap I’d like to fill.

The 2 previous posts in this series:
https://rpdeans.blogspot.com/2023/10/what-israeli-invasion-of-gaza-might.html

https://rpdeans.blogspot.com/2023/12/the-gaza-war-by-numbers-2-months-later.html

In my past post, at the end of Dec, I had speculated that brigades from the 36^th and 162^nd division of the IDF would move out for rest and refitting, while being replaced by fresh units. This was based on the high number of officer casualties, damage to tanks and the stress of 2 months of urban combat.

Shortly after that, the IDF announced they would reduce the number of brigades in Gaza by 5, including 3 training formations. The intent was to send home reservists home, given the adverse impact full mobilization was having on the economy and the slackening of the fighting. This was partly correct.  The IDF has 2 training formations, both of which were in Gaza. These were the 828 `Bismalach’ brigade and the 460<sup>th</sup> Armored brigade. These were withdrawn, along with the 3 regular brigades of the 36<sup>th</sup> Division.  The brigades of the 36th Division (the 1<sup>st</sup> `Golani’ infantry with the 7^th and 188 armored brigades) have arguably the best reputation in the IDF, but took high casualties, particularly officers.
I also argued that though the armored units took relatively few casualties, damage to tanks would
make it difficult to sustain operations beyond 2 months.

Three fresh brigades were moved to Gaza in place of the five that were withdrawn. These, based on Israeli press reports, appeared to be the  646 Para (reserve), the 205 Armor and 179 (Onxy) Armored brigades. Elements of the 4^th Armored (Kiryati), which had not featured in the fighting earlier, were also introduced. Thus, Jan saw no real reduction of IDF strength, with 3 regular and 2 training formations being replaced with 3 reserve brigades and elements of a 4^th.

At the end of Jan, 2 more brigades were withdrawn from Gaza. These were the 55 Para and the 5^th (Sharon) infantry brigade, both reserve formations.

The reduction in IDF numbers was probably the result of a drop in IDF casualties in Jan. The IDF reported 55 dead between 31 Dec and 31 Jan, of which 23 were from a single incident. 21 of those killed in that incident, were from the 261 brigade of the Gaza division, which also took several casualties on 7^th Oct. The Gaza division was, on Oct 7, responsible for security around the Gaza perimeter. Poor security and intelligence on their part probably contributed to the events of 7^th Oct and poor tactical awareness, to the ambush in Jan that claimed 21 men. The larger point it raises is about the quality of reserve formations, which is perhaps why 2 reserve brigades were withdrawn, along with the training formations, rather than the regular brigades that have taken significant losses (particularly officers).
The IDF’s 162 division, comprising the Givati brigade (40 dead), The Nahal brigade (33 dead) and the 401 armored (17 dead) should ideally also have been withdrawn due to officer losses and the strain of 100 days of combat.

Of the IDF's 34 brigades (Infantry, Parachute, Armor and training), 26 have so far been involved in the Gaza war.  

The IDF has announced at the end of Jan, the deployment of 3 divisions on the Lebanon border.
the IDF’s northern command comprises 4 divisions. These are:
 The 36^th Division (1^st Golani and 6^th Etzioni (reserve) brigades and the 7^th and 188^th Armored brigades. Given the losses to 3 of these 4 brigades, it will be likely that the 6^th (Etzioni) brigade will also be pulled out of the Gaza fighting and sent to the North.   
The 91st Division has all its 4 brigades on the Lebanon border. However, it is a lower quality division with 2 reserve and 2 territorial brigades.
The 146th Armored division has 5 brigades, all reserve. Parts of the 4^th (Kiryati) armored brigade in Gaza are moving back to the Lebanon border
The 210^th (Territorial) division is also of lower quality (2 reserve and 2 territorial brigades and has the responsibility for the Golan heights facing Syria.

A territorial brigade is a largely skeleton and static formation. It provides the HQ and supporting arms, with reservists familiar with the area, to be filled in by units from other formations assigned to the territorial brigade.  

Any attack into Lebanon (a 8-10 km strip that Israel is trying to get Hezbollah to vacate in ongoing negotiations between the US envoy and Lebanon) would involve at least the 36^th 91^st & 146^th division and would have to wait till the Etzioni brigade is fully redeployed and the other 3 brigades of 36^th division have replaced some of their losses, particularly equipment and officers.

Northern command will also need the commando units that are deployed in Gaza, which lost 46 men, excluding 10 instructors and 5 men of the 11^th (Yiftach) brigade, which is also considered a commando unit. These are high losses for commando units. They will similarly need to redeploy the combat engineering units now in Gaza and replenish stocks of artillery ammunition and bombs, since combat against Hezbollah will consume stocks (at already low levels) at a far higher rate than against Hamas.

Hezbollah’s strength is at least double of Hamas, with more favorable terrain (they can retreat into Lebanon whereas Hamas cannot retreat anywhere), so the IDF will be reluctant to attack with half the strength they deployed against Hamas. It would currently suit the IDF to keep negotiations going before taking a decision to initiate a ground offensive against Hezbollah. It would also give Israel the moral high ground (`we tried diplomacy, it failed'), while neutralizing Hamas’s offensive ability, if not as an organised force. The IDF would also probably need the passage of $ 17 billion of US aid, in order to launch an offensive against Hezbollah.

Violent incidents in the West bank are also increasing and keeping it pacified would probably require 1 or 2 brigades of Central command, now in Gaza, to move back to the West bank. These are the 421 (Ephraim) territorial brigade and possibly the 900 (Kfir) brigade which is a dedicated urban warfare and anti-terrorist brigade that has operated in the West Bank.

Analysis of casualties:  Deaths of Palestinians in Gaza have reduced from approx. 500 per day in Oct and Nov to 200 per day in Dec 100 / day from Jan. The drop in deaths is all the more significant, considering that the quality of medical care available to the wounded would have fallen sharply since the war began. A reason for reduced deaths could be international pressure on Israel to reduce civilian casualties, along with the case for genocide against Israel that the ICJ has ruled they would hear. The sharply reduced death toll raises the question of weather this could have been done at the outset, which would have helped Israel’s image internationally.

A large proportion of IDF casualties have been combat engineers, who were tasked with neutralizing tunnels and booby traps. Excluding the ambush that killed 21 men, there were just 12 deaths in the infantry in Jan (the combat arm that typically takes most losses in urban combat). 
There were periods of 5-6 consecutive days with no IDF deaths reported. From 23 Jan to 8^th Feb, the IDF lost just 6 men.

In my previous Gaza post, I had suggested that the IDF claim of killing 7-8000 Hamas men by Dec was inflated, as that would mean the end of Hamas (assuming a 1:2 ratio of killed to seriously wounded).

A US estimate, made public on 21^st Jan, estimated that the IDF had killed 20-30% of Hamas fighters with a similar percentage of tunnels destroyed. Assuming 25,000 fighters from Hamas and allied groups, with a dead to seriously wounded ratio of (conservatively) 1:1, it would mean most of Hamas has been neutralised. I had earlier assumed a 1:2 ratio of Hamas killed to wounded, but a sharply declining quality of medical care for the wounded, would reduce this ratio closer to 1:1.
This would mean at least 60% of Hamas fighters (15,000 of 25,000) neutralised.
The IDF ratio is 1 killed to 10 wounded ( or 1 killed : 5-6 seriously wounded), given the IDFs far superior medical care and the speed with which casualties are evacuated by helicopter to hospitals.

In situations where the defending side has lost over half its force, either the reminder (the best fighters who have survived a ruthless Darwinian process) fight harder and to the death, or, if the IDF has focused on the main centers of resistance and Hamas command and control, the remaining fighters
lose heart and either surrender, or go back into the civilian population, emerging to carry out sporadic guerrilla warfare. 
More significantly, leaving out Oct 7, the kill ratio is 30:1 in favor of the IDF, which is as good, or better than what they have achieved in the past against Hamas and Hezbollah.     

Thus Jan has seen the IDF meet 3 of its likely objectives:
- A sharp decline in Gaza’s civilian casualties from 500 to 100 per day.
- IDF losses are now at a `manageable’ level (3 per week) similar to other limited actions in Gaza or
  the West bank in the past.
- Organized resistance has reduced enough for the IDF to start transferring units to the Lebanon
  border for a possible offensive against Hezbollah.

IDF operations in Jan are similar to what one has come to expect from the IDF in the past - intelligence led surgical operations, involving fewer men, against a specific target. I believe the IDF has recovered from the intelligence failure of 7th October and and modified their tactics after their sledgehammer approach in the first few weeks of the war.  

Throughout Jan, despite intensified attacks, the IDF lost just 1 man (from the border protection corps) to Hezbollah, despite Hezbollah’s intensified shelling and rocket attacks and the loss of possibly 100 men in IDF strikes in Lebanon and Syria, including their leaders. If Hezbollah is unable to do more, even when Hamas is facing defeat, their bluff would be called. It would be a strategic victory for Israel, though that could change if Israel decides on a ground offensive against Hezbollah, as they did in 2006, with the intention of pushing Hezbollah behind a security zone, 8-10 km north of the border, which would mean Hezbollah loses their network of tunnels on the border with Israel. An indication for a possible ground war, would be the transfer of another division from Gaza to the Lebanon border.

The IDF’s 162 division, comprises the regular Nahal and Givati infantry brigades and the 401 Armored, all of which have taken losses in Gaza after 100 days of combat. All 3 brigades are in need of rest and rebuilding. The 4^th brigade of that division, the 5^th reserve (Sharon) brigade has already been withdrawn from Gaza. This division might be moved north in March, as a precursor to an offensive against Hezbollah.
Alternately, A division that might be moved to the North instead of the 162^nd, is the 252 (Reserve) division, which comprises the 10^th and 14^th Armored brigades and the 12^th (Negev) and 16^th (Jerusalem) brigades. This division is relatively fresh, having lost 11 men across its 4 brigades.   

The Houthis: The Houthi threat to attack shipping in the Red sea, is a classic example of asymmetrical warfare.  It does not matter if the Houthis do not sink any ship. The attacks on merchant ships – at very little cost to the Houthis have forces Western countries and Israel to divert shipping along a more costly Cape route – while Chinese and Russian shipping is unaffected. In particular, the rerouting of Qatari gas to Europe, coupled with a reduction in the supply of US gas (from Texas) to Europe, will be inflationary. Even the shooting down of Houthi drones by the US and UK navies isn’t really a victory since the drones cost less and the Houthis probably have a larger quantity than the missiles used to intercept them. That is also the problem with the bombing campaign against the Houthis – like in Afghanistan, the cost of the bombs/missiles are more than what they are destroying.

The diversion of US flagged merchant ships carrying cargo to Israel, away from the Red sea, despite being escorted by the US Navy, implies that the USN could not keep international shipping routes safe, even to transport military cargo for its ally. This would have implications for any future Chinese blockade of Taiwan. Keeping the sea lanes safe is the function of the USN and its failure to do so, will be a strategic defeat if this is not a one off incident.  

The fact that one of the Houthi missiles (of an older and more crude design than Iranian and Russian anti-ship missiles) got past the Aegis missile defense system of a US warship and was shot down by the close-in weapon system (CIWS) of the ship, only seconds before impact, would be a matter of concern.

If the Houthis fail to damage more ships and the confidence of shippers using the red sea is restored, the Houthis will no longer be  threat, particularly because Egypt and Qatar will be the biggest losers – the first from loss of revenue from the Suez Canal, the latter from reduced gas demand and both will put pressure on Iran to rein in their proxy.

Attacks on US bases in Syria and Iraq The US bases in Iraq and Syria are too small to defend against a large organized attack, or to support each other. If these bases are shut – which means a US withdrawal from 2 countries in the Middle East, it would be a strategic defeat for the Biden administration, particularly given the circumstances in which the US left Afghanistan. It would not be a US defeat, since those bases are not vital to US national security and a new administration may well close them down. If however, the bases remain, against the wishes of the Iraqi and Syrian governments and despite several attacks by Iranian proxies, it will be a defeat for Iran, which has also been unable to retaliate against the deaths of several men of the revolutionary guard working with their Syrian and Hezbollah proxies and killed in US and Israeli strikes.  

What to look for in March: 
1. Ceasefire in Gaza: Hamas currently wants it more than Israel. My sense is the IDF will wait till Hamas is further degraded, declare victory and then agree to a ceasefire and resume operations if all the hostages are not returned (several are believed to be dead).

2. Possible ground operations against Hezbollah, after a Gaza ceasefire and if Hezbollah refuses, in ongoing talks, to withdraw away from the Israel border. Indicators would be the movement an additional division (3-4 brigades) from Gaza to Lebanon and the approval of a $ 17 billion Israel aid package from the US.

3. Further attacks on US bases in Syria and Iraq, or an agreement to withdraw them from Iraq. If neither happens it would be viewed as an Iranian failure to project power through its proxies, particularly given Hezbollah’s lack of any meaningful attack on Israel, even when Hamas faces defeat.

4. A Houthi attempt to up the ante in the Red sea, by more intense attacks on warships, or cutting undersea cables (less likely as it will affect neutral countries). Failure to do this, would again represent a defeat for Iran.

Israel cannot however, continue a war indefinitely, due to the economic cost. Israel's GDP fell 20% in the last quarter of 2023 (more than forecast). Israel has budgeted US$ 14 billion for the war in 2024
but at the current rate, they will exhaust that amount in April. Israel's central bank has estimated a cost of $ 53 billion from 2024 to the end of 2025.