Ukraine war part 7 - After 2 years
In part 6 of this series, I had made 2 major sets of assumptions:
https://rpdeans.blogspot.com/2023/10/ukraine-war-6-logistics-politics-and.html
Manpower: Ukraine had deployed all its trained
manpower and all volunteers (1 million), to be left with an army of around
500,000 men, which is lower than Russia’s and of worse quality &
Plans: Russia would conduct several small attacks across the front –
most likely in Avdeevka, giving the Ukrainians a choice of either defending and
accepting an unfavorable casualty ratio, or giving up ground.
These assumptions were correct. Russian operations,
particularly the capture of Avdeevka have exacerbated Ukraine’s manpower
problems and worsened loss ratios.
Trends in losses: What is significant with the
current manpower numbers, is that they have, in my view, crossed a tipping
point for Ukraine and have moved loss ratios more sharply in favor of Russia.
This is inevitable if the bulk of the Ukrainian army now consists of
conscripted men with no prior military experience, whereas the Russian army has
experienced volunteers (who are 10 years younger on average) and a 3:1
advantage in firepower – the weight of artillery shells and bombs being thrown
against the enemy.
Mediazona (a joint venture between an Anti-Russia NGO and the BBC, to track
Russian losses based on obituaries, social media posts and funerals, is now
acknowledged even by the Pentagon to be accurate and the longer it operates,
the more `missing’ deaths it includes. I had suggested in an earlier post,
several months ago that Mediazona covers 2/3rd of all losses. I
believe it would now be 90% of Russian dead.
https://rpdeans.blogspot.com/2023/09/ukraine-war-part-5-how-russia-fights.html
As per Mediazona, between 02 Jan and 20TH May
2023, when the battle of Bakhmut took place, the Russian army lost 13648
confirmed dead, across all sectors of the front, or 99 men killed per
day.
The bulk of the fighting though was for the city of Bakhmut and most of the
dead were former convicts assigned to the Wagner group.
From 20 May to 9 Oct (coinciding with Ukraine’s counter-offensive), Russia lost 60
men per day.
Between 27 Sept 23 and 15 Feb ‘24, for a similar time period as the battle for Balkhmut, when most of the
fighting took place for the city of Avdeevka, the Russians lost 6926 dead, or 51
per day, though Russia was on the offensive against Ukraine’s most heavily
defended position and would be expected to take higher casualties.
Ukraine has been suffering (as per Russian MOD reports, which increasingly
match western observers, or accounts of Ukrainian units) 1000 irrecoverable
losses per day since 1 Feb. This would conservatively amount to 330 dead
per day, assuming the same ratio of 1 killed to 2 seriously wounded as Russia
(though in reality Ukraine, with worse medical evacuation, would have a poorer
killed : seriously wounded ratio). In 2022, Ukraine’s losses were an estimated 137
dead per day, increasing to 237 per day in 2023.
There is a study similar to Mediazona which attempts to
estimate Ukrainian losses, though not publicized, as it shows far higher losses
than the 31,000 stated by President Zelensky, or the 125,000 estimated by the
US. The New York times quoted US officials in Aug 23 – before the casualties in
Ukraine’s counter offensive were known) as having 70,000 dead, which should
have doubled since then. This study showed 175000 dead Ukrainian soldiers and was consistent with
similar data on:
- Satellite imagery of cemeteries &
- Accounts of losses from individual units. &
- Estimate of dead based on surveys (do you know someone who was killed) validated during Covid.
The Russian MOD has a figure of 466535 irrecoverable Ukrainian casualties as of
22 Mar (Dead, Seriously wounded and prisoner). If desertions and missing are
added, it would be 500,000 casualties. Assuming 2 seriously wounded for
each person killed (though the Russian figure is closer to 1), which would mean
about 160,000 killed – that's more conservative than other estimates made with some
rigor. The number of dead is moot, what matters is irrecoverable casualties. Some
Pro Russian sources claim 466,000 is the number killed. This cannot be true as
it would mean over a million total casualties, or the disappearance of the
Ukrainian army.
Thus - Russian casualties which were 330 killed per day for
the first 10 weeks of the war, have reduced to 51 / day in 2024, while
Ukrainian dead increased from 137/day in 2022 to (conservatively) 330/
day in 2024. Hardware losses have a similar trend.
The loss ratio has moved from 2.5: 1 in Ukraine’s favor to 1 : 6 in Russia’s
favor.
While this is at best an educated data based guess, what matters is not the exact number, but the way in which the casualty ratio has been changing
A point I have been making from the beginning of this series
of articles, is that the West has been making assumptions of Russian strength,
based on the loss ratio of the first few weeks of the war.
Those assumptions might be the biggest miscalculation of the war.
There is a similar trend for Russian tank and aircraft losses, which confirms the trend in manpower losses. The number of destroyed tanks are large enough to make inferences about trends. From Russian losses of 8.6 tanks per day in the first 10 weeks of the war, Russia averaged losses of just 3 per day throughout 2023 and under 2 per day in 2024. The trend is similar both for sites like Oryx and the Ukraine MoD.
Russian manpower and new units in Ukraine 2024. Russia
began the special military operation with 190000 men, which increased to
360,000 by the end of 2022, to 410,000 in June 23 (at the time of the Ukraine
counter offensive) and 470,000 in Dec 2023. Including troops in the `deep rear’
of the Ukraine theatre, there were 617,000 men of the Russian armed forces
deployed against Ukraine at the end of 2023.
From Feb 22, to Dec 23 the Russian armed forces increased in size from 900,000
men to 1,150,000 men. Although Russia plans to increase the armed forces to 1.5 million, the
sanctioned plan is for a total of 1.32 million, or 170,000 more men, to be
recruited from Dec 23 onwards. Russia currently has 1000 men volunteering for
service each day (most are former conscripts with military experience) and can
train and arm 130,000 every 6 months. This is in addition to conscription,
which has 260000 men being conscripted each year (130,000 every 6 months).
About a third – 80-90,000 of the 260,000 conscripts might volunteer to be
contract soldiers.
The 250,000 increase in Russian manpower came from
mobilization of 300,000 men and 480,000 volunteers. From this 780,000 men, must
be excluded the replacement of 150000 casualties (50,000 killed and 100,000
wounded) by Dec 23, 180,000 men who have completed their contracted service and
not reenlisting and 200,000 men who have reenlisted as volunteers.
The manpower target of a further 170,000 would come from the current rate of
volunteering and would mean 130,000 men in the army, who can be trained and equipped
in 6 months. Regular conscription (with conscripts terms of service extended by
a year) would more than make up for an expected 50,000
irrecoverable casualties in 2024.
By July 2024, (or a little later, since Russian recruitment centers report 85%
of their recruitment target is being met) the Russian army would have peaked in
strength. Based on current losses, Russian armaments production would be able
to replace losses and keep Russian combat units (600,000 strong) at normal
strength. Russia can potentially recruit more men (my figures assume 90,000 of
260,000 graduating conscripts are retained as contract soldiers and 50,000 will
replace casualties of 2024) but
will not be able to adequately equip them.
If equipment were available, there would be difficulty supplying a bigger force
than 600,000 due to shortages of trucks and vulnerability of depots to long
range missiles, as I explained in my previous post.
Any further increase in the strength of the army, or diversion of more trucks
and trains, will hurt the domestic economy, which is running at full employment
and has a shortage of workers for armaments plants- which have also increased
their manning by an estimated 1 million workers since the war began.
The increased Russian strength, can be verified from the new
units being raised. Since 2023, Russia has raised 3 new Motorized Rifle
divisions (MRD), upgraded 7 Motor rifle brigades to Divisions, upgraded
2 Airborne brigades to Airborne Divisions and 1 Naval infantry brigade to a Division.
There was also the announcement of a river flotilla to be formed by the end of
2024, which may suggest an operation to cross the Dnieper in 2025.
This is the equivalent of 30 new brigades, achieved by adding around 400,000
men (an increase of 420,000 men less 20,000 assumed to go to the air force or
Navy). It is also believed that there would be at least 2 new brigades to
strengthen the newly created Leningrad military district, to man a now hostile
border with Finland and an increased NATO presence in the Baltics. These 2
brigades may form the nucleus of 2 divisions (by keeping the 2 of the brigades
in each division as a shell, to be filled by reserves or conscripts in war and
hardware in storage).
Russia has also formed a new Air corps, suggesting that it has increased the
number of combat aircraft in active service, since the war started – possibly
by recalling mothballed SU-25/ 27s, or the TU-22, to form a new attack
regiment.
In my previous post, I had suggested that the number of new brigades would be
26, along with a new
army corps (which is typically 6-7 brigades). This corresponds to the recent
announcement.
Compared to the 32 new brigades from 400,000 men in the Russian army, the US army with 483000 men has
31 brigades. While Russian Brigades have hitherto been smaller than a US
Brigade combat team, all Russian brigades now have an increase in manpower,
from more drone operators, anti-drone units and combat engineers per brigade.
There were recent western reports (quoting the CIA) that
suggested that Russia had so far had 85% of its pre-invasion force as
casualties and (separately) that Russia had 315,000 casualties.
The 315,000 casualties at the beginning of 2024, referred to
killed and all wounded. However, modern armies have a killed : wounded ratio of
1 : 6 In the current Israel Hamas war,
the Israeli army – whose casualty
details I believe to be credible, listed 590 dead and 3069 wounded from 7 Oct
to 14 March – a
ratio of 1: 5.2 dead to wounded. The ratio of 5.2 refers to hospital admission.
1294 (or just over 2 wounded for every one kill), would be irrecoverably wounded
for Israel.
The US in Afghanistan reported 8.6 wounded for every killed, though these were
`all wounded’, not hospital admissions.
Russian figures suggest more than 2/3rd of the wounded return to
active duty. Hence, with 50,000
killed in the beginning of 2024, it was quite plausible to have 250,000 injured
(of which 100,000 will be irreplaceable). The Russian invasion force in Feb 2022, was
190,000 men and Russian irreplaceable losses are roughly 85% of that.
Ukrainian manpower: I had suggested that Ukraine had deployed 1 million
soldiers, which represented all its trained manpower. This has now been
confirmed by Ukraine. Almost all these were volunteers, or mobilized men who
did not evade military service. I had
suggested that the combat strength of the army was 200,000 with another 200,000
in support units and 100,000 in armed paramilitary units.
A recent audit ordered by the new Army chief showed that the total number of
men remaining in all combat units was 300,000 with 100,000 in the deep rear and
100,000 in para-military units. Therefore there is an irrecoverable loss of
500,000 men. It has also been confirmed that there are no fresh volunteers, nor
significant number of non-mobilized men in Ukraine, in the 18-27 age group. The
Ukrainian general staff had also said they need to recruit a minimum of 20,000
men a month just to replace losses (this was before losses increased from Mid
Jan 22), with a total of 500,000 to be recruited in 2024, to match Russian
manpower levels. This matches my estimate.
Ukraine’s manpower problems will be exacerbated by a delay in funding from the US, which alone can provide make up some of the gap in artillery shells and replace anti-aircraft missiles and launchers. Ukraine would have exhausted its stock of artillery shells by April 24, if not for a Czech led initiative to purchase 800,000 old shells from non-EU countries. Assuming that the deal is done and all those shells are available, the supply would be expected from July and last few months. However, even with these shells, the quality of which is uncertain, Ukraine lacks sufficient guns (since the more numerous Soviet era guns use 152 and not 155 mm shells) and the guns that are available have barrels that are worn out, reducing both range and accuracy.
I have got negative feedback from pro Ukrainian individuals suggesting that I have overstated losses for Ukraine and underplayed it for Russia. In all major wars for the last 100 years between peer opponents,
artillery caused over 2/3rd of casualties. By Ukraine's own admission, the Russian advantage in artillery (or the weight of explosive fired at the opponent) has been a multiple of Ukraine's. Other things being equal, casualties will be in the same ratio. Where Russia has improved since 2023 (as acknowledged by leading think tanks like the RUSI) is in the following:
- More accurate fire, guided by drones (as opposed to saturating an area with a large number of shells)
- Reduction in time between observing a target and destroying it (from hours to minutes).
- More counter battery radars and more precision guided shells used by Russia.
All these have moved the ratio of casualties caused by artillery more in favor of Russia.
A review of Winter operations:
I had suggested in my last post in Oct, that I believe Russia will
look at a limited offensive in multiple sectors (rather than a `big arrow’
armored fist).
Specifically, Russia will attempt to advance in 4 areas in the winter.
- The North.
- Avdeevka
- Reaching the Oskol & Severodonetsk river lines (capturing Kupiansk) &
- Crossing the Dnieper.
At the same time, Ukraine attempted to conduct an offensive
in 2 areas, which they should, in retrospect
have not attempted after Oct (when I wrote my last Ukraine post).
- Attacking on the flanks of Bakhmut to try and regain the city.
- Expand their bridgehead across the Dnieper (Krimki)
Most of the winter fighting was centered around Avdeevka.
This was Ukraine’s strongest position along the entire front, which had been
fortified over 8 years. As indicated earlier by the Russian casualty figures,
When capturing Avdeevka, Russia took a tougher position than Bakhmut, taking
fewer casualties.
Going by the number of brigades committed, Ukraine took roughly the same number
of losses defending each town (about 30,000 irrecoverable), but the retreat
from Avdeevka was more chaotic, with more prisoners taken and Russia was able
to push west of the town. The difference (based on accounts from both sides)
was the use of FAB glide bombs by Russia – something I said in earlier posts
would be a game changer and an artillery exchange ratio more in Russia’s favor and possibly a poorer
quality of Ukrainian troops – only 2 of the Ukrainian brigades (47th
Mechanized and 3 `Azov’) were believed to be of NATO standard, with the Azov
leaving their positions without orders. Just like Bakhmut a year earlier, the
defense of Avdeevka became a matter of prestige for Ukraine – like Stalingrad,
it sucked in troops from both sides, but unlike Stalingrad, it was the
defending side that lost more men and the city, in situation where Ukraine could not afford to
lose the city or the manpower.
My previous post speculated that along with Avdeevka,
Marinka and Pervomaiskie (1st May) could also be attacked and
occupied. Marinka was captured, as is most of Pervomaiskie, in both cases
resulting in an adverse casualty ratio for Ukraine.
Russia did not attempt to cross the Dnieper, because Ukraine
continued to maintain a bridgehead – albeit at high cost, on the Russian (west)
bank of the Dnieper, in the village of Krymki. However, the Ukrainian
occupation of Krymki has decimated Ukraine’s high quality marine brigades –
sent to the relatively quiet Kherson sector last year, after sustaining heavy
casualties in the summer counter offensive. Their weakened condition may have
led Russia to making its first heavy raid across the Dnieper, since their
retreat across the river in Nov 22.
Russia has not, contrary to what I assumed, undertaken even
a limited offensive in the North. However, Ukraine twice attempted an offensive
into Russia – the 2nd instance is the ongoing (at the time of
writing this in Mid-March 2024) brigade sized operation, which was aimed at
seizing territory at the time of the Russian Presidential elections and
possibly seizing a nuclear weapons base. Given the high casualties sustained by
Ukraine in this operation (where there is more evidence than just the Russian
MOD’s announcement), it’s possible that Russia may not attempt to create a
buffer zone in the North, to protect their towns from Ukrainian shelling and
drones and threaten Kharkov and Sumy. It would force Ukraine to deploy their
already stretched forces to defend these cities.
The North East sector (Along the Oskol river) from Kupiansk
to Liman has also been quiet as far as changes to the map go. However, there is
a large Russian force attempting to grind down the defending Ukrainians east of
the river in tough fighting over the last 6 months. The dilemma for Ukraine is
similar to what they face along the entire front – they can concede some
territory and move to a more defensible line along the Oskol, or Severo Donetsk
river (which they occupied till their Sept 22 offensive), or defend their
current positions and accept a worsening loss ratio. This is a sector where
Ukraine does have a defensible fall back position, unlike the rest of the
front, where it will be a lot more difficult for Ukraine to defend, once
Russian breaks through their current positions, as they have done in
Avdeevka.
Though Russia has a superiority in manpower (both quality
and quantity) and firepower, it is just a 2:1 superiority in numbers and a
little more in firepower. This is not sufficient to break through a defensive
line, in a situation where there is no surprise – the location of every Russian
unit from platoon level upwards is monitored by NATO in real time and by
Ukraine through drones. Any concentration of force for an offensive will be hit
by drones or artillery. Armored vehicles are very vulnerable to ATGMs and
drones and a heavy concentration of SAM’s rules out close air support.
It has to be said that though Ukraine is sustaining higher
casualties (which would imply that units are at breaking point), there is no
evidence of their units collapsing, or mass surrenders, or any loss in fighting
spirit when defending positions – even against heavy artillery that can destroy
a unit’s will to fight.
What high casualties seem to have cost Ukraine, is the ability to conduct a
successful offensive (the last one was in Oct 22) or even successful local
counter-attacks. A poorer quality of officers and NCOs and less experienced men
will lead to higher casualties than the unit would have sustained with the same
quality of manpower they started war with. It is a situation roughly similar to
the German army on the Western front in 1944, where, though depleted,
inexperienced and lacking equipment, they matched the tactical skills and
morale of the attacking American and British forces and inflicted heavier
casualties, until just before their final collapse.
Thus, if Russia has to achieve its objectives without heavy
casualties, it has to follow, (as is currently the case) `slow attrition’,
where small units – sometimes platoon level, conduct constant attacks at
multiple points, with reserves of manpower and artillery brought up just before
the attack to ensure enough numerical superiority for a limited advance. If
they fail to take a position, they try somewhere else, while pinning down the
defenders in the position they tried to capture and later bringing in fresh
units to attack the same position, which will have manpower that is more
depleted and tired, with losses of officers and experienced NCO’s making them
incapable of offensive action, or coordination with other units – as we are
increasingly starting to see. in an environment were there is no surprise, a `big arrow' offensive with masses of mechanized forces will be the fastest way for Russia to lose their numerical edge. They might do that when Ukraine is no longer capable of resisting, but that time has not come, since Ukrainian forces across the front are fighting fiercely, There have not been any mass surrenders (the largest was 18 men), or collapse of any unit when retreating.
The largest tank action by Russia in 2024, involved just 35 tanks. An offensive along the same frontage in the same area in WW2 (the tank battles in Kursk and Ukraine) involved armored forces
10 times larger.
There is an example of this kind of warfare in Russian ,military history - the Brusilov offensive of 1916,
or the fighting on the Eastern front for most of the time from the winter of 1943 onwards, where there was no `quiet' section of the front for the Germans and their capability against the Red army - in quality and quantity of manpower and in firepower steadily eroded.
Along with a creeping offensive along the front, Russia has started serious attacks on the electricity system of Ukraine. When these were first attempted over a year ago, it failed, partly because Ukraine's installed power capacity was far greater than consumption (with consumption falling as industrial output dropped), Ukrainian air defenses were strong (reducing the number of missiles or drones that could get through) and the number of missiles Russia had was limited. It appear though that the earlier exercise gave Russia the opportunity to see how Ukraine would react to an attack on its power grid and exploit its vulnerabilities. What will hit Ukraine is not just shortages of power, but spikes and sharp voltage fluctuations that can damage equipment.
Weapon systems:
One weapon system which had made a difference is `guided
glide bombs’ used by Russia. These are conventional bombs with a GPS kit and
fins, which enable it to be launched from beyond the range of most Ukrainian
SAMs. Russia fired 3600 of these in the first 10 weeks of 2024, which is a 16
fold increase from the number dropped in 2023. Western reports suggested that
Russia was running out of precision missiles as early as Mar 22 (a month into
the Ukraine war). However, Russia fired more missiles in the first 3 weeks of
Mar 2024 compared to the monthly average of 2022. A variant of
these glide bombs is the FAB or Fuel Air bomb.
There is a corresponding increase in the anti-aircraft missile launchers
knocked out by Russia and a reduction in the number of anti-aircraft missiles
available to Ukraine. Thus, from the spring of 2024, Russia will not only have
a much larger degree of air superiority, but the means to exploit it through
glide bombs and drones.
While Ukraine took a lead in the production of FPV drones, with Russian forces
using them only from June 2023, Russia is now producing significantly more
drones and recorded drone hits have increased 3 fold, in Feb 2024 compared to
Sept 23.
One weapon system that did not make any difference was the brief appearance of the M1 Abrams tank.
Their deployment was preceded by reports that confirmed what people familiar with armored warfare felt - that the tank was too complicated for newbies to operate, particularly when a complex maintenance system was unavailable, The heat from its engine would also show up more prominently
to sensors. There were reports of frequent breakdowns. In their first encounter after the battle of Avdeevka, 4 were destroyed, in a week, incl. one by a supposedly much inferior T-72 without making any difference even at a platoon level encounter. 2 more tanks built on the M-1 chassis were also destroyed. There was a video of a British Challenger tank sinking in the mud in its first appearance after one (or 2) were destroyed year in their first appearance. Coupled with that were reports in the German media that none of the Leopard-2 tanks supplied to Ukraine remained in fighting condition.
For Russia, what should be of concern is the shortage of AWAC aircraft, given losses to the A-50, delays in deploying the A-100 or using the older Il-22. The Russian air force is using Mig-31s as a stopgap solution, which may work, as long as they do not face a real air force - given that Ukraine has only a handful of operational aircraft. The other problem is their use of long range precision missiles is more than production, depleting stocks - though Western reports from as early as Mar 22 that Russia was about to run out of missiles were grossly inaccurate.
I had speculated that North Korea would supply a million 152mm shells in 2023. The actual number is believed to be higher - some reports suggest 3 million, but that may include 122mm shells and MLRS rockets. While NATO shells under ideal conditions are a lot better than those from North Korea (or Russia), ideal conditions do not exist on the Ukrainian battlefield. NATO supplied shells cost exponentially more (the cost increasing as the war has progressed) because they are over engineered and less suitable for an attritional war where soldiers will be increasingly less trained and maintenance more inadequate. A NATO supplied 155mm shell which cost 3 times more than a Russian 152mm shell in 2022, now costs 8 times more.
A significant development in the last few months (since my last post) has been Russia’s ability to launch precision strikes at temporary deployment points of the Ukrainian armed forces – e.g. at Patriot (SAM) or HIMARS (MLRS)) launchers or at a meeting place with senior officers. Earlier these strikes were mostly at fixed targets. This represents a big improvement, both in intelligence gathering and the time lag between getting information and that location being attacked. The better real time intelligence I would assume, comes from Russian `Spetznaz’ units who are operating more effectively behind enemy lines (there are videos of their activity in the Russian media) or Ukraine based partisans, particularly in the ethnically `Russian’ cities of Odessa or Kharkov.
There is correspondingly a reduction in the number of
precision strikes made inside Russia, by Ukrainian drones or missiles against
fixed targets (none against moving targets, except for one against a ship of
the Black sea fleet which was overwhelmed by a swarm attack) , despite better
coverage of Russia by NATO space based assets, because, in my view, several
launch platforms have been destroyed, or the supply of long range missiles
limited and a larger number of drones are either show down or neutralized by
electronic warfare.
Given Ukraine’s depleted manpower and ammunition stocks,
there is a window of opportunity for Russia, between April and July, to conduct
more aggressive operations, before Ukraine gets a fresh supply of shells and
fresh recruits. If Ukraine’s mobilization bill (stalled since Jan) is passed
and implemented immediately, new recruits will appear on the battlefield in
July. While April is the `mud season’ in Ukraine, most of the current fighting
is in semi urban areas and advances are limited to a few hundred meters a day,
so muddy roads would not affect an advance.
My prediction is for a Russian offensive, starting at the
end of April or early May, of greater intensity than in the winter, with these
objectives:
1. North: Create a buffer zone to protect Belgorod and the Kursk region.
This can be done by a Russian advance from the north, upto 10km, in the area
between Kharkiv and Sumy – a approx. 100km wide front and a depth of 10km. This
would push Ukrainian artillery and drones out of the range of Russian cities
and force Ukraine to deploy forces to defend both cities. Once deployed, it is
easier to switch Russian units than Ukrainian, because of a better road and
rail network on the Russian side and the
vulnerability of the Ukrainian side to air strikes (with a lot of their SAM
cover depleted).
2.North West: Advance upto the Oskol river, to the
line Kupiansk, Oskil, Lyman, or, if the Ukrainian forces collapse, reach the
Severo-Donetsk river, which was the original line Russian occupied till Sept
2023. The Russian objective will be to regain Kupiansk or Izyum as a rail
logistics hub, while threatening Kharkov from the East and Slavyansk-Kramatorsk
(the last major Ukrainian occupied city in the Donbass region). from the North.
3. West: There are 3 distinct axis that Russia can
advance into and I expect them to attempt all 3, exploiting whatever defensive
line breaks (while forcing Ukraine to accept an adverse casualty ratio even if a
line holds). This is illustrated in the map.
- From Marinka: Advance south towards Vuledar, forcing Ukraine to
retreat from that town and the entire salient east of Vuledar. The capture of
Vuledar (where Russia suffered losses trying unsuccessfully to capture it
earlier) will boost Russian morale and secure the South Donbass and new rail
line to Melitopol and Crimea. The Ukrainian logistics hub of Kurakhove is just
5km west from Marinka and will also be threatened. The loss of Kurakhove can
unhinge the whole Ukrainian line in the South. Ukraine will have to retreat
from the Vuledar salient to protect Kurakhove, or risk losing both.
- From Bakhmut: Advance towards Chasiv Yar and capture it, or bypass it and
advance towards the
logistic hub of Kostyantynivka. If Kostyantynivka is taken, Russia can move
south, in conjunction with
forces moving north from Avdiivka, to encircle the heavily fortified area of
Toretsk- Niu York.
- From Avdiivka: North to link up with a southern thrust from Bakhmut
and cut off the Toretsk- Niu York agglomeration, while also pushing the line
West, to secure Donetsk against artillery and drone strikes and threaten both
Kurakhove and Ukraine’s logistics hub at Pokrovske
4. South: (see map) A series of short advances to recover the territory
lost in Ukraine’s 2023 summer offensive – most of which is the Rabotino-
Verboye salient which will badly affect Ukrainian morale.
The next objective would be to attack the logistics and transport hubs that
sustain the Ukrainian presence along the front – The towns of Orikhiv,
Hulaiypole, Velyka Novosilka and Vuledar. This will
secure the land bridge to Crimea, prevent a repeat of Ukraine’s counter
offensive and create jumping off
positions to advance towards the town of Pokrovske (the main Ukrainian hub for
the region) and threaten the city of Zaporozhe.
The increased flow of the Dnieper river in spring and summer
makes it much wider and precludes either side from crossing it till Autumn
(neither side has the resources to do so as well).
As the map will illustrate, all these potential offensives
are linked. If any of them succeed, it will force Ukraine to reorient forces
across the entire front, taking losses whenever
a large force has to move, without defense against aircraft and under
observation by drones.
A word about the Russian presidential elections. While I do
not like to comment on politics, the election result makes an important point
about national will and morale.
There has been widespread criticism in the West that the election was rigged,
or illegitimate. It is true that the Russian system has not enabled serious
opposition to President Putin. The Levada center, which is an independent
polling center, funded by the US Govt and tracks Putin’s approval rating, measured that rating to be 86% before the
election. He got 87% of the vote in the election, which suggests that the
election correctly reflected the choice of voters.
Putin’s approval rating which was 60% in June 2020 and 69% at the start of the
special military operation in Feb 22, has risen to 86% in Feb 24. Other polls which measure support for the
war, also showed a similar increase. The
overwhelming view in Russia is that they are fighting an existentialist war
against NATO (as opposed to a police action in Ukraine, which many thought to
be the case in Feb 22).
Approval of Putin’s conduct of the war (which was the issue which mattered in
thus election) also increased from 60% in Feb 22, to 72% in Feb 24 (those who
disapprove, want a harder stance against Ukraine), so a more liberal candidate
would have fared worse than President Putin. Approval of the Govt also rose
from 55% to 72% which to me indicates
that a lot of inefficiencies that have affected the quality of life of Russians
and the functioning of the military have been addressed. This level of support
for Putin and the war, was before the Ukrainian attack on Belgorod and
targeting of civilians and the terrorist attack in Moscow on 22 March.
(Update: In the 10 days following Mar 22, the number of Russian volunteers accepted into the military
rose from 1000/day to 1600 /day).
The West’s choice to oppose Putin, Alexy Navalny, who died in prison, would
have got less than 10% of the vote if he had been a hypothetical candidate. At
the peak of his popularity, when he stood for election as Moscow’s mayor (where
his support base is), he got 28% of the vote with a turnout of less than 35%.
The assumption of NATO when advising Ukraine to reject a
possible peace deal in Mar 22, was that Russia would collapse in a few months,
due to a combination of sanctions and hardware manpower and territorial losses
on the battlefield, leading to a people’s revolt sponsored by Oligarchs and the
West– as it happened in Ukraine in 2014. The reality is that the Russian military is
stronger today than in 2022, the war has unified the Russian people and
strengthened Putin to an extent comparable only to the 1941-45 war against
Germany.
Map shows the projected advance for Russia in the North. These are short thrusts, which do not strain Russian logistics across the border. They are designed to, threaten Sumy and Kharkiv, forcing Ukraine to commit resources to defend against a possible attack. An additional thrust from the North East, threatens Kharkov from the East and Kupyansk from the north and would be a base to recapture Izyum, a potential rail hub for Russia.
It also recaptures all of Luhansk and a significant part of Kharkiv districts.
The current front line in blue and the projected finish lines of expected Russian thrusts in Red lines.
From the north: advances from Balhmut intended to either capture Chasiv Yar (cutting the road to Kramatorsk),
or bypassing it and capturing Konstantinovka, then moving south to encircle the Toretsk, Nu-York region, in conjunction
with a northern thrust from Avdeevka.
From Marinka, either advance south to attack Vuledar from the south and cut off a salient east of Vuledar, or attempt
a bigger envelopment.
WOW - found this through reddit. Really thorough and well presented. Keep up your the fantastic work!
ReplyDeleteThanks !
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