The Iran war - Timelines to follow

I have worked in Iran and done business with Israel. I know people in both countries and won't take sides, or discuss the politics of the conflict. I think this war should not have started if the leadership of each country worked in their country's interest. The irrationality around some of the decision making makes this conflict scary, while being of interest to a dispassionate observer like me.

A lot has been written on the ongoing war, examining subjects from military operations, oil supplies and political analysis – with analysts of all ideological biases weighing in. However, I don’t think enough has been written about the timelines and compulsions for each side - which in my view will determine how this conflict will be fought and end. This article looks at disparate factors that will influence the conflict.

Weapon stocks: There are three variables, all of which point to the current war – waged by missiles and drones from long range lasting for no more than a month.

Patriot and THAAD missile stocks are at an all-time low. It would take several years at current production rates to get to the pre war inventory level. Consumption in the first two days of the war, was estimated to equal annual production ! Israel’s stock of all interceptors is reportedly at a two digit number. Israeli interceptions of ballistic missiles are falling (27% of the last set of missiles got through) as stocks of interceptor missiles are rationed – being used against more serious threats. Stocks in the Gulf countries which had a lower pre war stock and had more missiles fired against them, would be in a worse position.

Before the ceasefire, Iran – after a surge of missiles fired on the first day, reduced the number of missiles and drones fired, but that number increased after a week and had stabilized to about 25 missiles (and around 40 long range drones) a day. With an estimated 1000 ballistic missiles still in stock, Iran can sustain missile attacks for another 30-45 days, which is more than the estimated number of missiles that can intercept. That said, Iran’s missiles are finite, their launchers will have a greater chance of being destroyed over time (use it or lose it) so they have to resume missile & drone firing if the US and Israel break the current ceasefire.

There is also a depletion of missiles that can hit Iran from long range (sea launched Tomahawk and air launched JSAAM missiles). More than half the US and Israel’s pre-war inventory of long range missiles have been depleted. Missile consumption in a single week of this war was more than annual production. If the ceasefire ends, the US and Israel will, in a few days, have to attack using shorter range weapons, running a higher risk of aircraft being shot down.

A complication with the US & Israel continuing with only an air & missile campaign, apart from the shortage of missiles, is that 11,000 targets in Iran have already been hit and remaining targets are either difficult to locate, or deep underground. The US has lost 24 MQ-9 Reaper drones and 2 MQ-4 high altitude (and high value) Triton drones. Israel is believed to have lost 8 drones. The US also lost
an estimated 15-20 MQ-9 drones in operations against the Houthis. Combined losses are almost 20% of the US drone inventory and has reduced the US & Israeli ability to conduct real time target acquisition and surveillance.

A continuation of the air campaign will bring diminishing returns, deplete the already low stock of
US missiles and cause Iran to retaliate against economic targets in the Gulf states – Oil refineries and pipelines, gas, helium and aluminium plants, power plants, desalination plants etc.

My sense therefore is that if the ceasefire ends and the US & Israel decide to continue the war, after a brief period of missile attacks by each side, if no new ceasefire is forthcoming, there will have to be
a ground operation by the US against Iran. A timeline for this is the impact on the world economy by the continued closure of the strait of Hormuz.

The strait closure. Why the worst is yet to come.
The reduction in the quantity of oil being shipped from ports, by the Gulf states: Feb 2026 vs 1^st half April

Country	Feb 26 (barrels/day)	1^st hf Apr 26 (mb/ day)
Saudi	7.0 million	4.5
Iraq	3.5	0.5
UAE	3.0	1.5
Kuwait	2.2	1.0
Iran	1.5	0.2
Total	17.2 mbd	7.7 mbd

There is a shortage of oil to the extent of 9.5 million barrels per day, due to the closure of the strait.

70% of the Gas export of the Gulf countries comes from Qatar (over 20% global market share), whose gas exports have fallen to almost zero in April, with 17% of its output reduced in the medium term, due to damage to its gas processing plant (which could take 3-4 years to restore). There is a similar shortfall in the supply of helium and fertilizer.

What can worsen this. Saudi oil is currently being diverted be pipeline to the Red sea, from where it
avoids the Persian Gulf route. However, this route can be hit either by drone attacks on the pipeline – which happened once and oil throughput immediately dropped, or the Houthis attacking shipping passing through a similar bottleneck as the Strait of Hormuz – the Bab el-Mandeb strait.

Some of Saudi’s red sea oil can move north through the Suez Canal, bypassing the Bab El-Mandeb, but this route cannot be used by very large tankers (VLCC).

If either the pipeline is hit or the Bab El-Mandeb is blocked, Saudi oil exports can fall by a further 2 million barrels a day.

Attacks on major oil refineries in the Gulf can worsen supplies even if oil output is not reduced, as some export destinations for Gulf oil do not have crude oil refining facilities.

What has prevented a real disruption so far:
Approx. 700 million barrels of Middle east oil are in transit (at sea or in ports). This is between 40-45 days of consumption. About 130 million barrels are Iranian oil, which was sold in March and early April after a US sanctions wavier. This is the reason Iran’s oil exports did not reduce in March 2026 – Iranian oil on ships was allowed to be exported without sanctions. However, fresh shipments from Kharg island to ships reduced to a tenth in April. That is a reason the Iranian economy also cannot survive the US counter blockade of the strait, unless China breaks the blockade AND Iran’s oil export infrastructure remains intact.

Strategic reserves: China, which consumes 17 million barrels a day has a strategic reserve of over 1 billion barrels (capacity is close to 2 billion). Even with a shortfall of 4 million barrels/day, China has stocks for over 8 months. Japan, Korea and India, assuming a similar percentage of oil shortfall have reserves of 3-4 months (India) to 5-6 months (Japan and Korea).

Other producers: Russia and the US have each increased oil exports in Mar and April by 1 million barrels a day. The rest of the world has increased output by about 0.5 million MBD. In theory, Venezuela can also increase output with its existing capacity, by about 0.3-0.5 MBD however it requires investment and the ability of refineries to process its heavy crude (Reliance in India is one such refinery).

India: India’s shortfall of 2.2 MBD from the Persian Gulf was made up in March by Russia (1 million MBD, some diversion of Saudi oil to the Red sea and small quantities sources (e.g. Brazil). There was also a one time purchase (30 day waiver from sanctions) enabling India to purchase Iranian oil at sea.

It has sometimes been suggested that India's strategic reserve of around 130 million barrels is less than a month's consumption (since we consume approx. 5.5 million barrels a day). However, the shortfall from the closure of the Strait of Hormuz is unlikely to be more than 1 MBD (assuming no transit stock is purchased). This gives a reserve equal to 4 months cover for possible oil shortfalls.

When will there be a real crisis:
The oil producing countries of the Gulf have a limited storage capacity for crude oil (and refined oil).
If oil cannot be shipped, maximum storage capacity will be reached in weeks after which refineries have to stop processing and oil wells have to stop production. It will take weeks for a oil well that is shut to resume production after which there is a shipping time to destination.

We are currently at the stage where most `floating stock’ has reached its destination (1 Mar + 45 days). Any oil shortfall will now have to be made up from strategic reserves. Assuming 4-6 weeks for oil wells or refineries to restart and 4-6 weeks transit time, this will deplete strategic reserves in importing countries, barring China, by more than half. Another 6 weeks of closure of the Strait of Hormuz will mean supply will be lower than demand, after consuming strategic reserves. That will lead to a real oil shock, with prices in excess of $ 150 a barrel.

At an earlier stage, there will be shortages of jet fuel and other petroleum derivatives, in countries without their own refineries.

Israeli compulsions: While I have stayed clear of politics when discussing this conflict, Israeli objectives are political and in particular have to do with securing Netanyahu’s legacy. Prior to Oct 23, Israel had already normalised relations with Saudi and UAE (and with Egypt, Jordan and Morocco earlier). Both Hamas and Hezbollah had been effectively defeated by Dec 2024. Major military operations against Hamas were effectively concluded by August of 2024, allowing for the deployment of IDF units to the north against Hezbollah, where operations started in Sept with a ceasefire in Dec ‘24. That coincided with the fall of the Assad regime in Syria (a long time objective of Israel), followed by the 12 day war with Iran in June 2025.

By the end of 2024, for the first time in Israel’s history, none of its neighbours were at war with Israel and the two armed groups hostile to it – Hamas and Hezbollah, were defeated. The only state openly opposed to Israel was Iran. If in the current conflict, Iran is significantly weakened with no possibility of the revival of its nuclear program and Hezbollah outlawed by its host the Lebanese govt, it will secure the legacy of Prime Minister Netanyahu – which is significant in the light of his legal trouble and his weak coalition government he heads.

Israel’s campaign has been helped by an unprecedented level of support from the Trump administration – the New York times article shows how Israel influenced Trump’s decision to go to war with Iran. This level of support is unlikely with any other president.
Support for Israel among the US public is also at its lowest in decades. Americans with an unfavourable view of Israel rose from 40% in 2022 to 60% now. Those with a `very unfavourable’ opinion of Israel tripled in 4 years.
Israel’s elections are scheduled for 27 Oct 2026.
The US mid-term elections are scheduled for 3 Nov 2026.
That is the window for Israel to remove the Iran and Hezbollah threat for good.

The IDF’s fatigue. In March, before the current operations against Hezbollah intensified, the IDF chief of staff. Lt Gen Eyal Zamir, made an unprecedented admission that the IDF faced `military collapse’ from internal reasons (10 red flags as he called it). These ranged from fatigue, to repeated calling up of reservists and a large proportion of eligible people exempt from conscription. This was first reported in June 2024 – I had made the point in my blog then that Israel was close to finishing the war in Gaza against Hamas – after which Israel continued operations in Gaza with diminishing returns, apart from 2 rounds of battles against Hezbollah.
My blog post on the last wat against Hezbollah in 2024.
https://rpdeans.blogspot.com/2024/11/israels-war-part-7-war-against-hezbollah.html

The Israeli army comprises 13 active and 46 reserve brigades.
Of the 13 active brigades, three are artillery brigades. The remaining 10 brigades have taken
67% of all IDF losses since 7 Oct 2023. Excluding those killed on 7^th Oct 23, who were mostly from
reserve formations, Israel’s active combat brigades have taken over 70% of all losses.

The IDF’s most experienced infantry brigades – 1^st (Golani) 933 (Givati) & 84^th (Nahal) along with
the 35^th (Para) and 89^th (Commando/Special forces) have been in constant combat since Oct 23
and lost 347 men killed. There are 2.7 men moderately to severely wounded for every man killed in action. If one assumes that these wounded are unavailable for active duty, we have irreplaceable losses of 935 men out of a combat strength of approx. 9000 men (2000 men in the three battalions of each
brigade and 1000 from various special forces). This loss of over 10% is literally the decimation of Israel’s best units, not to mention combat fatigue – particularly when the IDF is structured to fight short wars. Losses of officers are probably 20%
The 73 men killed from the various special forces units are a particularly high loss.

At the same time, reserve soldiers – who form the bulk of the army, have shown a lower inclination to join their units when summoned. Reservists reporting to their units has declined from over 100% in the aftermath to 7^th Oct 2023, to 70-80% a year later and reportedly 50-60% now.

The outcome of reduced manning of reserve units is that Israel’s northern command – tasked with fighting Hezbollah in Lebanon, which has 17 infantry, armoured and parachute brigades, is using
the 401st and 188^th armoured brigades in the current fighting. These took the highest losses in previous fighting (75 killed) among tan units. Israel has used them without committing their reserve 4^th 8^th,
205^th and 679^th armoured brigades.

Similarly, among the infantry brigades fighting Hezbollah currently, casualties have been among the Golani brigade - part of Northern command, but which has seen continuous combat since Oct 23 and lost 106 men killed and the 933 (Nahal) brigade – not part of Northern command and which has lost 73 killed in previous fighting, but none among the reserve infantry brigades.
While the IDF has officially lost only 13 men in the fighting against Hezbollah since March 26, they have 119 men moderately or seriously wounded, which (given the historical ratio of 2.7 moderately or seriously wounded for every man killed) suggests a higher death toll eventually.

Although Hezbollah claims of IDF losses (particularly tanks) seem highly inflated – Hezbollah claims are 136 tanks destroyed, more credible estimates are 20-30 at the time of writing this, it would still mean more dead tank crew than the three men killed from the tank brigades. As most hits to tanks are from drones (and not ATGM’s as was the case last year) it is quite likely than many `destroyed’ tanks were disabled with no crew losses – this is consistent with the Russian experience in Ukraine).

The difference between the fighting against Hezbollah in 2024 and now is the far higher civilian death toll in Lebanon this time – and none of Israeli civilians from Hezbollah rockets. A lot of Lebanese civilian casualties have been far from the front – notably in the capital Beirut. This, in my view is causing an erosion of the moral high ground that Israel had when responding to the Oct 7 2023 attacks. On the ground, most of the fighting has been around the towns of Bint Jbeil and Deir Saryan, each barely 3km from the border, which were neutralised in the 2024 fighting.

While Israel has lost fewer man against Hezbollah compared to the 2024 fighting, they are fighting for the same territory they occupied earlier, Hezbollah is still capable of organised resistance – despite losing a lot of their leadership and their Syrian patrons in 2024 and Israel is losing support among the international community.

In this scenario, the warring parties have the following objectives:

Iran has to ensure the Strait is closed for at least 6 more weeks (end May) so that the strain on the world economy gets them the best possible deal in a negotiation. Any attack on Iranian infrastructure will have to result in disproportionate damage to the infrastructure of the Gulf countries. Iran probably has the missiles and drones to retaliate for another 4-6 weeks. Any closure to the straits without fighting, improves Iranian leverage. However, preventing oil exports through a US blockade weakens that leverage.

Israel would like to weaken Hezbollah and Iran to a point where (in Lebanon) Israel has a permanent buffer zone in south Lebanon – upto the Litani river and the Lebanese state takes the responsibility to rein in Hezbollah. Iran needs to be weakened to a point where there is no threat from an Iranian nuclear program (something better than the JCPOA that Trump abrogated), their ballistic missiles or their proxies like Hezbollah. If the resulting fighting weakens the rest of the region economically, it would improve Israel’s position relative to the other Gulf states.

The US had announced objectives of: Regime change and unconditional surrender, both of which are unlikely. They would want at the minimum a nuclear deal better than the JCPOA (because Trump thought it a bad deal and abrogated it) and something meaningful for reducing the threat from Iranian missiles and Iran’s proxy forces. There would also have to be a resumption of oil supplies with a resulting drop in prices, before the US mid-term election.

Given these objectives there are three likely outcomes:

1.The ceasefire ends. The US and Israel resume attacks on Iran. The strait of Hormuz remains closed (with a counter blockade of the Iranian coast) with the Houthis blockading the Bab El-Mandeb. If Iran is attacked, it should be able to absorb damage and retaliate against the infrastructure of the Gulf countries. This would include Oil refineries, Gas plants, undersea cables, power plants, water desalination and targets which shatter the image of stability that the Gulf countries have created – i.e. attacks on Western interests in the gulf – expats, data centres, prominent buildings etc. This is the most destructive scenario but the one favoured by Israel. Air attacks by the US and Israel had brought diminishing returns before the current ceasefire, with no sign that Iran was going to concede US demands. US operations would therefore have to culminate in a ground operation to either occupy Iran’s oil export terminal (Kharg island) or secure the strait of Hormuz. The US will have the forces in place for this operation by the end of April.

2. The blockades and negotiations continue: This will be an endurance test between the ability of Iran’s economy to survive without oil revenues and price rises in the rest of the world – particularly the US. Iran can survive it if China (their only official export market) defies the blockade and sends tankers escorted by Chinese warships. Why I think this will happen is that an unescorted Russian tanker broke the unofficial US blockade on Cuba. In the case of China, which has warships in the region and can intervene, a US blockade would embolden them to declare one on Taiwan, without the US having the moral authority to oppose China. A blockade of Iran will be useless if Chinese ships can break it. China has the strategic oil reserve to do without Iranian and Gulf oil in the short term, but not in the longer term, which is why China has pushed Iran towards negotiating. However, Chinese ships prevented from accessing Iranian oil will be a serious loss of face for China. China would like to have the planned Xi – Trump summit if the US has leverage over China in the form of an Iranian blockade. Whoever faces more economic hardship

In both scenario 1 & 2, May and June is a time of extreme weather in the Persian gulf region. Apart from the heat – which affects not only soldiers, but electronics and vehicles, dust storms affect helicopters and drone operations. A US ground operation should either take place by the end of April or after June (Gulf war 1 & 2 had ground operations in Feb-Mar).

3. A gradual off-ramp. The ceasefire continues while negotiations take place. The strait is partly opened: Chinese ships quietly use Iranian ports, the Houthis do not block the Red Sea. Infrastructure in both Iran and the Gulf states are not attacked. There is a partial unfreezing of Iranian assets. The end result might be:
A nuclear agreement similar to the old JCPOA with some extras to make it look like Trump negotiated a better deal. Additionally, Iran agrees not to arm its proxies, coupled with a Lebanon-Israel peace deal marginalizing Hezbollah. The proxies have been more of a liability for Iran.
With the US having shut its base in Syria and scheduled to leave Iraq, Iran can market it as a victory where they forced the US to abandon some of its bases in the region.

In an earlier article, I made the point that the Houthi threat is more effective as a threat rather than
real action to hit ships. I wrote;

My view was that the Houthi attacks, far from disrupting Western supply chains showed up Iran’s missiles and drones (supplied to the Houthis) as ineffective. Between May and Aug 2024, of the 82 ships targeted by the Houthis, only one sank. In theory, with merchant ships being virtually defenceless against modern Anti-ship missiles, the missiles should have been more effective. Between 30Aug and 30 Oct, the Houthis claimed to have targeted 10 ships. Only 4 of them were actually hit, none seriously and with no loss of life. What the Houthis have however achieved is that the Israeli port of Eliat has had to declare bankruptcy (due to lack of business), while the loss to Egypt from drop in Suez canal revenue was US$ 2.2 billion for 2023-24.

We would know which option will be exercised by the end of April.

I was of the view, in a previous blogpost, that opening up the market to Iranian and Venezuelan oil would be good for the world economy and would actually affect the Russian economy (through lower realization on oil exports) more than sanctions, making them more amenable to a deal on Ukraine. The US now has the opportunity to work with both countries to increase oil output.

(my previous post on Russian oil)
https://rpdeans.blogspot.com/2024/12/indias-russian-oil-imports-reality.html

Implications for India:
If the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz continues, we will have a oil and gas shortage from June. We will start dipping into our reserve stock from May.

Attacks on infrastructure of the Gulf countries will hit their GDP. Qatar, Kuwait and Iraq are expected to have a negative GDP growth. UAE could be negative if tourism and real estate are hit. This affects Indian workers in the region and their remittances - which will exacerbate our forex crisis caused by an increased oil bill.

India is 100% dependent on imports for Helium and has stock of barely a week. Half our imports - from Qatar, have been affected.

India will also face a fertilizer shortage (unless we buy from Belarus where sanctions have been lifted)
The struggling civil aviation sector will take a serious hit from an increase in ATF prices.

Can the Indian navy escort an Indian tanker to a Gulf port and run the Iranian blockade ?
The risk will be to the tanker and its crew, less so to the warship.

Conversely, can we escort a tanker to Kharg island, defying the US counter blockade, or escort a
tanker buying oil from an Iranian sanctioned tanker on the high seas ? - which the US has now threatened to interdict. _______________________________________________________________________________

Search This Blog

DeansMusings

The Iran war - Timelines to follow

Comments

Post a Comment

Popular posts from this blog

Operation Sindhoor - What we don't realise

Operation Sindhoor 2.0. FAQ'S and lessons from Operation Rising lion

Pakistan - Unknown gunmen strike again