Ukraine war. Part 18 - The case against Russia
In this series, a criticism I often get in the feedback I receive, is that I am confident about a Russian victory and believe they are performing better than Ukraine. My view, through this series, based on data from both sides was prescient :
- While Russia did not have a plan B, after their initial advance in 2022 and
the failure of the Istanbul
talks,
Russia was also not going to collapse /run out of equipment /implode
economically, in 2022 and
2023 – that assumption was NATO’s
strategic error.
- The Ukrainian counter offensive failed and the Kursk incursion was mistake.
- Russian armaments production was outpacing losses and was able to equip new
formations &
- Russia was at peak strength in 2025 and its position relative to Ukraine
would only improve, making it
necessary for Ukraine to seek a peace
deal in 2025. Russia would achieve its territorial objectives by the end of 2026.
Over time, data from both sides began to
match. In the last blog post, I had listed a detailed study of casualties that
found flaws with the data I relied on for both sides, yet had a final total
which was similar.
Western estimates of Russian production now match Russia’s. Ukrainian estimates
of Russians `killed’ match Russian estimates of `sanitary losses’ and vice
versa.
That said, my conclusion that the Ukrainian
army would start to lose ground at an increasing rate (or lose more casualties
trying to hold ground) has not been borne out in 2026. Feb-April saw three
consecutive months where the territory Russia captured was less than 200 Sq km
each month. While these have been `low’ months in the previous three years as
well – spring thaw and lack of foliage in the forest reducing cover, I expected
Russia to do better having broken Ukrainian defensive lines in the winter fighting
and taken important positions – Pokrovsk, Siversk.
Russia lost most of the town of Kupyansk in
early 2026 (which they first lost in 2022 and took three years to recapture).
The fighting for the towns of Kostiantynivka and Lyman should have bene over by
March, but is continuing. The Ukrainian defensive line at Pokrovsk which was
broken with the fall of Pokrovsk, has been reformed west of the city, because
Russia failed to advance beyond the city, for two months.
Ukrainian forces have been able to defend positions
from which they are partly encircled and then retreat in an orderly manner when
defense is no longer possible. That is more the result of Russian failure to
exploit an advantage, than professional competence of the Ukrainian army.
Ukraine has also been able to organize
multi brigade counter attacks. While these have failed and Ukraine has lost the
territory it initially recaptured, it does not give the impression of a badly
attritted army only able to defend. Politically, Ukraine signaled that it would
not give up any of its territory.
Additionally, Ukraine in March matched
Russia in the use of long range drones (close to 200 per day) and caused the
heaviest ever damage to Russian production since the war began. If it wasn’t
for the Middle East conflict, which has given a windfall to Russian export
revenue, the Russian economy would start facing real trouble in 2026.
On this context, I took a closer look at
some of the numbers.
On paper, the Russian army in Ukraine has a
strength of 650-700,000 men, while the Ukrainian
army’s frontline strength is around 250000 (of an estimated total of 600,000
army men in uniform).
This calculation was discussed in my previous post.
A breakup of actual combat brigades is as follows:
|
|
Russia |
Ukraine |
|
Tank |
21 |
3 |
|
Mechanized Rifle |
79 |
41 |
|
Motorized rifle |
7 |
|
|
Special brigades |
12-13 |
21 |
|
Artillery |
30-40 |
14 |
|
Territorial defense/national guard/ paramilitary |
Approx 50,000 men |
47 |
Russia’s infantry strength:
The order of battle (ORBAT) of the Russian army in
Ukraine was covered in a previous post.
Russia's order of battle.
While there are an estimated 650-700,000 army men in formations assigned to
Ukraine, the actual
strength of the infantry formations is 35 Brigades and 56 regiments.
The difference between a brigade and
regiment in the Russian army, is that a brigade operates independently.
Therefore, apart from the infantry, it has its own armor, artillery and a
signals, engineering and done unit assigned to it. While a Rifle brigade has a
strength of 3500-4500 men,
the actual infantry component is 2-3 motorized rifle battalions or 1200-1800
men.
An infantry regiment comprises 2-3 rifle battalions, with no supporting arms
within it, as it operates within a larger division. The strength a motorized
rifle regiment is also 2-3 battalions of 1200-1800 men at full strength
Not all the 1500 `Rifle’ men (on average) in
a rifle regiment or brigade operate as infantrymen. However, this will be true
of the Ukrainian side too. Similarly, both sides will have men recovering from
injuries and not part of the active strength of the unit.
Thus of the 650-700 000 strong Russian army in Ukraine, the rifle strength is
around 1500 * 91 or
around 136000, excluding support functions and those in hospital. At
least 20% of these are rotated to the rear or on leave, leaving a `Rifle’
strength of 110,000 men. These are the man who have to physically take
territory, do almost all the fighting in built up areas, hold positions etc.
Ukraine’s
infantry strength (to hold ground): Due to battlefield losses and Ukraine’s
decision to create new brigades instead of strengthening existing brigades (to
bring them up to their standard strength)
Ukraine’s brigades are on average at around 50% of their strength. Due to tank
losses, tank brigades have been converted to mechanized brigades and some
mechanized brigades to motorized rifle brigades.
Within a mechanized brigade, losses of tanks and armored vehicles have
increased the proportion of infantry in the total. Thus in a real brigade
strength of 1800-2000 men, there would be about 1000 infantry men, giving a
total of 69000 infantry men.
There are additionally 47 National guard or
territorial army brigades. While some of these are holding quiet sections of
the front, or on an inactive border (Belarus), others have been in combat. None
of the Russian national guard or interior ministry forces are in frontline
combat units – they are used for guarding inactive sections, of the border,
anti-partisan activity, guard duty, internal security in Russian parts of
Ukraine etc. A Ukrainian national guard or territorial army unit probably has
500-1000 men capable of being light infantry or used for defense only. Assuming
another 11,000 men who are part of Ukraine’s infantry (750 infantrymen per
brigade * 15 brigades in combat) there
is a total Ukrainian infantry strength of 69000 + 11000 men or 80,000 men. If
one assumes 10% of men are rotated (lack of rotation relative to the Russian
army is the Ukrainian infantry’s biggest concern) it is 72000 men defending
against 110,000 Russians.
While the numerical strength of combat
units on both sides suggests that Russia has a close to 3:1 numerical
superiority, this analysis suggests that for the infantry, the arm that counts
most, Russia has an approx. 3:2 numerical superiority which is not
enough to advance into heavily defended positions without heavy casualties,
which Russia has been avoiding. As the previous blog post analyzed, Russian
manpower losses per sq km of territory taken, have been reducing.
Russia has irrecoverable losses of approx.
160000 killed and 320000 seriously wounded and unable to return to combat. This
excludes missing, deserted and POW, which are not believed to be significant
numbers for Russia. A detailed analysis of both side’s losses with flaws in
reports I had earlier referred to is in my previous post (see the section on casuaties)
https://rpdeans.blogspot.com/2026/03/ukraine-war-part-17-2026-year-it-ends.html
Of the 480000 irrecoverable losses, over half (240000) are estimated to be from
the infantry.
At an average of 60,000 irrecoverable infantry losses each year (Mar 2022-Feb
2026) and the average
strength of the infantry at about 103,000 (rising from 80000 in 2022 and 136000
now),
60% of the infantry will be irrecoverable casualties each year.
The elite airborne forces (operating as infantry) have taken 15,000
irrecoverable casualties (5000 dead). The infantry component of the airborne
forces is around 18,000 men, mostly longer service and not those with a 1 or 3
year contract. The Naval infantry has over 8000 irrecoverable casualties from
its
average infantry strength of 9000 – again, mostly longer service men.
Adjusting these losses for the battle of Bakhmut in 2023 where most Russian
casualties were convicts or members of the Wagner PMC group, the annual
irrecoverable loss rate for the infantry would be 50%
This is also a validation of the estimated casualty figures posted
earlier. If Russian casualty figures were much higher than what the study
suggested, the infantry would suffer over 100% casualties.
Russia managed to succeed in infantry intensive urban fighting in 2023, by
the use of convicts incorporated in the Wagner private military (mercenary)
units. The battle of Bakhmut – the most intensive urban combat since WW2, was
an exchange of Russian convicts for regular Ukrainian infantry and worked in
Russia’s favor.
In contrast, irrecoverable losses among the
tank and artillery regiments are under 10% over 4 years.
To put the 60% (or 50% number in perspective): This year, Russia will probably lose upto 25000 killed this year and 50,000 seriously wounded, giving irrecoverable losses of 75000 men from a strength of 650-700,000 men. This is an annual loss rate of just over 10% which is normal and less than the number of replacements, or Ukrainian losses. The problem is when the casualties are concentrated in the infantry, which the arm Russia most needs to take and hold ground.
The high salaries paid to volunteers for
the Russian army, particularly infantry, perversely create no
incentive to continue to serve beyond a one year contract. If there is a 60%
chance of being a casualty after a year, there is no reason why an infantry
volunteer will renew a contract after a year.
Ukraine’s policy of not rotating their infantry units may actually make sense
in this context, because you are likely to die before being due for rotation
and if you are rotated, the chance of an infantryman deserting are very high –
permanent desertions are the biggest source of irrecoverable casualties for
Ukraine in the past year. It makes more sense to keep infantry in place till
they are casualties.
The other element of superiority is in
firepower. Over 70% of Russian casualties (some estimates are higher) of
Russian losses are from FPV drones. Ukraine had a larger number of drones until
mid-2025, when it was estimated that Russia caught up (both sides increased
drone usage 10x in a year). In 2026, with supplies from NATO countries being
stepped up, Ukraine is again believed to have a superiority in the number of
FPV drones.
Russia has a 2:1 superiority in artillery,
a 3:1 superiority in tanks and about 200 air strikes daily. Adding these to the
weight of firepower delivered it is an approx. 5:3 superiority for
Russia (50% of Ukrainian frontline losses are estimated to be from Russian
drones). Again, this is not enough for a successful attack. Therefore Russia’s
strategy is adapted to this reality – squeezing Ukrainian forces across the
front line, with small advances of no more than section (8 man) sized teams. When
there is a 60% casualty rate among the infantry, they will be risk averse. An
infantry squad won’t want to charge at an enemy bunker, when they are due to end
their contract and return home in a month with a fat salary.
Unlike India, Russia (and Ukraine) have very few long service soldiers, without
the regimental system than generates pride in the unit (paltan in India). However,
Russian soldiers (like the Ukrainians) are highly motivated when defending
their motherland and more capable when fighting in a defensive role.
Ukraine has the advantage of better
satellite coverage of Russian positions (NATO satellites give an over 10 : 1
advantage) which makes their long range artillery more effective and gives them
the chance to move infantry to threatened sections of the front.
An indication of the diminishing role of
tanks and armored vehicles in this war, is the loss figures reported by Oryx - In the last 2 weeks, the Russian army lost 5
tanks, 5 BMP’s and 6 artillery guns. While loss rates in these categories are
falling and production figures are well in excess of losses, the problem for
Russia is no longer hardware, but a shortage of infantry.
I have tracked Russian armor losses since
the beginning of this conflict. While they reduced from 258 per month (690 in
the first 80 days) to 15 (15 lost in the past month) NATO, looking at the 258
number assumed Russia was running out of tanks. Russia, looking at falling
losses, assumed that production would exceed losses- which did happen. However,
this parameter was not as important as infantry.
As an example of how manpower superiority will work: On 25th Apr, the Russian 34th Guards mountain Rifle brigade - which got the Guards designation last Dec for their combat performance and returned to the front after a rest - with its full strength of three infantry battalions, advanced to capture
a village in the Sumy region (a quiet part of front), driving out the undermanned Ukrainian 119th Territorial brigade, then overcame a counterattack by a similarly understrength 425th regiment of the Ukrainian regular army. It was a set piece battle, where neither side used tanks.
The structure of new Russian divisions.
In early 2023, Russia announced the creation of new divisions and an increase
in the size of the armed forces to 1.5 million (from 980000). While Russia has
reached this manpower level and all the new formations exist, they are in my
view, unbalanced, because of the shortage of infantry and because of the shift
in manpower to air defense (against long range drone strikes). An estimated
50,000 men have been moved to air defense and anti-drone operations.
Among the newly raised divisions: The 71st Guards Motorized Rifle
division has its full strength of tanks, artillery and engineers and an
anti-tank and anti-aircraft battalion (when there is no serious tank or
aircraft threat from Ukraine). However, there are just 2 understrength infantry
regiments.
Similarly, the Russian 1st Guards
tank army, rebuilt after heavy losses in 2022, is an armor heavy formation with
three tank divisions. They were originally intended to fight a conventional battle
against NATOs armored forces, but are ineffective against drone swarms and in
the marshes, forests and rivers of the region they are in.
While it is easy to criticize the organization and deployment of this army with
the benefit of hindsight, the emphasis of both armies in 2022-23 was to get
tanks and armored vehicles (Ukraine for it’s 2023 counter offensive, Russia to
rebuild its tank units and for the `big arrow’ offensive that would come after
Ukrainian lines in the Donbass region were broken). After Ukraine’s 2022
offensive that (re)captured Kupyansk and Lyman, the 1st Guards tank
army was rushed there to prevent a further breakthrough.
Russia’s new 73rd and 74th Mechanized infantry divisions have
an understrength brigade of motorized or mechanized infantry, instead of two.
The 55th Naval infantry division (formed from the 155 Naval infantry
brigade) has only the newly raised 40th Naval infantry brigade and
the survivors of the 155th brigade (barely at battalion strength) as
its infantry. Fighting along the 74th Mechanized division, as part
of Army group East, neither division was able to exploit a winter breakthrough in
eastern part of the Zaporozhe district and advanced barely 10km in the last two
months, when there was no organized Ukrainian defensive line. A determined push
with the presence of reserves might have taken Army group East to the outskirts
of Zaporozhe city. In retrospect, the Russian army might have looked at
combining the 55th Naval infantry division and 74th
Mechanized into one division, with enough infantry to exploit any breakthrough
and veterans of the 155th Naval brigade – with rich experience in
urban fighting, spread among both divisions.
Two new airborne/ Air assault divisions were raised by Russia – the 44th
and the 104th. Both have just two understrength infantry regiments. It
might have been better to add a regiment to each of the four existing airborne/
air assault divisions, which also have an experienced cadre of NCOs and
experience in combat. The reason for six weak divisions rather than four
stronger ones, is simply because a decision was made in 2023 to add two more divisions
and that is a box which has to be ticked. While the new formations are competent
in a defensive role (just as newly raised Ukrainian brigades are) they are less
effective in attack and quite often lack of infantry reserves have prevented
airborne forces from exploiting a breakthrough.
On the other hand, the 69th
Guards rifle division, raised in 2024, has four rifle regiments and has a good combat
record since being raised. The 72nd Rifle division, also raised in
2024, has its authorized strength of three rifle regiments and has done better
in the fighting over the past year in the Kursk / Sumy sector.
Other factors:
Russia has full employment and any increase in volunteers will be at the cost
of the domestic economy, which is only being kept out of recession by a
windfall from oil and gas exports due to the Iran war.
Ukraine’s strikes on Russian energy and other
high value targets are beginning to hurt morale and cause economic damage
(going by people’s comments on Russian channels). It has necessitated
mobilization of reservists (and some volunteers) in anti-drone units. This force
might include some of those who would normally be in the anti-aircraft regiment
of existing divisions (which no longer have to face a threat from Ukrainian
aircraft) but it means reduced manpower for divisions at the front.
The war has also gone on longer than the Great Patriotic war (1941-45) The
number of Russians who favor a peace deal (albeit retaining the Donbass) is now
67-70% - the highest since the war began, though President Putin retains the
support of over 70%. The poll is done by the Levada center, generally considered
professional and unbiased in its sampling.
An increasing amount of Ukrainian support operations are being taken over by Europe /NATO. From longer term medical care of casualties, intelligence, planning of drone strikes, training, repair of weapon systems and vehicles and storage of weapons and ammunition, until they are sent to the front. This frees a larger proportion of the Ukrainian army for combat and within combat formations, the infantry.
Ukraine's drones are made in 16 locations across Europe (which cannot be attacked), with only final assembly in small widely dispersed facilities in Ukraine. The attacks on Ukraine's power grid have not yet been successful - though they might be by the coming winter, because Ukraine's installed capacity is far higher than peak use and current demand is less than the pre war levels, as millions of people have moved abroad and a lot of industrial use (non essential to the war) has stopped, since material can be imported.
My view on how the war can end and that Russia will achieve its objectives this year, stands.
This was the subject of my last post in this series.
https://rpdeans.blogspot.com/2026/03/ukraine-war-part-17-2026-year-it-ends.html
Further reading:
Ukraine's future in 2026. Mick Ryan has been pro Ukraine in his views.
https://mickryan.substack.com/p/the-scales-begin-to-tip-assessing
Simplicus (Pro Russia) substack on changed Russian tactics in 2026
Changed Russian tactics in 2026
Myth and reality of Ukrainian attacks on Russian energy facilities:
https://svakulenko.substack.com/p/tanker-chaos-or-tactical-hiccup
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