China and the Gen Naravane book controversary
I decided to write on the book controversary after actually reading the manuscript of the book, which is yet to be published and because I thought the row in Parliament and on social media lacked an understanding of the facts, or the background in which a sentence in a 400 page book was taken out of context.
While I believe
there was nothing wrong in how this particular incident was handled (and the
outcome was in our favour) it was to me, as someone exposed to corporate
decision making, and as an amateur enthusiast in military history, a case study
on the interaction between the political and military leadership in a conflict.
The controversary. A paragraph in the book suggested that when
Chinese tanks approached an Indian position on 31st August 2020, Gen. Naravane
repeatedly asked the political leadership for instructions, to be told a couple
of hours later - `Jo uchit samjo vo karo’ (do what you think is right). General
Naravane stated that he had been handed a hot potato and the decision to
potentially start w ar was with him and
not the political leadership. The instruction also implied that the situation
was purely military matter for the
commander on the ground to deal with and not something that the political
leadership needed to decide on.
The opposition suggested that this exchange implied the Govt was indecisive and
pushed the decision back to the army.
The reality is
different and has to be viewed in the context of a series of events that began
in
May 2020.
Background: Agreements between India and China to
maintain peace along the border (Line of actual control or LAC) in 1996, 2005
and 2013 required that neither side would open fire. Conflict would be handled
with restraint. Confrontation would be by non-lethal means. No guns or
explosives would be used within 2 km of the LAC. Only if a soldier’s life was
threatened could guns be used. These agreements have led to zero fatalities
over the years – as opposed to regular firing and casualties across the Line of
Control (LOC) with Pakistan.
To prevent escalation of any border incident, both sides are required to enter
into immediate consultations, to resolve issues by diplomatic means.
There are frequent
violations of the LAC, because it is not demarcated. That is because there are
areas where each side’s perception of where the LAC is, varies. What India may
regard as a LAC violation, would be perceived by the Chinese as patrolling their
own territory. As stated in Parliament in 2019, there were 273 LAC violations by the Chinese in 2016, 426 in 2017, 326 in 2018
and 660 in 2019. In 2019, China claimed that Indian
forces had committed 1581 LAC violations.
The actual manning
along the LAC has been both with the army – India has a single division in
Ladakh (3rd infantry) to monitor a LAC whose `straight line’ length
is 320 km, but the actual length over 500 km. Both sides use border police –
the ITBP in India and the border defence regiments for China. Given the low
density of the army and paramilitary personnel on both sides, patrols can
occasionally enter disputed areas and leave, without seeing the other side.
Simply violating the LAC does not mean either side’s territory has been
invaded.
Build up to the 31 Aug incident.
In early May 2020, a large Chinese force, present opposite the Line of actual
control in Eastern Ladakh moved into areas that we either disputed, or where
there was an understanding that neither side would occupy, or build any
structure. On 5th May, there was a tense face off between Indian and
Chinese forces. Another tense face-off, with injuries on both sides, occurred
on 18/19th May at two locations – Gogra/Hot Springs and on the North
bank of Pangong Tso lake.
At this stage there
was a flurry of meetings by both India’s China study group (CSG) and the
Cabinet committee on security (CCS). The advisor to the CCS was the Chief of
Defence staff – General Bipin Rawat. Unlike in the past, the political
leadership had access to an expert body – the China study group and had a
military advisor to the CCS, in the form of the newly created position of CDS.
General Rawat as the former army chief was also well versed with the situation
in Ladakh.
At this stage India
started increasing it forces in Eastern Ladakh by inducting two more divisions,
in addition to the 3rd infantry division already present.
The movement of two
divisions, in an area which hitherto never had more than one division (nor the
infrastructure to accommodate more) in the midst of Covid, would require a
considerable logistics effort. With Pakistan under pressure to increase the
level of the Kashmir insurgency in response to the abrogation of article 370 in
August 2019, the movement of forces to Eastern Ladakh had to be done without
weakening forces deployed against Pakistan. This would have required not just
considerable planning, but frequent discussion with the political
leadership.
The build-up of
Indian forces, prompted what was to be the first of many meetings between
Indian and Chinese commanders, in keeping with agreed border protocols to
defuse tensions. Starting in the first week of June 2020, these talks had the
approval of the China study group.
On 15th June, came the clash at Galwan. Suffice to say that this was
the first clash since 1967 (Sikkim) with fatalities on both sides, although no
guns were fired. At this stage, the army chief (as he mentions in the book)
loosened the rules of engagement to allow troops to open fire if they were in
danger. This would be confined only to the unit being threatened.
As the book suggests, the Galwan clash came as a surprise to the army
leadership. It appeared to have started when the Chinese attacked an Indian
unit pitching tents to counter a similar Chinese move inside what was
considered Indian territory. It may also have come as a surprise to the PLA
leadership, as President Xi, birthday was 16th June and he would not
have liked to get the news that the Chinese army suffered its first fatalities
since 1979. My sense is that the political leadership in both countries wanted
to ensure they were kept `in the loop’ if there was a high chance of armed
clash, rather than let a relatively junior officer start a war on his own.
This was also the
time contingency plans were put in place to enable newly inducted troops to
undertake offensive actions against the Chinese if required. The newly inducted
XVII corps – the new Mountain strike corps, was responsible for offensive
actions and XIV corps (the existing corps) for defensive operations. A
precursor to any offensive action was a plan by India, to pre-emptively occupy
dominating features, where the Chinese forces squatting in disputed areas, or
attempting to advance further would be at a disadvantage. These were discussed
with the political leadership, including the CSG, hence nothing that happened
later would have been unexpected.
Since June, talks between the commanders on both sides also took place. While
there was apparent agreement on both sides for the need to avoid escalation or
provocations, the Chinese actions on the ground belied what was agreed in terms
of disengagement, with a strategy of presenting India with a fait accompli, of
a Chinese presence. To counter this and after assessing that China would
attempt to occupy strategic heights, the army chief gave the go ahead to
implement the army’s own plan to occupy these features, presumably with the
concurrence of the political leadership – the chief did not mention specific
approval.
On the 29th
of August, the Indian army occupied these features.
This substack article gives a good explanation of the terrain and Operation Snow leopard.
https://diplomaticdispatches.substack.com/p/operation-snow-leopard
The Chinese
apparently rattled by the Indian occupation of these features, called for a
meeting on the 30th evening to de-escalate the situation by freezing
all movement. At the meeting, the Indian
side reiterated that it would open fire if the Chinese violated the `no further
forward movement’ agreement. Positions of individual Indian units that had dug
in , had barbed wire ahead of them. That barbed wire was to be a red line, the
crossing of which would result in opening fire.
On the 31st,
a Chinese unit in company strength (around 120 men) approached within 300
meters of the positions of 29 Punjab and did not advance further when asked not
to. Another unit (Gen Naravane says they were larger than the unit which
approached 29 Punjab, but gives their number as 100, whereas a Chinese infantry
company has over 100 men) came within 30-35 meters of 13 Mahar. Shots were
fired in the air by both sides, before the Chinese withdrew. The political
leadership was not consulted on permission to open fire, when threatened.
By the 31st
A’noon tanks from both sides started moving towards each other, as did a 500
strong force of Chinese on the north shore of Pangong Tso. Gen Naravane listed
15 infantry battalions
and two regiments of armoured and mechanized forces on the Indian side, who by
the A’noon of 31st August, were in close proximity to Chinese forces
in the Pangong Tso area.
On the Indian side these were:
North bank of Pangong Tso: 1/1 GR, 5/4 GR, 2 Sikh LI, 17 Kumaon, 16 Punjab and
9 SF
South Bank: 2 Dogra, 11 Sikh LI, 6 Sikh, 2 & 4 ;Ladakh scouts and 7 Vikas
Kailash range: 6 Grenadiers, 29 Punjab, 13 Mahar.
Mechanised forces: 18 Guards, 53 Armoured regiment.
This is only the
middle section of the LAC in Ladakh. There was presumably a similar build up in
the North: From Daulat Beg Oldi (and the Depsang plans – another point of
contention), moving south along the Shyok river, upto Gogra (including Galwan)
and South of the Kailash range upto Demchok and the Himachal Tibet border.
Given the very large
forces now confronting each other, Gen Naravane was informed that a decision to
open fire had to come from the political leadership.
At 2015 on 31st
August, after being informed that Chinese tanks started advancing further,
towards Indian positions, Gen Naravane cites his calls to the CDS (Gen Rawat)
the defence minister, National security advisor & foreign minister to ask
for instructions. Since all these are members of the CCS, I would assume the
members of Chinese commander suggested a meeting the next morning – this was news
that had to be conveyed to the CCS.
However, at 2210, there were report of further movement of Chinese tanks towards
the Indian positions – 500 meters away. A warning shot had failed to deter them
and the recommendation of Lt Gen Joshi (Northern army commander) was to open
fire with artillery. After speaking to the defence minister again, General
Naravane was told that:
- The Prime minister had decided that this was a military decision &
- The army could act as it saw best (Jo uchit samjo vo karo)
Thereafter Gen
Naravane asked the northern army commander – Lt Gen. Joshi to get his tanks to
move into a firing position and train their guns on the enemy – something the
Chinese would know was a prelude to opening fire. That worked and the Chinese
backed off, just as they had done the previous day when they approached the positions
of Indian infantry units.
What this suggests to me is:
The political leadership
had been involved for over 3 months (since the first clashes on 18/19 ,May and more
often since 15 June). During this time the army refined the circumstances under
which they might open fire and (presumably) the CCS approved.
Given the large
number of forces involved – the equivalent of 17 Indian battalions in the
Pangong Tso, Kailash range area any impulsive action by a junior officer had
the potential to escalate into a clash involving thousands of men on each side.
Neither side wanted a repeat of Galwan,
so the political leadership would have wanted the reassurance that the army leadership
was monitoring the situation, not do anything outside of agreed protocols and
keep the government informed.
The presence of tanks facing each other, was something unprecedented on the
China border, which probably necessitated keeping the CCS informed – unlike the
previous day when Chinese infantrymen approach Indian infantry positions.
The Prime minister
was consulted before a final decision. It wasn’t just the defence minister giving
the army chief a one line instruction.
The larger point
being made was that political considerations would not override what the army
wanted to do. The army had red lines, the crossing of which would entail
opening fire. Those red lines were conveyed to the Chinese. My sense was the
political leadership did not see the need to override the army’s policy around
opening fire. Nor could a civilian sitting in Delhi advise the army on how tanks
should be used.
Gen Naravane suggests
that if, hypothetically, the govt had ordered the army not to fire the first
shot (as was the case earlier), it would have resulted in a situation where
Chinese troops surrounded Indian positions, effectively capturing them without
firing a shot. To avoid a Galwan type situation and counter Chinese advances
after giving assurances to the contrary, the rules of engagement were changed
and the Chinese informed that Indian troops would open fire if the Chinese
advanced and threatened their position. Any instruction to the contrary would
have undermined the army’s position.
The decision of Gen Naravane
turned out to be correct. It led to the Chinese tanks withdrawing (blinking
first) and then the start of a real disengagement process.
Lt Gen. Joshi had praised
the Govt’s `whole of govt approach, including involving a foreign ministry
representative for commander level talks, in resolving the crisis.
Aftermath: India’s reading of Chinese intentions was in
my view correct, because in Dec 2020,
after a cooling off period after Galwan, to save the most important Chinese
characteristic – face,
the commander of China’s Western military theatre command Zhao Zhongqi (reputed to be close to President Xi) was retired – apparently he acted
in an over aggressive manner, not approved by the Chinese leadership.
His successor, Zhang Xudong died from sickness exacerbated by high
altitude conditions.
The man who actually oversaw ground operations against India in 2020 – Xu Qiling (earlier head of ground forces for the Western theatre and considered a
mountain warfare specialist) succeeded Zhang Xudong, but was dismissed after
just 2 months, reportedly due to the high number of casualties from high
altitude operations.
My sense from the
rapid turnover of Chinese commanders (who typically have longer tenures at the
top than their Indian counterparts) is that the Chinese leadership did not have
a plan to actually occupy Indian territory – though they would have squatted on land as a salami
slicing tactic, if their
Western theatre commander had presented the leadership with a fait accompli by
occupying what was hitherto land unoccupied by both sides. Gen Naravane’s view
at the time, as he mentions in the book was that the size of the PLA force
meant that it did have the `blessings from the top’. All the Chinese troops
involved were however part of the Western theatre and based in Western Tibet
and since they moved into Ladakh after scheduled exercises, it may well have
been done at the initiative of the Western theatre commander – Gen. Zhao
Zhongqi.
What I would have liked to see in
the book:
- What was Gen Naravane’s recommendation to the CCS on 31st Aug ?
- What was the role of the CDS, Gen Rawat (as advisor to CCS) and what was his
view ?
- Did we have a contingency plan to deal with large scale fighting in Ladakh ?
Why the controversary:
If someone reads only the one page (of 400) quoted by the media, it would give
the impression that
the army chief awaited instructions on how to act, without any suggestion that
he had his protocols in place and a plan for dealing with an escalation. It
gives the impression that the govt pushed the `hot potato’ (an avoidable phrase
in my view) back to the General, implying that the seniormost General in India –
Gen Rawat, as CDS and advisor to CCS, also did not have an opinion. One could
have said for e.g. `I informed the CCS of the evolving situation and our recommendation
for dealing with it and wanted a free hand, within the constraints of our plan,
to deal with any escalation’.
From the Chinese side:
I am inclined to believe that the Chinese commander had no plan B, if they were
not able to squat on
the land the Chinese had intruded into in May & June 2020. Having to disengage
and withdraw to
the positions before their incursion was in my view, a big loss of face. As I have
argued in another blog piece, India was very vulnerable in the summer of 2020.
https://rpdeans.blogspot.com/2023/08/pakistans-economic-implosion.html
We were dealing with Covid. After the abrogation of article 370 in the state of
Jammu & Kashmir and the splitting of the state into J&K and Ladakh, Pakistan
was under a lot of pressure to up the ante in Kashmir by pushing in more
terrorists – something accompanied by more cross border firing which could escalate
into war. Having been taken by surprise by Chinese intrusions (as General Naravane
admits – when he says we were tactically surprised) a two front war in the
middle of Covid could have been a nightmare scenario for us. Instead, in the
beginning of 2021, Pakistan agreed to a ceasefire along the LOC. At a time when
China would have dearly liked to see their ally put pressure on India, in order
for some of the newly inducted troops on the LAC, move back to positions
oriented towards Pakistan, Pakistan agreed to a ceasefire instead.
Further reading:
The army chief's earlier interview on China, Galwan the LAC etc.
https://indiachina.substack.com/p/the-changing-terms-of-lac-disengagement
This is a more critical take:
https://aliahd66.substack.com/p/naravane-sets-the-cat-among-the-pigeons
What the book says about the other side:
https://indiachina.substack.com/p/what-the-indian-army-chiefs-memoir
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