Ukraine war - Part 17: 2026, the year it ends ?
I am writing this part after a long gap, as
there were more informative posts on subjects I wanted to cover, and because the overall direction of the war was in line with what I had
mentioned earlier.
The war has also gone on longer than the Great Patriotic war, leading to some `blogger fatigue'.
My view is that 2026 will be the year that
Russia achieves its territorial objectives in Ukraine and will be in a position
to propose a peace deal that will not involve Ukraine giving up territory since
they will not be in control of any territory Russia needs.
In a previous blog piece in Feb 25, I had
suggested that a peace deal could involve the war ending on the then front
line, with an exchange of territory (Russian held territory outside four
provinces claimed by Russia, in return for territory in the Donbass not yet
occupied by it) that would lead to a final truce line.
https://rpdeans.blogspot.com/2025/02/ukraine-war-part-12-how-war-might-end.html
Since then, all that has happened is that Russia has taken more territory –
both in the Donbass and other provinces, with the loss ratio moving more
adversely against Ukraine.
My predictions for 2026 – which I will
elaborate on:
1. By the end of the 2026. Russia will have taken the territory they need to fulfil their objectives.
There are approx. 5600 square km of territory in the Donbass region (Donetsk and Luhansk) not occupied by Russia. Of this, about 1000 km is a grey zone, being controlled by neither side. Russia captured over 6000 sq. km of Ukraine in 2025. Even at a slower rate of advance, or assuming not all territorial gains by Russia are in the Donbass, Russia will have occupied the remaining 4600 sq km by the end of the year. Any unoccupied territory will either be a grey zone, or can be exchanged for territory captured by Russia, in other provinces. As of 1st Mar, this is approx. 1400 sq km in Kharkov, 150 sq km in Dnipro (increasing) and approx. 250 sq km in Sumy oblast.
2. The damage to Ukraine’s economy and loss of manpower will be worse in 2026 than in 2025.
This will result in the inability of the Ukrainian
army to fight further – except on the defensive.
The damage to critical infrastructure (from more Russian missiles and drones
and a lower rate of interception) will most likely cross a tipping point –
power, heating, fuel storage and train
services will not be available at a scale to sustain military operations, or
normal life in cities.
3. The Russian economy, which was projected to have 0% GDP growth in 2026, will grow.
The estimated growth assuming a 50%
increase in the price of oil and gas for the next 6 months, will be 2.5 -3 .0%
in 2026 from the increased prices of oil and gas exports and a higher volume of
exports. Conversely, the EU’s GDP is expected to fall by close to 1% with
overall growth close to zero in 2026, constraining its ability to finance
Ukraine.
4. Russian production of all major weapon systems will continue to exceed losses.
Newly raised units would have been fully
equipped by mid-2026 and in some cases
stocks (of aircraft and missiles) are at the same levels as at the start of the
war.
1. Territory.
Russia’s plan for 2026, was summarized in a blog article at the end of 2025. It
lists objectives and timelines for every sector of the front, for 2026, which I
broadly agree with. In the three months since this was published, Russian
progress in each sector has been as per this plan.
https://simplicius76.substack.com/p/2025-end-of-year-wrap-up-and-battlefield
My view of each sector by the end of 2026:
North: Russian units will advance slightly (no more than 10km from their
current positions) either to
bring the major cities of Kharkov and Sumy within artillery and drone range, or
to increase the buffer zone with the Russian border – reducing Ukrainian drone
attacks inside Russia. Given the threat to Kharkov and Sumy, Ukraine cannot
afford not to deploy a large force to defend each city.
Kupiansk (North East): Russia will reach the east bank
of the Oskil River (which they have in several
places) which is a natural defensive line for Russia and can put pressure on
Kharkov from the east. There may be an attempt to take the logistics hub of
Izyum, which will also cut off a transport route to the cities of
Slavyansk-Kramatorsk (the only remaining cities in the Donbass occupied by
Ukraine).
Kherson (South West): No change in the front, as the
Dnieper is a strong defensive line for both sides and Russia have secured its
objectives in Kherson oblast, barring the capital – Kherson city. If Ukraine weakens
sufficiently, Russia may attempt a crossing of the Dnieper to take the city of
Kherson, or one of the islands the city lies on.
Zaporizhia (South): Russia’s objectives were to establish
and provide depth to a land bridge to Crimea which has been done, with over 70%
of the oblast captured. As the article by Simplicius suggests, Russia could
move within artillery and drone range of the city of Zaporizhia. Ukraine will have to deploy considerable
forces to defend the city (which they cannot afford to lose). This force will
have the Dnieper to their back, with supplies affected, when bridges across the
river (which have to supply both the urban population and the defending forces)
are attacked.
Donetsk (Centre): Russia will surround the last
remaining urban area of the Donbass – the twin cities of Slavyansk Kramatorsk
(see map) after taking the towns of (clockwise): Svyatohirsk, Lyman,
Kostyantynivka, Druzhkivka and Dobropilya.
It would be a replay of the battle for Pokrovsk-Mirograd where Russia slowly
took the city in a cauldron and squeezed its supply.
North Donetsk. Blue line is the current front and red is the expected Russian advance this year.
The maximum distance between these lines is 20km. This results in the Slovyansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration being enveloped and the roads supplying it cut off. Should Ukraine send more resources to defend it, it will weaken their forces to the North and South, enabling a Russian advance to the West or towards Izyum.
Map of the entire Donbass with Zaparozhye. The blue line is the current front line. The red line is the likely front line towards the end of 2026.
Analysis of manpower losses. I have found a recent analysis from the History legends channel, to be the most details and rigorous work in estimating KIA (killed in action) on both sides. It draws from existing sources – including Mediazona (for Russian losses) and UAlosses.orn that I have used and pointed out shortcomings in both.
Casualties analysis
The resulting figures, which I agree with, since the underlying data and
assumptions are transparent, are fairly similar and are:
Russia dead till 29 Feb 2026: 155726
Ukrainian dead till 28Feb 2026: 170537
On the Ukrainian side, Russian attacks
(bombs, drones and missiles) on rear areas have resulted in significant
casualties of those in support units, or support functions in the rear, which
are not always listed under casualties of active units. Thus the Ukrainian KIA
figure may be slightly understated.
Both sides have also list foreign mercenaries, though the confirmed number is
less than 1% of total deaths so I have disregarded them.
As I have been stating throughout this blog series, I consider irreplaceable
losses, which are:
Killed + Missing believed killed +
seriously wounded + deserted + prisoner.
Ukraine is also estimated to have 200,000
deserters not expected to return to battle. I have derived this estimate is
derived from the following article:
Ukraine's desertion crisis
Upto Sept 25 (just when monthly desertions
started increasing significantly) there were 53954
listed as deserted (article 408) with no intention of returning.
235646 were deserters under article 407 (absent for over 3 days, some of
whom may move to article 408).
Estimates from Oct 25 to Feb 26 (Ukraine
stopped publishing data on deserters towards the end of 2025) based on a Aug-Sept 25 monthly average, would be another 120000 under article
407 and 17000 under article 408. Assuming 1 in 3 temporary deserters becomes
permanent, it would give:
53954 + 17000 + 1/3 * (235646+120000) = 189502
`permanent’ deserters
While it can be argued that the 1/3 ratio
of temporary deserters becoming permanent increases the total number, I am
disregarding unreported cases of desertion (because commanders do not want to
get into the detailed procedure of reporting cases and because officers can use
equipment or pay of unreported deserters. There are Ukrainian sources that
concede that losses from desertion have crossed those killed in action.
For every soldier killed in action, there
are two who are seriously wounded and unable to return to combat. These are
therefore irrecoverable losses.
There are around 7000 Ukrainian prisoners of war in Russian custody.
Hence irrecoverable losses are: 170537 (dead) + 341000 (wounded) + 200000
(deserted) + 7000 (POW)
or 718000.
Since 1991, a total of approx. 1.75 million
Ukrainian men received military training, as conscripts.
This is the `universe’ of all men with military experience, aged upto 54.
Approx 20% of these moved abroad, or have escaped the draft
Another 20% live in Russian controlled areas.
1.05 million men with military experience remain.
Added to this are about 150000 permanent members of the armed forces at the
start of the war.
There are also an estimated 400,000 men and women with no military experience
who volunteered to join the Ukrainian military after 2022.
Of this pool of 1.6 million,
irrecoverable losses are 718000.
Of the remaining 882000: About 250000 are deployed as border guards
(preventing desertion across the border and guarding the quiet border with
Belarus). Another 100000 are armed police, or the corps used for training and
finding draft dodgers. A further 250,000 of those with relevant experience, are
deployed in a similar capacity in non-combat roles: e.g. in logistics,
maintenance, engineering, medical etc.
Of the total estimated size of the
Ukrainian armed forces of 600,000 (of which about 200-250000 are in combat
units) about 280000 are either volunteers or have prior military
experience – over half of those with military experience have not volunteered,
but conscripted in forced mobilization.
Thus over half of the Ukrainian military
are those with no military experience who have been conscripted. Half the
remainder have some military experience (less than a year as a conscript years
earlier and were also conscripted).
The Ukrainian army having as the bulk of
its strength, inexperienced conscripts, has two implications:
They can be used for limited defensive
tasks – occupying fortified positions supported by drones, not in an attacking
role, or be capable of more complex tasks – for e.g. using mechanized forces in
open ground and coordinating with other arms. All three Ukrainian counter
attacks (undertaken by a Corps level formation comprising several brigades)
conducted in 2025 failed.
Russia, based on loss trends per month and
casualties per sq km of territory taken (declining), should lose between 20 and
25000 dead this year, with irrecoverable losses of upto 75000 men. Russia will
recruit 360,000 men. Since the Russian armed forces reached its planned
(expanded) strength in 2025,
the remaining 285000 men would be those renewing contracts (not new signups).
This is consistent with
the duration of contracts for frontline soldiers. Thus Russia can replace
losses with men of equivalent quality and also ensure contracts typically last
for no more than 3 years while being able to rotate soldiers in and out of
combat. A combat strength of 600000: 200-250000 that Russia has over Ukraine,
would actually be closer to 500000 : 200-250000 men after considering
rotations.
The problem for Ukraine is that veteran soldiers are now serving in their 5th
year and others on the front line are not being rotated – as acknowledged by
the Ukrainian side. Coupled with inexperience and forced mobilization, there
might be a tipping point where formations under constant attack break.
Russia’s firepower advantage: Though artillery has traditionally been the cause of the largest
number of casualties in wars between peers, the Ukraine war has changed this
and drones are now the biggest source of casualties. Until the latter part of
2025, Ukraine had an advantage in FPV drones (which account for 2/3rd
of Russian casualties). Russia has caught up in FPV drone usage.
In artillery Russia has retained its advantage – 2.5 to 3 million shells per
year (152mm) vs 0.8-1.0 million for Ukraine.
Where the advantage is increasing is in long range (Geran) drones, Missiles and
glide bombs.
Estimated Russian Geran drone usage and interception by Ukraine are as follows:
|
|
Drones used |
Intercepted |
Hits |
|
2024 |
10970 |
7489 |
3480 |
|
2025 |
44228 |
28230 |
16000 |
|
2026 |
70000 (est) |
35000 |
35000 |
In UPMK (semi guided, glide) bombs, Russia
used an estimated 40,000 in 2024, 48000 in 2025 and likely to use over 65,000
in 2026*. What has changed is not the number, but the size (1000 and 1500kg
replacing 500kg) and the range, over 200km, making the attacking aircraft
immune to surface to air missiles.
* In Jan 2026 Russia used over 5700 UMPK bombs and capacity is increasing. On
27 Feb, Russia used an estimated 350 UMPK bombs, which was a record.
Thus while approx. 170 drones or UMPK bombs
hit Ukraine each day in 2025, this number is expected to be 270-275 per day in
2026. Given the increased lethality of drones (speed) and the increased size of
bombs, damage to Ukraine will be around double of 2025. This increased
firepower will be exacerbated by better targeting and fewer targets (e.g. power
transmission stations, or energy facilities that are still intact). Guided
missiles (ballistic and cruise) increased from an average of 7-8 per day in 2025
to 9 per day in Jan-Feb 2026. This is contrary to the view expressed since
2022, that Russia was about to run out of missiles. Interception rates which –
as per Russian reports, are falling, will be affected in 2026, with a shortage
of Patriot missiles to intercept missiles and drones, since all available stock
was diverted to the Middle East.
The economy:
Russia’s economy had falling growth for 4 consecutive quarters (from 3.3% in Q4
2024
to 0.6% in Q4 2025, ending 2025 at an estimated 1% growth (this is what President
Putin mentioned in his annual address. The forecast by the IMF was 1.5% growth for
2025). Growth would have been zero to negative if not for the Iran war. If oil
and gas revenues increase by 50% (as they have in March) it will result in a 2.5%
(2.5-3.0%) increase in GDP in 2026. Russian GDP growth in 2026 is expected to
be higher than for the EU, whose growth will fall by an estimated 1% due to
higher energy costs.
Russian interest rates have fallen from 21% in Q4 2025, to 15.5% now.
I would expect speedier completion of the
power of Siberia-2 das pipeline, which would double the volume of gas sent to
China and would exceed what was supplied to Germany under Nord stream. This
project was held up only on the assumption of a global oversupply of gas, after
Qatar expanded its gas output. Not only has the Iran war put that project on
hold, but has removed 17% of Qatar’s gas output, making Russian gas the only
alternative for China.
This would mean that the Russian economy
would show real strain from the war effort not before 2027, rather than 2026,
as predicted earlier. Conversely, Europe ability to fund the war, in the
absence of the US, would be lower. There would be little money beyond the Euro
90 billion (a loan unlikely to be repaid) that has not been cleared at the time
of writing. If however, there is a peace deal with Iran,
Oil prices (not gas) would fall back to $ 60-70 a barrel once more Iranian oil is available, which will hit the Russian economy in 2027.
A peace deal.
The US had apparently offered security guarantees to Ukraine as part of a peace
deal, if it vacated the parts of the Donbass (Donetsk oblast) under their
control. This was rejected by Ukraine, but might be moot if the area is either taken
by Russia, or partly taken, with Russia willing to give up more valuable land
in other provinces.
Given the possibility of a lame duck US
presidency after the November mid-terms, there would be pressure on President
Trump to push for a deal before that. By then I would expect Russia to have met
its territorial objectives and Ukraine more amenable to a deal.
https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/russia-economy-low-growth/
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