Longewala 1971 - The reality and counter factuals
The movie `Border' brought the 1971 India-Pakistan war – more specifically the Battle of
Longewala, into popular imagination. While movies, particularly those by
Bollywood which have traditionally taken liberties with historical accuracy,
are allowed some license in portraying events, I think the reality of the
Battle of Longewala brings out more of the ethos of the Indian army than the
movie shows.
Nor is the revisionist claim that there was no real ground battle and the IAF did everything, correct.
There is also a larger strategic picture that is missed when talking of the
heroic stand of 120 men at Longewala. What the battle achieved strategically
has been little understood. Information on the battle, of the kind that will
interest a serious student of military history is scarce. After trawling
through them, this piece attempts to show what really happened, why the reality
was more impressive than the movie and how it affected the larger picture.
What
Longewala was not:
Longewala was not simply the story of 120 isolated men defeating an armoured brigade. That popular version understates what actually made the battle remarkable: A small forward company held a post long enough for battalion, brigade, artillery and air-force commanders to react rapidly and turn a dangerous penetration into a Pakistani defeat. It was not however a last stand against huge odds. The larger point is leaving posts isolated, to be attacked by
far superior enemy forces, represent a failure to deploy troops properly, or an
intel failure in anticipating where the enemy might attack.
We did have heroic last stands in the 1962 war – Joginder Singh’s platoon of 1
Sikh at Tongpen La. Capt. Shaitan Singh’s C company, 13 Kumaon at Rezang La, or
Maj Dhan Singh Thapa’s D company 1/8 Gurkha rifles at Sirjap. All these
deployments, were, with the benefit of hindsight, avoidable. All were last
stands – we lost almost all our men and the post.
None of these were true at Longewala. What should be commended was the
flexibility in deployment displayed at Longewala, by different formations. For
the defenders at Longewala, the very light casualties suffered (3 dead),
against a superior force, while holding the post and later throwing back the
enemy.
What could have been in the movie:
There were two commanders at Longewala for most of the battle. Maj Kuldip
Singh Chandpuri – commanding A company 23 Punjab, who was the hero of the movie
and Maj. Kulvinder Singh, who commanded the 185(3) mortar battery supporting A
company.
The
commanding officer of 23 Punjab – Lt Col. Kursheed Hussain CO 23 Punjab and adjutant of 185 light regiment Capt. Zameeruddin Shah (later Lt. Gen and VC of
Aligarh Muslim University), took timely action to reinforce Longewala. The
religion of both officers is irrelevant in the secular ethos of the Indian
army. However, seeing a Muslim CO playing a role in our victory, would have had
an impact on the viewing public.
Air
observation pilot, Maj. Atma Singh, who observed the Pakistani force
approaching, had to crash land in during the fighting, in `no man’s land’ and
the Pakistanis would have liked to capture him. He was rescued by a patrol of
23 Punjab and resumed flying thereafter. The Russians made a hit movie `Pilot’
on the same theme.
Getting artillery and ammo to 23 Punjab: It involved the
artillery commander taking a decision to reinforce Longewala on the spot, his
battery commander innovating to get his guns to the unit, without maps, any
proper road, in the dark & radio silence and with the enemy all around.
The big picture: The fighting on the Western front,
mostly in Jammu and Punjab has been well documented. The area between southern
Punjab and Gujarat saw relatively little fighting. However, Pakistan had plans
for an offensive in southern Punjab, particularly if an Indian offensive in
East Pakistan looked like succeeding (which it did). This offensive became
particularly important, when in the north, India pre-empted a similar offensive
by advancing into the Shakargarh bulge.
Pakistan’s II Corps which was to conduct this offensive, was based in the Multan-Bahawalpur
area (see map). It comprised: 1 Armoured division, 33 Infantry
division and 7th Infantry division. It could also have used tank
regiments of the neighbouring 18th division, which were however
assigned to the Longewala battle. In addition, Pakistan’s 25th
brigade, south of 11 Corps, was intended to either support this offensive,
or support 18th Division, against any Indian attacks from Rajasthan
into Sindh.
To oppose II Corps, India had its 1 Armoured division and 14th
Infantry, apart from three brigades (Foxtrot sector) spread along the south Punjab,
North Rajasthan border. 14th Infantry division had one of its three
brigades reassigned. India had 8 brigades to Pakistan’s 9 (or 10, if Pakistan’s 25 brigade was included). A Pakistani offensive with 10 brigades, vs 8
Indian, might have taken some territory in the first few days, before India’s 1
Armoured division (placed further from the border) arrived, giving Pakistan a propaganda
victory.
Deployment in Rajasthan (see map)
Pakistan had its 18th infantry division, with 2 armoured regiments. Of the 3 Brigades of 18th Division, the 51 and 206 Brigades were assigned for the Longewala operation and to handle India’s 12th Infantry division in the area between Jaisalmer and Rahim Yar Khan. Both tank regiments – 38 and 22 Cavalry were also to support the Longewala operation and were attached to 51 and 206 brigade.
In the South, Pakistan’s 55 Brigade (the remaining brigade
from 18 Division) was deployed.
Pakistan also had 25th (independent) Brigade,
between II corps and 18 division.
India had 2 divisions in Central and South Rajasthan (see
map). In the Jaisalmer area, 12 Division was supposed to advance towards
Islamgarh and Rahim Yar Khan.
In the Barmer sector, 11 Division was to advance towards Naya Chor.
As the map shows, there was a large gap between India’s 11
and 12 Divisions. This was not unexpected. The area between 11 and
12 divisions (Jaisalmer to Barmer) had few tracks where vehicles could operate,
or a large force supplied. This area was held by border posts.
As the map shows, posts like Longewala, connected by a track to its neighbouring
posts Sadewala and Ghutaru, ran parallel to the border.
Pakistan had fewer soldiers in the Rajasthan sector - 4 brigades (counting the 25th
) to 6 Indian, but more tanks, which were concentrated for the Longewala
operation.
The Pakistani plan (see map) was to move from Sandh to Longewala.
One group (a tank regiment with infantry) would capture Longewala, while a
similar sized group would advance along the road to Ramgarh and then Jaisalmer,
unhinging and cutting off the supply road to 12th Division. Ramgarh
was our logistics base for 12 Division.
What actually happened:
Deployment of both sides: Putting together both Indian and Pakistani
accounts of the battle, I have been able to conclude that this was the most
likely sequence of events.
The Pakistani force assigned to the Longewala operation had
to move almost 100km from
the rail head to the border. Spread out over 20km in flat desert, with a
limited road network, they would be quite visible to aircraft. The day before the battle, IAF aircraft checking the route
the Indian army intended to advance across (in Pak) failed to identify the
expected concentration of Pak forces, particularly tanks, known to be in the
area. However, a column of tanks was spotted advancing towards India on a
different route. The Pakistani force (51 brigade) tasked with the advance
towards Longewala and beyond, would have stretched 20 km. On the evening of 4th
Dec, the Indian 12th division, knew of the presence of a Pakistani
armoured force, that could potentially cross the border, but not where.
There
are differing accounts of how the info about the Pak armoured force was acted
on – was it uncertainly, or an intel failure ?
At 1600h on 4th Dec, a patrol of 23 Punjab led by
2/Lt Dharam Vir, reached the border – Border posts 635/638, as a forward screen.
This was about 16 km from Longewala.
At that time, Pakistani tanks were at Gabar in Pakistan, 30
km from the border.
At around midnight 2/Lt Dharam Veer reports hearing
tanks from Pakistan heading for the border. This is the first concrete info
India had of a Pakistani armoured force heading on the track towards Longewala.
Both side's accounts suggest that the tanks he heard were in Masitwari Bhit,
about 6km from his location on the border. One Indian account says he heard
tanks just after 2300. 2/Lt Dharam Veer’s own account says close to midnight.
This was when the CO 23 Punjab, Lt Col Khursheed Hussain was informed. Maj
Chandpuri started preparing his position for immediate action.
We know the Pakistani
force from 51 Brigade, assigned to take Longewala had some changes to
its original formation. On 3rd Dec, when war broke out it comprised:
- 38 Baluch,
- 22 Cavalry (Type-59 tanks).
- 38 Cavalry (Sherman tanks)
- Recon force from 28 Baluch
- A 130mm artillery battery
- 7 East Bengal (disbanded as they were unreliable/ unavailable).
51 Brigade also had 10 Punjab but they appeared too late to influence the battle.
The 206 Brigade (from which 38 Cavalry came) had 20 Frontier force,
which started to participate in the operation but did not take part in the
battle.
38 Cavalry
had WW2 era Sherman tanks, considered not fit for desert operations. 22 Cavalry
had more modern Type 59 tanks.
The Pakistani
account says that at 2100h, tanks of 22 Cavalry were refuelling at
Masitwari Bhit, followed by 6 tanks of 38 Cavalry. 38 Baluch was accompanying
22 Cavalry.
Artillery had passed though that location earlier.
At 2300. Tanks of 22 Cavalry, with soldiers of 38 Baluch riding on them,
start moving to the border. This is what 2/Lt Dharam Veer heard. The Indian
account says they reached BP 638 at 2230. The Pakistani account says they were 5km from the
border at 2300h.
At 0030 Pak opened artillery fire.
At 0200
The first part of 22 Cavalry reached Longewala. Possibly one company of 38 Baluch
accompanying the tanks were with 22 Cavalry. 38 Cavalry attempted to follow but
of their 6 tanks, only 2 made it to within 3 km of Longewala – the others being
stuck in soft sand or with breakdowns. This is different from the account that
says the post fought off attacks from 51 Brigade, 206 Brigade and 2 armoured
regiments.
Earlier,
around 0000, CO 23 Punjab, Lt Col Hussein was informed of the tanks
advancing towards BP 638. He identified Longewala as the likely target and
reinforced it, with two jeep mounted 106mm guns and a medium machine gun
section. This is firepower usually available to a battalion, not a company and
may have contributed to Pakistan’s hesitation in attacking the post later. At
the same time, artillery support was requested. Lt Col. Dhawan, CO of 185
regiment, ordered the regiment's no 3 Battery, under Maj. Kulvinder Singh to move to Longewala.
At 0230,
the reinforcement of the 106mm guns and medium machine guns reached Longewala. Air
support was also requested at 0230.
At 0300 The
185(3) battery of 120mm mortars under Major Kulvinder Singh reached Longewala
and started setting up. They were ready to start firing around 0400. From being
first informed of the threat to Longewala, to artillery being despatched, to
mortars arriving at Longewala was a very fast reaction time by the standards of
1971.
At 0400 Brigadier
Ramadoss commanding 30 Brigade of 12 Division, assumed responsibility
for organizing reinforcements to Longewala. He asks for the following
reinforcements:
1701
field battery is ordered
to support Longewala.
2/Lt PK Gupta took the initiative and started firing at enemy positions,
without waiting for
an artillery OP officer, instead using Maj Chandpuri’s men to observe his
artillery fire.
1 company
of 17 Rajputana Rifles ordered to move to Longewala. Significantly,
Brig. Ramadoss assessed the threat to Longewala as requiring an infantry
reinforcement of no more than 1 company, instead of the whole battalion of 17
RajRif, which he would need, in case the Pakistan force bypassed Longewala
4 AMX-13 tanks (part of the armoured regiment held much further back, also ordered to Longewala). 3 of them arrived for the battle. Both Pakistani and Brig Ramodoss's account says one of the four tanks was hit.
Concerned about Pak bypassing Longewala (moving into Sadewala - the jumping off point for India's
own offensive) Brig Ramadoss ordered a company of 6/5 Gorkha rifles placed as a screen about 2 km ahead of Sadhewala, while the remainder of 6/5 GR remained available around the Sadhewala concentration.
If there was more pressure on Longewala, Brig Ramadoss had arranged for the rest of 17 Raj Rif and 6th Independent armoured squadron (14 * T-55 Tanks) to reach Longewala by noon on the 5th.
Thus, by the morning of 5th Dec. Longewala would have in support of the post:
- 1 company 23 Punjab. + a BSF unit.
- 1 company 17 RajRif
- 1853 mortar battery
- 1701 field battery firing in indirect support.
- 4 AMX-13 tanks.
- Air support.
With 6th Armoured squadron, the rest of 17 Raj Rif, 6/5 GR and 13 Kumaon held in reserve.
The Pakistani force attacking Longewala thus far were 22 Cavalry with 38
Baluch with
an artillery battery.
38 Cavalry, with 28 Baluch and 20 FF (frontier force) were
to follow up.
The
fighting:
Pakistani artillery opens fire at 0200 (The Indian source says 0030,
Pakistan says 0200). This was in support of 22 Cavalry who reached Longewala at
0230, so 0200 seems more plausible. The Pakistani account specifies an order
given to fire from 0200. There was also a view that 0200 might be too early, warning the Indians of the impending attack – in which case 0030 would have
been far too early.
At 0230 Pakistani tanks started bypassing the Longewala post, cutting
off the road from Longewala to Jaisalmer and then Tanot - Longewala. This was
in line with the original Pakistani plan to bypass Longewala and advance
towards Ramgarh and then Jaisalmer.
However, the follow up units that were supposed to capture and hold Longewala –
38 Cavalry and a recon unit of 28 Baluch that were now part of 51 Brigade,
after a last minute shuffling of units between 51 and 206 brigade, were nowhere
to be seen. The account of CO 38 Cavalry candidly says that only 2 of his 6
tanks that started from their staging area made it to within 3 km of Longewala
– the others had broken down, or were immobilized in soft sand. He had the
bizarre story of NCOs of 38 Cavalry recon troop hiding their vehicles so as not to advance. The recon unit of 28 Baluch was also not available having moved off in another direction - its CO Lt. Col Shah, said his orders to to make a wide outflanking movement around Longewala.
Another infantry unit 20 Frontier force, had all its civilian trucks unable to
move in the sand and had to march on foot. In the absence of these units, it
was decided that 22 Cavalry and 38 Baluch attack Longewala.
Between
0230 and 0400 there were probing attacks on the Longewala post, possibly by 1
squadron (12-14 tanks) of 22 Cavalry and 1 company from 38 Baluch. In this
period, a tank was hit by an Indian 106mm jeep mounted gun.
This was the time Pakistan had a numerical advantage, but failed to attack, or
just bypass the post and move on. There are several possible reasons.
The Indian
side’s account was that seeing a strand of barbed wire, the Pakistanis assumed
it denoted a minefield, stopped at the wire and waited two hours for sappers to
come up and clear the minefield. The Pakistani account makes no such mention,
but says a tank was hit by a mine, causing everyone to pause.
The
Pakistani account also mentions the absence of the Brigade CO Tariq Mir, who
could have planned the attack on the spot, or decided to bypass it. One account says he lost his nerve.
Because of
fire from the Indian 106mm jeep mounted guns and – after 0400, heavy
mortars of 185(3) battery, the Pakistanis may have assumed that they were facing
a much stronger position than one held by a 120 man company. That, and a combination of uncertainty of
operating in the dark (which neither side liked to do with tanks at night),
location and depth of a possible minefield and soft sand, all may have led the
Pakistani force to wait till dawn to stage a stronger attack on the post – they
may also have hoped that 38 Cav and 28 Baluch with 20 Frontier force would show up by then.
At 0400, the Pakistani account says all 3 squadrons of 22 Cavalry were
on 3 sides of Longewala. Between 0400
and 0600, the Pakistanis made ineffective attacks, with 23 Punjab now having
supporting fire from 1853 mortar battery.
At around 0600 (the Pakistani account says 0700) the Pakistanis made a
more determined attack. Pakistani sources say it was with 1 squadron of tanks
and 2 companies of 38 Baluch. Pakistan had all
3 squadrons of tanks
in place with 4 companies of 38 Baluch available. However, Gen Bajwa's account also mentions one company of tanks and two companies of 38 Baluch. This was the most critical
part of the fighting where the Pakistanis got to within 100 meters of Maj
Chandpuri’s command post. The IAF account was that one tank was engaged 50 yards
from the helipad of the Longewala post.
There was a
time just before sunrise (0700) when 1853 battery ran short of ammo. Maj
Kulwinder Singh CO of 1853 battery says they started firing smoke shells. The Pakistanis
may have assumed it was a prelude to an Indian attack – since by now they could
hear some Indian tanks approaching – the 4 AMX tanks, which may have been 30
for all Pak knew. The smoke was followed by firing from 1701 field battery with
heavier guns than 1853 mortar battery.
By now, some guns of India’s 168 artillery regiment had joined 1701 battery in
firing at the Pakistanis.
The real
achievement of 23 Punjab at this stage, was that they lost only 3 men during
the entire fighting – Sepoy Jagjit Singh, Sepoy Charan Das and Sepoy Bishan
Das.
Between 0702
and 0715. The first IAF attack, with two Hunters took place. Between two
and five tanks were destroyed during this attack – accounts vary. The Pakistani
force did not know if this was a one off attack, or not. They decided to resume
their attack. As a prelude, their tanks had to form up again, breaking a semi
encirclement around Longewala.
The second IAF attack took place between 0730 and 0745. It was
believed to have destroyed six more tanks.
Interestingly
earlier that day, the Pakistani air force attacked Jaisalmer with a single
C-130 dropping 34 bombs. None caused damage. If the PAF reported that the base was
disabled, it may have contributed to the army’s shock when experiencing non-stop air
attacks the next day.
The movie showed the frustration of the IAF not being able to use their Hunters
at night. The problem is not in the Hunter flying, but being able to identify a
target in the dark – and land on an unlit airstrip. During the attacks, the IAF
had a spotter aircraft to help them identify targets. Maj. Atma Singh, piloting
that light aircraft had to crash land at one stage and was rescued by 23
Punjab.
At around
0900h, when ordered by the Divisional commander to capture Longewala, Brig,
Tariq Mir refused, saying the position was too strong. At this time 3 AMX-13 tanks
had arrived, along with a company from 17 Raj Rif. The danger to Longewala had
ended.
By the end of the day, 22 Cavalry lost 17 tanks, almost all to air strikes (Pak account).
At 1700h Pakistan's 1 Punjab and 10 Punjab had arrived, while 20 Frontier force had arrived earlier. The IAF had completed their air strikes for the day (it was getting dark). By this time however, 51 brigade having decided that Longewala could not be taken, had started withdrawing.
The Indian
account is that Pakistan lost between 34-37 tanks, along with 40-50 other
vehicles. This is plausible because it includes abandoned tanks. 22 Cavalry had
42 tanks to begin with. 38 Cavalry had 4 tanks broken down (2 destroyed by
their own side) and possibly 2 more in the vicinity of Longewala. The rest did not take part in the Longewala
battle.
The Pakistani side did almost the opposite of India: A numerically powerful force was progressively reduced by poor movement planning, mechanical failures, transport failures, command confusion and piecemeal arrival, until only a fraction of the nominal force was actually attacking Longewala at any one time.
The
consequences:
India’s 11th Infantry division advancing from southern Rajasthan
into Sindh, was pushing back Pakistan’s 55 brigade. Outnumbered 3 to 1, 55
Brigade had to be reinforced by 60 Brigade from 33 Division. 60 Brigade was
originally earmarked for II Corps (of which 33 Div was a part) offensive into
south Punjab.
The
surviving units of 55 and 206 brigades had to be redeployed against India’s 12
Division, now advancing into Pakistan. Pakistan’s 25th Brigade,
which could have covered the southern part of a possible II corps attack into
India, now had to be retained as a reserve, in case 51 & 206 brigades fell
back against 12 Division. The loss of both 60 and 25 Brigades from II Corps’s
planned offensive, made an already problematic offensive unviable. Thus, Longewala contributed to preventing II Corps offensive getting underway.
The advance
of 11 and 12 Division into Pakistan was criticized by some as being too
cautious. However, India’s objective was not to take territory, it was to
ensure that Pakistani forces would be fighting in their own territory. Our
advance did not face a problem of vehicles floundering in the sand, protection
from air strikes, or poor supplies, because it was better planned.
The map (below)
shows the territory captured by 11 Division – along with 10 Para commando who
did deep penetration raids.
11 Infantry division captured around 5000 sq km of territory and 12th division 800 sq km
Counter factual 1.
Pakistan’s best case scenario:
What if Pakistan bypassed Longewala, as per their original plan ?
Assume by
0230, 22 Cavalry has bypassed Longewala – the defenders cannot stop this, but
will report that their position is being bypassed. Lt. Col Akram Syed simply
assumes that Longewala will be occupied by the units following -38 Cavalry and
20 frontier force, or 1 Punjab, so he proceeds to Ramgarh, along with 38 Baluch.
However, it
isn’t as simple as driving along a road to Ramgarh. 22 Cav’s tanks have already
travelled 100 km. They need to refuel. They need to find a track, in the dark,
that their heavy Type 59 tanks can use. In all probability they will still get
to Ramgarh by dawn. However, 38 Cav and their accompanying infantry will not get to Longewala.
The
Indian reaction:
The 4 AMX-13 tanks asked to move to Longewala will instead move to the Ramgarh-Longewala road to delay the tanks of 22 Cavalry.
6/5 GR will move towards Longewala (still held by A company 23 Punjab), cutting
off the supply route for 22 Cavalry, moving to Ramgarh.
4 Maratha
LI, in Ramgarh on the 4th night, will be asked to stay there and
prepare for the
defence of Ramgarh, supported by an artillery regiment – either 167 or 168.
All the
tanks of 20 Lancers (AMX-13) reach the Longewala area by noon on 5th
Dec.
Along with them are 17 Raj Rif and 13 Kumaon -the nearest units to both Ramgarh
and Longewala. They can attack the Pakistani force between Longewala and
Ramgarh, from the north and south, and/or reinforce 6/5 GR, in case Pakistan’s 38
Cavalry with 20 Frontier force, or 1 Punjab tries to break the ring surrounding
22 Cav/38 Baluch.
The tanks of India’s 6 independent Armoured
squadron (14 * T-55 tanks) which are more than a match for the Type 59, reach Ramgarh
during the day and with 4 Maratha LI
are enough to defend the town. The AMX-13 tanks which would be in Longewala by noon, would have an advantage over the mechanically unreliable Sherman tanks of 38 Cav.
For the
IAF, it would no longer be a mission to save a single company, but an emergency
to save the supply base of an entire division. Every available IAF aircraft
would be throw into the attack. 22 Cav would have been lost – along with most
of 38 Cav, if they got to Longewala.
With 4 serviceable aircraft, the IAF hunters at Jaisalmer flew 17 sorties
against the Pak force at Longewala on the 5th of Dec and another 18 on the 6th.
The IAF could have, in theory, used HF-24 (Marut) aircraft in Uttarlai and moved Hunters from Jamnagar to Jaisalmer (in reality, 8 more Hunters were moved to Jaisalmer,
on 7th Dec, but they were, by then under-utilized). So, against this
theoretical scenario, the IAF could have generated more than double the number
of sorties than they historically did.
The PAF could not have intervened effectively, as Jacobabad airfield (the only facility they had in the area) was not operational. The PAF informed the army before the Longewala operation, but 18 Division decided to press on regardless. In a similar situation in the India side, civilian labour got Bhuj airfield operational.
At best a
quick armoured raid to destroy supply dumps and rear area facilities at Ramgarh might have succeeded but, as the Pakistanis also concluded later, it
was a very high risk gamble with potentially far higher losses than they
historically lost at Longewala.
Counter factual 2. Pak begins its attack 24 hours later
This has two advantages.
The CO Pak 38 Cavalry says in his memoir, that a pre-requisite for this operation was that his
forces form up on the 4th night and cross the border on the 5th night (a day later). That is what this scenario is. The other condition was the presence of the PAF which did not happen. Hence, in this scenario:
- There is no staggered arrival of Pak forces. Instead of only 22 Cav and 38 Baluch in position to
advance towards Longewala, there would also be 1 Punjab, 10 Punjab and 20 Frontier force and
some of the tanks of 38 Cavalry.
- Some of India's 12th Divison would have advanced into Pak, reducing the numbers who could have intervened at Longewala.
However, given the extra 24 hours, a combination of air recon, signals intelligence and the fact that
the units of 12 Division would have found nothing in front of them, as they advanced towards Rahim Yar Khan, would have led to the discovery of Pakistan's 51 and 206 brigades in their assembly point.
The concentration of two brigades would have invited an immediate air strike, the repositioning of more aircraft to attack the following day and the return of some of 12 Division (which was advancing very slowly), to protect Longewala.
On the 5th night/6th morning, India would have had around Longewala:
2 Tank squadrons (Pak would have 3 squadrons of Type 59 and upto 3 of inferior Shermans).
3 artillery regiments (Pak had 1) with the following infantry battalions:
4 Maratha LI, 17 Raj Rif, 6/5 Gurkha and 13 Kumaon, reinforcing A company of 23 Punjab.
(4 Indian battalions against 4 Pakistani).
India could halt the main RYK advance (it had only intended to do it on D+5) while leaving its leading elements holding the ground already gained. The Pakistani concentration around Gabar / Masitwari would meanwhile have stripped much of 18 Division's mobile strength from the RYK front. Pakistan would therefore face the uncomfortable choice of continuing its now-detected Ramgarh offensive, or returning forces to oppose 12 Division's developing penetration. In all, it would be Pakistan's 25th Independent Brigade (detached to defend RYK) with 51 and 206 Brigade of 18 Div, fighting India's 12 Div with IAF support. It would be a battle of attrition that Pak would be at a disadvantage without air support and without a numerical advantage on the ground.
What happened to the Pakistani officers:
The decorations given to the Indian officers for Longewala were well documented. Less is known about the Pakistanis. There was a mention of NCOs from 38 Cavalry being court martialled for their role at Longewala, but little is known about senior officers:
Maj Gen
BM Mustafa CO of 18
Division, was relieved of command, the day after Longewala and instead of facing
a court martial, was to be tried in public, for neglect of duty. His plan for Longewala was judged militarily
unsound and haphazardly planned. The trial never took place.
Brig.
Tariq Mir. CO 51
Brigade Relieved of command, but no court martial. He joined the diplomatic
corps and was ambassador to Sri Lanka, Iraq and Iran.
Brig Jahanzeb
`Bobby’ Arbab CO of
206 Brigade should have been held responsible for a logistics disaster that
prevented his 206 brigade from getting to Longewala. Trucks were not made
available for 20 FF and he chose routes unsuitable for heavy vehicles. 38
Cavalry’s tanks were also unsuited for the operation. He was later suspended,
not for Longewala but for misappropriating money in East Pakistan where he was
posted earlier. Reinstated and promoted to Lt Gen.
Lt. Col
Akram Syed of 22
Cavalry was held not responsible for losing most of his tanks to air strikes. He
did manage to move his tanks 100km in the desert and got all of them to Longewala,
which 38 Cav failed to do. He however disregarded his orders to bypass Longewala
(as did his superior, who was absent) and advance towards Ramgarh. He became secretary to the new army C in C.
Lt. Col
Zahir Khan CO of 38
Cavalry, was quickly promoted to Colonel and, in less than a year, to
Brigadier, before being asked to retire. 38 Cav’s problems at Longewala were
considered to be due to logistics and mechanical problems, beyond his control.
Maj
Ghulam Mujtaba.
Court martialled for cowardice, but in an operation after Longewala.
Three personnel from Pakistan's 18th division got a gallantry award for the 1971 war. Surprisingly all three were from Army aviation and none for the battles in around Longewala.
On the Indian side the contribution of 185(3) battery was recognised only in 2019 and included in the Longewala war memorial in 2024.
Link to all my articles on Indian military history:
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Sources:
2. View from Pak - of CO 38 Cav - Brig ZA Khan.
https://genbajwa.blogspot.com/2008/08/battle-of-laungewala.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com
(His blog is an accessible version of his article for the United services institute)
Ramgarh was considered more achievable and taking that would have cut off the supply route and base of 12 Div.
Brig. ZA Khan says the Gen was absent from the battle. The brigade commander who lost control of the battle may have ordered the attack. The next afternoon, a junior officer sent by helicopter, by the GOC 1th Division, asked for the attack on Longewala, but was told by CO 51 Brigade that it could no longer be captured.
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