Gaza war (part 4) - Israel's quiet turnaround

 After 6 months of the ground war, I want to look at how Israel fared so far.

Israel had the following objectives:
Operational:
1. Destroy Hamas’s capacity to be threat.
2. Get their hostages back
3. Handle any threat from Hezbollah, West Bank, or others while operating against Hamas.

Strategic:
1. Put any talk of a Palestinian state on the back burner (as it has been after Saudi and UAE
    normalized relations with Israel)

Hamas had the following objectives:
Operational:
1. Demonstrate that Israel was not invincible (either on Oct 7, or in subsequent fighting).  
2. Get back some of their prisoners in exchange for hostages.

Strategic:
1. Force the world community to seriously discuss the creation of a Palestinian state.
2. Start a larger war against Israel with the participation of Hezbollah, Iranian proxies and other
     Palestinians in the west bank.

My view, as expressed in part 1 of this series, was that if the IDF suffered 10,000 irrecoverable casualties (dead + wounded seriously enough to be unable to fight again) which Hamas remained
standing would be a defeat for Israel. 10,000 because that would exceed the irrecoverable casualties of the IDF in the 1973 Yom Kippur war, which despite the victory was a traumatic event for Israel.
https://rpdeans.blogspot.com/2023/10/what-israeli-invasion-of-gaza-might.html

More importantly, 10,000 irreplaceable casualties would represent a high proportion of the IDF’s infantry strength. It would have weakened the IDF to a point where Hezbollah would be encouraged to intervene, or there may have been a Palestinian uprising in the West bank.

Perversely, if 50,000 civilians were killed in Gaza, it would be a victory for Hamas, because world opinion would turn against Israel, leading to Arab unity, more violence against Israel and serious steps by the world community to force some sort of 2 state solution on Israel.  

Oct 7^th 2023 represented in my view, the biggest failure of intelligence in Israeli military history. It has been likened to the intelligence failure before the Yom Kipper war of 1973 which also started on 7^th Oct. However, in that case, correct intelligence was obtained, it was not properly interpreted and
not acted upon. In this case, arrogance, reliance on AI models and possible poor tactical awareness of the Israeli troops around Gaza, led to the intel failure and its aftermath.

The aftermath of 7^th Oct boosted Hamas. It achieved the Hamas objective of bursting the myth of Israeli invincibility. The shelling and air strikes after the ground war resulted in 500 civilian casualties per day and united the Muslim world against Israel, including bringing Shia Iran and Sunni Saudi Arabia together.

By the end of November, the IDF looked to be in difficulty. I had commented on IDF losses in an earlier post. https://rpdeans.blogspot.com/2023/12/the-gaza-war-by-numbers-2-months-later.html

 Officer losses were 25% of total deaths. The loss of over 100 officers, with another 220 wounded seriously enough to be classified as irrecoverable (based on the IDF’s declared casualty figures and classification of wounded), meant the loss of over 300 officers concentrated in a few brigades. This was exacerbated by the lack of an experienced NCO or Senior NCO (JCO in India) cadre, which made entire battalions leaderless, at anything above platoon level. Either the IDF had 20 year old sergeants,
or there were older recalled reservists who had not spent much time in their units.
I had calculated, based on losses of men in the armored corps, that the IDF lost 66 tanks, with an equal number damaged enough to be out of action for some time.

Civilian casualties in Gaza between Oct and Dec were around 250 a day.

A validation of my analysis might be the deployment of the reserve 179 armored brigade to Gaza after a month of fighting and the deployment of officer cadets from an officer training school into the fighting. 

The Israeli government was, at this time the most unpopular in history and possibly the most divided
internally.  There seemed to be an unprecedented level of unity in the Muslim world against Israel.
Israel agreed to a ceasefire, which also resulted in a partial exchange of hostages for prisoners.
  
From December, there was a turnaround, which in my view has not been appreciated.  

The turnaround. This can be explained by 3 sets of figures

1. In the last 3 months of the ground war (Jan 25 – Apr 25), the IDF lost just 51 men, compared to
   553 dead between 07 Oct and 25 Jan (plus 61 dead from the Israeli police and paramilitary).
   Casualties have been reducing each month: 109 dead in Dec, 53 in Jan, 21 in Feb, 16 in March and
   only 4 in April.

Against a total of 604 dead (including those of 7th Oct), Hamas has lost between 7000 (Gaza estimate) & 12000 men (Israel's estimate) with a 1:1 dead to wounded ratio. 

In comparison, the 2004 battle of Mosul where the elite US 101 Airborne division fought Sunni militants and the Battle for Raqqa in 2017 (Syrian groups and US special forces vs ISIS), which were similar to Gaza the casualty ratio was roughly 1:4 in favor of the attackers. Here it is a 1:15 ratio
in favor of the IDF, even after considering the high IDF casualties of 7th Oct.  

Morale: In part 1 of this series, I made a point about the will to fight. I suggested that if the attacks of 7th Oct were made out of desperation at their plight - living in the world's largest concentration camp was an analogy used by some to describe the population of Gaza, then Hamas, with no where to retreat to, would fight to the end (as it happened in the Warsaw ghetto uprising in 1943) and the Israeli's would take heavy casualties. This has not happened. Where causes of death of IDF soldiers have been described, there are hardly any killed in hand to hand, or close quarter fighting (which characterized the fighting for cities like Stalingrad, or more recently Bakhmut). 
IDF casualties are mostly from IED's, ambushes, anti tank weapons fired from a distance, or friendly fire. There have been surrenders of Hamas fighters starting from December, with a corresponding
lull in the fighting over time.      

Under these circumstances, the vast tunnel network under Gaza, simply becomes an underground
prison, unless Hamas fighters can use them to get behind Israeli positions. In the last 2 months the IDF has not lost anyone from such attacks.  

 2. Casualties among Gaza’s population have dropped from over 250 a day between Oct and Dec 2023,
     to 100 a day from Jan to 20^th April, as per Gaza’s health ministry.
     This fall is more dramatic when considering 2 factors:

- The quality of medical care for the injured has deteriorated as the war has continued.
- Gaza’s mortality rates in peace time (3.9 per 1000) are 23 per day. The number of Hamas fighters     dead and included in the overall casualty figures are 50 /day (9000 dead is the midpoint of Israeli
  and Hamas estimates). Thus the civilian deaths from Israel’s actions fell from 177 (Oct-Dec)
   to 27 per day (Jan-Apr).

3. There were no significant disturbances along the Northern Border (Hezbollah), the West Bank  (Palestinians) and from Iranian proxies in Syria, because they took disproportionately high casualties
whenever they attacked Israelis.

This had the following effect on the IDF’s deployment.

IDF’s deployment:
The main unit of organization of the Israeli Army is a brigade. The composition of brigades in a division varies. Some divisions with a static HQ are skeleton units, filled up by brigades depending on the situation in their area. However, given the large number of brigades deployed for the Gaza operation, I will refer to divisions for simplicity. Each division has an artillery brigade and engineering
or support units, in addition to the brigades I mention.

Israel deployed 20 brigades against Hamas in Gaza. This represented most of the Israeli army and was the heaviest concentration of force (per km of front) since WW2. It is the heaviest concentration of force in modern military history, against an opponent with no heavy weapons. In the beginning of April, Israel announced that only 2 brigades would remain in Gaza. This was not quite correct, though most of the 20 brigades were recently withdrawn, as follows:

36^th Div: Its brigades are: 1^st Golani & 6^th (reserve) Infantry and 7^th & 188^th Armored brigades.
The 3 regular brigades are the most elite formations of the IDF.
This division lost 119 men killed, of which 76 were from the Golani brigade. They were withdrawn
to the North (they are part of Northern command) from the beginning of Jan.

98^th Para Div. Comprising 89^th Commando brigade, 35 Para and 55 (Reserve) Para Brigades.
This division was withdrawn from Gaza at the end of March, losing 96 men, of which 56 were
from the Commando brigade, a very heavy loss in any army.

162 Div. Part of Israel’s Southern command. Comprises the 84^th (Givati) and 933^rd (Nahal) Infantry brigades, 5^th (reserve) infantry and 401 Armored brigade.
2 of its brigades, the 84^th (Givati) and the 401 Armored (Iron Trails) are retained in the Gaza strip for continued combat. They occupy the centre of the Gaza strip, cutting the strip in 2. This division lost 109 men killed. 65 of those killed are in the 2 brigades that continue to fight, which might indicate the doubtful quality of the reserve 5^th brigade and the Nahal brigade, which lost 2 Battalion commanders among its 34 men killed. The Nahal and 5^th brigade will probably be held in reserve, as there is no mention of them being deployed outside the Gaza area

366 (Reserve) Div. Southern Command. Comprising the 10 Armor, 406 Armor (a training brigade) and the 551 Para brigade. 406 Armor has done back to its training function.

252 (Reserve) division. Comprising 12^th and 16^th Infantry brigades and 10 and 14^th Armored
brigades. All 4 brigades are reserve formations and lost 12 men killed, between them. This division
was moved to the north, against Hezbollah in the beginning of April.

143 (Gaza) division. In peacetime, it had a single brigade - 261 (reserve) responsible for perimeter security at Gaza. The brigade had 43 men killed. The 646 (reserve) para brigade and 205 (reserve) Armored brigade were probably attached to this division.

Also withdrawn from Gaza to parent formations:
421 (territorial), 179 Armor, 11 Commando, 99 and 900th Infantry brigades – to Central command.
4 Armored brigade – to Northern command.

Thus the IDF in the Gaza area still retains 3 Division HQs (162, 366 and 143) with two of them available for operation against the remaining Hamas forces in Rafah, rather than only part of the 162^nd Division in Gaza, as reported in the media.

Strengthening of Northern Command to fight Hezbollah
During the height of the Gaza war, the IDF’s Northern command (facing Syria and Lebanon) had:
 
The 210^th (Territorial) division. This is of lower quality - 2 reserve and 2 territorial brigades and has the responsibility for the Golan heights, facing Syria in the East and Lebanon in the West.

The 91st Division with 4 brigades. It is also a lower quality division with 2 reserve and 2 territorial brigades.

The 146th Armored division has 5 brigades, all reserve. The 4^th (Kiryati) armored brigade sent to Gaza has moved back to the 146^th division.

This force has been strengthened by the elite 36^th infantry and the 252 reserve divisions, which  were moved from Gaza to the North, as we have seen.
 
Thus, Northern command now has 5 divisions, which (after the experience of the 2006 war with Hezbollah) is considered the force necessary to undertake a possible offensive against Hezbollah.

The 98^th Para division is available as a reserve. More importantly, 5 brigades withdrawn from Gaza to Central command (West Bank) have now got battle experience and few casualties from the Gaza fighting and can be rotated with the inexperienced reserve and territorial brigades of Northern command.

In the 5 month of fighting in Gaza, Hezbollah did not take advantage of a reduced IDF presence in
the North. In artillery exchanges, Hezbollah, by their own admission, lost 282 men (the Israeli estimate of Hezbollah losses is around 600), while the Israeli army lost 11, the majority of which were from accidents.

More importantly, Hezbollah also lost several senior commanders. The IDF achieved a loss ratio of approx. 30 : 1  (compared to 5 : 1 in the 2006 war) despite using only an estimated 10,000 shells
in 6 months, compared to 170,000 in 5 weeks, during the 2006 war. By comparison Israel fired an estimated 100,000 shells into Gaza in the first month of the war. The Air force similarly flew only a fraction of the sorties per day against Hezbollah, compared to 2006, but got better results.
While Hezbollah rocket attacks killed 44 Israeli civilians in 1 month in 2006, only Israeli 2 civilians were killed in 6 months, despite Hezbollah having more powerful rockets compared to 2006.

The lack of any impact of Hezbollah’s rocket and missile attacks, meant that most of the 200,000 civilians who were evacuated from northern Israel at the start of the conflict, have returned. However, over 100,000 Lebanese have also moved away from the southern border with Israel. The impact on the much smaller Lebanese economy is more than on Israel’s. Hezbollah is part of the Lebanese govt and their operations against Israel have exacerbated the grim economic situation in Lebanon that existed pre-war.

Since Jan The IDF’s operations in Gaza and later against Hezbollah changed from brute force, to the kind of operations the IDF has hitherto excelled in. Intelligence based strikes using precision weapons, or small teams. They have taken a higher proportion of casualties among combat engineers (to destroy the Hamas tunnel network), commandos and soldiers in recon units, rather than infantry and armored forces.

The Houthi threat: The last fatal attack on a ship attack by Houthi drones or missiles was on 6^th March and the last attack that hit a ship was on 24^th March. Although the US led coalition is probably spending more intercepting missiles than the cost of the Houthi missiles and drones, that cost can be sustained. The reduction to the Houthi missile arsenal and damage to their infrastructure by air raids, has led to a reduction in attacks on shipping and a corresponding increase in ships transiting the Suez canal in the past month. The attacks on shipping hurt Egypt’s economy (transit fees through the Suez canal) more than Israel’s and coupled with the Houthi-Saudi hostility, reduced any chances of a rapprochement between Iran and Saudi.

The Iran missile threat. In the previous post, I had suggested that the easiest target for Iran, should they wish to intervene against Israel was against US bases in Iraq and Syria, as they were too small and vulnerable to be defended against a sustained attack and their closure (and a US withdrawal from Iraq and Syria) would be seen as a US defeat. This did not happen possible as Iran was concerned about US retaliation. Israel then started attacking Iranian agents and proxies outside Iran almost with impunity, until Iran finally retaliated with a mass missile and drone attack on Israel.

While a lot has been written about this strike and Israel’s much smaller level of retaliation, the real effect of the Iranian attack was, in my view the following:

- It has hardened Western attitudes against Iran, letting Israel off the hook for civilian deaths in Gaza. It has again distanced the Arab world from Iran (they cooperated with Israel in stopping drones) just when they were coming together in a show of Muslim unity.   

-If over 300 drones and missiles cause no visible damage with almost all being shot down, it erodes
 Iran’s ability to deter an attack in future. Israel claims 99% of drones and missiles were shot down.
For balance, I’m attaching a fairly well argued analysis which says that a higher proportion got through and Iran did not use their newer missiles.
https://simplicius76.substack.com/p/iran-breaches-anglo-zionist-defenses

That does not however detract from the point that Israel’s attack on the Iranian consulate caused real damage, Iran’s retaliation did not.
Similarly, Israel’s `light’ counter-strike which followed Iran’s was believed to have caused some damage (a S-300 anti-aircraft system was hit). While there has bene public posturing in Iran that
they demonstrated their capability to hit Iran, I believe Iran’s ineffective strikes will reduce its ability
to support its proxies like Hezbollah and the Houthis.

What next: I believe Prime Minister Netanyahu, who is unpopular and will have to face a trial should he lose power, would like to secure his position by removing threat’s to Israel’s security and securing the support of hardliners. The military component could involve:

- An operation against the remnants of Hamas in the Rafah area. I had suggested in my last post that Hamas was largely finished and its remaining fighters might choose to merge with the civilian population rather than make a heroic last stand. The low Israeli casualties over the last 3 months suggests that this is the case.

 -An offensive against Hezbollah, in response to Hezbollah’s shelling and its violation of UN resolutions. This could seek to push Hezbollah north of the Litani river, recreating the security zone in South Lebanon which Israel enforced till it withdrew from South Lebanon in 2000.

Israel had budgeted US$14 billion for military operations in 2024, which has been consumed in the first quarter of 2024. However, any overspend will be made by the  US$ 17 billion aid just passed by the US government. 

Previous posts in this series:
https://rpdeans.blogspot.com/2024/02/gaza-war-part-3-100-days-of-ground-war.html

https://rpdeans.blogspot.com/2023/12/the-gaza-war-by-numbers-2-months-later.html

https://rpdeans.blogspot.com/2023/10/what-israeli-invasion-of-gaza-might.html

A note to readers.  In forums that I post in, I have been asked who I support in this conflict and asked about my background and sources.

In my posts on this conflict (and all my blog posts) I avoid politics and try to analyse military and geopolitical strategy based on data. The only country I’d support, in a conflict is mine (India).
I post on areas that I believe have no been adequately covered and I post something original.
The political aspect has been covered by innumerable people of all persuasions and I have nothing
new to add.

My experience has been in the corporate world and I am an enthusiastic amateur in the area of military history and geopolitics, where I use data and information from different sources to make sense of what is happening – much as I might so when running a business.
I worked in Iran and have done business with Israel and across the Arab world, years ago.
My interest in the region led me to a diploma in the History of the modern Middle east, from Tel Aviv University. My experience gave me a more nuanced understanding of the region than `One side good, the other bad’.     

My source of Israeli casualties in their govt website, which I believe to be credible, it mentions name, rank age and unit of those killed and is updated daily. It matches press reports of the deaths and funerals of the same soldiers. There is also a daily update of the wounded. I assume a brigade is fighting in Gaza not because the Israeli press says so, but because that unit has been taking casualties in Gaza.

The Gaza health ministry data has been used for deaths in Gaza, it has been found credible by UN agencies and I have used that data to show that civilian casualties have reduced significantly.