The Indus water treaty (part 2) A year after suspension

 Water Wars II: India finally acts

In my earlier article on the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT), written in 2023, I argued that India did not need to abrogate the treaty to put pressure on Pakistan. It merely needed to fully utilise the rights that the treaty already gave it. The points made were:
2023 Blogpost on the IWT

-India is not utilizing even its (20%) share of river water.

-India is not utilizing the power and irrigation capacity on the Western (Pakistan’s) rivers that is entitled to. Consequently J&K, where the rivers flow through, has a power and water shortage.

- India has taken no steps to divert any water from Pakistan’s rivers – in fact, we should have actively helped Afghanistan negotiate an equitable water sharing treaty for rivers rising in Afghanistan and flowing into Pak. 

Summary of water allocation:
The IWT gives India unrestricted use of the three Eastern Rivers – the Ravi, Beas and Sutlej – while allocating most of the water of the three Western Rivers – the Indus, Jhelum and Chenab – to Pakistan. India nevertheless retained important rights on the Western Rivers, including run-of-river hydroelectric generation, limited irrigation and water storage. While 3 rivers each sounds equitable, Pakistan gets 139 MAF (Million acre feet) of water and India’s 3 rivers provide 33 MAF.
Pak also gets 27 MAF from rivers in Afghanistan flowing into Pak, without any water sharing treaty.

Of India’s exclusive 33 MAF, we use 31, with 2 MAF flowing uninterrupted into Pak. Interestingly
Pak estimates that upto 4 MAF from India’s eastern rivers on average flows into Pak.

Of the three rivers exclusively allotted to Pak under IWT, The Indus carries on average 90 MAF,
The Jhelum 23 MAF and the Chenab 26 MAF. The Chenab is closest to the Indian rivers (Beas).

(The figures are averages for the year. The total has varied over time and between Indian and Pak official statements. India’s official figure is 135 MAF for the Pak rivers)

India’s neglect of the Indus rivers and IWT began to change after 2016. It changed more dramatically after the terrorist attack at Pahalgam in April 2025, when India placed the IWT in abeyance. There are therefore two distinct phases to India's changing Indus policy.

The first change – after Uri
Following the terrorist attack on the Indian Army camp at Uri in September 2016, Prime Minister Modi famously stated that "blood and water cannot flow together". More importantly, the government created a high-level inter-ministerial Task Force on the Indus Waters, chaired by the Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister, Nripendra Misra. Its first meeting in Dec 2016, examined how India could accelerate projects and make fuller use of its entitlements under the treaty.
Among the issues discussed was fast-tracking roughly 8,500 MW of hydroelectric capacity in Jammu & Kashmir.

This represented an important change in approach. Instead of treating Pakistani objections as a reason to indefinitely postpone projects, India began looking systematically at projects which had been delayed for years. There were two separate issues: using India's almost unrestricted share of the Eastern Rivers and exploiting India's more limited rights on the Western Rivers.

Eastern Rivers: Stopping India's water from flowing unused into Pakistan, as there was considerable under-utilisation of water. The government estimated in 2019 that India was using about 95% of the approximately 33 million acre feet (MAF) allocated to it from the Eastern Rivers. However, around 2 MAF of Ravi water was still flowing annually into Pakistan. This was water over which Pakistan has no treaty entitlement. Three projects became particularly important.

Shahpur Kandi
The Shahpur Kandi project on the Ravi had been stalled because of a dispute between Punjab and Jammu & Kashmir. The project was revived and construction resumed. It is designed to use water released from the Ranjit Sagar/Thein Dam which was otherwise flowing downstream, while providing 37,000 hectares of irrigation and generating 206 MW of electricity. Excess water flow into Pak, estimated at 0.25 MAF, was believed to have been stopped in Mar 26, while power generation will start from April 27.

Ujh Multipurpose Project This is considerably more ambitious. The Ujh is a tributary of the Ravi in the Jammu region. Following the recommendations of the 2016 Task Force, the Central Water Commission fast-tracked the Detailed Project Report for the Ujh Multipurpose Project. The project was repeatedly revised because of its cost. After years of delay, it received approval in 2025 and is expected to be completed not before 2032 (2034 is more likely).

The current project envisages roughly 186-212 MW of power generation and irrigation for nearly 90,000 hectares in Jammu & Kashmir and Punjab. An estimated 0.65 MAF Water from the Ujh which currently enters the Ravi and flows into Pakistan can instead be stored and used in India.

The second Ravi-Beas link project (declared a national project in 2008, but nothing happened for years) is the only one designed specifically to divert surplus flows from the Eastern rivers, back to India. It is targeted to divert 0.58 MAF of water. As of Sept 26, the design has not yet been finalised.
A realistic completion date would be not before 2035.

Together, 2^nd Ravi-Beas (0.58 MAF) Ujh (0.65 MAF ) and Shahpur Kandi (0.2 MAF ) will prevent the flow of 2 MAF into Pak – the remaining 0.6 MAF would be achieved by better canal utilization. This is something we should have done years ago. That’s a point made in my earlier article: reducing water flows into Pakistan does not necessarily require taking water allocated to Pakistan. We should have used our own allocation better.

The bigger prize – the Western Rivers
The Western Rivers are a different matter. They contain roughly four times as much water as the Eastern Rivers. Under the IWT, Pakistan received all their water, but India retained the right to generate hydroelectric power with restrictions and undertake specified irrigation and other uses.
There are three things can do with these rivers:

1.Build dams, for power generation and flood control. IWT gives us a limited power
generation capacity and negligible storage of water.
2. Irrigation beyond the amount allocated under IWT (which is also under-utilized)
3. Diversion of water from the western to eastern rivers (e.g. from Chenab to Beas).

After 2016, several long-delayed projects on the Chenab system began moving again.
Four projects became particularly important:
Pakal Dul – 1,000 MW, Ratle – 850 MW, Kiru – 624 MW, Kwar – 540 MW. 3014 MW in total. These projects matter beyond the electricity they generate.

A chain of hydroelectric projects gives India considerably greater ability to regulate the timing of water moving down the Chenab, even when individual projects have relatively small reservoirs. Pakistan therefore repeatedly challenged Indian dam designs, particularly the permitted pondage, spillways and low-level outlets. This became one of the principal weaknesses of the IWT from India's perspective.

Pakistan's objections and India's attempt to change the Treaty
Pakistan challenged the design of the Kishenganga (pre 2016, on the Jhelum river and operational from 2018) and Ratle projects. The dispute produced an extraordinary situation in which a World Bank-appointed Neutral Expert and a Court of Arbitration were simultaneously considering related questions. India argued that this parallel process was contrary to the treaty and refused to recognise the Court of Arbitration, while continuing to participate in the Neutral Expert proceedings.
The CoA would feature again in 2026.

In January 2023 India formally notified Pakistan that it wanted the treaty modified.

A second notice followed in 2024, with India arguing that fundamental changes since 1960 – including population growth, environmental issues, the need for clean energy and security considerations – justified reviewing the treaty. In January 2025 the Neutral Expert accepted India's argument that all seven technical questions concerning Kishenganga and Ratle fell within his competence. India was therefore still operating through the treaty mechanism at the beginning of 2025. Three months later (Pahalgam) that policy changed completely.

Pahalgam and the suspension of the IWT
After the terrorist attack at Pahalgam on 22 April 2025, in which 26 people were killed, the Cabinet Committee on Security announced that the Indus Waters Treaty would be held in abeyance with immediate effect until Pakistan "credibly and irrevocably" abjured its support for cross-border terrorism. Suspension of the treaty is different from its abrogation. However: 
India could not simply turn off the Indus system. India had never constructed the storage capacity required to hold back the enormous flows of the Western Rivers. The immediate impact was therefore limited.

What we have done:
The first practical step – flushing Salal and Baglihar came within days. India began reservoir-flushing operations at Salal (690 MW) and Baglihar (900 MW) on the Chenab. Sediment had accumulated in both reservoirs. Removing it improves reservoir capacity and electricity generation.
Under the IWT, India had avoided the kind of low-level reservoir flushing that Pakistan opposed.

Beginning on 1 May 2025, India emptied substantial quantities of water from the reservoirs to flush accumulated sediment. It did so without giving Pakistan the notification that would previously have accompanied such operations. The immediate result was striking.

Flows measured downstream at Pakistan's Marala headworks fluctuated sharply. At one stage Pakistan reported Chenab flows falling from about 31,000 cusecs to approximately 3,100 cusecs before subsequently recovering. This does not mean India can permanently reduce the Chenab by 90%. It demonstrated that even existing Indian reservoirs can create huge variations in downstream flows. As more reservoirs are constructed, India's ability to regulate those flows increases. The Central Water Commission subsequently recommended regular flushing of Salal and Baglihar.

Accelerating the Chenab cascade: The second response was to accelerate projects already under construction. Immediately after the treaty was placed in abeyance, the government directed agencies to remove obstacles affecting Pakal Dul (1000 MW), Kiru (624 MW), Kwar (540 MW)
and Ratle (850 MW) – four projects totalling 3,014 MW.

Pakal Dul and Kiru were to be commissioned in December 2026 . Pakal Dul has a history of delays and the deadline appears unlikely to be met, Kiru has been delayed and the revised deadline is Dec. Kwar was targeted for March 2028 – appears to be on schedule.
Ratle was originally started in 2014, stalled and under a new contractor, got approval in 2021.
This is not expected to be operational before 2029 (deadline revised from Nov 2028).

The importance of these projects is cumulative. They form a cascade of dams and power stations across the Chenab system. The purpose is primarily electricity generation, but a cascade also gives India substantially greater operational control over the river than a single isolated run-of-river project. They will not however reduce the overall water availability to Pakistan.

Commissioning the next generation of projects.
The major ones are:
Sawalkote – 1,856 MW. Conceived in 2021. Delayed and clearance received in Jul 2025.
Construction expected to start in 2027.
Kirthai-II – 820 MW. Forest clearance received only in June 26 – after reducing planned power generation capacity from 930 to 820 MW
Dulhasti-II – 260 MW. Construction started May 26. Expected to be completed Jan 2030.
Uri-I Stage II – 240 MW. Construction started May 26. Expected commissioning in 2030.

Storage is the real game changer
Hydroelectric capacity is not water storage. A run-of-river dam (which these projects are) cannot hold enough water to stop the Chenab for an extended period. If India wants the ability to materially alter seasonal flows, it needs much larger reservoirs. This makes two long-delayed projects particularly important.

Bursar The proposed Bursar project on the Marusudar, a tributary of the Chenab, is an approximately 800 MW project designed with significant storage. Unlike the normal run-of-river projects, Bursar was conceived as a storage project. It had been discussed since 2014 and delayed for years, before finally started after Pahalgam. Deadline for completion is 2028. It can hold approx. 0.5 MAF of water. This does not mean, that amount is withheld from Pak, but in conjunction with other completed projects on the Chenab, it can hold water when Pak most needs it, or release it when it might cause downstream flooding. If all the dams on the Chenab are completed and some of that water used in India for irrigation, domestic & industrial use etc, Pakistan could be deprived of 2-3 MAF of water from the Chenab from 2030. 

Reviving Tulbul India began constructing the Tulbul navigation project on the Jhelum / Wular lake in the 1980s but stopped work in 1987 after Pakistan objected. After the IWT was placed in abeyance, the government began examining its revival.

The proposed barrage would provide approximately 0.30 MAF of storage and regulate water flowing from Wular Lake into the Jhelum. There would not be any real `diversion of water’ but it would help India ensure year around navigation on the Jhelum (whose water level varies considerably) between Sopore and Baramulla by holding water, potentially preventing flooding in the monsoon (releasing that water in the low flow season). That ensures year round water for power generation and a potential benefit for tourism.

Diversion of water from the Western rivers. This is where we have real leverage over Pakistan

Chandra (Chenab) Beas link: This involves building a 8.7 km tunnel to connect a tributary of the Chenab (Pak’s river) with the Beas, in Himachal. Approved in May 26, this project is fast tracked for
completion in July 2029. It will divert upto 1 MAF of Chenab water from Pak to India. Although media reports say it will generate 4000 MW of power, this is incorrect. This is not a power project.
The extra availability of water from this project will support existing hydel plants in the low season and possibly generate an incremental 450 MW of power.

Ranbir canal extension. (see map) After the suspension of the IWT, the Govt considered extending the 60km canal (built in the 19^th century), to 120 km with a flow increasing from 40 to 150 cu meters /sec. The incremental flow of 110 cu meters/sec is the equivalent of 2.81 MAF. However, due to a highly seasonal flow of the Chenab, the incremental 110 cu meters/sec will not be available for more than 6 months. A more likely level of diversion will be 2 MAF. The water will largely be used in Jammu (irrigation and for Jammu city). The govt of J&K has only submitted this project for approval to the Central water commission on 24th June 2026, a delay of over a year after Pahalgam, though J&K is under central rule. The earliest this project can be completed is probably early 2030.

                   Map of the Ranbir canal, it's extension and the further Chenab-Ravi canal

Chenab-Ravi link canal: This is an extension of the Ranbir canal project. It is 113 km (see map)  still in the feasibility stage. Assuming it is approved now and fast tracked, it is unlikely to be completed

before 2032 (2034 is more likely). Calculating the extra amount of water that can be diverted is complex, as Chandra-Beas and the Ranbir canal extension draw water from the same source. Looking at different estimates, the combined diversion of  Chenab water on account of the Ranbir canal extension plus Chenab-Ravi would be 3-4 MAF

The Jhelum. The projects on the Jhelum (Kishenganga and Tulbul) will not involve diversion of water from Pakistan to India. Geographically, exploiting the Jhelum through an inter-basin transfer is harder. The Jhelum flows through the Kashmir Valley and exits toward Pakistan through the Baramulla–Uri corridor. India's large irrigation demand and the Eastern River network lie south of the Pir Panjal. A major permanent diversion would therefore require something conceptually like:

Jhelum/Wular → storage → long tunnel through Pir Panjal → Chenab/Ravi system → Punjab irrigation network.

The Indus: This carries the most water, but hardest to exploit. The water of the Indus can be used for local irrigation – Ladakh is a `cold desert’ and power generation. What India is doing is:

More hydro power for Ladakh: India has cleared 7 mini hydro projects on the Indus, which will generate upto 130 MW. These have no irrigation or water storage/ diversion potential.
 
Irrigation: Ladakh has only 22,000 hectares of irrigated land. In 2026, the administration started a program of check dams and canals to increase irrigation. In May 2026, the restored Igoo-Phey canal will irrigate an additional 4400 hectares. 36 check dams are being built an additional 7530 ha.
On 3^rd Sept the govt of Ladakh regularised 24000 Ha of Nautor (waste) land, for individual cultivators, with the understanding that irrigation of that land will help cultivation. Considering all these projects, 50,000 hectares might be irrigated by 2036. This would consume only 0.2 MAF of
water that might otherwise flow to Pakistan.

0.2 MAF is negligible for Pak but can have transformative effects on Ladakh’s economy. If another 15,000–25,000 ha eventually becomes reliably irrigated, it could support combinations of fruit, vegetables, seed potatoes, pulses, fodder and greenhouse cultivation. For e.g. Ladakh produces 16000 Tns of apricots from just 2612 ha of land and can double this with more irrigation. That would have three economic effects: higher farm incomes, lower dependence on food trucked over the Himalayas, and potentially a sizeable premium-horticulture/export industry. Ladakh has a large year-round military presence and tourism economy, both of which create demand for fresh vegetables, fruit, dairy and animal products. The NITI Aayog assessment specifically notes increasing demand for vegetables around urban centres from hotels and the armed forces.

In summary, the new projects can, by 2035, give the following benefits.

 

 

 

 

Afghanistan: About 23 MAF of water flows from Afghan rivers into Pakistan. There is no water sharing agreement between Pakistan and Afghanistan. It is only recently that the Afghan govt has taken water security seriously (Afghanistan is more water scarce than Pakistan). Interestingly their only major dam project in recent years was the Salma dam constructed by India in 2016 – though that prevented water flowing into Iran, not Pakistan. The Afghan govt has plans for 59 dams, of which 7 have been built since 2021 and 24 under construction (5 are larger size dams). On completion of all projects on the Kabul and Kumar rivers, the water flowing into Pakistan will reduce by an estimated 3 - 3.7 MAF. This figure is relatively low, but represents a 17% reduction in the water for irrigation available to Pakistan’s Kyber-Pakhtunkhwa province and over 50% of the irrigation water in 3 districts of KP – Peshawar, Charsadda and Nowshera.

Effect on Pakistan. Agriculture does not merely require a certain annual quantity of water. It requires water at the right time. While the wheat crop will not be significantly affected by a reduced flow of water from India, the rice (summer) crop, which requires more water at a time when river water availability is low, will be. Too little water when the crop is being established (Apr-June Kharif crop) is damaging, followed by excess water (unplanned release from India), damaging standing crops. 

Reduced water availability has a disproportionate effect on the cotton crop, which requires more water than wheat and is grown in southern Punjab and Sindh. A reduction in water availability
would probably result in the more politically dominant (and upstream) northern and central Punjab getting no reduction in water.  A reduction of 7 MAF of water from India, maximised in the dry season and any unplanned discharge from India in the monsoon, can hurt Pakistan’s rice crop by upto 10% and cotton by 15%. It is estimated that wheat shortage can be around 5% Pakistan’s largest export is cotton textiles, followed by Basmati rice, both of which will be hit by lower harvests and consequently higher prices. These estimates are for 2035 and assume completion of all projects by then. 

What Pakistan’s data tells us
Pakistan’s Ministry for Food security and the IRSA (Indus River systems authority) prepare a water availability report each year for the kharif and Rabi crops. In 2026, IRSA projected a water availability of 24.48 MAF and late kharif 78.81 MAF. This is an indication of how much watch availability changes during the year and therefore how much more the effect of reduced flow from India will be in the dry season. The previous forecast of IRSA was only 1% off.

Moreover in the last 20 years, wheat output (Pakistan’s main food crop) had risen less than population growth. Wheat output between 2005-2025 grew 39% while the population grew 57%
Wheat yield grew 29% the rest of the crop yield was additional acreage. Pakistan’s economic survey
Pakistan’s latest economic survey shows that per capita availability of wheat, rice and pulses in 2025-6 has fallen compared to 2018-9 (this is in a regime where the army does not like adverse data
to be published). Over the next 10 years, even without a reduction in Indus water, per capita availability will reduce further without imports. In this context, a reduction of 5-10% in the harvest by a reduction in Indus water, can create a food crisis. 

We have seen earlier, that the reduced flow from Afghanistan will severely affect water availability in 3 districts of KP province. The average reduction of irrigated water in the whole province is 17%, but since there are other sources of water, the overall reduction in water for KP will be around 10%
 
Other effects of suspending the treaty.
There is another, less visible consequence of placing the treaty in abeyance. The IWT required India and Pakistan to exchange extensive hydrological information. India is no longer routinely providing Pakistan with data under the treaty mechanism.

During the severe floods of August 2025, India did provide Pakistan with warnings about high water levels, but explicitly described this as being done on humanitarian grounds, through diplomatic channels rather than through the suspended IWT mechanism. For Pakistan, this matters. Advance knowledge of upstream rainfall, reservoir releases and river flows is important for operating its irrigation network, reservoirs and flood-control system. Water information is therefore itself a consequence of the treaty's suspension, apart from the physical quantity of water crossing the border.

Status of the legal dispute.
In August 2026, the Court of Arbitration constituted in the Indus proceedings ruled that the treaty remains in force and that India cannot unilaterally suspend its obligations. It also imposed interim restrictions concerning construction at Ratle, pending the Neutral expert process. India rejected both the jurisdiction of the Court and its ruling and has maintained that these decisions will not affect projects it is undertaking.

My view: The preamble of the IWT states that it is based on friendship and goodwill between both countries, which is clearly not the case. Disputes are to be resolved in a cooperative way, which is also not the case when every project on the Indus river system is questioned (and rulings gone against Pakistan, vindicating our position that some of the disputes raised were male-fide).
 
Articles 60 & 62 of the Vienna convention on treaties (India has not ratified this, but these clauses are cited in International law), give grounds to suspend treaties.
Article 60 can be invoked because cross border terrorism constitutes a breach of the treaty, predicated on friendship and goodwill – this terrorism incudes targeted killing of workers on
Indus projects.
Article 62, is about a `fundamental change of circumstances’ affecting the treaty. The fundamental circumstances (terrorism) underlying India's consent to an unusually permanent and cooperative bilateral arrangement have changed radically, while the treaty's own mechanisms have become incapable of addressing India's concerns.”
That is because India had already attempted to use Article XII(3) to seek modification, rather than abruptly abandoning the treaty; Pakistan did not agree to India's proposed renegotiation.

Legal experts can debate the nuances, but the west has suspended treaties on far weaker grounds.

How India can play this: No country, not even those traditionally close to Pak, has criticized our
suspension of the treaty. It is possibly the most unequal water sharing treaty in the world which is why I think Pak may be nudged to negotiate a more equitable treaty, rather than threaten war.
In this context, India’s position could be to split its Indus projects into the following categories:

1.      Eastern rivers. No dispute. India is working on what it is entitled to.

2.      Indus/Ladakh: There is only a 0.2 MAF reduction of water to Pak, but it will have a transformative effect on Ladakh’s economy. It would be cussed of Pakistan to demand this stop.

3.      Chenab & Jhelum: Power projects do not affect availability of water in Pak. Local irrigation
(in Kashmir) has been hitherto underutilized under the treaty and pak can hardly complain
that the people of Kashmir are getting irrigated land and water. 

If these are conceded and there is meaningful progress on terror, India could agree to negotiate a new Indus water treaty.