Could India have used offensive air power in 1962 ?

One of the enduring views about the 1962 war is that India could have used the Air force to attack the Chinese and not doing so was a lost opportunity. However, this view has been made without any analysis and is typical of a lot of revisionist history and a what-if’ done without analysis.

Even air force analysts have had mixed opinions about the use of air power in 1962. Both sides in my view have insufficient analysis. One point if view is that the military was keep to use air power but Nehru declined as he was concerned about Chinese retaliation by bombing Indian cities.

 This is an attempt to analyse the situation, as known at the time and look at the impact of using the air force in the 1962 war.

 Before the war: In 1959, as Indo-China relations worsened and the border dispute became serious, the army was notified that the Chinese were building airfields in Tibet. That was something that would influence our thinking during the war.

In 1960. GOC Eastern Command Lt Gen. Thorat, identified the Chinese threat, recommended additional forces in NEFA (Arunachal) without however addressing how they were going to be supplied by air. His study suggested that the IAF would not have the same constraints that the Chinese would have,  operating from high altitude airfields in Tibet. However, this proposal did not result in a proper army-air force study of a future conflict.

To avoid escalating the border situation, a decision was taken by the govt, not to allow IAF recce flights within 25 km (15 miles) of the border. Later. Specific recce fights were only permitted to identify drop zones for supplies to our forces, but not to observe Chinese forces, or their possible logistics areas. As the war showed, the banned 25km zone was possibly the only place where close air support would be needed.

On 2 May 1962, the DMO, Maj Gen Palit recommended the use of offensive air power to overcome our shortfall in numbers in both Ladakh and the North East. That proposal did not result in any action, or 
even a strategy for use of the air force. 

Some of the IAF squadrons listed later in this article were inducted into the area only from 1961. They were to be coordinated by 20 Wing (Bagdogra) , set up only months before the conflict. Thus, IAF squadrons had no practise in the likely battle area, on finding a location based on map coordinates, bombing or rocket attacks in mountain valleys, angles of attack & exit etc. Air-ground coordination for close air support was non-existent. In the Ladakh area, no fighter had landed even in Srinagar, let alone Leh or Chushul.  

 Use of the IAF during the war; 
The fighting took place in 3 sectors.
- Ladakh
- Tawang (West Arunachal)
- Walong (East Arunachal)

The first serious clash took place on 10^th Oct 1962, though the war officially started on 20 Oct and ended on 21 Nov. From Aug, the IAF was used to transport troops and supplies to all three sectors.
The IAF’s transport and helicopter fleet was extensively used, along with recon flights.

The IAF lists 3263 sorties flown by transport aircraft in Nov (the fighting ended on 21^st Nov), an increase from 2557 sorties in Oct. There is a separate figure giving  peak of 50-60 sorties a day for transport aircraft. In Sept 1962, the IAF flew 1179 sorties, a large part as part of operation Leghorn to supply 7 and 11 Brigades. Thus, the IAF was used even before the war started

Helicopters:
The IAF used 3 HUs (helicopter unit) in the war:
105 HU  with an assortment of 7 helicopters .
110 HU with 6 serviceable Mi-4 helicopters. 105 & 110 HU were in the North East
107 HU estimated 6-8 Mi-4 helicopters. Based in Ladakh.  

Thus, no more than 20 helicopters were used.
5 helicopters were believed to be lost during the war, but 110 HU which lost 1 helicopter on 13 Nov, had received additional machines earlier.  

The no 110 helicopter unit in the Tawang area flew 650 hours between 9 Sept, after the unit was formed and Operation leghorn was initiated to supply 7 Brigade and 21 Nov. This is under 9 hours of flying per Day for 6 helicopters, or 1.5 hours a day per helicopter. At its peak, on 22 Oct, the unit flew 60 sorties, for about 25 hours, or 4+ hours per machine.    

 Transports: The IAF had 12 transport squadrons, of which 10 were deployed for the war.

Sector	Squadron and aircraft type	No of aircraft
Ladakh (Chandigarh)	No 42. Ilushin-14	14
Ladakh (Srinagar)	No 43 Dakota *	8
Ladakh (Chandigarh)	No 44 An-12	7
Ladakh (Pathankot)	No 19 C-119 Packet	14
Ladakh (Srinagar)	No 12 assorted	4 (est)
Gauhati	No 11 Dakota	6
Jorhat	No 49 Dakota	7
Gauhati	No 48 C-119 Packet *	14
Jorhat & Tezpur	No 59 Otter	12
Jorhat	No 41 Otter	12
Total	10	98

 ·     No 43 squadron sent 3 aircraft to no 49 sqn. No 48 sqn sent aircraft
       to the Ladakh sector.

 *    Aircraft of the civil airline Kalinga air were also used, indicating that the IAF had no further
       aircraft to spare.

The transport aircraft used in the Ladakh region were mostly used for landing supplies in Leh and Chushul airstrips. Chushul had 152 landings from 21 Oct to 13 Nov, or 7 per day. Assuming the 47 aircraft serving the Ladakh sector were equally divided into landings at Leh and Chushul (with a small number at Thoise) and assuming an aircraft availability of 50%, with one sortie per day per aircraft, then 11 aircraft available for operations at Chushul on any given day, achieved under 7 landings each day. Therefore, on half the days, bad weather probably prevented air operations. The assumption of 50% availability matches the figure in Air Marshal Tiwari’s analysis of operations where he says peak sorties achieved by the transport fleet were 50-60 per day, from 98 transport aircraft.

 Recon: 106 Squadron (Canberras) flew 22 recon missions from 13 Oct to 11 Nov.

 The real problem: Inadequate airlift capability.
The 3 brigades facing the Chinese needed to receive approx. 70% of their supplies by air.
Forward posts in Ladakh had to be supplied only by helicopter. The whole sector was dependent on air supply once winter closed the roads. In the Walong sector, all supplies depended on one airstrip (the sector had to be abandoned when the airstrip was shelled). In Tawang forward positions had to be supplied by air – the dependence being greater in winter.

The units stationed in Ladakh, Tawang (7 Brigade) and Walong (11 Brigade) required 600 tonnes
per day of supply by air. The IAF’s supply capacity, considering aircraft availability, was never more than 400 Tonnes. While aircraft landed on airstrips in Walong and in Ladakh (Chushul and Leh), supplies had to be airdropped in Tawang. It is estimated that under 40% of what was dropped, was actually collected. The reasons for the shortfall were: missing the drop zone, supplies landing in ravines, or inaccessible places and the long time to recover supplies due to a shortage of porters. The official history of the war also states that in the North East the IAF’s supply capacity was never more than 2/3^rd of what was required. This excludes what was lost after it was dropped.  

A point made in the official history of the war, was that there was no serious effort to step up supplies in the months before August 1962, because the possibility of war was not taken seriously. Once war started, the number of sorties achieved was only possible by postponing overhaul and maintenance. A large part of the fleet remained non-operational for months after the war. 

 Problems the IAF faced during the airlift was the ceiling (15,000 ft) of some of its aircraft, requiring a longer route, bypassing mountains and a shortage of pilots and co-pilots. HAL technicians were used to compliment IAF maintenance crews. By the end of November there was a shortage of parachutes, used
for dropping supplies. 

If the army deployed more men to face the Chinese in Oct 1962, or the war had continued longer they would have run out of supplies faster.
The army had 4 battalions in Ladakh. They had a requirement of 5 more, when the war started, but there was no way these men could be transported to Ladakh and the existing force supplied.

On 14 Nov, PM Nehru told Parliament that winter clothing was not reaching troops due to constraints with air supplies. 

 The use of fighters for close air support
Of the 3 sectors where fighting took place, only the Tawang sector was within easy reach of IAF fighters. At Chushul, IAF fighters taking off from Punjab would have limited time over the target area and Walong was too far for effective fighter support.
The IAF had the following fighter aircraft in the East: 

Squadron & location	Aircraft type	No of aircraft
No 4. Tezpur	Toofani (Ouragan)	16
No 29. Tezpur	Toofani	18 (with 8 pilots)
No 24. Chabua	Vampire	16 Newly raised
No 14 Kalaikunda, WB	Hunters	16
No 17 Chabua	Hunters	16

 In addition, no 7 squadron (Hunters) at Adampur was kept on alert for operations over Ladakh.

 The problems with close air support.
The IAF had not considered the possibility that the Chinese would attack in the Tawang region. There was also a diktat against any recon flights within 24 km of the border. It meant the IAF would have difficulty even locating the general area they were supposed to operate over, particularly in bad weather.
None of the squadrons had experience in practising ground attack missions over the battle area. 

Aircraft could not operate in bad weather, or poor visibility. If they did operate, locating the target would be a challenge, given the lack of preparation, due to constraints imposed earlier. This was particularly a problem for the newly raised no 24 squadron.   

Army-Air force coordination was non-existent. If the army did locate a Chinese troop concentration it would be hours before the air force responded, by which time the enemy would have moved.

The Chinese did not have heavy vehicles, or known supply depots, or transport hubs, that were relatively easier to attack. It was difficult to identify light infantry moving in heavily forested areas, in rough terrain.

The US view, based on its experience in the Korean war, was that close air support air strikes would have limited impact in the rugged terrain. 

Chinese retaliation. The Indian leadership was aware that the Chinese air force was far bigger and that it had airfields in Tibet. They did not consider the fact that Chinese aircraft operating from Tibet would have significant weight penalties, or that there were no Chinese aircraft in Tibet when war broke out. However, the Chinese had options if India used offensive air power.

There were three Chinese anti-aircraft regiments deployed against Indian forces. The presence of  Chinese anti-aircraft units was an acknowledgement that the IAF might intervene in the fighting. 

If there were serious attacks against Chinese logistics hubs, bridges, artillery etc, there would be retaliatory anti-aircraft fire, in which the slower Vampires of no 24 squadron might be vulnerable and the attack less effective. 

Most clashes during the war were over in a few hours. That was shorter than the time it would take for the army to identify a target – which was very difficult for them to do, unless they were in contact with the enemy and then for the IAF to arrive and attack it – there was every chance that weather would prevent the attack, or the aircraft would not be able to spot anything. If infantry on both sides were firing on each other, friendly fire might kill our own side.

 On 27 Sept, the IAF lost a Hunter from 27 Squadron, possibly because the pilot was lost and ejected. 
 It highlights the possibility of navigational errors in the mountains in poor visibility. 
 On 14 Oct, a Toofani from 29 squadron was lost on a routine flight and the pilot killed.  

Although the Chines did not have any aircraft in Tibet during the war, they could have based MiG-19s on Tibetan airfields, particularly if the Chinese did not intend that those aircraft be used for an extended period with maintenance support, stocks of ammunition fuel etc. If the Mig-19s, which outmatched all Indian fighters, except possibly the Hunter and flown by veterans of the Korean war with real combat experience (which IAF pilots did not have) the IAF would be forced to provide escorts for its transports undertaking the airlift that troops on the ground were critically dependent on. They would also need to maintain a combat air patrol (CAP) over our own airfields – Tezpur, Chabua, Jorhat had no radar or
anti -aircraft defences and shelters for aircraft. Walong, Leh and Chushul were airstrips where supplies
were dropped, also with no ability to defend themselves. Even though operating from high altitude airfields in Tibet would impose a weight penalty, a Mig-19 could operate for a limited period, armed with cannon. In the Ladakh sector, Chinese aircraft taking off from Hotan would have no weight penalty and would be as far from the front as Indian fighters taking off from Ambala or Adampur. A plausible scenario might be a couple of Hunters flying over estimated Chinese positions in Chushul, finding nothing, but then opening Leh or Chushul    

If Il-28 or Tu-4 bomber of the Chinese air force were used from their bases at lower altitude, they could bomb Indian cities (Gauhati or Calcutta) or airbases. The strength or accuracy of the raid would be irrelevant, as the psychological impact would be huge. The political leadership had always feared retaliation by the Chinese air force, including against Indian cities. The Americans had warned that using our air force would have a bigger downside than any expected gain from ground attacks (The Indian General staff had the same view earlier, when Commander IV corps twice asked for air support). An extra hunter squadron would have to be sent to the east, in addition to the two already there, to provide even basic air cover for the major cities and air bases and to escort transport aircraft.

 If close air support was approved (it was requested twice), the IAF might have been able to generate at best 15-20 sorties per day in the East and 6-8 in the Ladakh sector. This assumes 50% aircraft availability and no operations for a third of the time, due to bad weather. We know that no 29 squadron had only 8 pilots for its 18 aircraft. No 4 squadron was being used for recce missions and against Naga rebels. No 24 squadron was newly raised and flew recce missions to identify Chinese movements and drop zones for the transport squadrons.

 What actually happened: 
On 9^th Set 1962, after Lt Gen Kaul arrived at IV corps to consider an operation to occupy Thag-La ridge, he requested close air support for that operation. The IAF would have enough time to do the recce required as the operation was not scheduled to start until a month later.  

11 Sept. Army HQ rejected that request.
7^th Oct, just before the planned operation, Gen Kaul again made that request and it was turned down again. On 18-20 Oct it was decided to restrict the IAF to non-offensive missions only and to place IAF fighter squadrons on alert, if needed. 

 The reason for denying air support, as mentioned in the official history, were fear of Chinese retaliation, (the words of the signal read `The Chinese are bound to retaliate), the likely ineffectiveness of close air support, the feat that Chinese fighters would target transport aircraft, on which our ground forces depended. In Sept, the corps accepted that the likely risks outweighed the benefits. However the corps commander asked for air support again, just before the main battle on the Namka Chu river, which wiped out 7 Brigade in a few hours  

31 Oct. XV Corps in Ladakh also requested offensive air action. 

Lt Gen Kaul is often derided as the General responsible for the debacle in the East. He had no combat experience, or command of a combat unit, but was given command on the eve of battle. He asked for the execution of an impractical plan (capture Thagla ridge) while being inflexible when the situation on the ground was different from his assumption. He also lost his nerve when seeing the first skirmish on 10 Oct.

 In reality, Gen Kaul, as DGMO was familiar with the situation (as given to him in the wrong assessments of the IB). He was given command of a newly created IV corps, with no HQ in place, because Lt Gen Umrao Singh CO of XXXIII corps, had to deal with multiple insurgencies in the north East and could not also handle China.

With his logistic background (ASC), he delayed the attack until he had a minimum supply in place, which was done by deferring winter supplies, incl. clothing, because he was told that the area they were going to take would not have to be occupied in winter and that and possible skirmish would not require a significant use of ammunition. He did go on record asking for air support twice, but was denied.     

The reality is therefore more nuanced that some of the revisionist views on 1962, namely that Kaul was in charge as he was favoured by Nehru, he bungled the battle (it was also terrible intelligence assessments) and that air support would have changed the outcome, but Nehru didn’t want it.  

Ironically, before the war the army felt offensive air power could be useful against China, but did nothing about it. As the crisis developed and war started, there was less confidence in using offensive air power, though there is nothing to suggest it was a join army-air force view. The air force made their own arrangements for a possible conflict. No 17 squadron (Hunters) was moved East. 20 Wing started to be formed (operational just before the war) but did not discuss a possible strategy with the army.  

My sense is that using offensive air power would have made little difference to the outcome.

Link to all my articles on Indian military history: 
All my articles on Indian military history

 Further reading:

1.A critique on the lack of preparation for 1962, by the IAF.
Close air support in the 62 war 

2.Official history of the 1952 war. Link to air operations:
Official history, IAF in the 62 war 

3.The IAF in wars. Air Marshal Tiwari
4.1962. The war that wasn't - Shiv Kunal Verma
5.The Henderson Brooks report (available online) 
6.R Sukumaran. The 1962 India China war and Kargil 1999. Restrictions on the use of air power.
7.Indian air force in the Sino-Indian war of 1962 - Air Marshal Bharat Kumar

Link to all my articles on Indian military history: 
All my articles on Indian military history